PREM 19/643
The handling of the Falkland Invasion.

ARGENTINA.

September 1981

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PART 1 ends:

\[ \text{OD (SA) (BO) 6th Nov 27 81/482} \]

PART 2 begins:

\[ \text{OD (SA) (BO) 11 of 14/4/82} \]
## Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

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The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES.

Signed [Signature]  
Date [Date]  

PREM Records Team
Mr Haig telephoned the Secretary of State at 1240 on 13 April. He said that he had heard again from the Argentine Foreign Minister, who had come back with a further compromise proposal. The Argentine Government would in effect accept the formulation in paragraph 5 of the Anglo/US paper, but in return insisted on language paralleling the 1964 UN Resolution on decolonisation of the Islands. In that context, they would be willing to give the islanders local self-determination. In response to a question from the Secretary of State, Mr Haig confirmed that the Argentine Government had now dropped the five demands they had put forward earlier in the day and had moved a considerable way from their previous position. Mr Haig said he wanted to be sure that we would not reject this new proposal out of hand. If we could agree to language about decolonisation, subject to the wishes of the islanders, he thought that the Argentine Government would accept the Anglo/US paper, perhaps with one or two small changes to make it more palatable to them.

The Secretary of State said that clearly we would have to look at this carefully and would want to do the necessary research. Mr Haig said that the American side were also doing some homework and hoped to obtain the Argentine proposal in more specific form from the US Ambassador in Buenos Aires. He hoped that until there had been a chance to look at this proposal properly, all further action could be held up. He had told Mr Costa Mendez that he would soon almost certainly not go back to Buenos Aires. He also did not wish to stay much longer in London since it would begin to look as if he were acting as our agent. When the Argentine proposal had been firmled up, therefore, he would probably return to Washington.

The Secretary of State said that we would probably wish to discuss this proposal with Mr Haig further. Mr Haig said this might be necessary, but repeated that he could not stay in London much longer. Mr Haig added that our position (presumably over sovereignty) had been eroded over the years in the view of many other governments and he hoped we would not want to be too rigid on this now. In any event the Argentine suggestion was an opportunity to keep the dialogue going.
We have subsequently telephoned the US Embassy to check that they are now working on a specific proposal which could be put to us. Mr Streator undertook to let us know the position as soon as possible. He subsequently telephoned to say that the Americans were obtaining the text of the relevant resolution urgently and that Mr Haig would be in touch with the Secretary of State as soon as he could say anything more specific.

13 April 1982

cc: PS
    PS/Mr Hurd
    PS/Mr Onslow
    PS/PUS
    Mr Giffard
    Lord Bridges
    Mr Wright
    Mr Ure
    Mr Gillmore
    Defence Dept
    News Dept
PRIME MINISTER

c Sir R Armstrong

OD(SA) MEETING: 11 APRIL

A possible agenda for your meeting at 7.00 pm this evening will be -

1. The diplomatic situation. Today's letter to Mr Whitmore from the Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary sets out the latest position. You will need to decide what our attitude should be when Mr Haig returns to London tomorrow.

Paragraph deleted and retained under Section 3(4)

Wayland
1 May 2012

iii. The Governor. Last Wednesday morning's meeting deferred a decision on whether he should be on-loaded as the Task Force passes Ascension. The Foreign Secretary will be briefed on when this option will expire and will be able to offer considered views on whether he favours the idea.

iv. Declaration of War. President Galtieri appears to have threatened to declare war if we take military action against his forces, eg in the Exclusive Zone from tomorrow. The danger is perhaps remote, since even if he means it we seem unlikely to be offered an early target for military action. But the Home Secretary will be briefed on the implications, if war is declared on us.

v. Military situation. The Defence Secretary will be able to report on how soon new military decisions will need to be taken: eg what should be the Rules of Engagement for the Task Force? should we seize South Georgia (planning for this was authorised last Wednesday)? do we need to attack Port Stanley airfield?

11 April 1982

R L WADE-GERY
00 FC0 (DESKBY 111530Z)

RR WASHINGTON

GRS 220
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 111530Z
FM BRASILIA 11:1444Z APRIL 82
TO IMMEDIATE FC0
REPEATED INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 088 OF 11 APRIL

FALKLANDS: OUR TELNO 087 AND TELECON FLYNN-BRIGHT
PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO'S MESSAGE

1. CONTRARY TO THE IMPRESSION GIVEN BY SARDENBERG ON THE TELEPHONE
THE MESSAGE SENT BY PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI IS
MARKEDLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT SENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER. TEXT AS
PUBLISHED IN PRESS OF 11 APRIL IS AS FOLLOWS IN FREE TRANSLATION:
BEGINNS. AT THIS MOMENT OF SERIOUS RISK TO PEACE I AM DIRECTING MY
THOUGHTS, WITH EMOTION, TO THE SISTER PEOPLE OF ARGENTINA, TO WHICH
THE BRAZILIAN NATION FEELS FOREVER LINKED BY TIES OF THE DEEPEST
THOUGHTS, WITH EMOTION, TO THE SISTER PEOPLE OF ARGENTINA, TO WHICH THE BRAZILIAN NATION FEELS FOREVER LINKED BY TIES OF THE DEEPEST AND UNBREAKABLE FRIENDSHIP. I RENEW TO YOUR EXCELLENCY YET AGAIN THE SOLEMN COMMITMENT OF BRAZIL TO DO EVERYTHING TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SOLUTION WHICH PRESERVES THE SUPREME VALUE OF PEACE AND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLES OF ARGENTINA, THE AMERICAS, AND THE WHOLE WORLD. IN THIS SENSE I AM SENDING SIMILARLY TO PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER AN APPEAL IN FAVOUR OF CONCILIATION AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. RECALLING THE GREAT HISTORIC MOMENTS OF BRAZILIAN-ARGENTINE FRIENDSHIP AND THE PLEASANT TIMES I SPENT IN YOUR COUNTRY, IN THE NAME OF THE BRAZILIAN PEOPLE I WISH ALL ARGENTINES PEACE, CONCORD, AND FRATERNITY. ENDS.

2. A REPORT IN TODAY'S JORNAL DO BRASIL, QUOTING A SENIOR DIPLOMATIC SOURCE IN BRASILIA LAYS STRESS ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE WARM TERMS USED IN THE MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI AND THE FORMAL LANGUAGE USED IN THE MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

HARDING

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 11:1516Z AD/TW
Ref. A08091

PRIME MINISTER

**OD(SA)(82) 3rd Meeting**

The first business for this meeting will be to approve the instructions to be sent to the first SSN to enter the exclusion zone, and to other SSNs as they arrive there. A paper is being handed round. The instructions contained in it, which are based upon the rules of engagement already transmitted to the submarine, have been agreed with the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence.

2. In effect they give the Commander of the submarine discretion to attack any vessel positively identified as an Argentine warship, submarine or naval auxiliary. They do not restrict his discretion as to the size or type of naval vessel to be attacked; we are told that the Commander can be relied upon to use his discretion not to waste torpedoes on unimportant small naval craft.

3. The second purpose of the meeting is to agree upon the line to be taken with Mr Haig this afternoon. He will presumably accept that our immediate objective is the removal of Argentine troops from the Falklands and the restoration of British administration. You may like to agree with your colleagues on what should be said if he goes on to try to explore our ideas for long-term solutions. I suggest that at this stage, and before Mr Haig goes to Buenos Aires, we should say no more than that, once Argentine troops and British administration has been restored we shall be prepared to resume discussions of long-term solutions and shall be prepared to consider any solution which respects the wishes of the islanders themselves. If he asks whether that extends to a willingness to discuss sovereignty, the answer must presumably be that we do not wish to exclude in advance any solution which respected the wishes of the islanders.

4. Thirdly, the Sub-Committee may like to take note of the memorandum circulated yesterday evening on United States economic relations with the Argentine and the scope for economic pressure against Argentina.
Paragraph 5 deleted and retained under Section 3(4).

1 May 2012

6. Fifthly, you will wish to decide who should be with you for the meeting with Mr Haig; and when the Sub-Committee should hold its next meeting - if it is possible to take a decision before the meeting with Mr Haig.

7. For the meeting with Mr Haig, you should be aware that the United States intelligence agencies are helping and supporting our own intelligence effort with unreserved openness and generosity. Mr Haig himself has assured Sir Nicholas Henderson that if there is anything we need in the area of covert support and assistance we have only to ask. Profiting from this, a telegram of requests has already gone over to Washington. You may like to express your appreciation to Mr Haig.

8. You should also know that the presentation unit for which you asked is now in operation. It is in the Cabinet Office, and in the formal sense linked to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Paymaster General so that he can "represent" it in meetings of the Sub-Committee. It will of course have close links with the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

8 April 1982

The Chief of the Defence Staff would much like to be here.
Dear Mr.,

FALKLAND ISLANDS: MILITARY ACTION

As agreed I attach a copy of the paper on military action produced by the Chiefs of Staff today. It has been prepared as a paper for OD(SA).

I cannot over emphasize the sensitivity of this paper, and I am arranging for it to be sent to you by highly secure means. I have been asked to say that copies of the paper for the members of OD(SA) will be available in the Cabinet Room so that Ministers may read it before the meeting begins at 9 a.m.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary, Foreign Secretary and Paymaster General and to David Wright and Robert Wade-Gery (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

(D B OMAND)

A J Coles Esq
A J Coles Esq  
10 DOWNING STREET

Dear John,

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. You asked in your letter of 4 April to Brian Fall for an analysis of whether the Argentine press and public statements by the Government of the Argentine Republic should have shown well before the most recent events that there was an intention to invade the Falkland Islands. You also asked about possible evidence in letters from Falkland Islanders.

2. At Sir Michael Palliser's request, I enclose the following:

   (a) a note (JIC(82)(N)29 (Draft)) prepared by the Assessments Staff summarising developments from December 1981 onwards

   (b) a chronology of Argentine press comments and public statements between late December 1981 and March 1982;

   (c) an analysis of Argentine governmental and press comment during earlier periods of tension;

   (d) a note on letters in recent months from Falkland Islanders.

3. The analysis of Argentine comment and governmental statements in recent months shows that, although there were a number of references in the Argentine press to the possibility of an invasion, many of these appeared in one newspaper ("La Prensa") and were indeed the work of one journalist (a point also made in paragraph 3 of the Assessments Staff note). The general effect was that the nationalistic clamour on the Falklands which has always been a feature of the jingoistic Argentine press was stepped up, but not to the point where it could be said to amount to a clear indicator of the Argentine Government's intentions. Government statements reflected a harder line than that taken by the

/previous
previous Argentine administration; but the overall evidence (see the Assessment Staff's analysis) was that the Argentines remained committed to finding a solution by diplomatic means. To the extent that the press may have been officially inspired, the objective would have been to demonstrate Argentine impatience, at the time of the New York talks, for progress through negotiations on Argentine terms. This press comment also had to be set in our assessment of Argentine intentions against the repeated Argentine assurances made to the United States as well as to ourselves that they continued to give priority to a negotiated settlement on sovereignty.

4. Comparison with the analysis of the tone of Argentine press and government comment during earlier periods of crisis suggests that there has been no particular correlation between words and deeds. On a number of occasions, bellicose statements have been made by the Argentine press and to some extent by the Argentine Government, but in the end the crisis has passed over. The Shackleton incident in 1976 was potentially of a far graver nature than that in South Georgia.

5. The analysis of the very few letters received from Falkland Islanders in recent months shows that in so far as they were concerned about the prospect of an Argentine invasion, this concern was largely based on what was appearing in the Argentine press and therefore did not constitute independent evidence.

6. Finally, you will see that the Assessments Staff note concludes from the available evidence that the Argentine decision to order the task force to invade the Falkland Islands was almost certainly not taken earlier than 28/29 March, and could have been taken as late as 31 March or even 1 April. The note does not refer to our own despatch, at the initiative of the Foreign and Defence Secretaries, of an SSN on 30 March and of two further SSNs by 1 April.

* ~ ~ Passenger deleted and retained under Section 3(4).

CM Wayland
1 May 2012

R A Burns
Private Secretary to the
Permanent Under Secretary

cc: M S Webb Esq, MOD
D J Wright Esq, CABINET OFFICE
CHRONOLOGY OF ARGENTINE PRESS COMMENT AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS (END-DECEMBER 1981 - MARCH 1982)

22 December: Inauguration of President Galtieri. Inaugural speech emphasises need to stay firmly allied to the West and contains no direct reference to the Falklands.

29 December: Editorial in La Nacion emphasises Argentina's 'sovereign and unquestionable rights, based on historical and juridical factors' in the South Atlantic, and refers to establishment of research station on Southern Thule as reconfirmation of Argentine presence in area and 'civilized expression of exemplary scientific work'.

Until mid-January, press largely concerned with moves by Galtieri and his administration to consolidate their position in power.

24 January: Article in La Prensa entitled 'Foreign Affairs Offensive', by Iglesias Rouco, refers to Argentine conditions for the continuation of negotiations which, if not accepted by Britain, would result in immediate breaking-off of relations. Also refers to probable US support for 'any action leading to recovery of the islands, not excluding military action' and to the belief 'in the US and Europe that ... Buenos Aires will recover the islands by force this year ... although the government may not have foreseen this alternative, a military attempt to resolve the dispute cannot be ruled out when sovereignty is at stake. Moreover, it is calculated that such an operation will be relatively simple in view of the scant military resources of the area.'

3 February: Article in magazine Siete Dias entitled 'Enough?', calls 1982 the key year for effective recovery of the islands and draws attention to New York talks which could end in either bilateral agreement or, 'if the English persist in their systematic procrastination, in armed intervention to get back that part of our territory /usurped
usurped 149 years ago'. Also refers to demands in Argentina for 'explosive military operation', a 'final thrust to end this matter which affects our territorial integrity and national pride'. Emphasises Argentina's intention to persist in peaceful approach in hope that 'faced with the real alternative of armed occupation, the UK will ... press negotiations to a final conclusion'.

7 February: La Prensa terms the Falklands 'a now intolerable problem'. Says that determination by Argentine government 'conforms to most positive chapter of its policy'. The Government 'is not prepared to continue talking indefinitely, nor to put before the UN again something on which that organisation has already pronounced. If London does not agree to bind itself to a written timetable, Buenos Aires will apparently reserve the right to take other action ... which by no means excludes recovery of islands by military means'.

9 February: Editorial in Buenos Aires Herald called 'The Tough Approach' says that the dispute has gone on 'for far too long and that unless solved in the only reasonable way - by transferring the islands to Argentina, it will be resolved in a messy and damaging way that will harm the interests of everyone involved ... and it is time that the British, deservedly famous for the intelligent realism of their foreign policy, recognised this and took the only sensible course open to them'.

12 February: Captain Raúl Suarez del Cerro, Governor of Tierra del Fuego, reported in La Nación as saying that he hoped God would give him an opportunity to become governor of the Falklands before the end of the Argentine Government's term of office.

18 February: Iglesias Rouco, in La Prensa, claims that 'the time is approaching for Buenos Aires to think of force ... based on reason, capacity and necessity'.

/26/27 February

2 March: Statement by Argentine MFA following talks reserves Argentina's negotiating right to terminate procedure 'and to choose freely the procedure which best accords with her interests' in absence of progress towards early settlement. Unnamed government spokesman, quoted by _La Nación_, recalls former Foreign Minister's assertion that islands' status was 'unsustainable' and states that although plans exist for economic and diplomatic measures against Britain in absence of progress, suggestions of possibility of armed force could 'at the moment' be discounted.

3 March: _La Prensa_ draws attention to Argentina's dissatisfaction with New York talks as result of which 'it is very seriously considering possibility of a rupture with Britain in near future, which will include military occupation of islands'. Also refers to 'prospect of an escalation which could easily end in the taking of the islands by force'.

9 March: Argentine agency dispatch from Brasilia reports statement by Argentine Foreign Minister that Argentina dissatisfied with negotiations started 17 years ago, but was nevertheless willing to try all means provided by UN Charter to recover sovereignty over islands.

12 March: _La Prensa_ article, probably inspired by government, criticises support by UK media for islanders' wishes.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

4 April 1982
ANALYSIS OF ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND PRESS ATTITUDES DURING PREVIOUS CRISSES

1. In 1963, the Government of President Illia decided to press its claim through the United Nations. In 1964, the Falkland Islands was made a major target for Argentine diplomacy and internal propaganda. A government-inspired publicity campaign which included the institution of 'Malvinas Day', the promotion of demonstrations and lectures, etc, kept the issue in the public eye. Minor outrages were perpetrated against the British Embassy and three Vice-Consulates. In September, an Argentine pilot landed at Port Stanley, planted an Argentine flag and handed over a letter purporting to be a proclamation of sovereignty over the Islands. Although the Argentine Government disassociated itself from this incident, after a strong protest from Britain, the pilot received a hero's welcome and favourable treatment by the media on his return to Buenos Aires. The incident occurred simultaneously with the opening of discussion on the Falkland Islands in the UN Committee of 24.

2. The Condor incident. A similar incident occurred in 1966 when an Argentine Airlines DC-4, on a routine flight, was hijacked by a group of young Argentine right-wing extremists and directed to Port Stanley, where it made a forced landing on the race-track. 'Operation Condor' was followed by rowdy demonstrations all over Argentina in support of the claim to the Islands. The British Consulate in Rosario was attacked and shots fired at the Embassy when the Duke of Edinburgh, on an official visit to Buenos Aires, was inside. The 'invasion' was immediately praised by Peronist trade unions, which threatened strikes if the extremists were punished for their action. The Ongania government however condemned the incident (largely because Anglo-Argentine negotiations on the dispute were proceeding in a good climate). Encouraged by the strong lead taken by the Government, Argentine press coverage of the incident was however relatively objective.
3. **RRS Shackleton incident (1975-6).** In December 1975, Lord Shackleton visited on the RRS Shackleton to conduct a survey of economic development potential. This aroused strong Argentine hostility; and on 4 February 1976, an Argentine warship fired shots across the RRS Shackleton's bows. This led to the withdrawal of Ambassadors.

4. **Before the arrival of RRS Shackleton in the Islands,** the Argentine Navy sent messages threatening to arrest the ship if she began operations within 200 miles of the mainland. The Argentine UN Permanent Representative termed the visit "a unilateral and inconsiderate action by Great Britain which could have grave consequences". Argentines, he said, had reached the limits of their tolerance: and their patience should not be underestimated. Press speculation about the purpose of the ship's presence was rife, with a number of newspapers taking the opportunity to raise the sovereignty issue in strident terms. For example, *La Nacion* (November 1975) warned Britain that 'Argentina will not tolerate a return to imperialist methods', and other papers carried headlines that 'London should not go against the grain of history'. The press attempted to whip up public sentiment against British sovereignty over the Falklands as a "typical act of piracy". A public opinion poll conducted by the leading weekly magazine *Siete Dias* claimed that more than 60% of the Argentine population favoured an invasion of the Islands. There were reports that "concrete measures" would be taken to protect Argentina's interests, including the possibility of military action against the Islands.
LETTERS FROM FALKLAND ISLANDERS

1. The FCO are aware of only three letters from islanders since the date when General Galtieri became President of Argentina, all of them addressed to Members of Parliament. (There were also very few letters in the preceding few months.)

2. Of these letters, one, from the wife of an Island Councillor to Mr Julian Critchley MP, who sent a copy to Mr Luce, covered a number of points, including the withdrawal of HMS ENDURANCE, but did not refer to a possible Argentine invasion.

3. The two letters which did refer to the possibility of an Argentine invasion came from Mrs K. Bertrand, of Port Stanley (not a councillor) and were addressed to Sir Bernard Braine MP, who referred them to Mr Luce for comment. The first, dated 16 March, said that: 'Argentina is using broadcasts and newspapers to threaten us. They are saying that unless Britain hands over the Falklands this year, they will invade before the end of the year ... most of us feel that this is mainly a war of nerves, but there remains the possibility that a group will do just that, and we feel very strongly that Britain should make it quite clear to them that they would not take such an action tamely but would answer force with force.'

4. Mrs Bertrand's second letter, dated 9 March said: 'I do not know if you are aware that Argentine press (including the official press) is threatening to invade .... the threat is that unless Britain settles the dispute in their favour very soon they will be obliged to take the Islands over. It is mostly a war of nerves, no doubt .... then last week a heavy aircraft, probably a Hercules, flew over this town at 3 am, and was low enough to waken people up'.

5. Thus Mrs Bertrand's letters were prompted largely by Argentine press comment of which we were already aware. Overflights of the kind to which she refers have occurred from time to time for a long period, and we have always protested whenever the aircraft has been identified as Argentine. There was no increase in the period leading up to the invasion.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
4 APRIL 1982
With compliments,

Michael Jay
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 231934Z SEPT 81
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 989 DATED 23 SEPTEMBER 81
INFO PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES, WASHINGTON, PORT
FOR GOVERNOR FALKLAND ISLANDS)

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE’S MEETING WITH ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER
23 SEPTEMBER

1. LORD CARRINGTON RAISED THE QUESTION OF MISS HOBSON AT THE END
OF THE MEETING. DR CAMILION SAID THAT HE WOULD SEE WHAT COULD BE
DONE BUT EMPHASISED THAT THE PROBLEM WAS A DIFFICULT ONE AND
HELD OUT NO REAL HOPE OF A POSITIVE SOLUTION. THE REST OF THE
MEETING WAS DEVOTED TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

2. CAMILION, WHO WAS SUPPORTED BY ORTIZ DE ROZAS, ARGUED ON
PREDICTABLE GROUNDS BUT WITHOUT POLEMICS FOR A START TO FORMAL
NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR AT A LEVEL TO BE
AGREED. LORD CARRINGTON REPLIED THAT WE TOO WANTED NEGOTIATIONS
TO GET UNDER WAY BUT THAT WE HAD TO CARRY THE ISLANDERS WITH US.
IT WAS A BASIC FACT OF POLITICAL LIFE THAT NO BRITISH GOVERNMENT
COULD NEGOTIATE OVER THEIR HEADS OR SEEK TO COERCE THEM. WE WOULD
CONTINUE TO DO OUR BEST TO PERSUADE THEM OF THE BENEFITS OF AN
ACCOMMODATION, ESPECIALLY AS FAR AS INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT WERE CONCERNED, BUT WE HAD REALISTICALLY TO ACKNOWLEDGE
THAT ISLAND OPINION HAD IF ANYTHING GONE BACKWARDS OVER THE LAST
FEW MONTHS. THE NEXT THING WAS TO GET THE ISLAND ELECTIONS OUT
OF THE WAY. THE BEST WAY OF MAKING PROGRESS THEREAFTER MIGHT BE
FOR THE ARGENTINES TO SAY THAT THEY HAD SOME PROPOSALS TO MAKE
AND THAT THEY WOULD INTRODUCE THEM WHEN TALKS RESUMED (TO ANNOUNCE
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSALS BEFOREHAND MIGHT PROVOKE AN
ISLANDER REJECTION).

3. ORTIZ DE ROZAS RECALLED THAT THE ARGENTINE NOTE PROPOSING
NEGOTIATIONS REMAINED ON THE TABLE AND REQUIRED AN ANSWER.
LORD CARRINGTON REPEATED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE ARGENTINES
TO MAKE A PROPOSAL ON THE LINES HE HAD SUGGESTED AFTER THE ISLAND
ELECTIONS.

4. IN THE COURSE OF FURTHER DISCUSSION CAMILION SAID:

1. THE ARGENTINES WOULD MAINTAIN THE SERVICES THEY PROVIDED TO
THE ISLANDERS BUT THEY SEEMED TO GAIN VERY LITTLE THEREFROM;
THE ISLANDERS SIMPLY POCKETED WHAT WAS ON OFFER.
MEANWHILE THE ARGENTINES WERE NOT ABLE TO TAKE MEASURES
SUCH AS OPENING A BANK OR A TELEVISION STATION WHICH WOULD
HELP THEM PERSUADE THE ISLANDERS OF THEIR CASE.

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11. ARGENTINA WAS COMMITTED TO RESPECT THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS, WOULD STICK TO THIS POSITION AND WAS PREPARED TO OFFER ALL GUARANTEES THAT COULD BE IMAGINED. BUT IF THE STARTING POINT WAS TO BE THE WISHES RATHER THAN THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS THERE WOULD BE NO WAY FORWARD BECAUSE THE ISLANDERS WISH TO PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO WOULD ALWAYS PREVAIL.

111. THE KEY QUESTION WAS THAT OF SOVEREIGNTY AND THIS HAD TO BE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE ARGENTINE. NO-ONE LIKED CHANGE, BUT THE ISLANDERS COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO VETO THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS.

5. LORD CARRINGTON PICKED UP CAMILION’S REFERENCE TO ISLAND INTERESTS AND WISHES AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE WERE COMMITTED TO RESPECT THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS. IT WAS ONLY ON THIS BASIS THAT IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY POSSIBLE FOR US TO MAKE PROGRESS. HE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD GET THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED BUT THERE WAS NO POINT IN PRETENDING THAT DIFFICULTIES DID NOT EXIST. WE WOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ORTIZ DE ROZAS ON HOW BEST TO PROCEED.

PARSONS

Fco WHITCHALL

SAND

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

CONFIDENTIAL
1. The attached draft submission has been prepared by the Defence Secretariat.

2. Unless I hear to the contrary by telephone (Ext 6575) by noon on Tuesday 15 September 1981, I shall assume that the Chiefs of Staff have taken note of the submission and agreed its conclusions.

Attachment:

Draft Submission. (6 pages)

Distribution:

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Copy to:
ACDS(Pol)
ACDS(Ops)

14 September 1981

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DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS OF ARGENTINE ACTION AGAINST THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

(A Note by MOD officials)

Introduction

1. The recent JIC assessment (1) argued that the Argentine Government would prefer to pursue their sovereignty claim by peaceful means, but that if they concluded there was no hope of a peaceful transfer of sovereignty, military action could not be ruled out. Argentine military options were identified as:

   a. Harrassment or arrest of British shipping.
   b. Military occupation of one or more of the uninhabited islands.
   c. Arrest of the British Antarctic Survey Team on S Georgia.
   d. Small scale military operation against the Islands.
   e. Full scale military invasion of the Islands.

This note considers the defence implications of seeking to deter or counter these options by military means.

Argentine Military Capability

2. Argentina, with some of the most efficient armed forces in S America, has the military capability to pursue any of the options listed above. Her navy includes an aircraft carrier, 1 cruiser, 4 submarines and 9 destroyers backed up by amphibious ships, maritime patrol aircraft and offshore patrol vessels, and with 5 Marine battalions has the capacity to mount a substantial naval or amphibious assault operation. Air superiority would be afforded by land and Carrier based combat aircraft. The Argentine Air Force inventory includes over 200 fighter aircraft and 11 Canberra bombers. Operational and logistic support are relatively close by, the Falkland Islands being about 400 miles from the nearest Argentine naval and air bases.

(1) JIC(81)(N)34 dated 9 July 1981
Britain's military capability in the area

3. The Falkland Islands are nearly 8,000 miles from the UK. They comprise two large and upwards of 100 small islands with a population of about 1,800 concentrated in and around the capital, Port Stanley, on E Falkland. The two Falkland Islands dependencies, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands Group, are situated about 800 and 1,300 miles respectively to the South East and are uninhabited except for the 20 scientists of the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) on S Georgia and an unauthorised Argentine base on S Thule.

4. We retain a garrison of 42 Royal Marines on E Falkland, equipped with light infantry weapons, whose primary task is to defend the seat of Government at Port Stanley. The garrison could offer small-scale resistance to a minor localised incursion, but do not have the manpower, firepower, transport or communications to deal with anything but a very minor incident on one of the outlying islands. The part-time Falkland Islands Defence Force (approximately 100 men thinly scattered throughout the Islands) is of very limited military value.

5. The Ice patrol vessel, HMS ENDURANCE, patrols the area in the Summer months (Dec–March) but 1981/82 will be her last season. She is very lightly armed but has two Wasp helicopters embarked, equipped with anti-ship missiles. She has also a secure communications link with the UK. Her main value lies in maintaining a visible RN presence. After 1982 there will be only infrequent visits by RN ships.

General Constraints on Reinforcement of the Falkland Islands

6. Apart from South American airfields, which would be denied us, the nearest airfield is at Ascension Island, nearly 3,500 miles away. The only RAF aircraft which could cover this distance and operate
From the 4,100 ft Port Stanley runway is the Hercules. Its payload over this route is no more than 30 men, lightly equipped. Round trip fuel could not be carried and fuel supplies on the Falklands are very limited. Moreover, the lack of diversion airfields, limited airfield facilities and the adverse and unpredictable weather conditions, all militate strongly against using Port Stanley airfield for military operations.

7. A British military response to Argentine provocation would therefore have to be primarily a naval one. Reinforcement beyond the despatch of a frigate would probably have to come from the UK, since it is most unlikely that a suitable force would be more readily available. With passage time in the order of 20 days and, depending on the scale of the operation, the additional time required for assembly and preparation reinforcement by sea could take a month or more. There could be significant penalties to our commitments elsewhere.

Possible Responses to Argentine Action

8. a. Harrassment or Arrest of British Shipping. While the amount of British shipping currently in the area is relatively small, it offers an easy target for Argentine harrassment. We could decide to deploy a frigate on a semi-permanent, deterrent basis. To maintain one frigate always on station would require the deployment of two, to allow for maintenance and unserviceability. In the absence of local South American facilities, two RFA's would be required in support. This would add up to a considerable commitment, the extra cost of which would be over £20 million on an annual basis. Such a RN presence might be effective in deterring harrassment, but the initiative would remain with the Argentines, once the force departed. Prevention of an attempted arrest of British shipping could require the use of force.
b. Military occupation of one or more of the uninhabited islands. A realistic force to evict a small military force from an uninhabited island would be a Royal Marines Company Group (around 150 men) with amphibious assault craft and helicopter support. The extra cost of this deployment would be around £1M. In addition, a naval protection force (on similar lines to 8a) would be required. Were the force to remain for more than a few weeks, additional logistic support and resupply would be needed.

c. Arrest of the BAS team on S Georgia. To pre-empt a possible arrest, an additional detachment of Marines could be deployed to the Falklands to be stationed on S Georgia. They would need accommodation and, in the absence of a RN presence, would have to rely on a BAS ship for deployment and subsequent resupply. An additional RM detachment might cost about £0.2M for a year.

d. Small scale military operation against the islands. Permanent or semi-permanent reinforcement of the garrison to deter a small-scale invasion of say E Falkland would require a larger force. This could comprise a Royal Marines Commando Group of 850 men including an air defence capability of Blowpipe or Rapier as well as support from amphibious assault craft, helicopters, engineers and RN ships. Air support would be desirable, but only the Harrier could operate from Port Stanley airfield and its deployment would pose formidable operational and logistic problems. An Invincible class carrier, if available, could provide air cover and support helicopters, but its deployment would be costly. Fuel alone would cost about £5M, while the cost of maintaining the force on station would be over £2M a month.
e. **Full scale military invasion of the Islands.** In order to deter a full-scale invasion, a large balanced force would be required, comprising an Invincible class carrier with 4 destroyers/frigates, plus possibly a SSN, supply ships in attendance and additional manpower, up to brigade strength, to reinforce the garrison. Such a deployment would be very expensive (fuel costs alone amounting to about £10M) and would engage a significant portion of our naval resources. Moreover, its despatch could well precipitate the very action it was intended to deter. If then faced with Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands on arrival, there could be no certainty that such a force could retake the Dependency. Argentine national pride would probably demand a maximal response. Their geographical advantage and the relative sophistication of their armed forces would put our own task group at a serious disadvantage, relying as it would on extended lines of communication.

After the withdrawal from Service of our specialist amphibious shipping in 1984, RN surface ships, RFA's or landing ships logistic (their own future now under review) would be required to transport troops to the Islands. If LSL's were not available commercial shipping would have to be chartered for the transport of an RN Commando group; whilst commercial chartering would be essential if a brigade had to be deployed, since the RN would not have sufficient resources.

**Conclusions**

9. Military measures to deter or counter Argentine military action against the Falkland Islands would require the despatch to the area of additional forces, primarily naval, and possibly on a substantial scale. Any such deployment would be costly and pose considerable
logistic difficulties. To deter or repel even a small-scale invasion would require a significant commitment of naval resources, at the expense of commitments elsewhere, for a period of uncertain duration. To deal with a full-scale invasion would require naval and land forces with organic air support on a very substantial scale, and the logistic problems of such an operation would be formidable.