PART 7 ends:

31 May 1982

PART 8 begins:

1 June 1982
## Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

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The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES**

Signed [Signature]  Date 15 May 2012

**PREM Records Team**
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| UNDER FOI EXEMPTION |

| RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) |
| OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 |

| TEMPORARILY RETAINED |
| 15 May 2012 (C/Wayland) |

| MISSING ON TRANSFER |

| MISSING |

| NUMBER NOT USED |
**LETTERCODE/SERIES**

PREM 19

**PIECE/ITEM**

649

(one piece/item number)

**Extract/Item details:**

MODUK INTSUM No. 114,
31 May 1982, (folio 35)

**CLOSED FOR ..................YEARS**

UNDER FOI EXEMPTION

**RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4)**

OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

15 May 2012

DA Wayland

**TEMPORARILY RETAINED**

**MISSING ON TRANSFER**

**MISSING**

**NUMBER NOT USED**
SECRET

FM FCO 301950Z MAY 82
TO FLASH PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 311 OF 30 MAY

PERSONAL FOR AMBASADOR

M.I.P.T. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE.

BEGINS:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

1. YOU WILL REALISE HOW VERY SERIOUSLY CONCERNED I WAS BY YOUR TELEPHONE CALL ABOUT THE POSSIBLE DELIVERY OF EXOCET MISSILES TO PERU. THIS AFTERNOON I DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH MY CABINET COLLEAGUES MOST CLOSELY INVOLVED IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE AND WITH THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF.

2. I HAVE TO TELL YOU THAT THEY WERE ALL DISMAVED BY THE PROSPECT OF FRANCE SUPPLYING THESE MISSILES TO PERU WHEN, AS YOU YOURSELF AGREED, THERE CAN NO DOUBT THAT PERU WILL PASS THEM ON TO ARGENTINA. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN SINCE WE SPOKE THE RESOLUTION PASSED IN THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES WHICH SPECIFICALLY REQUESTS THE STATES' PARTIES TO GIVE THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC THE SUPPORT THAT EACH JUDGES APPROPRIATE TO ASSIST IT IN THIS SERIOUS SITUATION. PERU WOULD TAKE THIS AS FULL JUSTIFICATION FOR PASSING ON THE EXOCETS WHICH YOU PROPOSE TO SUPPLY. THEY HAVE ALREADY BEEN USED WITH DEADLY EFFECT AGAINST OUR SHIPS.

3. I UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM WHICH FACES YOU IN RELATION TO THE CONTRACT WITH PERU BUT I MUST ASK YOU WITH ALL THE EMPHASIS AND URGENCY AT MY COMMAND TO FIND A MEANS OF DELAYING THE DEPARTURE OF THESE MISSILES FROM FRANCE FOR AT LEAST A FURTHER MONTH. NATURALLY WE WOULD PREFER THEM NOT TO BE SUPPLIED AT ALL BUT THE NEXT FEW WEEKS ARE GOING TO BE PARTICULARLY CRUCIAL: WE CANNOT BE SURE HOW QUICKLY THE OPERATIONS TOWARDS PORT STANLEY WILL GO, OR WHETHER ARGENTINA WILL AGREE TO A FULL CEASE-FIRE EVEN IF THEY ARE FORCED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE FALKLANDS.

4. I WAS GREATLY REASSURED WHEN YOU TOLD ME AT NO. 10 THAT YOU HAD DECIDED THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXOCET CONTRACT WOULD BE DELAYED FOR AS LONG AS NECESSARY AND,

SECRET
SECRET

AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN MUCH HEARTENED BY FRANCE'S STALWART SUPPORT BOTH IN PUBLIC AND IN PRIVATE. IF IT BECAME KNOWN, AS IT CERTAINLY WOULD, THAT FRANCE WAS NOW RELEASING WEAPONS TO PERU THAT WOULD CERTAINLY BE PASSED ON TO ARGENTINA FOR USE AGAINST US, FRANCE'S ALLY, THIS WOULD HAVE A DEVASTATING EFFECT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. INDEED, IT WOULD HAVE A DISASTROUS EFFECT ON THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. THIS IS THE LAST THING THAT EITHER OF US WOULD WISH. I GREATLY HOPE THEREFORE THAT FOR THE TIME BEING YOU WILL BE ABLE TO FIND SOME WAY OF KEEPING THESE MISSILES IN FRANCE.

WITH BEST WISHES,
MARGARET THATCHER.

MESSAGE ENDS.

PYM

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE LIMITED
HD/EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/S AND D
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/E&L
HD/RFU
DEP HD/PUSD
HD/RES D
PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MRONSELOW
PS/LORD BEISTEAD
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I. SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WEIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
MR BARRETT

COPIES TO
PS/HOME SECRETARY
PS/S OF S DEFENCE
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG
PS/SIR M PALLISTER
PS/SIR A DUFF
MR WADE-GERY
MR FULLER
MR O'NEILL
HD/ASSESSMENTS STAFF
MR COLVIN
DIO
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DG1 MOD
SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE
DIRECTOR G CH Q

SECRET
SECRET

GR 390
SECRET
FM FCO 301842Z MAY 82
TO FLASH PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 310 OF 30 MAY

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR.

1. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND TELEPHONED TO THE PRIME MINISTER
ON 29 MAY TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM OF FRANCE'S CONTRACT TO
SUPPLY PERU WITH EXOCET MISSILES. HE HAD DELAYED MATTERS
SO FAR AS HE HAD PROMISED AND A PERUVIAN SHIP HAD RECENTLY
ARRIVED IN A FRENCH PORT TO TAKE DELIVERY OF THE MISSILES BUT
HAD BEEN SENT AWAY EMPTY. PERU WAS NOW PROTESTING TO FRANCE
ABOUT THE NON-EXECUTION OF A SIGNED CONTRACT. ANOTHER
PERUVIAN SHIP WOULD ARRIVE NEXT TUESDAY.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS A CONDITION
IN THE CONTRACT THAT THE MISSILES SHOULD NOT BE PASSED TO THIRD
COUNTRIES. MITTERRAND CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS THE CASE AND
FRANCE WOULD NATURALLY DRAW ATTENTION TO IT. THE PRIME
MINISTER SAID THAT WE HAD GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT PERU WAS
OFFERING EXTENSIVE HELP TO ARGENTINA AND IT WOULD BE A VERY
SERIOUS MATTER INDEED IF THE EXOCETS WERE DELIVERED TO ARGENTINA
VIA PERU. MITTERRAND SAID THAT HE TOO HAD LITTLE FAITH IN
PERU OBSERVING THE PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER.

3. THE PRIME MINISTER EXPRESSED HER GREAT CONCERN OVER THIS
QUESTION. AS IT WAS AN OPEN LINE, SHE SAID THAT SHE WOULD PREFER
TO SEND THE PRESIDENT A MESSAGE BY OTHER MEANS. MITTERRAND, FOR
HIS PART, EXPLAINED THE FRENCH PROBLEM ABOUT FAILING TO IMPLEMENT
A CONTRACT AND HE SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE
THE MISSILES COULD BE USED AGAINST US, ASSUMING THE PERUVIANS
PASSED THEM ON. HE ASKED IF THE PRIME MINISTER COULD GIVE HIM
SOME IDEA OF HOW SOON WE COULD TAKE PORT STANLEY. THE IMPLICATION
WAS THAT HE EXPECTED THIS TO BE THE END OF HOSTILITIES AND
THAT HE WANTED IF POSSIBLE TO HOLD DELIVERY UP UNTIL THEN.

4. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS DISCUSSED THIS WITH A NUMBER OF HER
CABINET COLLEAGUES AND WITH THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF.
ALL ARE AGREED THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE MISSILES ARE HELD
IN FRANCE AT LEAST FOR A FURTHER PERIOD. PLEASE DELIVER URGENTLY
THE MESSAGE IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM TO BERE戈OVOY
WITH THE REQUEST THAT HE GETS IN TOUCH IMMEDIATELY WITH THE
PRESIDENT. THE PRIME MINISTER ASSUMES THAT HER MESSAGE WILL BE
SUFFICIENT TO CONVINCE THE PRESIDENT THAT THE MISSILES SHOULD NOT

SECRET
SECRET

BE ALLOWED OUT OF FRANCE. IF, HOWEVER, HE OR BERE GOVOY THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER, THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD SEND SIR MICHAEL PALLISER AS HER PERSONAL EMISSARY. SIR MICHAEL COULD ARRIVE IN PARIS TOMORROW, 31 MAY.

PYM

[COPYIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

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LIMITED
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HD/S AM D
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/2RD
HD/CGD (E)
HD/FUSD
DEP ED/FUSD
HD/RES D
PS
PS/RI HURD
PS/RI ONSlOW
PS/EGED BELSTEAD
PS/FUSD
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIRFARD
MR WEIGHT
MR GILMORd
MR URE
MR BARRETT

SECREf

COPYIES TO
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HD/ASSESSMENTS STAFF
MR COLVIN
DIO

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE
DIRECTOR G CH Q
Mr Jackson

cc: PS
    PS/PUS
    PS/No.10
    Sir M Palliser,
    Cabinet Office

FRENCH ARMS SALES (ref - Mr. Lamb's Tel Call)

1. Mr Arbuthnott, Head of Chancery, Paris, telephoned this evening to say that he had contacted the Secretary-General of the Elysée to inform him of the contents of our telegrams Nos.310 and 311. The Secretary-General is out of Paris.

2. The Embassy had delivered a translation of the text of the letter in telegram No.311 to the Elysée Palace but Mr Arbuthnott did not anticipate their taking any action on the letter until tomorrow morning. He would pursue it with them at that time. I have informed the Duty Officer, No.10 and Sir Michael Palliser.

3. DS11 Duty Officer in the MOD has also been informed. Their interest is that they are making contingency arrangements for an aeroplane to take Sir M Palliser to Paris and an expert on the subject of the arms sales in question is standing by.

30 May 1982

M W Growcott
Emergency Unit
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When we last considered the case of Lt Cdr Astiz at OD(SA) it was agreed that he should return to the UK. He is at present onboard the MV BRITISH AVON which is expected to arrive in the UK on about 6th June. Arrangements have been made for Astiz to be accommodated in the Keep at Chichester which forms part of the RMP Training Centre. This will provide a secure, self-contained area with all the necessary facilities for a POW. It will however be expensive in terms of the manpower required.

2. As you know the ICRC saw Astiz at Ascension Island and although they were satisfied with the conditions under which he was being kept they refused to take any part in questioning him. As expected Astiz refused to see any representatives of the French or Swedish Governments and refused to answer any questions about his activities in Argentina. I understand that the French and the Swedes have now been informed of the outcome of the approach to Astiz. Since Astiz cannot be either extradited from the UK or handed over to another Government and since no pressure may be put upon him there is no more we can do to help the French and the Swedes.

3. Although the ICRC have kept a relatively low profile so far and tried not to comment on the retention of Astiz our latest contacts with them suggest that they are coming under increasing pressure to make their position clear. If they do make a statement it is unlikely to support the UK's position. I feel that we must
do all that we can to avoid an unhelpful or possibly even hostile comment from the ICRC which would clearly put us in a difficult position internationally - and indirectly create unnecessary dangers for our POWs in Argentinian hands.

4. I believe strongly that all the factors now point towards repatriating Astiz immediately he returns to the UK. We have done all that we legally can to help the French and Swedish Governments but, given the refusal of Astiz to co-operate, there is nothing more that we can do. Now that we have resolved this question the detention of Astiz when all other Argentinian prisoners have been, or are in the process of being, repatriated is even more difficult to justify. We also need to try and avoid a hostile reaction from the ICRC. The arrival of Astiz in the UK is an opportunity to make a clear-cut decision and although facilities for holding him are available they will be very expensive in terms of manpower and facilities. I therefore favour repatriating Astiz on the first available flight.

5. I am copying this minute to OD(SA) colleagues and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

[Signature]

Ministry of Defence

28th May 1982
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Dear John,

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - ARGENTINE MERCHANT SHIPS

Sentence deleted and retained under Section 3(4).

Wayland, 15 May 2012

At CINCFLIGHT's request my Secretary of State has therefore authorised her addition to the list of vessels which cannot be designated as combat or auxiliary ships but which pose a threat to the survivability of the Task Force. This means that under the ROE currently in force, the CHUBUT, like the fishing vessels CONSTANZA and MARIA ALEJANDRA, can be prevented from continuing its task by the use of minimum force when it has been positively identified either inside or outside the Total Exclusion Zone. These vessels are only to be attacked as a last resort, if they fail to heed all warnings.

CINCFLIGHT has also asked for the fishing vessel SANTA EUGENIA to be added to the list of Argentine ships classed as naval auxiliaries for ROE purposes. Current ROE permit our forces to attack auxiliaries both within the TEZ and outside it should the vessels show hostile intent. SANTA EUGENIA is currently believed to be preparing to run the Falkland Islands' blockade with supplies but your legal advisors have ruled that unless it were supplying naval units the vessel would not meet the definition of a naval auxiliary. In the light of this advice the Secretary of State has decided that the ROE which now apply to SANTA EUGENIA should not be amended since she could in any case be stopped inside the TEZ where the ROE permit attacks on "any merchant vessel or fishing vessel which appears to be engaged in re-supply activity."

I am copying this letter to John Coles (No 10) and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours,

(J E RIDLEY) (MISS)

J Holmes Esq
Supply by France of Exocet Missiles to Peru

President Mitterrand telephoned the Prime Minister this morning. He said that he had been following the Falklands situation closely and had recently spoken with Chancellor Schmidt. Consequently, confidential contacts were being established with the UK authorities and certain discussions might already have taken place. He very much hoped that the confidentiality of his discussions with us would be maintained. A number of British Ministers had written to their French opposite numbers expressing gratitude for French solidarity. It was better that nothing should be said in public about these matters. The Prime Minister said that we would of course respect French wishes; if our expressions of gratitude were causing difficulty, we would be very careful in the future as to what we said.

President Mitterrand said that he particularly wanted to discuss the problem of France's contract to supply Peru with Exocet missiles. As we knew, a Peruvian ship had recently arrived in a French port to take delivery of a certain number of these missiles. The French authorities had refused to supply the missiles and the ship had sailed away empty. Peru was now protesting to France about the non-execution of a signed contract. In these circumstances, France had to be very careful. Another Peruvian ship would arrive next Tuesday.

The Prime Minister enquired whether there was a condition in the contract that the missiles should not be passed on to third countries. President Mitterrand said that such a clause did exist and when the moment came to deliver France would naturally draw attention to it. The Prime Minister commented that we had reason to believe that Peru was already offering extensive help to Argentina. We therefore had little faith in what clause in the contract. It would be very worrying if the missiles were delivered to Peru. President Mitterrand said that he too had little faith in Peru observing the prohibition on transfer of the missiles to third countries. But he was in a difficult position. Peru had made it known to other Latin American countries that France was declining to execute the contract.

/Consequently,
Consequently, France's contracts with other Latin American countries were in danger. He would do all he could to avoid making things more difficult for the United Kingdom but in order to do so he needed to know urgently our view of the future course of events. If the missiles were handed over it would take the ship some days to reach Peru. Then it would take a further period for Peru to transfer the missiles to Argentina. What he needed therefore was a precise estimate of the date on which the arrival of these missiles in Argentina would no longer be dangerous for our situation. The Prime Minister said that every day's delay would help. But it was not possible to be more precise on an open telephone line. "She would prefer to send the President a message in another way."

President Mitterrand said that he of course accepted this but he wanted the Prime Minister to have a clear understanding of France's problem. Thus he repeated that he had declined for ten days to implement the contract; a Peruvian ship would arrive on Tuesday in a French port; it would be several days after that before the missiles could be used against us; he would therefore welcome a secret message indicating the date on which delivery would cause us no difficulty. The Prime Minister again undertook to send such a message. She expressed gratitude for the action France had already taken and for the President's telephone call.

After this conversation, the Prime Minister told me that she would want to discuss the problem after the meeting of OD/SA which is to take place at Chequers tomorrow. She envisaged discussion in a restricted group, comprising the Secretary of State for Defence, the Chief of the Defence Staff, yourself, the Foreign Secretary and Sir Antony Acland. As the Prime Minister has asked for this matter to be handled with extreme care, I am copying this letter only to Sir Antony Acland. I should be grateful if you and he would take steps to inform the other persons named above.

Yours ever,

John Whil.

Sir Frank Cooper GCB CMG
Ministry of Defence.
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Under FOI Exemption

Retained under Section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958

15 May 2012

Ollie Hayland

Temporarily Retained

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**Extract/Item details:**

MODUK INTSUM No. 109, 28 May 1982 (Folio 28)

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UNDER FOI EXEMPTION

**RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4)**

OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

15 May 2012

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MODUK INTSUM No. 108, 28 May 1982 (folio 27)

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PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Falklands: OD(SA) on 28th May

I. Current Issues

1. The meeting should begin with the usual reports, from the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, on overnight military and diplomatic developments.

2. At Cabinet this morning the Defence Secretary said he would also like to discuss Lieutenant Commander Astiz, who he thought was arriving in the United Kingdom in the next day or two. In fact, Astiz is not due here until 5th June, and Mr Nott’s office have now agreed that the problem need not be considered by OD(SA) until 1st June. This is welcome, since we shall need as much time as possible tomorrow if there is to be a proper discussion of the longer term.

3. The Ministry of Defence have, however, circulated a last-minute paper seeking discretion for the Argentine Navy to be attacked inside the 12-mile limit. There is in fact only one place, in the extreme south, where they want to do this. There are, therefore, three questions for the Sub-Committee.
   - Do we do this?
   - Do we give warning first?
   - How urgent is it?

You will need the Defence Secretary’s recommendations on each point. It may be possible, and wise, to defer the issue until next week. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, on past form, will much dislike being bounced; and he will argue persuasively against such action while the current OAS meeting is in session. But if an immediate decision does have to be taken the Attorney General’s views will be important and should be clearly established.
II. Longer-term Issues

4. The main papers were listed in my brief dated 25th May:
   - Sir Michael Palliser’s paper (OD(SA)(82) 38)
   - the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary’s paper on Independence (OD(SA)(82) 56)
   - the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary’s paper on Economic Development (OD(SA)(82) 57).

In addition, there is now Mr. Fynn’s minute to you of 25th May on Future Policy (PM/82/38), which has been seen by other members of the Sub-Committee; and Sir Robert Armstrong’s personal minute to you of 25th May (A0518), which has not.

5. Quantitative work by officials has now been set in hand. It will seek to estimate on varying assumptions, the order of magnitude of public expenditure costs likely to be involved in

   (a) the current military operations;
   (b) making good our military losses;
   (c) permanent British garrisoning;
   (d) making good war damage to the Islands;
   (e) economic development (is direct investment by the Government and provision of the infrastructure necessary to attract private investment).

Of these (a) is clearly going to mean increased public expenditure. So presumably will (b) and (d). Key questions for policy are whether (a) and (e) should also involve new money or whether they should be offset by lower Ministry of Defence and Overseas Development Administration expenditure elsewhere.

6. It may help to order tomorrow’s discussion if the Sub-Committee is invited to consider successively our interests and objectives

   (i) in the immediate aftermath of repossession;
   (ii) in the longer term.
7. As regards (i), we are presumably aiming at full reestablishment of the colonial administration. But are we prepared to say anything, now or when repossession is complete, about our willingness to consider change and/or international negotiations? If so, what? If not, how do we carry the Americans with us?

8. As regards (ii), the Sub-Committee should try to distinguish security issues and economic issues, although they are inevitably interconnected.

9. The key security issues are —
   - Are we prepared to divert our own resources to underwrite the Islands’ security in all circumstances? Or do we want this tab picked up by the Americans or others?
   - If we want American help, what levers have we to induce them to provide it on our terms? If we cannot do so, what are their terms likely to be? Will they, for example, insist that we seek an accommodation with Argentina?

10. The key economic issue, apart from cost, is how far development will be possible in the absence of a settlement with Argentina. Discussion should also focus on the Governor’s ideas (OD(SA)(82) 57).

11. Finally, the Sub-Committee will need to consider whether independence is really the only long-term option (as Mr Nott argued this morning). If so, the difficulties in the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary’s paper (OD(SA)(82) 56) need to be assessed. If not, which of the other possibilities in Sir Michael Palliser’s paper do the Sub-Committee regard as realistic?

12. In the light of the discussion, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should be asked to set work in hand urgently on the line which you and he should take in discussing longer-term policy issues — particularly those in paragraphs 7 and 9 above — with President Reagan and Mr Haig during their forthcoming visit to Europe. Mr Pym may tomorrow wish to suggest a line for a preliminary discussion on these issues between Mr Haig and Sir Nicholas Henderson.

27th May 1982

R L WADE-CERY
Thank you for your letter of 18 May about the Falkland Islands Government’s representation in London.

I am sorry that you should feel that no action has been taken on that part of your and Michael Shersby's report which recommended that a Falkland Islands Government Office should be set up in London. In fact, as soon as the Government received a copy of your report (during your meeting with Richard Luce on 9 March) the idea was referred to the Governor in Port Stanley. In his reply, sent just before the Argentine invasion, the Governor's view, endorsed by Councillors, was that the Falkland Islands Government had no funds available to establish such an office. While it is the case that some of the larger dependent territories, such as Hong Kong and Bermuda, maintain offices in London financed from their own budgets, this is not the case for the smaller dependencies who rely on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to look after their interests in London. If we were to finance an office for one dependent territory the others would almost certainly demand equal treatment.

Both the Governor and the Chief Secretary have an office in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and are readily accessible on 01-233-3760 or 01-233-4639. Mr. Hunt has a secretary, Mrs. Wells, on 01-233-3573. I can assure you that Mr. Hunt enjoys the same facilities within the Office as any other senior member of H.M. Diplomatic Service. He is in regular contact with individual Islanders and interested groups in the UK; but, if you / know
know of any who have been unable to get in touch with him, please do give them these details.

We hope that the present crisis will soon be resolved and that those Islanders now in the UK will be able to return to their homes and jobs on the Islands. We will then need to consider again, with the Falkland Islands Government, taking into account the new circumstances, how the Falkland Islands Government should be represented in London.

Finally, I should like to say that I am in full agreement with you on the excellent and energetic work of the Falkland Islands Office over the last seven weeks. They have performed an invaluable service.

Eric Ogden, Esq., M.P.
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PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Falklands: OD(SA) on 26th May

I. Current Business

Your meeting at 10.00 am tomorrow will need to start in the usual way with

a. the Chief of the Defence Staff’s report on the latest military news;

b. a report from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary or Sir Antony Acland on latest developments in New York.

Whether decisions will be needed on either topic will depend on overnight developments.

II. Longer-term Issues

2. As agreed at today’s meeting, the rest of the time can then be devoted to a preliminary discussion of the longer term. The Sub-Committee will have three papers in front of them –

   i. Sir Michael Palliser should be asked to speak briefly to his paper of 30th April on British Objectives (OD(SA)(82) 38), indicating the essential elements in his analysis which are unaffected by all that has happened since then.

   ii. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should speak to his paper on the Independence Option (OD(SA)(82) 56), which suggests that this course would be feasible but difficult and expensive. The Defence Secretary should comment on the implications for defence policy.

   iii. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should also introduce his paper on the Scope for Developing the Economy (OD(SA)(82)57). This circulates the Governor’s memorandum, which you have seen;
and a note by Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials, based
on the letter of 20th May to Mr Coles which you have also seen.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's conclusion is that
there is a reasonable potential for development; but that the
key factors will be security, communications and investment.

3. This will not be the right meeting to take firm decisions on long
term issues. Too much depends on the outcome of the fighting in the
Islands; and on the effect of that outcome on Argentine policy, American
attitudes and British public opinion. Major decisions, in any case,
ought probably to be addressed by a wider group of Ministers, ie OD.

4. But there are three preliminary conclusions to which the Sub-Committee
could probably be guided —

(1) The need for time. Our immediate public posture could
defensibly be that we shall need time, after the Islands are
freed, to consult the Islanders and others about the future
in the light of the traumatic events of the recent past.

(2) The Americans. In the end our freedom of action will be
limited by the attitude of the United States Government and of
American public opinion. You will clearly need to talk about
this to President Reagan when he is here. Meanwhile,
Sir Nicholas Henderson could be laying the foundations for
such a talk with his White House and State Department contacts;
and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office should perhaps be asked
to let OD(SA) have a paper on what your meeting might be primarily
aimed at achieving.

(3) Costs. It would help to focus future discussion if officials
were commissioned to make some preliminary estimates of
- the cost of making good war damage;
- the cost, to the Government, of providing the framework
  for economic development;
- the cost, both capital and current, of garrisoning the
  Islands and deterring further aggression.
5. Work on costs could if you wished be organised under Cabinet Office lead. It will no doubt involve devising a range of appropriate assumptions. Conclusions could only be tentative. But they will serve to highlight what are going to be very major issues of aid policy and defence policy. For example, is the Defence Budget to be enlarged, not just temporarily to cover current operations and replace losses (say £500 million?), but permanently to cover garrison costs? If not, what existing defence activity is to be sacrificed to make room? Similarly, is the Aid Budget to be enlarged to cover both rehabilitation and development, or if not whose aid is to be cut? Such questions cannot be addressed until we have some idea of the orders of magnitude involved.

25th May 1982

R L WADE-GERY
## Extract/Item details:

MOJUK INTSUM No. 104,
26 May 1982 (folio 23C)

## RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

15 May 2012
K. Wayland
**LETTERCODE/SERIES**

PREM 19

**PIECE/ITEM**

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(One piece/item number)

**Extract/Item details:**

BRITDEFAT LIMA telegram
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RETIRED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

15 May 2012

DAWYCK

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OD(SA) tomorrow morning is to have a first discussion of the prospect after the Falkland Islands are repossessed. There will be three papers:

(a) Sir Michael Palliser’s paper on objectives for a longer term settlement (OD(SA) (82) 38).

(b) A Foreign Office paper on the independence option (OD(SA) (82) 56).

(c) The Governor’s paper on the development potential.

2. It seems to me that the Government will be faced with an acutely difficult problem of political management, when we have repossessed:

(a) Domestic public opinion will see repossession and eviction of the Argentine forces as a great victory. They will expect to see the Governor back, the traditional local administration restored, and the Falkland Islands and the dependencies garrisoned and protected (by us, with or without United States support) against renewed Argentine aggression.

(b) Argentina may de facto accept an "honourable defeat" for the time being. But whatever her government she is unlikely to abandon her claim to the sovereignty of the Islands and the dependencies, and she may well keep up the threats of air raids, naval attacks and even commando-style raids in order to make our victory as pyrrhic and as expensive as possible.

(c) International opinion, in the United Nations and elsewhere, will be opposed to a simple return to the status quo ante bellum, unless that is seen as a stage to some longer-term settlement other than continuance of British colonial rule.

(d) In particular the United States, whose agreement and perhaps support is likely to be indispensable to any long-term guarantee of security for the Islands, will be looking for something other than a return to British colonial rule. They will be looking for something which enables them to mend their Latin American fences.
3. Ministers are going to have to decide how to manage this difficult combination of conflicting political pressures. Domestic public opinion will expect the Government to act *fortiter in re*, in re-establishing British administration, repairing war damage, and reassuring the Falkland Islanders that their wishes and interests will be respected. Will the handling of international opinion, and particularly of the United States, require that to be balanced by *suaviter in modo*? If so, what forms should that take?

4. The Ministry of Defence are already assessing what would be required, on various assumptions, to garrison and protect the Falkland Islands. It may be that there should now be wider studies of what assumptions should be made, and what the costs to public expenditure and the effects on defence policy would be under the various assumptions.

5. How should we conduct our international relations? President Mitterrand advised you ten days ago that, once the military operation of reposssession was complete, we should move at once – within twenty-four hours, he said – to show magnanimity in victory and to demonstrate an intention to think positively about the longer-term future. Similar pressures will come from the United States, and from the rest of the European Community. Is that good advice? Should we, by following that course, be showing signs of weakness and uncertainty? Or should we be catching a tide which, if we could catch and control, might produce a settlement which met our political needs and enabled us to carry the international community?

6. If we were going to try that course, it is not at all too soon to define our political needs, as a pre-requisite for defining the solution that might satisfy them. Our political needs are, presumably:

(i) not to hand the Islands to Argentina;
(ii) to deny Argentina the opportunity to recover the Islands, or flood them with people against the wishes of the Islanders;
(iii) to associate the United States with the settlement and with the assurance of security for the Islands;
(iv) to foster the economic development of the Islands;
(v) to minimise the additional costs to public expenditure of protecting and developing the Islands.
7. Perhaps it is too soon, during and immediately after the invasion, to try to define too precisely the elements of a long-term solution. Time is needed for the air to clear, and political tensions to relax a little. The Foreign Office paper does not make the independence option look easy or very attractive. United Nations trusteeship would open the door to Argentinian flooding. Economic development is not going to occur unless there is the prospect of political security, either as a result of a settlement accepted by Argentina or as a result of a credible guarantee, which probably needs to involve the United States as well as ourselves. Some kind of association with the United Kingdom - like some of the West Indian States had, or like the Channel Islands - might technically be presentable as "decolonisation", but would leave us with a long-term and expensive commitment to defence, foreign relations and development of the Islands. Conceivably some kind of Anglo-American trusteeship could meet our requirements, if only the Argentinians could be brought to acquiesce in it.

8. A first discussion tomorrow of the political dilemma which we shall face, and of the political needs we shall need to try to satisfy, could form a basis on which further work could be done by officials both on the strategic question where we might aim to go in the longer term and on the more immediate tactical question on what ground we should seek to be on the morrow of repossession.

9. Our United States allies have a strong interest in the outcome of all this, by virtue of the Monroe doctrine and their extensive Latin American interests. We are going to be dependent on their agreement and support, both to sustain the garrisoning and protection of the Islands after repossession and for whatever is to be the longer-term settlement. Should we be taking the initiative to discuss the prospects and possibilities with them more systematically than hitherto? This might be something to be discussed with President Reagan when he visits London next month.

Robert Armstrong

25th May 1982
SECRET //NODIS//

25 MAY 82
TO: 0433
CN: 12106
CHRG: STA

ACTION: AMB-5+2D/MD

PERSONAL

NODIS
FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 5/24/82 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M., JR.)
TAGS: PBOR, AR, FA, UK
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S LETTER TO FOREIGN SECRETARY PYM

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE TUESDAY MORNING,
   YOUR TIME, THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO FOREIGN SECRETARY PYM:

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCIS:

AT THIS CRUCIAL MOMENT IN THE COURSE OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS, I WANTED YOU TO HAVE MY LATEST THOUGHTS ON THE OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS WE FACE TOGETHER. FIRST AND FOREMOST, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT YOU CAN CONTINUE TO COUNT ON US SUPPORT AS YOU DO WHAT IS NECESSARY.

WE ARE FAST APPROACHING THE POINT AT WHICH THE UK WILL HAVE A DECISIVE LOCAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE, WITH SUCCESS CLEARLY WITHIN YOUR REACH. AT THAT POINT, WHICH EVEN ARGENTINE SELF-DELUSION CANNOT HIDE, THE ARGENTINES COULD BE COMPELLED TO TURN TO THE CUBANS AND SOVIETS AS THEIR LAST HOPE TO AVOID TOTAL HUMILIATION. SHOULD GALTIERI RESIST THESE PRESSURES, HE COULD BE SWEEPED ASIDE AND REPLACED BY THOSE FAR MORE HOSTILE TO FUNDAMENTAL WESTERN INTERESTS. EVEN IF THE ARGENTINES DO NOT OPEN THEMSELVES TO THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS, THEY ARE VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO WANT TO CONTINUE A STATE OF WAR, WHICH THEY WILL PURSUE WITH WHATEVER MEANS THEY CAN ACQUIRE.

IF THIS OCCURS, HOWEVER SUCCESSFUL YOU ARE ON THE ISLANDS, WE WILL UNQUESTIONABLY FACE A FUTURE OF OPEN-ENDED CONFLICT, POSSIBLY SUPPORTED BY THE EAST AND AT CONSIDERABLE RISK AND COST TO YOUR INTERESTS AND OURS. WHATEVER DISPOSITION TO SETTLE THERE MAY NOW BE IN BUENOS AIRES WILL EVAPORATE. MOREOVER, HOWEVER UNJUST, WE WILL TOGETHER BE LEFT ISOLATED IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, WITH RELENTLESS PRESSURES TO SETTLE ON TERMS FAVORABLE TO ARGENTINA NOTWITHSTANDING THE JUSTICE OF OUR POSITION AND THE SUCCESS OF YOUR FORCES.

IN THE FACE OF THESE LONG-TERM PROSPECTS, I SEE MAJOR

SECRET //NODIS//

STATE 142651

1/2
ADVANTAGES IN AN EFFORT BY YOU TO PUT FORWARD TERMS OF A JUST AND REASONABLE SETTLEMENT AS SOON AS YOU ARE SURE THAT YOU CAN AND WILL SUCCEED MILITARILY. I APPRECIATE FULLY YOUR RESERVATIONS ABOUT AGREEING, IN A SETTLEMENT, TO WITHDRAW BRITISH FORCES WITHOUT AN ASSURANCE THAT THE ISLANDS AND THE INHABITANTS WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY SAFE FROM RENEWED AGRASSION IF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BROKE DOWN. THEREFORE, AND IN THE INTEREST OF AVERTING DANGEROUS POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ARGENTINA, THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE A BATTALION-SIZE FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENSURING THAT THERE WOULD BE NO VIOLATION OF ANY INTERIM AGREEMENT PRECEDING A FINAL SETTLEMENT. BECAUSE OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO OUR STANDING WITH THE ARGENTINES AS A RESULT OF OUR SUPPORT FOR YOU, THERE IS NO CHANCE THAT A US-ONLY FORCE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. WE WOULD THEREFORE NEED TO PERSUADE THE MOST TRUSTWORTHY MAJOR HEMISPHERIC POWER — BRAZIL — TO JOIN US. A COMBINED FORCE WOULD PRESENT A CREDIBLE DETERRENT AND ASSURE THE SECURITY OF THE ISLANDERS FOR THE PERIOD OF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT.

NO DOUBT YOU ARE AWARE OF THE PROPOSAL THE BRAZILIANS HAVE INTRODUCED IN NEW YORK. WE CAN APPRECIATE THAT LONDON WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY WITH THIS PROPOSAL, PARTICULARLY AS IT PERTAINS TO FORCE WITHDRAWAL AND INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. HOWEVER, AT THE POINT AT WHICH BRITISH MILITARY SUCCESS IS AT HAND, IT MAY WELL BE POSSIBLE TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT BASED ON A BRITISH PROPOSAL THAT CONTAINS ELEMENTS OF THE BRAZILIAN TEXT, WITH PROVISIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL AND INTERIM ADMINISTRATION ADJUSTED TO MEET YOUR CONCERNS, AND WITH THE US AND BRAZIL READY TO PROVIDE PEACEKEEPING FORCES. IF YOU AGREE THAT SUCH AN EFFORT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE, WE WOULD BE READY TO ASSIST IN SUCH AN INITIATIVE, PERHAPS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE BRAZILIANS.

I HAVE ASKED THE BRAZILIANS IF THEY MIGHT CONSIDER PARTICIPATING IN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE UNDER A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION, THOUGH WITHOUT, OF COURSE, GIVING THEM ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT YOU ARE INTERESTED IN THEIR PROPOSAL, NOR COMMENTING IN ANY WAY ON THEIR TEXT.

I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL REACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THESE IDEAS, WITH REGARD BOTH TO SUBSTANCE AND TIMING. IF OUR WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE A SUBSTANTIAL PEACEKEEPING COMPONENT MAKES THE PROSPECTS FOR AN EARLY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT MORE ATTRACTION TO YOU, I WOULD WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS ON OTHER NECESSARY PROVISIONS.
YOU CAN APPRECIATE, CIRCUMSTANCES MAY ALTER OUR ABILITY TO OFFER PEACEKEEPING FORCES IF RADICAL CHANGES OCCUR IN BUENOS AIRES. THIS ARGUES FOR MOVING QUICKLY ENOUGH TO FORESTALL ANY SUCH CHANGES.

I HOPE YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT WHAT I AM SUGGESTING WOULD SERVE OUR LONG-TERM INTERESTS, IF IT MADE AGREEMENT POSSIBLE, AS WELL AS PUT YOU IN A BETTER POSITION POLITICALLY IF AND AS YOU DO WHAT YOU MUST MILITARILY.

SINCERELY, AL

END OF TEXT.

HAIG

2/2
24 May 1982

Dear John,

Israeli Arms Supplies to Argentina

At this morning’s meeting of OD(SA) it was agreed that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office would produce a short general brief which Ministers and Senior Officials could use with suitable contacts. I enclose such a brief.

I am copying this letter to Private Secretaries to the members of OD(SA), Sir Robert Armstrong and Sir Michael Palliser.

Yours ever,

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
ISRAELI ARMS SUPPLIES TO ARGENTINA

Background

1. At the beginning of the current crisis we asked Israel to embargo arms sales to Argentina, in common with other western countries. The Israelis refused to give us an assurance but said that whilst existing contracts would be fulfilled, no new contracts would be signed during the crisis. In addition, they undertook not to accelerate deliveries under existing contracts, for example, by airfreighting equipment. Finally, there have been a number of statements that no military items have in fact been shipped since the beginning of the crisis. The Americans have also raised the issue with the Israelis on our behalf and received similar replies.

2. Despite these assurances, we have seen clear indications that Argentina is making a major effort to obtain arms and military equipment from Israel, and that Israeli companies have made offers or are involved in negotiations on the supply of weapons. Some of the negotiations concern highly sophisticated equipment which could cause considerable damage to our forces if it is supplied. Many of the reports involve shipments via third countries, which suggests that Israeli companies are using this approach to circumvent the restriction.
ISRAELI ARMS SUPPLIES TO ARGENTINA

Points to Make

1. (a) The UK was disappointed that Israel was unable to impose a ban in common with our other partners;

(b) We were not asking Israel to do more than others had willingly accepted; we do not believe that this action would have put Jewish interests in Argentina at risk;

(c) Although certain assurances were given by Israeli representatives, we have received a good deal of information suggesting that Israeli companies are negotiating sales with Argentina and that deliveries are being made, frequently via third countries. This fact throws doubt on the value of the assurances which we have been given.

(d) Some of the equipment concerned is highly sophisticated and could significantly enhance the Argentine military threat to our forces. Public opinion in this country would be deeply shocked if a British ship or aircraft were to be destroyed as a result of equipment supplied by the Israelis.

(e) It is becoming increasingly difficult for Ministers to ignore this situation and to continue to make reassuring public statements about Israel's position. We therefore very much hope that Israeli authorities will reassess
will reassess their policy and take urgent steps to ensure that there is a genuine ban on deliveries to Argentina or to third countries which sympathise with the Argentine cause.
Dear David,

I wrote to you on 19th May about OD(SA)'s consideration of special operations.

2. At OD(SA) on 21st May Ministers were told of a possible plan to supplement the means of reconnoitring and attacking the target already approved. They gave the CDS discretion to approve this plan or other comparable variants of the current operation.

3. Ministers should be consulted further if the Ministry of Defence wish to recommend moving against a different target altogether (one further north was mentioned in earlier discussion at official level); or varying the method of attacking the approved target so radically as to alter the whole nature of the operation (the possibility of such radical alteration has also been aired at official level, see paragraph 3 of my earlier letter, but not put to Ministers collectively).

4. If necessary I am sure Ministers would be willing to respond very rapidly indeed. I cannot predict what they would or would not agree to; but they would certainly not want any operation held up for lack of a clear answer one way or the other.

5. Since the above was written OD(SA) have this morning considered a wholly different approach to the same target. It was agreed that discussion would resume tomorrow. Meanwhile one preliminary deployment, well outside the area of operations, was approved.

6. I am copying this letter to John Coles (No.10) and Brian Fall (FOO).

D B Osand Esq.
Ministry of Defence
Dear Jane,

Non-Combat Aircraft: Contingency Press Release

Your letter of 14 May to John Rhodes enclosed a further draft of your contingency press release in case we have to shoot down a non-combat aircraft.

I should like to repeat a comment we have made on earlier versions of this draft. In our view the reference to the Total Exclusion Zone in paragraph 3 of the draft is misleading and weakens the argument. We risk falling into the same trap which we laid for ourselves in the case of the "General Belgrano".

The point about the TEZ is that it is total. As far as Argentine forces are concerned there is an EZ (ie not covering civilian aircraft or merchant ships) throughout the South Atlantic. Any reference to the TEZ in a press release of this kind therefore risks giving the wrong impression. In particular, if the incident were to take place outside the TEZ, it would hardly be helpful to us to draw attention to the fact.

We also believe that the argument about the observed behaviour of the aircraft - while it might be persuasive to an RAF expert (and even perhaps to a specialist journalist) - may not be persuasive to the general public. It might sound like an excuse for having shot down a civilian airliner by mistake, which is of course what the Argentines may accuse us of having done.

We therefore
We therefore hope that the whole of paragraph 3 could be omitted. The identification of the aircraft type (Boeing 707/C130) could be added to paragraph 1.

I am copying this letter to John Coles (10 Downing Street), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and John Rhodes (Department of Trade).

(Signature)

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

Miss J E Ridley
Ministry of Defence
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**15 May 2012**

**C. Wayland**

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A Wayland
SITUATION REPORT FOR OPERATION SUTTON AS AT 231900A MAY

1. There have been no official reports of contact with Argentine forces ashore in the Falkland Islands since the last situation report at 1100A today.

2. Before dawn this morning, the Falkland Island Company Vessel MONSUNEN which was located by a Harrier yesterday afternoon, was intercepted by a ship of the Task Force close to the southern shore of East Falkland. The ship fired starshell to illuminate the vessel which was run aground and abandoned by her crew. There are no reports of any casualties.

3. Sea Harriers on combat air patrol over the Falkland Sound sighted three Argentinian helicopters proceeding south along the western shore of the Sound in the vicinity of Shag Cove. The Sea Harriers attacked causing the leading helicopter, a Puma, to crash into the hillside and explode, a Bell helicopter landed but was set on fire by gunfire and the third, another Puma, was engaged on the ground but damage was not assessed.

4. At 1345 local time two A4 aircraft approached our ships in San Carlos Water, no bombs were seen to be released and one A4 was shot down by ANTELOPE. In the second wave ANTELOPE was hit by an unexploded bomb and it is thought that one A4 may have hit ANTELOPE's mast and may have ditched subsequently. Casualties in ANTELOPE are as yet unknown.

5. At 1412 local time two waves of Mirage aircraft attacked our ships in the Sound. BROADSWORD's Seawolf accounted for 1; ANTELOPE and PLYMOUTH accounted for another with 20 mm guns and 1 further Mirage possibly splashed. In a simultaneous raid Sea Harriers on combat air patrol splashed 2 Mirage.

6. There have been no reports of any attacks on the Carrier Battle Group.
SITUATION REPORT FOR OPERATION SUTTON AS AT 231100A MAY 82

1. Activity in the Falkland Islands has been at a low level overnight since the last Sitrep at 1900A.

2. On land, there have been no incidents. Headquarters 3 Cdo Brigade has moved ashore and taken up a position NE of San Carlos settlement.

3. There were two further reports of action by own forces yesterday not previously reported. Harriers from HERMES attacked military targets in the Goose Green area. Gun positions, vehicles and fuel dumps were attacked. Several wrecked Pucara aircraft were seen which had previously been noted on high level photography. Harriers carried out an armed reconnaissance of Weddell Island without sighting any targets. The ex Falkland Islands Co vessel MONSUNEN was sighted South of East Falkland. This sighting will be investigated by surface ships from the Task Force today.

4. During the afternoon yesterday, 6 Argentinian Mirage aircraft escorted two low flying aircraft which landed in West Falkland, possibly a re-supply mission or additional light combat aircraft being ferried in. The escorting aircraft returned to the mainland 10 minutes later. Shortly before dusk, two A4 aircraft made an ineffectual attack on the ships in San Carlos Water. One aircraft ditched its bombload at the entrance and the second did not press home its attack. Troops ashore reported a possible submarine in the Falkland Sound just West of Port Sussex. PLIMOUTH and two anti-submarine helicopters investigated without result.

5. ANTELOPE escorted NORLAND and STROMNESS into San Carlos Water overnight so that further stores and equipment can be unloaded.

6. The next of kin of all casualties including those in HMS ARDEN have now been informed. Additionally the next of kin of survivors from ARDEN are being informed, this is virtually complete.
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SITUATION REPORT FOR OPERATION SUTTON AS AT 221900A MAY 82

1. HMS ARDENT sank in the Falkland Sound whilst anchored off the North West Islands during the night 21/22 May. She had lost both weapons systems when hit by bombs and rockets in the first air attack. Two or three direct hits by bombs in the second attack on her caused major fires and uncontrollable flooding. Survivors were taken off before she sank and most were taken aboard CANBERRA although some were taken to other ships. Casualty figures so far are 22 dead and over 30 wounded.

2. The unexploded bomb lodged in ANTRIM was successfully removed and she sailed together with the merchant transports from the Falkland Sound at 0200Z to the east so as to be out of range of shore-based air attack by dawn. It is hoped to repair the damage to her missile systems in the next few days.

3. The two unexploded bombs in the main machinery compartments of ARGONAUT have been successfully defused. She remains at anchor close inshore south of Fanning Head. The damage to her is substantial although her short range air defence missile system and Lynx helicopter are still operational.

4. BROADSWORD and BRILLIANT, both of which suffered damage, remain with the force in the Falkland Sound together with PLYMOUTH and YARMOUTH. COVENTRY and GLAMORGAN are outside the Sound to the west to give additional warning of air attack.

5. Ashore, the three Commandos and two Parachute battalions have been consolidating their positions. Air Defence weapons including Rapier have been set up ashore to create a safe haven for the Amphibious vessels which are continuing to unload weapons, ammunition, stores and equipment. There are no reports of any engagements ashore in the past 22 hours.

6. An Argentinian Boeing 707 reconnaissance aircraft made contact with the BRISTOL group of ships some 1300 miles NE of the Total Exclusion Zone. The aircraft was first detected on the ships radars at 1205Z. The aircraft remained in contact but out of missile range until 1504Z when CARDIFF, who had been detached towards the threat fired at the target at distant range. The Sea Dart missiles are believed to have missed as the Boeing turned away.

7. Sea Harriers on combat air patrol over the Falklands are reported to have engaged and damaged an Argentinian patrol boat in Choseul Sound, the main inlet south of Port Stanley which leads to Goose Green and Darwin. We await confirmation from the Commander of the Task Force of this incident.
This transmission consists of 13 page(s) PLUS leader.

From: CHANCERY UKMIS NEW YORK

To: EMERGENCY UNIT FCO

FALKLANDS
SECURITY COUNCIL: PANAMA

Following is text of Foreign Minister Illueca's intervention in the Security Council on 22 May.
(See our telno [?].)
Mr. ILLESCA (Panama) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to greet you most cordially, Ambassador Ling Qing. We are grateful that a statesman of your stature, who represents one of the major Powers of the world, is guiding these debates to the satisfaction of all and in a manner consistent with the ideals of the United Nations. I should like also to greet my predecessor, Ambassador Kamanda wa Kamanda of Zaire, who presided over the deliberations of the Council last month.

Panama is particularly pleased at the presence of two Latin American Foreign Ministers, representing two countries with a great Latin American history with which we respect, admire and esteem.
I am referring to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina
Mr. Rancor Costa Mendez, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Venezuela,
Mr. Jose Alberto Zambrano. They represent two nations whose peoples shed
their own blood in the days of the struggle for independence in order to
liberate other peoples. Behind them is the image of Simón Bolívar and of
José de San Martin, and the ideal of the unification of Latin America as
reflected in the Panama Congress of 1826. an endeavor not yet completed but
about to be concluded.

I refer to this because we truly do have a colonial question before us,
as was stated at the Council's meeting of 3 April. At that meeting I expressed
my own country's concern at the threat represented by the colonial presence of
an extra-continental Power in Latin American territory.

On 3 April there had been no breach of the peace, there had been no
outbreak of hostilities. When the Government of Argentina carried out the
occupation of the archipelago which rightfully belongs to it, it did so with
great respect for peace and for individual safety which reflected great care
for human life, and it caused no personal harm to any British soldier or to
any civilian. It was claimed that that action by Argentina violated the
legal order, but the opinion of Panama and the opinion of the United Nations
in many resolutions is that the State that was committing a breach of the
peace was the State which does not belong to that continent, which did not
comply with the United Nations resolutions on decolonization and which was
disregarding General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Here we have proclaimed
an anti-colonial law which has not been codified but which appears in many
resolutions and which the colonial and neocolonialist Powers naturally do not
want to see codified. Therefore peoples that want to maintain their
territorial integrity, freedom and independence must lay claim to their
anti-colonial rights as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and
in numerous resolutions. Those resolutions emerged as Latin American
initiatives at the time when Latin America constituted the strongest regional
group of the Organization, which has been strengthened with the passage of time by
the Asian, African and Arab nations and by some European nations which work in a
way which is attuned to the interests of the third world. Those anti-colonialist
resolutions proclaim in a clear-cut way, without ambiguity, that peoples that are
subject to colonial oppression may use all means available to them in order to put
an end to that colonial situation.
It was for that reason that my country objected to the adoption of
Resolution 502 (1982) on 3 April of this year. On that occasion we made a
very clear statement that the intransigent anti-historical attitude of the
United Kingdom was going to cause great problems, tribulations, conflicts and painful
situations for the countries represented in the Council the Western world
and mankind at large, including the Socialist and Eastern Powers because
this is not a problem that is confined to Latin America and Argentina but
rather one which is bringing the world to the brink of a conflagration. It
is time to appeal for reflection, for prudence and calm so that there should be
no more of these punitive expeditions where two-thirds of a British naval fleet
now I should say it is four-fifths of its fleet - is despatched, to attempt
to punish and humiliate and confront Argentina, disregarding the fact that there
is a Latin American continent that has historical and cultural links and
that an affront and threat to Argentina is an affront and threat to the dignity
and rights and aspirations of all Latin American peoples. An attempt
has been made to conceal and cloud the colonial problem, and it is regrettable
that countries that call themselves civilized view Latin America nations
merely in terms of their Governments. There are countries with a history
and a social and cultural structure that have permanent values, values that cannot
be obscured, that are not negotiable, are not on the market; cannot be bargained
away - those are the values of our peoples and perhaps that is why the
Anglo-Saxons do not understand Latin Americans.

Those values of our peoples cannot be subjected or violated because that
would cause blood and tears for mankind. There are many such cases in the history
of mankind. It will be seen that Latin America, together with Argentina is right
in this case, that the Security Council and particularly the countries
represented here must look at the roots of this problem, which are purely
and simply colonial. Resolution 502 (1982), in spite of our opposition, contained
three elements. One was a cessation of hostilities, which at that time did not
exist and that is why we had stated that the resolution was illogical. Those
hostilities have now occurred with only one party to blame, one aggressor
with only one Government acting in an irrational and disrespectful way,
disrespectful of the United Nations system and the system of contemporary
civilization.
It is lamentable to see in the newspapers that the leaders of the United Kingdom are saying that civilized peoples should be grateful for the action taken by the United Kingdom. This is a reflection of colonial thinking - to speak in this day and age of civilized peoples implies that there are uncivilized peoples. Who is civilized and who is not? Is the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom civilized when she tells the Chairman of the BBC that British patriotism has to be defended and has to be told that the media exist not to defend patriotism but to provide the facts, and that an Argentine widow deserves as much pity as a British widow?
are considering here an infamous loss of life which has no possible
sanation, no reason to exist in a civilized world - to use her own words -
world which has reached this stage of development.

That same resolution talked about negotiations. It was not a matter of
situation of hostilities, because unlawful action was taken by the nation that
opposed this. We have to go back to General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX),
which told Argentina and the United Kingdom to sit down at the negotiating
able to discuss what? The decolonization of the Malvinas. Why? Because
Argentina's claim was proper, not the United Kingdom's. It was stated that
account should be taken of the interests of the inhabitants, not the rights of
inhabitants. There is no right to self-determination in this case. You
should not be surprised to hear me say that there is no right to self-determination
in this case. The right to self-determination is for the oppressed, not for the
oppressors. The 1,800 inhabitants of those islands are all dependants of a British
colonial company with headquarters in London, which has some 700,000 sheep that are
grazing in the Malvinas, and it would really be making a mockery of the right
to self-determination if we were to say that the future of the islands must be
decided by the employees of a colonial company who are of the same nationality
as the oppressor nation. That is the position.

That resolution was prepared by those who later were going to violate it,
but in any event we do have those two elements which must be considered.

The United Kingdom has set itself up as the executor of that resolution,
but in order to violate it, and what are those violations? On 3 April we stated
here that the United Kingdom, with its obstinacy in this matter, was going to
provoke a crisis in the inter-American system. We stated this before the crisis
ever took place, but now the crisis has occurred, and why has it occurred?
The United Kingdom has decreed a maritime exclusion zone extending 200 miles
from the Malvinas Archipelago. That could only be done by the Security Council.
We need only read Articles 39, 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter to see
that such a thing can only be done by the Security Council, so this is an
affront to the Security Council.
We cannot be indifferent to this. Is there order, or is there not? Does the Charter of the United Nations exist or not? Must it be respected or not? But that is not the only thing. That exclusion zone runs counter to the zone of geographical security enshrined in article 4 of the Inter-American Treaty for Mutual Assistance. So it can clearly be seen that this is not a crisis that we are inventing; it is a crisis that was designed by the United Kingdom, which is disregarding this entire inter-American system.

I am mentioning this here because the situation must be considered in depth and a solution must be found before more regrettable extremes are reached. Because we are all aware of the loss of life, the damage to property and the very profound spiritual injury done to all the Latin American peoples.

But the violations of resolution 502 (1982) do not stop there. The Veneziela's Foreign Minister, in an outstanding and most lucid way, described those violations, one of the most disdainful of acts committed because a major maritime Power — which is what the United Kingdom is — is taking action which the President of the Republic of Panama, Dr. Aristides Royo, has quite rightly described as a deceitful action. Why? Because the cruiser "General Belgrano" which was torpedoed by one of the nuclear submarines belonging to the United Kingdom was outside that maritime exclusion zone. If we follow the logic of that civilized people — to use its own words — well then, in a civilized way England decided that, so as not to violate its own zone, the zone should be extended to within 12 miles of Argentine continental territory. Does that exonerate England, or does it mean that England wanted freedom to act, to take justice into its own hands by night, to gain time so that the troops arriving in a luxury liner would manage to reach the Malvinas Archipelago and Argentine territory? The zone of war is being extended, and it is being extended without any declaration...
We, the developing countries, have greatly suffered from the actions of certain Powers. Innocent passage is requested of us. At the Conference on the Law of the Sea we had great difficulties because of that obsession to keep the seas free. How many of those maritime Powers, above all the European Powers, protested or condemned this irrational, unreasonable act on the part of the United Kingdom? I know of only one - the Soviet Union. It must be said that the Soviet Union has stated that it can not in any way accept the decision taken by the United Kingdom. But if there is any other such act, I think it would be very helpful if it stated here in the Security Council that it does not accept that type of decision taken unilaterally by the United Kingdom, which feels itself very powerful.

Mr. Illueca, Panama has already referred to the nuclear or nuclear-powered submarines which are being used for military purposes, in our view, in violation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Treaty that prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America.
Prohibited explosives have also been used, bombs that really constitute a crime against mankind. We have seen photographs. It has been said that it is not true. Well, if it is not true, I think it would be good to have that repeated here in the Security Council, because that type of device should not be used. It should also be stated that nuclear weapons must not be used and are not going to be used, but we have not witnessed any great haste to make that kind of pledge.

The chain of violations of resolution 502 (1982) by the United Kingdom has created a crisis in the United Nations system of security - a crisis which worsened when other members of the European Community, also in violation of the clear provision of the Charter that it is for the Security Council alone to decide on taking such action, decided to impose sanctions against Argentina.

That crisis has now been reflected in the inter-American security system. We must look at this calmly and give it profound thought. In 1947 the American States signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance - the Rio Treaty. That stipulates that an attack, particularly one by an extraterritorial Power, against a signatory State is to be considered an attack against all the other States parties to the Treaty.

Pursuant to the Treaty, during the first week of this month a meeting was held in Washington of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the countries parties to the Rio Treaty. An historic event occurred. The countries gathered there recognized Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas. They decided to make collective representation to the Security Council and to the parties involved. They also requested a cessation of hostilities. Seventeen countries voted in favour of that decision and only four abstained. But the Treaty proved ineffective in this connexion, although it envisages sanctions against the aggressor, measures to support the country against which a violation is directed and measures for the collective security of the Rio Treaty countries.

Why has it not been possible to apply the Treaty? A strategic problem arises. The question of the Malvinas invites serious reflection because, in addition to its being a colonial question - which is the root of the problem -
other considerations are involved which are not ideological but involve strategic interests. The major Powers are interests in the South Atlantic sea routes. The nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of course, would be extremely pleased if the United Kingdom, even if by force, were to maintain control over the Malvinas Archipelago, given the fact that it is in the South Atlantic.

But it is possible to consider whether Argentine sovereignty affects the interests of any other country? Argentina has a legitimate right to sovereignty over those islands and to exercise its full authority there. Of course, in the framework of world relations it is for Argentina to assume its responsibilities. But this is a matter that falls under Argentine sovereignty. There is a conflict between countries. Strategic alliances are involved. We can see that here there is a NATO conflict.

We have the Rio Treaty, but it has proved ineffective because Latin America lacks a system of collective security.

A distinguished United States admiral publicly declared in statements that were published in the press that the United States was not obliged to help the United Kingdom because the NATO Treaty applied north of the equator but that did not include the Malvinas. But we can invoke the Rio Treaty.

We should not like to see this matter handled from a strategic standpoint. We believe that we must come back to its essential roots, that is, its colonial nature. I say that we do not want it handled that way because clearly if, in view of the fact that the United Kingdom is concentrating all its naval forces in the South Atlantic to commit this aggression against Argentina, other NATO countries make replacements of services in NATO, there is just an exchange of positions. In other words, it could be France, the United States or any other NATO country effecting a transfer of military equipment. Then a party to the Rio Treaty with its own commitments could be involved.

There is growing resentment against the United Kingdom and against all the nations that are lending themselves to the United Kingdom's aggression against Argentina, and this must be put on record.
Hence we consider that the root of the problem is colonial, that the United Kingdom is against the legal order of the United Nations, that in attempting to maintain its anachronistic colonial presence it is against the contemporary spirit - against the process of change: a process of change which must take place right there in the Malvinas, and which will have to be registered in Gibraltar also. Anachronistic as is the United Kingdom presence in the Malvinas, so also is it in Gibraltar. Indeed, it is offensive to all of us with an Iberian-American conscience. This is something that must not be overlooked by the Council or by the other Members of the United Nations. Above all, the people of the United Kingdom must realize that at the close of the twentieth century these colonial enclaves have no justification; they are inadmissible, reprehensible, and stand condemned by the world conscience.

The Non-Aligned Movement has declared its support for the Argentine claim. True, the Group of 77 is not a political group, but economic sanctions caused it to be concerned about these issues. Hence its representatives in various capitals have declared their support for Argentina and their opposition to sanctions. We therefore believe that the Security Council should find a way of reaching some type of decision or agreement that would effectively bring about a cessation of hostilities, a separation of forces and the withdrawal of that colonial presence, thereby opening the way for negotiations.

Indeed, as was stated by the Inter-American Legal Committee, what we have to negotiate is the withdrawal of the United Kingdom. There is nothing else to be negotiated. And it must be negotiated so that, in the most orderly, peaceful way possible, we can restore the legal order of the United Nations, which is completely anti-colonial.

The efforts of the Secretary-General are to be commended. The Secretary-General deserves the support expressed to him by the Head of State of Panama, as well as the support of all members of this Council. Thus far, however, those efforts have been unsuccessful because of the intransigence of the United Kingdom.
The way in which this matter has been handled by the United Kingdom leaves a very bitter taste indeed because, as events have unfolded, I think our position of the Council has been affected. The intensive negotiations earlier this week, both here at United Nations Headquarters and in the offices of the Secretary-General on the 38th floor and at his residence gave us grounds for hope. One of the participants in them was Mr. Enrique Ros, a well-known statesman here at the United Nations, whose good sense and professional qualities need no additional mention by me. Also present was the representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Anthony Parsons, who also enjoys our respect and who possesses excellent qualities in his own right. At the same time, we are aware that he is subject to instructions which at times, it is said, are iron-clad, even though we wish they were more humane.

Now, just when the Secretary-General's efforts seemed headed for success and the Security Council had been convened the Council began to find itself in what I believe to be a very difficult and embarrassing position. When the rumour was circulated that the negotiations, as reported throughout the world press, had broken down, the Secretary-General communicated personally with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, according to press reports, Mrs. Thatcher had made positive signs and asked the Secretary-General to continue his efforts. Similarly, the Secretary-General contacted the President of Argentina, General Galtieri, who also expressed the desire that the Secretary-General continue his efforts. As I understand it, the Security Council met this past Wednesday in an informal meeting and, as also reported in the press, on the basis of that background information decided to allow the Secretary-General an additional few days in which to pursue his peace-making efforts—efforts which, I repeat, we all commend and fully support. Indeed, we only wish he could be given a mandate to complete those efforts successfully—of course, with the co-operation of the parties concerned.
That was on Wednesday of this week. The Security Council, as everyone knows, had agreed to give the Secretary-General a few days more to continue his efforts. However, the rebuff to the Council came not from Argentina but from the other side of the Atlantic, because on the following day the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom appeared before the House of Commons to say that negotiations were leading nowhere and had broken down.

What caused that? The United Kingdom had made some proposals and issued an ultimatum to Argentina. That also was published. And if the version that I am stating here is inaccurate, may I be corrected. It was indicated that if Argentina failed to accept those proposals as put forward, the United Kingdom, which had been involved in a process of prolonging those talks in order to prevent specific agreement, was going, as indeed it subsequently did, to begin an escalation—an escalation which is taking place right now.

That, of course, leaves the Council in the position of being slighted. By its intransigence the United Kingdom is snubbing the Security Council and all its members. As I stressed in this Council on 31 April after adoption of the resolution, a punitive expedition had been mounted, and the resolution should in no way be understood as authorizing the United Kingdom to use force. I said that because a British expeditionary force was advancing towards the South Atlantic—a force of overwhelming military capability. No one here objected to the interpretation made by Panama that resolution 502 (1982) in no way authorized the use of force by the United Kingdom. Yet it has resorted to force and is now engaged in an escalation of the use of force; to the detriment of the Argentine people and of Latin American peoples at large.
(Mr. Illueca, Panama)

It has been stated in England that civilized peoples should be grateful to England for this oppressive, aggressive, warlike, unlawful action against Argentina. What we must say is that Latin American people are grateful to Argentina; that we are grateful to Argentina for its sacrifices; that Argentina and the Argentine people have behaved nobly, as they did in the days of liberation and independence, when Argentina helped peoples throughout America to achieve independence. The Latin American conscience is moved by the reaffirmation of its own cultural, political and economic values.

I wish to conclude by stating that the Security Council must take clear and categorical action for the cessation of hostilities. But at the same time I should like to tell the men and women of Argentina, the mothers and sisters who have lost their children, their brothers or their husbands, that all this sacrifice will not be in vain; that this tragic process will lead to a new Latin America - a united, worthy, active Latin America with a greater awareness of the role it must play so that peace and justice may prevail in the world.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Chinese): I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Panama for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Canada. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
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Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Operations)

21 MAY 1982

DSC (Controller)
Navy Ops
Army Ops
AF Ops
PSO/CDS
COSSEC
DS 11
DIC

OPERATION SUTTON - SITREP AT 1645A 21 MAY 82

1. This sitrep is based partly on signals from 317.0 and partly on a telephoned assessment from COS to CinC Fleet. Some items are not confirmed by signal but the Force Commander believes it is fairly accurate.

2. FANNING HEAD is now occupied by SBS units, surviving Argentine troops have surrendered.

3. All major infantry units are in position around SAN CARLOS Harbour and heavy equipment and artillery started to move ashore at 1620A.

4. 1 Chinook and 1 Puma destroyed by GR3 attack near PORT STANLEY and 1 Pucara was shot down by Stinger during raid on GOOSE GREEN. Two UK Gazelles have been shot down by Argentine Infantry weapons (casualties not known).

5. Air attacks have been made on ships in Falkland Sound and off SAN CARLOS’ harbour since 211330Z. 2 A4s, 1 Mirage and 1 Pucara have been shot down. 1 A4 possibly crashed. BROADSWORD (4 Casualties), ARGONAUT (3 casualties) and ANTRIM have suffered minor damage and ANTRIM has an unexploded bomb aft. An EOD team is being sent.
6. The Lynx from ARDENT attacked a tanker with Sea Skua at 1325A. Position given was 24 miles SE of SWAN ISLAND but as this put her on top of HORN HILL position is suspect.

7. Earlier reports of Exocet attacks have not been confirmed.

8. The air attacks on the Amphibious Force indicate that the Argentines have realised a major landing is in progress. The NORLAND and CANBERRA must have been located by some of the attacking aircraft. Therefore it seems that no further military concealment of our intentions is likely to succeed.

20 May 1982

A J WHETSTONE
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SITUATION REPORT FOR OP SUTTON AS AT 212100A

1. Shortly after midnight local time, the Amphibious Force entered Falkland Sound from the North. HM Ships INTREPID, FEARLESS, MVs NORLAND, CANBERRA and STROMNESS comprised the initial troop lift escorted by HM Ships PLYMOUTH, YARMOUTH, ANTRIM, BRILLIANT, ARDENT, ARGONAUT and BROADSWORD. The initial landing was by Royal Marines of the Special Boat Service from HMS ANTRIM after she had bombarded Argentine positions on Fanning Head. The Argentinian positions were captured and a number of Argentinian troops surrendered.

2. The main landings were made by Royal Marines and soldiers of the Parachute Regiment on both Eastern and Western shores of San Carlos Water starting at 0740Z (0440 local). These landings were unopposed.

3. A small raid on Goose Green airstrip was mounted by Special Forces during dark hours and a full report is awaited although it is known that one Pucara aircraft was shot down by a short range hand-held missile system.

4. Following the troop landings in San Carlos Water, the Landing Ships (Logistic) entered and began to unload Air Defence and heavy weapons and equipment. All major infantry units were put ashore by 1200Z (0900 local).

5. Harrier GR3 aircraft from the carriers attacked Argentinian helicopters on the ground near Port Stanley during the forenoon accounting for 1 Chinook and 1 Puma.

6. At 1330Z (1030 local) the Argentine Air Force began air attacks on the ships in San Carlos Water and units of the Task Force standing off the Falklands. During these attacks, HM Ships ANTRIM, BROADSWORD, BRILLIANT, ARGONAUT and ARDENT were damaged the latter two seriously. A report at 1817Z indicated ARDENT was sinking but this has yet to be confirmed.

During these air attacks a total of 10 Mirage, 5 A4 and 3 Pucara were destroyed with a further A4 possibly destroyed. One of our Harrier GR3 aircraft and two Gazelle helicopters are missing.

9. A late report states that:

ANTRIM is anchored making repairs.
ARGONAUT is under tow by PLYMOUTH.
ARDENT is afloat under tow by YARMOUTH.
BRILLIANT and BROADSWORD only minor damage.
PLYMOUTH and YARMOUTH undamaged.
No damage to Amphibious ships or civilian ships carrying the Landing Force.
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bomb disposal

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20 May 1982

A J WHETSTONE
ACNS(O)

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FLEET TO BEGIN LANDINGS

UNITED NATIONS, FRIDAY - BRITAIN'S SOUTH ATLANTIC BATTLE FLEET WAS UNDER ORDERS TODAY TO BEGIN LANDINGS AND HIT-AND-RUN RAIDS ON THE ARGENTINE-HELD FALKLAND ISLANDS FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE OF U.N. EFFORTS FOR A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT.

THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE WORD OF MILITARY ACTION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC EARLY TODAY, BUT A SENIOR BRITISH GOVERNMENT SOURCES SAID COMMANDERS OF THE 5,000 MARINES AND PARATROOPS WITH THE BRITISH TASK FORCE HAD BEEN GIVEN THE GO-AHEAD TO LAUNCH A WAR OF ATTRITION AGAINST THE ESTIMATED 9,000 ARGENTINE TROOPS ON THE ISLANDS.

A SET-PIECE BATTLE INVOLVING A FULL-SCALE INVASION AGAINST STRONGLY ENTRENCHED DEFENCES APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN RULED OUT BY THE GOVERNMENT, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. "ATTRITION IS THE NAME OF THE GAME NOW," THE SOURCE SAID.

GOVERNMENT SOURCES SPOKE OF THE "MILITARY SCREW BEING TIGHTENED QUITE QUICKLY AND QUITE TIGHTLY," WITH THE AIM OF ISOLATING AND DEMORALISING ARGENTINE FORCES.

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