RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA
POSITION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

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**ARGENTINA**
Part 1: Sept 79
Part 25: June 82
PART 25 ends:

18 June

PART 26 begins:

19 June
## Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

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The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES.

Signed [Signature]  
Date 23 April 2012

PREM Records Team
Thank you very much for your letter of 17 June outlining your offer to help with the rehabilitation and enlargement of the airport at Port Stanley. Your firm clearly has past experience which could be useful.

I note that you have sent copies of your letter to John Nott, Francis Pym and Lord Cockfield. I am asking them to let me have their views on your proposal as soon as possible.
18 June 1983

Thank you for your letter of 18 June, with which you enclosed the original of the letter from the Australian Prime Minister to Mrs Thatcher.

AJC

Miss Leone Orth
18 June 1982

Dear Mr Coles,

Please find enclosed the original of the letter from the Australian Prime Minister to Mrs Thatcher, the cabled text of which was passed to you on 15 June 1982.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

(Leone Orth)
Senior Secretary

Mr A. Coles
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
No. 10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1.
RESTRICTED

(FM BERNE 1913672L

FROM BISBA TELNO 171 OF 18 JUNE
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
ALSO IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO, SANTIAGO, BRASILIA, WASHINGON,
UKMIS NEW YORK.
WPT: GENERAL NICOLAIDES

1. MAJOR-GENERAL CRISTINO NICOLAIDES WAS BORN IN CORDOBA ON
2 JANUARY 1925. HE JOINED THE ARMY IN 1944, GRADUATED FROM THE
WAR COLLEGE IN 1957, WAS PROMOTED TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL IN 1966,
TO COLONEL IN 1970, LATER APPOINTED MILITARY ATTACHE TO PARAGUAY
IN 1972-73, PROMOTED TO MAJOR GENERAL ON 31 DECEMBER 1979
AND APPOINTED COMMANDER OF THE CORDOBA 3RD ARMY CORPS IN DECEMBER
1980. IN DECEMBER 1981 HE BECAME COMMANDER OF THE BUENOS AIRES
1ST ARMY CORPS.

2. NICOLAIDES LED THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT'S TOUGH ANTI-GUERRILLA
CAMPAIGN IN THE INDUSTRIAL AREA OF CORDOBA IN THE MID-70S. HE
WAS CONSIDERED A CLOSE FRIEND OF GALTIERI'S WHO APPOINTED HIM
TO THE 1ST ARMY CORPS IN BUENOS AIRES. HE HAS OFTEN BEEN PORTRAYED
AS A HARD-LINE ANTI-COMMUNIST AND BECAME NOTORIOUS NEARLY TWO
YEARS AGO WHEN, AS COMMANDER IN CORDOBA, HE ANNOUNCED HE WOULD
OPEN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST LOCAL LEADERS OF THE RADICAL PARTY
WHO HAD ISSUED A STRONGLY-WORDED CONDEMNATION OF GOVERNMENT
POLICIES.

3. INITIAL REACTIONS TO HIS APPOINTMENT AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
PREDICT A TOUGHER ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLITICAL EMANCIPATION AND
A SLOWING UP OR EVEN HALTING OF THE NATIONAL RE-ORGANISATION
PROCESS. HE HAS MAINTAINED A TOTALLY INVISIBLE PROFILE DURING
THE FALKLAND CRISIS WHICH HAS NOW EARNED HIM PROMOTION TO THE
TOP ARMY JOB.

JOY 18.6.
UNQUOTE

POWELL-JONES

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FALKLAND ISLAND GENERAL
FCO
S AM D
CABINET OFFICE

RESTRICTED
Falklands: Australian National Appeal

The Australian Prime Minister has announced his support for a National Appeal to assist families of British Service-men and Falkland Islanders affected by the Falkland Islands dispute. The Australian Government will be contributing A$250,000 (about £150,000) towards the National Appeal and has agreed that contributions towards the Appeal will be tax-deductable. The Appeal will be co-ordinated by the Returned Services League. The precise arrangements for the disbursement of funds from the Appeal have yet to be worked out. However, the Prime Minister may wish to send a message to Mr Fraser acknowledging the Australian Commonwealth Government's contribution to the Appeal.

I attach a draft of the message, which might be sent telegraphically. In handing over the message our High Commissioner might, if you agree, tell the Australians that we have no objections to the message being released to the press.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
MESSAGE

DRAFT: Exempt

FROM: The Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

TO: The Rt Hon Malcolm Fraser CH MP
Prime Minister of Australia

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

Reference

Your Reference

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

I have just heard of your announcement of your Government's support for a National Appeal in Australia to assist families of British servicemen who have suffered in the Falkland Islands dispute, and Falkland Islanders who might be in severe hardship as a result of the dispute. I would like to say how much I appreciate this and how grateful we all are for your Government's contribution to the Appeal. We have all been much encouraged by the support and solidarity shown by the Australian Government and people in this tragic conflict.

Enclosures—flag(s)............
FALKLAND ISLANDS: NEGOTIATION WITH THE ARGENTINES

1. EAGLEBURGER HAS TOLD ME ABOUT A PROPOSITION WHICH WAS PUT TO
   HAIG THIS MORNING BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN NEW YORK. THIS WAS
   THAT SINCE PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF SCR 502 HAD NOW IN PRACTICE BEEN
   FULFILLED, THE WAY WAS OPEN FOR HMG AND THE ARGENTINES TO NEGOTIATE
   A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION UNDER PARA 3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SEEMED TO
   THINK THAT HE MIGHT NOW HAVE A ROLE IN BRINGING THE TWO TOGETHER.

2. EAGLEBURGER SAID HAIG WOULD LIKE OUR VIEWS. I SAID THAT THERE
   WAS NO FUTURE IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL TRYING TO PURSUE THIS THOUGHT.
   THINGS HAD CHANGED FUNDAMENTALLY SINCE THE RESOLUTION WAS PASSED.
   EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT WAS HAIG'S THOUGHT TOO.

HENDERSON
No 10 Downing Street
Cabinet Office D10

IMMEDIATE

GR 1200
UNCLASSIFIED
FM UKMIS New York 193402 Jun 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

Telegram Number 1828 of 18 June
INFO IMMEDIATE Washington, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Damascus, Amman
INFO ROUTINE all other Middle East Posts, Paris
INFO SAVING all other EC Posts.

MIPT: ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY STATEMENT

MR PRESIDENT

MY GOVERNMENT IS HORRIFIED BY THE TERRIBLE SUFFERING AND
DAMAGE WHICH HAS BEEN INFLICTED UPON LEBANON AND ITS PEOPLE.
LARGE NUMBERS OF INNOCENT MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN HAVE BEEN
KILLED OR WOUNDED. HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS HAVE BEEN MADE
HOMELESS. WHOLE COASTAL CITIES HAVE BEEN DEVASTATED.

THE DANGERS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE MUST BE EVIDENT TO US
ALL. WE ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE RISKS OF THE
CONFLAGRATION SPREADING. ALREADY THERE HAS BEEN BITTER
CONFLAGRATION SPREADING. ALREADY THERE HAS BEEN BITTER FIGHTING BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES.

THE EVENTS LEADING TO THIS AWFUL DESTRUCTION HAVE BEEN CLEARLY SET OUT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS REPORT TO THIS COUNCIL. BEGINNING WITH THE BOMBING OF BEIRUT BY ISRAELI AIRCRAFT ON 4 JUNE, HE HAS DESCRIBED HOW HOSTILITIES ESCALATED DESPITE APPEALS FOR RESTRAINT BOTH BY HIM AND BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL. ON 5 JUNE THE COUNCIL MET AND UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED RESOLUTION 508 CALLING UPON ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHIN LEBANON, AND ACROSS THE LEBANESE/ISRAELI BORDER, NO LATER THAN 2600 LOCAL TIME ON 6 JUNE. THE PLO RESPONDED TO THIS CALL BUT ISRAEL DID NOT. THE FOLLOWING MORNING, 6 JUNE, ISRAELI FORCES INVADED LEBANON FORCING THEIR WAY THROUGH UNIFIL LINES AT GUNPOINT. THAT EVENING THE COUNCIL MET AGAIN AND UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED RESOLUTION 509 CALLING FOR THE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES.

THE PLO AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED THAT RESOLUTION, THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL DID NOT. THE INVADING ISRAELI FORCES HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY ADVANCED TO THE OUTSKIRTS OF BEIRUT LEAVING A WAVE OF DESTRUCTION BEHIND THEM.

MR PRESIDENT, THE FACTS ARE PLAIN. ISRAEL HAS INVADED LEBANON IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PARAGRAPH 4 OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CHARTER, AS WELL AS IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE DEMANDS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. MY GOVERNMENT REGARDS THE INVASION AND OCCUPATION AS A VIOLATION OF LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND WE CANNOT ACCEPT THAT THE ISRAELI ACTION AMOUNTED TO SELF-DEFENCE. TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, WE HAVE MADE OUR POSITION CLEAR IN A STATEMENT ISSUED IN BONN ON 9 JUNE. IN THIS STATEMENT THE TEN CALLED URGENTLY ON ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509, AND IN PARTICULAR ON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS FORCES IMMEDIATELY AND UNCONDITIONALY FROM LEBANON AND TO PLACE UNIFIL IN A POSITION TO ACCOMPLISH ITS MISSION WITHOUT HINDRANCE. THE STATEMENT CONTINUED THAT SHOULD ISRAEL REFUSE COMPLIANCE WITH THESE TWO RESOLUTIONS THE TEN WOULD EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE ACTION.

MR PRESIDENT, MY GOVERNMENT STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NATIONAL
INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NATIONAL UNITY OF LEBANON. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS THE DUTY OF THE COUNCIL TO UPHOLD THESE ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS. WE WANT, AS WE BELIEVE THE LEBANESE PEOPLE WANT, TO SEE A LEBANON FREE FROM VIOLENCE AND SUFFERING WHICH HAS BEEN ITS TRAGEDY.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE CAN BE NO REAL PEACE OR STABILITY IN THE REGION UNLESS THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE ARE ALSO TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT IS EITHER WISE OR JUST FOR ISRAEL TO SEEK TO DENY PEOPLE THE RIGHT WHICH IT CLAIMS FOR ITSELF. ANY LASTING AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION WILL HAVE TO CONFIRM BOTH ISRAEL’S RIGHT TO PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. THESE PRINCIPLES HAVE BEEN SET OUT IN THE VENICE DECLARATION. THEY ARE PRINCIPLES WHICH MY GOVERNMENT BELIEVES REMAIN ESSENTIAL TO THE SEARCH FOR PEACE.

OUR IMMEDIATE TASK THIS EVENING WAS TO CONSIDER THE FUTURE OF UNIFIL. MY GOVERNMENT WARMLY SUPPORTED RESOLUTION 511 EXTENDING THE FORCE’S MANDATE FOR TWO MONTHS. WE BELIEVE IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO KNOW WHETHER THERE IS A ROLE FOR UNIFIL IN THE NEW AND RADICALLY ALTERED CIRCUMSTANCES IN LEBANON. BUT WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS RIGHT TO RESERVE THE OPTION FOR SUCH A ROLE, AN OPTION WHICH MIGHT WELL BE LOST IF THE FORCE WERE PRECIPITATELY DISBANDED. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT, IN SO FAR AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT, THE FORCE MAY BE ABLE IN THE INTERIM TO PLAY A HELPFUL AND HUMANITARIAN ROLE. IN THIS CONTEXT WE CALL ON THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO SHOW THE FULL RESPECT FOR UNIFIL WHICH IT HAS SO FAR FAILED TO DO.

ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT I SHOULD LIKE TO PAY TRIBUTE TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF UNIFIL AND TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS FOR THE SELFLESS EFFORTS WHICH THEY HAVE MADE, AND ARE CONTINUING TO MAKE, ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE DO NOT ACCEPT THE MISGUIDED CRITICISMS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE ABOUT THE FORCE’S INABILITY TO PREVENT THE ISRAELI ADVANCE. AS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS RIGHTLY STATED THE FORCE HAD NEITHER THE MANDATE NOR THE MILITARY CAPACITY TO COUNTER AN INVASION. WE ACKNOWLEDGE THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH CONFRONT GENERAL CALLAGHAN AND HIS MEN IN MAINTAINING UNIFIL AND ITS POSITIONS AFTER THE ISRAELI INVASION HAS MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO CARRY OUT THEIR MANDATE. WE SALUTE WITH GRATITUDE THEIR READINESS TO RESPOND TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S WISH THAT THEY SHOULD NEVERTHELESS REMAIN ON THE SPOT UNTIL BETTER TIMES WHEN IT MAY AGAIN BE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO EXERCISE ALL THEIR FUNCTIONS.
AGAIN BE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO EXERCISE ALL THEIR FUNCTIONS. MEANWHILE THEY DESERVE THE CONTINUED SUPPORT AND APPRECIATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

TONIGHT OUR THOUGHTS, MR PRESIDENT, MUST BE ABOVE ALL WITH LEBANON AND THE PEOPLE WHO LIVE THERE. THE HEARTFELT SYMPATHIES OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE GO OUT TO THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON IN THEIR PLIGHT. MY GOVERNMENT IS CONTRIBUTING TO THE URGENTLY NEEDED HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORT THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES, BOTH BILATERALLY AND VIA THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. WE HOPE THAT ALL COUNTRIES WILL CO-OPERATE IN THIS INTERNATIONAL EFFORT.

ABOVE ALL, MR PRESIDENT, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE FIGHTING SHOULD NOW COME TO AN END, AND THAT ISRAEL SHOULD COMPLY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 599 AND IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAW ALL HER FORCES FROM LEBANON TO THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED BOUNDARY. THE RULE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW MUST BE UPHELD OR WE SHALL ALL SUFFER THE GRIM CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILURE TO DO SO.

FOC PASS SAVING SAVING ATHENS, BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS.

PARSONS

NNNN
PS (6)
PS/1/R HURD
/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NEENAD
HD/KE
HD/UND
HD/SEC DEPT
HD/EO
... ...
HD/CONSULAR DEPT
... ...
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PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE D10

RR KUWAIT
RR MUSCAT
RR RABAT
RR SANAA
RR TRIPOLI
RR TUNIS
RR PARIS

GR 750
CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 193002 JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1026 OF 18 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, AMMAN
INFO ROUTINE ALL OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, PARIS
INFO SAVING ALL OTHER EC POSTS

ADVANCE COPY
IMMEDIATE
1. At the informal consultations of the Security Council this afternoon (19 June) there was the expected wrangle between Troyankovsky (USSR) and Mrs Kirkpatrick (US) over the text in my Tel No 1019. Mrs Kirkpatrick resisted Troyankovsky’s attempt to have resolutions 508 and 509 re-affirmed in an operative paragraph. After a laborious but moderately good-humoured discussion, consensus was reached on the text in MIFT.

2. The Council then proceeded to a formal meeting and the text in MIFT was put immediately to the vote and was adopted 13-2-2 as SCR 511. The USSR and Poland abstained as customary on UNIFIL mandate resolutions.

3. Mrs Kirkpatrick made a brief statement expressing pleasure at the extension of the mandate but insisting that it did not imply an extension of UNIFIL’s functions, scope or area. She said that there would be an opportunity while the situation in Lebanon stabilised to study what would best serve its people and the peace of the region. Dorr (Ireland) attacked the Israel invasion and the contempt shown by Israel for UNIFIL. He emphasised the fragility of UN peace-keeping operations and the need for full co-operation by all parties if UNIFIL was to carry on. He also stressed that the extension of UNIFIL’s mandate should be considered as no more than a temporary holding operation.

4. Troyankovsky (USSR) attacked Israel and the US on familiar lines. He reiterated that events in the region could not but affect Soviet interests.

5. The text of my statement is in my second MIFT.

6. The Netherlands and Sweden speaking as troop contributors criticised the Israeli invasion and the lack of respect shown to UNIFIL. Scheltema (Netherlands) said that the presence of Israeli troops in UNIFIL positions and the limitations imposed by the Israelis on the UNIFIL troops’ freedom of movement made it impossible for the force to perform its duties properly. Like Sweden, however, the Netherlands was willing to maintain its force in UNIFIL for an interim period.

7. Blum (Israel) repeated that Israel had no territorial ambitions in Lebanon but demanded that arrangements be made so that it could no longer serve as a staging ground for terrorist actions against Israel. He said that reports of the situation in Lebanon had been greatly exaggerated. The Red Cross were only treating 300 wounded and the medical situation in Tyre and Sidon was under control. After giving details of Israeli relief efforts, he went on
309 COMPLETELY AND THE MEDICAL SITUATION IN TYRE AND SYRIA WAS UNDER
CONTROL. AFTER GIVING DETAILS OF ISRAELI RELIEF EFFORTS, HE WENT ON
TO LAUNCH A STRONG ATTACK ON MOST OF THE PREVIOUS SPEAKERS SINGLING
OUT IN PARTICULAR TROYANOFSKY, DORR AND MYSELF. HE SAID THAT THE
UK'S POSITION AS A PERMANENT MEMBER WAS BLOCK RESOLUTIONS
INIMICAL TO ITS VITAL INTEREST CONFERRED NO MORAL SUPERIORITY.
8. FATTAL (SYRIA) MADE A TYPICALLY BOMBASTIC STATEMENT WHICH
AVOIED VIRTUALLY ALL MENTION OF SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT
OTHER THAN TO SAY SYRIA WOULD SPARE NO EFFORT TO STAND BY LEBANON
AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. HE CALLED FOR ISRAEL'S EXCLUSION FROM
THE UN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CHAPTER 7 SANCTIONS.
9. TUEH (LEBANON) THANKED PREVIOUS SPEAKERS FOR THEIR SUPPORT
FOR LEBANON AND ATTACKED BLUM'S ATTEMPT TO MINIMISE THE DAMAGE
AND SUFFERING CAUSED THERE. HE SAID THAT THE FUTURE OF LEBANON
WOULD NOT BE CONSTRUCTED IN THE SHADOWS OF GUNS OF OCCUPATION.
LEBANON WAS FOR THE LEBAEOSE ALONE AND THEY ALONE WOULD DECIDE
ITS FUTURE.
10. THE OTHER SPEAKERS WERE CHINA, ZAIRE, POLAND AND MAKSUD
(ARAB LEAGUE). THE PLO SPOKE BRIEFLY. DE NANTEUIL (FRANCE) MADE A
SHORT CONCLUDING STATEMENT IN WHICH HE SAID THAT THE INTERIM
EXTENSION OF UNIFIL'S MANDATE MUST BE FOLLOWED BY A REDEFINITION
OF THAT MANDATE. FRANCE WAS DEVASTATED BY THE SUFFERINGS OF THE
PEOPLE IN LEBANON. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF RIGHTS OF REPLY TO BLUM.

FCO PASS SAVING ATHENS BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN THE HAGUE
LUXEMBOURG ROME UK REP BRUSSELS

PARSONS

NNNN
UNCLASSIFIED

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 190245Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F CO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1025 OF 18 JUNE 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MIPT: FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING IS OUR SUMMARY/TRANSLATION OF THE ARGENTINE NOTE OF 18 JUNE.

2. THE FIRST FEW PARAGRAPHS OF THE NOTE DEAL WITH THE MILITARY OPERATIONS ON EAST FALKLAND, THE ARGENTINE SURRENDER ON 14 JUNE, OUR ALLEGED REFUSAL TO IMPLEMENT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 3 OF SCR 502, OUR VETO ON 4 JUNE AND ARGENTINA'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE PERPETUATION OF A SITUATION OF COLONIAL DOMINATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

3. THE NEXT PARAGRAPH READS:
"ARGENTINA COMES BACK AGAIN TODAY TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ESTABLISH CLEARLY, AS IT HAS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, ITS FULL READINESS TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTIONS 502 AND 505. MY COUNTRY HOPES
"
3. The next paragraph reads: "Argentina comes back again today to the Security Council to establish clearly, as it has on previous occasions, its full readiness to implement resolutions 502 and 505. My country hopes at the same time that the Council will pursue its efforts to get the United Kingdom to implement those resolutions in full."

4. The note then refers to our exclusion zones and the EC sanctions, and to yesterday’s note from the Argentine mission about the situation in Southern Thule (MY TELS nos 1021-1023).

5. The note continues: "There exists de facto in present circumstances a cessation of hostilities which Argentina is observing, but this cessation of hostilities will be precarious as long as the British attitude, as shown by the military occupation, the blockade and the economic aggression, continues. The complete cessation of hostilities will only be achieved when the United Kingdom lifts its sea and air blockade and the economic sanctions already referred to and when it withdraws its military occupation forces on the islands, the naval task force and the nuclear submarines which it has deployed in the waters of the region. Argentina indicates once again that only a negotiation conducted under the auspices of the United Nations and in accordance with the relevant resolutions, for which Argentina has always been ready, can lead to the definitive solution of the dispute, removing the situation of illegal colonial domination, sustained by force and which in itself constitutes a permanent threat to peace."

Parsons

NNNN
Falklands Selective Advances

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/LORD BERSTEAD
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
MR BARRETT
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
ED/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/PUSD
MR REED, PUSD

Emergency Room
Resident Clerk

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)
PS/S OF S DEFENCE
PS/HOME SECRETARY
PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DST)
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG
PS/SIR M PALLISER
PS/SIR A DUFF
MR WADE-GERY
MR FULLER
MR COVW
MR O'NEILL HD ASSESSMENTS STAFF
DIO
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
ADMLR SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

Confidential

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 190248Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F CO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1024 OF 18 JUNE 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

Falkland Islands: Security Council

1. At midday today (18 June) Reuters carried a report from Buenos Aires that Argentina had asked the United Nations to negotiate a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of British forces. As far as we can discover here, this is a reference to the latest in the series of letters the acting permanent representative of Argentina (Listre) has been sending to the President of the Security Council. A summary translation is in MI5. I do not think that this is evidence of a decision by the Argentines to return to the Council; it contains a lot of rhetoric and no specific request for a Council meeting. Listre has not seen the Secretary-General or the President of the Security Council. Nor do I think that the two paragraphs relating to a cessations of hostilities amount to anything new.

2. I had in any case been intending to see the Secretary-General today to explain to him, with brutal frankness, the impossibility of getting into negotiations with the Argentines at
2. I had in any case been intending to see the Secretary-General today to explain to him, with brutal frankness, the impossibility of our agreeing to enter into negotiations with the Argentines at present. I had heard that he had been discussing the question of reopening negotiations during calls he had received from heads of governments etc in connexion with UNSD II and that he had received some encouragement. E.g. from Schmidt.

3. I saw him twice this evening during the Council's proceedings on Lebanon. I told him that, in advance of the PM's visit, I wanted to speak to him. I would not mince my words. Britain and the Islanders had gone through a very testing experience. There had been an unprovoked invasion, the Argentines had refused or evaded all attempts to get them to implement SCR 592 peacefully. We had had to fight. We had suffered significant human losses and losses of material in making a monumental effort which had caught the imagination of the whole country. The Islanders had had an appalling experience, details of which were now beginning to emerge. We had been obliged fully to defeat the Argentines in the field in order to repossess the Islands. Even then the Argentines had shown an indifference to the wellbeing of their own troops which had further revolted British opinion.

4. Against this background it was absolutely and totally out of the question that we should sit down to diplomatic negotiations with the Argentines through any third party in order to discuss the future of the Islands or anything else. This represented not just the firm view of my Government but the strongly held view of the British people as a whole. It was no good talking of exchanging a full cessation of hostilities for an opening of diplomatic negotiations. If we could not get an unconditional cessation of hostilities out of Argentina, we would have to live with this. If anyone brought a resolution to the Council proposing a start of diplomatic negotiations, I was in no doubt whatsoever that we would veto it, however hard this might look in UN terms. What we now needed was a long cooling off period with no outside interference while we restored normal life to the Islands.

5. Perez de Cuellar said that he well understood our position. His problem was that he had a mandate and could not simply ignore it. He would have to say so to the Prime Minister and ask her how long she thought it would be before we could contemplate any kind of negotiation. In answer to my question, he said that he was not under pressure from the Argentines (he, like me, regarded Listre's latest note - MIET - as rhetoric) nor from anyone else in the
UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE ARGENTINES (HE, LIKE ME, REGARDED LISTRE'S LATEST NOTE - MIFT - AS RHETORIC) NOR FROM ANYONE ELSE IN THE COUNCIL. BUT THERE WAS NO KNOWING WHEN SOMEONE E.G. THE RUSSIANS, PANAMA, SPAIN, WOULD ASK HIM WHAT HE WAS DOING ABOUT HIS MANDATE. HE ASSURED ME THAT HE WOULD NOT SPRING ANY SURPRISES ON US: HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THE WHOLE SUBJECT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

6. I TOLD URQUHART AFTERWARDS OF THE ABOVE CONVERSATION. HE SAID THAT HE WAS GLAD I HAD SPOKEN AS I HAD. HE HAD BEEN PRESENT AT ALL PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S RECENT MEETINGS. A NUMBER OF VISITORS, INCLUDING REAGAN/Haig, SCHMIDT (RATHER OFFENSIVELY TO US), AND TRUDEAU HAD BEEN WRINGING THEIR HANDS ABOUT THE NEED TO HEAL THE BREACH BETWEEN THE WEST AND LATIN AMERICA AND ABOUT THE NEED FOR THE BRITISH TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY ETC. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD TOLD EACH OF THEM THAT, IN HIS JUDGEMENT, THE ARGENTINES HAD BEEN IN THE WRONG FROM THE START, THAT THEY HAD BEEN VASTLY MISTAKEN NOT TO ACCEPT OUR OFFER OF 17 MAY "WHICH INVOLVED MAJOR CONcessions WHICH HE KNEW WE HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO MAKE"; THAT ARGENTINA HAD WRECKED HIS NEGOTIATIONS, THUS LEAVING US NO CHOICE BUT TO REPOSSESS THE ISLANDS BY FORCE.

7. SINCE DRAFTING THE ABOVE I HAVE SEEN WASHINGTON TELNO 2190 WHICH REINFORCES MY JUDGEMENT THAT THE TIME HAD COME TO SPEAK PLAINLY TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR.

PARSONS
CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 1819592 JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1023 OF 18 JUNE 1982

MY 2 IPTS: SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT REPLY:

I HAVE THE HONOUR, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT, TO STATE THE FOLLOWING IN REPLY TO THE LETTER DATED 17 JUNE 1982 (S/15230) FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA ABOUT THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS.

THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS LIE APPROXIMATELY 1500 MILES EAST SOUTH EAST OF CAPE HORN IN THE ANTARCTIC OCEAN, TO THE NORTH OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY AREA. THE ISLANDS WERE DISCOVERED BY A BRITISH NATIONAL, CAPTAIN COOK, AND BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY WAS PROCLAIMED IN 1775, BEFORE WHICH THE ISLANDS WERE TERRA NULLIUS. THE ISLANDS HAVE LONG BEEN ADMINISTERED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM (MAINLY AS REGARDS SEALING AND WHALING); AND EARLIER THIS CENTURY THIS FACT WAS ACCEPTED BY ARGENTINA. ARGENTINA FIRST ADVANCED A CLAIM TO THE ISLANDS IN 1937. IN THE 1940s AND 1950s, THE UNITED KINGDOM OFFERED TO REFER THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE; AND IN MAY 1955 THE UNITED KINGDOM SUBMITTED ITS CASE TO THE COURT.
May 1955 the United Kingdom submitted its case to the Court by delivering an application to the Registrar (full text in "ICJ pleadings Antarctica cases (UK v Argentina)"). Having seen the strength of the British title to the islands, Argentina declined to accept the Court's jurisdiction.

In 1976, the United Kingdom became aware of the establishment of an Argentine station on Southern Thule for which no authorisation had been sought. Accordingly the United Kingdom protested at the time and has maintained its protest ever since.

On 2 April 1982, Argentina purported to proclaim "The recovery of its national sovereignty" over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. This proclamation was brought to the attention of the Security Council by the representative of Argentina in his statement at the 2346th meeting of the Security Council on 2 April 1982. At the same time, Argentina used armed forces in order to invade.

In my letters of 17 June and 26 April 1982 (S/15231 and S/15002), I reported to the Council the recovery by the United Kingdom of possession of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia, respectively. I now have the honour to report the recovery of possession of the South Sandwich Islands. The necessary operations by British forces were taken in exercise of the United Kingdom's inherent right of self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Parsons

NNNN
UNCLASSIFIED
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 181957 Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F CO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1022 OF 18 JUNE 1982

MINT: SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ARGENTINE LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

ON EXPRESS INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT, I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REFER TO CERTAIN ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD TO THE SCIENTIFIC STATION "CORBETA URUGUAY", WHICH THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC SET UP IN MARCH 1977 ON MORELL ISLAND, IN THE SOUTH SANDWICH GROUP. PREVIOUS WORK ON THIS STATION HAD BEGUN AT THE END OF 1976.

IT IS PERTINENT TO RECALL THAT THIS BASE WAS ESTABLISHED FOR PURELY SCIENTIFIC PURPOSES TO SERVE AS A SUB-ANTARCTIC STATION IN SUPPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITIES WHICH ARGENTINA IS CARRYING OUT IN THE ANTARCTIC AND IN ORDER TO RENEW THE WORK PREVIOUSLY CARRIED OUT DURING THE ANTARCTIC CAMPAIGNS OF 1954/55 AND 1956/57 IN THE SAME PLACE. ALREADY IN JANUARY 1955, THE ARGENTINE ICEBREAKER GENERAL SAN MARTIN HAD SET UP A BASE IN FERGUSON BAY, ON THULE ISLAND, IN THE SAME GROUP OF ISLANDS, WHICH REGRETEDLY DURING THIS SUMMER...
IN FERGUSON BAY, ON THULE ISLAND, IN THE SAME GROUP OF ISLANDS, WHICH HAD BEEN TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED DURING THIS SUMMER.

IN 1976, THE WORK OF REHABILITATION AND ENLARGEMENT OF THE EXISTING INSTALLATIONS WAS RENEWED WITH A VIEW TO HOUSING A SCIENTIFIC STATION TO CARRY OUT GEOLOGICAL PROSPECTING, PETROGRAPHY, STUDIES OF THE CONTINENTAL DRIFT AND OTHER SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUCH AS RESEARCH IN SOLAR RADIATION, GLACIOLOGY, OCEANOGRAPHY AND METEOROLOGY, DESIGNED TO SUPPORT BROADER RESEARCH PROGRAMMES IN ANTARCTICA.


IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT, BEFORE THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SCIENTIFIC STATION, NO PERMANENT INSTALLATION LIKE "CORBETA URUGUAY" HAD BEEN BUILT ON THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY THERE WAS NO PERMANENT SETTLEMENT ON THE ISLANDS UP TO THAT POINT. IT SHOULD ALSO BE RECALLED THAT ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS BRITISH SHIPS HAD CALLED AT THE SCIENTIFIC STATION AND MADE NORMAL CONTACT WITH IT.

"CORBETA URUGUAY" IS NOW ISSUING METEOROLOGICAL BULLETINS OF INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE. ITS INSTALLATIONS CONSIST OF THE MAIN DWELLING-HOUSE AND AN EMERGENCY HOUSE, A BUILDING HOUSING GENERATING EQUIPMENT AND BOILERS, AND A SHED FOR STORAGE AND SCIENTIFIC EQUIPMENT. HOWEVER, IT HAS NO EQUIPMENT OF A MILITARY NATURE.

WE HAVE NOW BEEN INFORMED THAT THE BRITISH WARSHIP ENDURANCE HAS INFORMED THE PERSONNEL OF THE STATION THAT THEY SHOULD ABANDON IT AND GIVE THEMSELVES UP AS PRISONERS; OTHERWISE THE SHIP WILL OPEN FIRE. THIS EXAMPLE SHOWS ONCE AGAIN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S OBVIOUS ATTACHMENT TO THE USE OF FORCE IN ORDER TO REMOVE BY VIOLENT MEANS A SCIENTIFIC STATION WHICH THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC HAS MAINTAINED SINCE 1977 AND WHICH CONSTITUTES ABSOLUTELY NO MILITARY THREAT.

PARSONS
CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKM1S NEW YORK 181955Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE FC O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1021 OF 18 JUNE 1982

SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS


2. I SHOULD LIKE TO REPLY AS SOON AS WE HAVE CONFIRMATION THAT THE ARGENTINES AT SOUTHERN THULE HAVE SURRENDERED.

PARSONS
CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 181747Z JUNE 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1020 OF 18 JUNE

MIPT: ISRAEL/LEBANON.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY DRAFT STATEMENT:

BEGINS

MY GOVERNMENT IS HORRIFIED BY THE TERRIBLE SUFFERING AND DAMAGE WHICH HAS BEEN INFLICTED UPON LEBANON AND ITS PEOPLE. LARGE NUMBERS OF INNOCENT MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN HAVE BEEN KILLED OR WOUNDED. HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS HAVE BEEN MADE HOMELESS. WHOLE COASTAL CITIES HAVE BEEN DEVASTATED. THE DANGERS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE MUST BE EVIDENT TO US ALL. WE ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE RISKS OF THE CONFLATION SPREADING. ALREADY THERE HAS BEEN BITTER FIGHTING BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES. THE EVENTS LEADING TO THIS AWFUL DESTRUCTION HAVE BEEN CLEARLY SET OUT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS REPORT TO THIS COUNCIL. BEGINNING WITH THE BOMBING OF BEIRUT BY...
ISRAELI AIRCRAFT ON 4 JUNE, HE HAS DESCRIBED HOW HOSTILITIES
ERUPTED DESPITE APPEALS FOR RESTRAINT BOTH BY HIM AND BY THE
PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL ON 5 JUNE. THE COUNCIL MET AND UNANIMOUSLY
ADOPTED RESOLUTION 508 CALLING UPON ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT
TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES
WITHIN LEBANON, AND ACROSS THE LEBANESE/ISRAELI BORDER, NO LATER
THAN 0600 LOCAL TIME ON 6 JUNE. THE PLO RESPONDED TO THIS CALL BUT
ISRAEL DID NOT. THE FOLLOWING MORNING, 6 JUNE, ISRAELI FORCES
INVADED LEBANON FORCING THEIR WAY THROUGH UNIFIL LINES AT GUNPOINT.
THAT EVENING THE COUNCIL MET AGAIN AND UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED RESOLUTION
509 CALLING FOR THE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI
FORCES. THE PLO AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED THAT RESOLUTION.
THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL DID NOT. THE INVADING ISRAELI FORCES HAVE
SUBSEQUENTLY ADVANCED TO THE OUTSKIRTS OF BEIRUT LEAVING A WAVE OF
DESTRUCTION BEHIND THEM.

MR PRESIDENT, THE FACT ARE PLAIN. ISRAEL HAS INVADED LEBANON IN
FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PARAGRAPH 4 OF ARTICLE 2
OF THE CHARTER, AS WELL AS IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE DEMANDS OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL. MY GOVERNMENT REGARDS THE INVASION AND
OCCUPATION AS A VIOLATION OF LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND WE CANNOT
ACCEPT THAT THE ISRAELI ACTION AMOUNTED TO SELF-DEFENCE. TOGETHER
WITH THE OTHER MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, WE HAVE
MADE OUR POSITION CLEAR IN A STATEMENT ISSUED IN BONN ON 9 JUNE. IN
THIS STATEMENT THE TEN CALLED URGENTLY ON ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED
TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509,
AND IN PARTICULAR ON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS FORCES IMMEDIATELY
AND UNCONDITIONALLY FROM LEBANON AND TO PLACE UNIFIL IN A POSITION
TO ACCOMPLISH ITS MISSION WITHOUT HINDRANCE. THE STATEMENT CONTINUED
THAT SHOULD ISRAEL REFUSE COMPLIANCE WITH THESE TWO RESOLUTIONS THE
TEN WOULD EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE ACTION.

MR PRESIDENT, MY GOVERNMENT STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE INDEPENDENCE,
SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NATIONAL UNITY OF LEBANON.
WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS THE DUTY OF THE COUNCIL TO UPHOLD THESE
ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS. WE WANT, AS WE BELIEVE THE LEBANESE PEOPLE
WANT, TO SEE A LEBANON FREE FROM THE VIOLENCE AND SUFFERING WHICH
HAS BEEN ITS TRAGEDY. AT THE SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE CAN
BE NO REAL PEACE OR STABILITY IN THE AREA UNLESS THE ASPIRATIONS OF
THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE ARE ALSO TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. WE DO NOT
BELIEVE THAT IT IS EITHER WISE OR JUST FOR ISRAEL TO SEEK TO DENY
PEOPLE THE RIGHT WHICH IT CLAIMS FOR ITSELF. ANY LASTING AND
PEACEFUL SOLUTION WILL HAVE TO CONFIRM BOTH ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO
PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO SELF-DELIM-
OUR IMMEDIATE TASK THIS EVENING WAS TO CONSIDER THE FUTURE OF UNIFIL. MY GOVERNMENT HARNESSED SUPPORTED RESOLUTION .... EXTENDING THE FORCE’S MANDATE FOR ....... WE BELIEVE IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO KNOW WHETHER THERE IS A ROLE FOR UNIFIL IN THE NEW AND RADICALLY ALTERED CIRCUMSTANCES IN LEBANON. BUT WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS RIGHT TO PRESERVE THE OPTION FOR SUCH A ROLE, AN OPTION WHICH MIGHT WELL BE LOST IF THE FORCE WERE PRECIPITATELY DISBANDED. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT, IN SO FAR AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT, THE FORCE MAY BE ABLE IN THE INTERIM TO PLAY A HELPFUL AND HUMANITARIAN ROLE. IN THIS CONTEXT WE CALL ON THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO SHOW THE FULL RESPECT FOR UNIFIL, WHICH IT HAS SO FAR FAILED TO DO.

ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT I SHOULD LIKE TO PAY TRIBUTE TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF UNIFIL AND TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS FOR THE SELFLESS EFFORTS WHICH THEY HAVE MADE, AND ARE CONTINUING TO MAKE, ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE DO NOT ACCEPT THE MISGUIDED CRITICISMS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE ABOUT THE FORCE’S INABILITY TO PREVENT THE ISRAELI ADVANCE. AS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS RIGHTEOUSLY STATED THE FORCE HAD NEITHER THE MANDATE NOR THE MILITARY CAPACITY TO COUNTER AN INVASION. WE ACKNOWLEDGE THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH CONFRONT GENERAL CALLAGHAN AND HIS MEN IN MAINTAINING UNIFIL AND ITS POSITIONS AFTER THE ISRAELI INVASION HAS MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO CARRY OUT THEIR MANDATE. WE SALUTE WITH GRATITUDE THEIR READINESS TO RESPOND TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S WISH THAT THEY SHOULD NEVERTHELESS REMAIN ON THE SPOT UNTIL HAPPIER DAYS WHEN IT MAY AGAIN BE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO EXERCISE ALL THEIR FUNCTIONS. MEANWHILE THEY DESERVE THE CONTINUED SUPPORT AND APPRECIATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

TODAY OUR THOUGHTS, MR PRESIDENT, MUST BE ABOVE ALL WITH LEBANON AND THE PEOPLE WHO LIVE THERE. THE HEARTFELT SYMPATHIES OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE GO OUT TO THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON IN THEIR PLIGHT. MY GOVERNMENT IS CONTRIBUTING TO THE URGENTLY NEEDED HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORT THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES, BOTH BILATERALLY AND VIA THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. WE HOPE THAT ALL COUNTRIES WILL CO-OPERATE IN THIS INTERNATIONAL EFFORT.

ABOVE ALL, MR PRESIDENT, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE FIGHTING SHOULD NOW COME TO AN END, AND THAT ISRAEL SHOULD COMPLY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 509 AND IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAW ALL HER FORCES FROM LEBANON TO THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED BOUNDARY. THE RULE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW MUST BE UPHOLDED OR WE SHALL ALL SUFFER THE GRIM CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILURE TO DO SO.

ENDS

PARSONS
1. FOUCET (c/o) told Head of Chancery this afternoon that

saying the French would probably send a team to see that lifting

the economic sanctions against Argentina immediately lifting the economic sanctions against Argentina. You may already have seen a report that Fouquet

said the French would make a move to this effect. The French contentions was that lifting

sanctions would start a process of de-escalation of the crisis.
SACTIONS WOULD START A PROCESS OF DE-ESCALATION OF THE CRISIS.

2. ARBUTHNOTT ARGUED THAT TO LIFT SANCTIONS BEFORE THE ARGENTINES HAD AGREED TO END ALL HOSTILITIES WOULD TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF THEM TO DO SO. FOUQUET SAID THAT REFUSING TO END HOSTILITIES WAS THE ONLY CARD LEFT IN THE ARGENTINE HAND. IN THE FRENCH VIEW, LIFTING THE SANCTIONS MIGHT WELL GIVE THE ARGENTINES THE OPENING THEY NEEDED IN ORDER TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY AND OPEN NEGOTIATIONS: CHEYSSON WOULD SAY THAT THIS WAS THE NEXT STAGE FORESEEN BY SCR 582 AND SHOULD NOW BE IMPLEMENTED. ARBUTHNOTT REPEATED THE ARGUMENT THAT SINCE SCR 582 HAD NOT BEEN HONoured BY THE ARGENTINES, THERE WAS NO OBLIGATION ON THE UK TO NEGOTIATE. FOUQUET DID NOT COMMENT FURTHER BUT SAID THAT HE WAS ONLY FORECASTING THE LINE CHEYSSON WOULD TAKE.

FRETWELL
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM UKMIS GENEVA 181000Z JUN 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 341 OF 18 JUNE
INFO FLASH MODUK, CINC FLEET, IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO, BERNE, BRASILIA
WASHINGTON, SANTIAGO, PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TEL 338 (NOT TO ALL): REPATRIATION OF POWS

1. AS EXPLAINED TO THE EMERGENCY UNIT, ICRC TELL US THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED TWO NOTES FROM THE ARGENTINE MISSION HERE THIS MORNING. THE FIRST AGREES TO THE CANBERRA AND THE NORLAND DESEMBARKING POWS IN MONTEVIDEO.

2. THE SECOND, RECEIVED ONE HOUR LATER, ACKNOWLEDGES A NOTE FROM THE SWISS EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES, NOTES THAT OUR WISH TO RETURN POWS QUICKLY IS BASED ON HUMANITARIAN CONCERN AND, BEARING IN MIND THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS RELATING TO POWS, OFFERS AN ALTERNATIVE. BOTH SHIPS MAY DESEMBARK POWS AT PUERTO MADRIN OR, IF WE PREFER, THE NORLAND COULD DOCK AT PUERTO QUILLA.
3. THE NOTE CONTINUES BY SAYING THAT DISEMBARKATION AT COMODORO RIVADAVIA WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE AS THERE ARE INSUFFICIENT FACILITIES THERE. THE ARGENTINES OFFER THE USE OF TWO OF THEIR HOSPITAL SHIPS, BAHIA PARAISO AND ARANTE IRIZAR PLUS THE CABO SAN ANTONIO (AUXILIARY SHIP) TO PARTICIPATE IN THE EXERCISE IF WE WISH.

4. THE NOTE LAYS DOWN THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:
   A) SHIPS FROM BOTH COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT CARRY ARMS
   B) THEY SHOULD NOT BE ESCORTED BY WARSHIPS
   C) HOSPITAL SHIPS SHOULD CARRY NORMAL HOSPITAL EMBLEMS
   D) OTHER SHIPS SHOULD BE MARKED PG OR PW
   E) DURING THE NIGHT SHIPS SHOULD SAIL WITH LIGHTS ON
   F) SHIPS WILL BE GRANTED FULL SECURITY BETWEEN PORTS OF DEPARTURE AND ARRIVAL.
   G) TO FACILITATE IDENTIFICATION FULL DETAILS OF ROUTES AND ESTIMATED ARRIVAL DATES AND TIMES SHOULD BE PROVIDED
   H) SHIPS WILL BE GUARANTEED USE OF ALL HARBOUR FACILITIES FOR EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING POWS.

5. THE NOTE ENDS BY CONFIRMING THAT ARGENTINA WILL REQUEST FULL ICRC PARTICIPATION IN THE EXERCISE. IT SEeks AN EARLY UK REPLY TO THE PROPOSAL.

MARSHALL

NNNN

SENT / RECEIVED AT 18/1030ZM 1M/VRJ
GRS 360
CONFIDENTIAL
FM THE HAGUE 181327Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 168 OF 18 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS AND LUXEMBOURG
INFO SAVING OTHER EC POSTS

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. I took van Walsum, Director for Western Hemisphere at the
MFA, through the points set out in Para 1 of your telno 153
To Brussels this morning. He stressed that those in (1)
and (III) were particularly welcome to the Dutch. I asked that
the points should be brought to the attention of Dutch Ministers,
in particular of whoever would be representing the Netherlands
at the Council on 21/22 June (almost certainly van AGT).
Van Walsum undertook to ensure that this was done.

2. I asked van Walsum about reports in this morning's press that
the Netherlands Government wanted Community sanctions against
Argentina lifted now that the Falklands were again under British
ADMINISTRATION. VAN WALSUM SAID THAT THESE REPORTS CORRECTLY REFLECTED THE DUTCH ATTITUDE. THEY WERE IN LINE WITH WHAT VAN HAD TOLD THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE SECOND CHAMBER ON 17 JUNE, AND WITH DUTCH MESSAGES TO PARTNERS SENT ON THE COREU NET-WORK EG CPE BIL ETR 266 OF 17 JUNE. THE BACKGROUND WAS THAT THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT WAS UNDER VERY STRONG PRESSURE BOTH FROM INDUSTRY AND IN PARLIAMENT TO ENSURE SANCTIONS WERE LIFTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SHOULD ARGENTINA UNEXPECTEDLY RESUME HOSTILITIES, "A NEW SITUATION WOULD ARISE".

3. VAN WALSUM ADDED THAT A FURTHER FACTOR WAS THE CONCERN THE DUTCH FELT ABOUT THE TOUGHER ATTITUDE THEY BELIEVED THE UK WAS NOW TAKING IN RULING OUT NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE ISLANDS' FUTURE EXCEPT WITH THE ISLANDERS THEMSELVES. AN ARGUMENT ON THIS POINT LED VAN WALSUM TO STRESS THAT THE CONCERN FELT BY THE DUTCH ORIGINATED WITH VAN AGT. I SUGGESTED THAT THAT MADE IT THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT HE SHOULD HIMSELF ATTEND THE COUNCIL ON 21/22 JUNE WHEN YOU WOULD NO DOUBT WISH TO EXPLAIN IN DETAIL TO YOUR COLLEAGUES THE BACKGROUND TO OUR THINKING.

4. I ALSO TOOK UP WITH VAN WALSUM THE QUESTION OF FUTURE ARMS SUPPLIES FOR ARGENTINA (YOUR TELNO 373 TO PARIS). VAN WALSUM TOOK CAREFUL NOTE. HE AGREED THAT THE QUESTION OF ARMS EMBARGOES WAS DISTINCT FROM THAT OF SANCTIONS. THERE WAS NO REASON AT THIS STAGE FOR THE DUTCH TO CHANGE THEIR PREVIOUS POLICY.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

HERVEY

NNNN

SENT AT 10/1401Z AW
CONFIDENTIAL

FM BOGOTA 182236JU6E 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCDO
TELNO 161 OF 18 JUNE

RI (IMMEDIATE) BRASILIA, LIMA, UKMIS NEW YORK (PRIORITY) MEXICO CITY, MONTEVIDEO, SANTIAGO, WASHINGTON, CARACAS, UKMIS GENEVA

YOUR TELNO 153 TO BRUSSELS: FALKLANDS: CEASEFIRE AND PRISONERS

1. I WAS SUMMONED TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE AT 1500 HOURS LOCAL TIME TODAY. AFTER PREPARING ME TURBAY SAID THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER (WHO HAD JOINED HIM FOR A PREVIOUS FUNCTION) WOULD EXPLAIN WHAT HE WISHED TO BE CONVEYED.

2. CARLOS LEMOS SAID THAT THE COLOMBIANS HAD CONSIDERED THE REQUEST IN YOUR TUR OF WHICH THE SUBSTANCE HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO THE MFA ON 17 JUNE (MY TELNO 160: NOT TO ALL). OVERNIGHT THERE HAD BEEN TWO DEVELOPMENTS. FIRST HE UNDERSTOOD THAT ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN AGREED FOR ARGENTINE PRISONERS TO BE CONVEYED BY SEA TO PUERTO MADRYN. SECONDLY GALTIERI HAD FALLEN AND THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN BUENOS AIRES WAS OBSCURE. WITH THE QUESTION OF DEPATURE APPARENTLY ON THE WAY TO A SOLUTION AND WITH THE POLITICAL TEMPERATURE IN BUENOS AIRES BOTH RAISED AND UNCERTAIN, HE DOUBTED WHETHER PRESSURE BY COLOMBIA TO DECLARE THAT HOSTILITIES WERE AT AN END WOULD PRODUCE A POSITIVE RESPONSE NOW FROM...
ILITIES WERE AT AN END WOULD PRODUCE A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE ARGENTINES. TURBAY HAD THEREFORE AGreed WITH PRESIDENT DELAUNDE AND FIGUEIREDO THAT COLOMBIA, PERU AND BRAZIL SHOULD JOINTLY OFFER TO PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION, BY SEA OR BY AIR, TO FACILITATE THE REPATRIATION OF THE REMAINING ARGENTINE PRISONERS. THIS WOULD BE A HUMANITARIAN GESTURE MADE TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS, WHICH COULD BE OF PRACTICAL ASSISTANCE AND HELP POLITICALLY TOWARDS SECURING THE CONFIRMATION ON THE ARGENTINE SIDE OF THE CESSION OF HOSTILITIES WHICH HE AGREED WAS ESSENTIAL. HE WAS NOW CONVEYING THIS OFFER "FORMALLY TO ME ON BEHALF OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS. HE HAD ALREADY DONE SO BY TELEPHONE TO THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR.

3. I SAID THAT AGREEMENT FOR THE RECESSION OF ARGENTINE PRISONERS AT PUERTO MADRYN WAS WELCOME, AND THAT TO A CERTAIN EXTENT THE QUESTIONS OF REPATRIATION AND A DECLARATION BY ARGENTINA OF AN END TO HOSTILITIES APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN DISENTANGLED. I UNDERSTOOD THAT SOME 5000 PRISONERS WERE BEING TRANSPORTED UNDER THE PRESENT EXERCISE. I APPRECIATED THE OFFER BY THE THREE GOVERNMENTS TO ASSIST IN REPATRIATING THE REMAINING PRISONERS AND WOULD IMMEDIATELY CONVEY IT TO MY GOVERNMENT. I WAS SURE HMG WOULD CONSIDER IT PROMPTLY AND WOULD WELCOME THE PRACTICAL AND POLITICAL MOTIVES WHICH INSPIRED IT.

4. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE FAILURE OR INABILITY OF THE ARGENTINE REGIME TO CONFIRM PUBLICLY THAT HOSTILITIES WERE AT AN END REMAINED A SERIOUS OBSTACLE AND POSED A PRACTICAL RISK TO OUR FORCES. THE TASK OF RESTORING PEACE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC WAS DAUNTING, NEITHER WE NOR OUR FRIENDS (NOR ARGENTINA'S) COULD EVEN BEGIN TO TACKLE THIS UNTIL THE ARGENTINES BROUGHT THEMSELVES TO AN EXPLICIT CONFIRMATION. WE WOULD WELCOME ANY HELP THE COLOMBIANS COULD GIVE TO SECURE THIS. LEMOS AGREED (BUT OFFERED NO FURTHER SUGGESTIONS). HE REPEATED THE TERMS OF THE JOINT OFFER AND SAID THAT IN PRACTICE COLOMBIAN ASSISTANCE WOULD BE IN THE FORM OF AIRCRAFT.

5. I SAID THAT I WISHED TO KEEP IN TOUCH. LEMOS SAID THAT HE WOULD BE IN BOGOTA ON 19 AND 20 JUNE. ON 21-24 JUNE INCLUSIVE HE WOULD BE IN NEW YORK FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT. HE EXPECTED TO SPEAK ON 23 JUNE, AND MADE THE POINT THAT HE WOULD BE GOING EARLY IN ORDER TO HEAR THE PRIME MINISTER'S ADDRESS. ALTHOUGH THE QUOTE JOINT OFFER QUOTE CLEARLY FALLS SHORT OF A FULL RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST IN YOUR TUR (AND MAY NOT BE ONE WHICH YOU WILL WISH OR NEED TO TAKE UP), IT IS A FURTHER DEMONSTRATION OF COLOMBIAN READINESS TO ACT POSITIVELY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF WHAT THEY BELIEVE TO BE THE POSSIBLE FOR THEM. SUBJECT TO THE VIEWS OF HER AMBASSADORS AT LIMA AND BRASILIA, IT WOULD ALSO SEEM TO BE DESIRABLE TO SHOW PROPER ATTENTION TO AN HOME.
WOULD ALSO SEEM TO BE DESIRABLE TO SHOW PROPER ATTENTION TO AN
INITIATIVE BY THREE GOVERNMENTS WHICH ARE NICELY BALANCED IN
FORMS OF THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARDS HMS AND ARGENTINA OVER THE
FALKLANDS. I THEREFORE VERY MUCH HOPE DUE NOTICE CAN BE TAKEN OF
LEMONS DURING HIS VISIT TO NEW YORK AND THAT IF AT ALL POSSIBLE HE
CAN BE RECEIVED AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL.

FCO PLEASE PASS

ROBSON

NNNN
Death of an Argentine Prisoner of War on South Georgia

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 15 June, the Attorney General's minute of the same day and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 16 June. Mrs. Thatcher is content that Mr. Nott should proceed as proposed in paragraph 6 of his minute.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of the other members of OD(SA), and also to Jim Nursaw (Law Officers' Department) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

D. B. Omand, Esq., Ministry of Defence
Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands

Thank you for your letter of 17 June. The Prime Minister has approved the proposed reply to the Chief Minister of Gibraltar and I should be grateful if you would arrange for its delivery.

A. J. Coles

F. N. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 28 June enclosing a letter to her from the former Prime Minister, Mr. Takeo Fukuda. She was most grateful for Mr. Fukuda's comments on the Falkland Islands situation and was sorry not to have been able to meet him during his visit to London.

AJC

18 June 1982

His Excellency Mr. Tsuyoshi Hirahara
London, 18th June 1982

Prime Minister

Dear Prime Minister,

I am asked to deliver the enclosed letter to you by former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, Special Envoy of the Japanese Government, who was passing through London on his way back from Saudi Arabia.

Yours sincerely,

Tsuyoshi Hirahara
Ambassador

The Rt.Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury,
10, Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.
Economic Measures against Argentina

1. I mentioned briefly at Cabinet on 17 June that I would seek to resist any attempt by our Community partners to lift economic sanctions against Argentina before a total cessation of hostilities. Since we had so little time to discuss the matter then I thought I should set out in more detail the line I shall follow in Community discussions and elsewhere.

2. Following the Argentine surrender on the Falkland Islands we have proposed to the Argentine Government that, if they are prepared to confirm that there is now a total cessation of hostilities between the two countries, the economic measures instituted by both parties should be lifted and at the same time we would be ready to ask those countries who have imposed economic measures against Argentina to bring them to an end.

3. The economic measures in question are:

   (a) the ban on Argentine imports;
   (b) the withholding of export credit cover for new business;
   (c) the freeze on Argentine assets in the UK;
   (d) the cancellation of the operating permit for Argentine airlines.

The old Commonwealth countries, the European Community members (apart from Ireland and Italy), Norway, the United States and to some extent Japan have supported us with parallel action under either or both of the first two of these measures. Although no other country has frozen assets, some have given informal advice to their banks to make no new loans. Argentina has taken retaliatory measures, chiefly on a matching basis.
4. In addition, our friends and allies have supported us in varying degrees in imposing an embargo on all arms and military supplies for Argentina or which might reach Argentina through third countries.

5. The Argentines, in repatriating the Brazilians on the repatriation of prisoners of war, have avoided replying on the cessation of hostilities. At the same time the German Foreign Minister has conveyed to me a decision by the German Cabinet on 16 June, for which he subsequently sought and apparently obtained French support, that the Community's import ban should be lifted immediately. I have received a message from the Italian Foreign Minister that he would now like to see us opening negotiations with Argentina on a longer term settlement of the Falklands issue. There have been other indications of similar European views, including at a meeting of the Political Directors of the Ten on 14 June.

6. The matter will be discussed at and in the margins of the Foreign Affairs Council on 20/21 June. I shall argue strongly against lifting the ban (unless Argentina has by then agreed to a complete cessation of hostilities) on the grounds that what we are looking for is peace and the secure trading conditions that would follow. If the Argentines have not responded we shall be maintaining our own import ban and the Total Exclusion Zone will remain in place with consequent disruption to trade with Argentina. I hope that our partners will recognise that it is in their own interest to insist with us on a total cessation of hostilities. But if - as the evidence suggests - they press for the Council to lift the EC's measures against Argentina there and then, it will not be possible to prevent this. I would in that case seek agreement that, in lifting the import ban, our partners should:

/(a) continue
(a) continue their arms embargo for as long a time as we can persuade them to do so and until Argentine intentions become apparent. This is in fact the most important thing that our partners can now do for us.

(b) agree that, should the Argentines attack British forces or the Falkland Islands, the EC import ban would be reimposed. I would of course make it clear that in any case in the absence of a continued cessation of hostilities we should ourselves maintain our import ban and other economic measures, relying as we have done from the start on Article 224 of the EEC Treaty.

7. Most of our non-Community supporters will be guided by what the Community does, although New Zealand and Australia may prefer to stick with us. I propose that we should tell them that we want them to continue their measures in support of us, and that in particular we would want them to do as we ask on the arms embargo.

8. I have considered whether we should continue any of our own measures as a means of pressure to achieve our objectives even after Argentine agreement to a total cessation of hostilities throughout the South Atlantic. Apart from the arms embargo, the only measure which has much impact through our national action alone is the freeze on assets. But if this is retained, it would delay the restoration of reasonable economic relations and prolong the dangers to British firms in Argentina and the potential damage to the City of London. The assets frozen here belong mainly to Argentine firms and private citizens, not to the Government. I doubt if there is anything significant which we could achieve by maintaining the freeze which would compensate for these drawbacks.

9. As regards the economic measures taken against us by Argentina, we shall want the Argentines to make clear that they are
they are removing their measures banning British imports and preventing payments to service debts to British banks, as well as their recent legislation preventing any transfer of British assets and attaching Government representatives to British firms. They should also be ready to restore air traffic links although whether we shall wish to take advantage of this is another matter. We need not object if they continue general trade restrictions and export control measures, which may be needed to conserve foreign exchange, provided there is no discrimination against us.

10. Once the blanket denial of new export credit cover for Argentine business is removed, it will be for discussion between ECGD and other Departments concerned to decide what policy should be adopted with regard to Argentina from now on, though this is bound to be very cautious, and restrictive.

11. I am copying this to OD colleagues and to the Governor of the Bank of England.

18 June 1982
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

(FRANCIS PYM)
18th June 1982

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

As I pass through London on my way back from Saudi Arabia, I wish to let it be known to you how deeply I sympathize with you in your difficulties over the Falkland Islands. Above all, I want to express my deep admiration for your determined leadership. I sincerely hope that a ceasefire be achieved as promptly as possible thus enabling a process for normalization to be effected.

Although I am refraining from seeking an opportunity to meet you on this occasion, I wish you every success. I am looking forward to seeing you before too long.

Sincerely yours,

TAKEO FUKUDA

The Rt.Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister and First Lord of The Treasury,
10, Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.
The Falklands

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has just received from President Reagan, extending his congratulations on the success of British arms in the South Atlantic. I think the Prime Minister would be grateful for advice from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on the terms of a reply.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD(SA) and also to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. J. Coles

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET.
DEAR MARGARET:

LET ME EXTEND MY CONGRATULATIONS ON THE SUCCESS OF BRITISH ARMS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. YOUR VICTORY WAS BOTH A BRILLIANT MILITARY FEAT AND A DEFENSE OF OUR SHARED PRINCIPLE THAT DISPUTES ARE NOT TO BE RESOLVED BY AGGRESSION. THE MINIMUM LOSS OF LIFE AND THE GENEROUS TERMS OF WITHDRAWAL WERE ALSO IN THE FINEST BRITISH TRADITION.

A JUST WAR REQUIRES A JUST PEACE. WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONSULTING WITH YOU AND TO ASSISTING IN BUILDING SUCH A PEACE. IT MUST OF COURSE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SACRIFICES OF YOUR MEN IN BATTLE. ITS ELEMENTS IN MY JUDGEMENT MUST INCLUDE ENHANCEMENT OF THE LONG-TERM SECURITY OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, MITIGATION OF ARGENTINE HOSTILITY AND IMPROVEMENT IN THE RELATIONS OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES WITH LATIN AMERICA.

IT WAS GOOD TO BE WITH YOU IN PARIS, LONDON AND BONN.

WARM REGARDS,

RON

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£4195

NNNN

DE CAB QSL WHO4195/4196 AT 11816Ø4Z

TKS KK
Mr Fearn

CLOSURE OF CONSULAR SECTION OF FALKLAND ISLANDS EMERGENCY UNIT

1. As already agreed the Consular Section of the Falkland Islands Emergency Unit is closing down in Room W117 as from midday today Friday 18 June.

2. The files maintained by the Consular Section are being removed to Clive House (Room 605). Enquiries should be referred to Section 5 of Consular Department (Room 603 Clive House, tel 213 6021) during office hours and to the Consular Duty Officer (213 4396) at the weekend.

3. The Telephone Supervisors have been informed separately.

K Goodwin
Emergency Unit Consular Section

18 June 1982

cc: Falkland Islands Distribution
CONFIDENTIAL

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION), 0730 HOURS, 18 JUNE 1982

Change of Government in Buenos Aires

1. Galtieri has 'retired' as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and been replaced by Cristino Nicolaides who will assume the duties of Army Commander today. Galtieri will submit his resignation to the Junta as President of the Republic today. Press reports say that he will be replaced temporarily by the present Interior Minister, General Alfredo San Jean, until the Junta appoints a new President. According to Reuters, Nicolaides is a moderate, but the Swiss Ambassador in Buenos Aires describes him as a man of the Right considered as hard and unimaginative.

Repatriation of POWs

2. Efforts continued throughout the 24-hour period to ensure the return of the bulk of the Argentine POWs by the shortest possible route. A reply received from the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister via the Swiss was categoric about the prospects for British ships docking in Argentine ports and described it as 'absolutely forbidden'. Ros added that Argentina would not accept any British proposal for a ceasefire as long as there was no mention of the possibility of discussion on sovereignty. The Uruguays meanwhile confirmed that they were prepared to accept the Canberra if necessary. The Brazilians have received indications that the Argentines would have no objection to the use of a Brazilian port if necessary.

3. The ICRC have passed to us confirmation from a member of the Argentine General Staff that the Argentines have no objection to Canberra and Norland going to Montevideo, and passing on the request that the Bahia Paraiso and two Argentine merchantmen should sail to Port Stanley to pick up POWs. It looks, however, as though there is still a chance that British ships could discharge the POWs at an Argentine port. An earlier report passed on by Washington that the Secretary-General of the Argentine Foreign Ministry was recommending that Canberra be permitted to enter port at Puerto Madryn has just been confirmed by telegram from HM Embassy Washington: the US military Attaché in Buenos Aires had spoken to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Army) who had confirmed with Nicolaides, the new Army Commander, that he would guarantee safe passage to the Canberra. The Chileans have confirmed that their position remains that they are willing to offer Punta Arenas if Argentina agrees.

Maintenance of
Maintenance of Economic Measures and Arms Embargo

4. Efforts are continuing through representations by HM Embassies in EC and OECD countries to maintain economic measures for the moment and to ensure that the arms embargo is kept up for as long as possible.

Communications with Port Stanley

5. We have received our first telegram from Port Stanley (on the state of accommodation).

Comment

6. The position of the Argentine authorities on repatriation remains apparently contradictory. Reports from the ICRC and the Brazilians confirm continued Argentine preference for Montevideo. We now however appear to have the agreement of the new Army Commander-in-Chief to Canberra and Norland offloading at Porto Madryn on the Argentine mainland, within short sailing-time from Port Stanley.

7. We need to decide whether to act now on the strength of General Nicolaides's reported agreement to the US Attache or to seek further assurances through the ICRC.

8. Otherwise, the only alternative option remains Montevideo or a southern Brazilian port. Punta Arenas remains blocked to us so far. Meanwhile the Argentines are publicising their own offer to send Argentine merchant ships to Port Stanley.

P R Fearn
Emergency Unit

18 June 1982

[Handwritten signatures: Monckton - Fl. H. Glover. South Atlantic Time. Logue]
CONFIDENTIAL

ZZ BERNE
GRS 777
CONFIDENTIAL

PM FCO 171600Z JUN 82
TO FLASH BERNE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 124 OF 17 JUNE
AND TO FLASH WASHINGTON, SANTIAGO, BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO AND UKMIS GENEVA
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK (DS 5, DS11, SC AND L) AND CINCFLFRT.

REPATRIATION OF ARGENTINE POWS

1. WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE CONDITION OF ARGENTINE POWS ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND OUR EFFORTS TO REPATRIATE THEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE HAVE BEEN MISUNDERSTOOD (OR IN SOME CASES MISREPRESENTED).

2. THE FACTS ARE THAT THE ARGENTINE POWS WERE FOUND IN AN APPALLING STATE (VIZ THE REPORTS FROM THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER) AND WE HAVE NO MEANS OF GIVING THEM ADEQUATE SHELTER OR PROTECTION IN BLIZZARD CONDITIONS ON THE ISLANDS. WE HAVE ASKED THE ARGENTINES TO AGREE THAT WE SHOULD REPATRIATE THESE TROOPS TO ARGENTINE PORTS AND FOR THIS PURPOSE WE NEED A GUARANTEE OF SAFE CONDUCT FOR OUR SHIPS. WE ARE NOT, REPEAT NOT, UNREASONABLY USING THE PRISONERS OF WAR AS A BARGAINING COUNTER. THE ARGENTINES IN RESPONSE HAVE SAID MERELY THAT THE PRISONERS SHOULD BE REPATRIATED TO MONTEVIDEO. THIS FACES US WITH A SEVERE PRACTICAL AND HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM. IF THE PRISONERS ARE REPATRIATED TO AN ARGENTINE PORT (PREFEABLY COMODORO RIVADAVIA) THE RETURN JOURNEY FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WILL TAKE 45 HOURS. FOR A JOURNEY AS SHORT AS THIS WE COULD LOAD THE CANBERRA WITH 5,000 PRISONERS OF WAR. (SIMILAR CONSIDERATIONS APPLY TO THE USE OF PUNTA ARENAS WHICH IS ALSO WITHIN ABOUT 24 HOURS SAILING TIME OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS). IF THE PRISONERS HAVE TO BE TAKEN TO MONTEVIDEO THE TRAVEL TIME WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY LONGER. MOREOVER, WE CANNOT DITCH THE CANBERRA ALONGSIDE AT MONTEVIDEO AND PRISONERS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE DISEMBARKED FROM OFFSHORE BY BOAT, AN OPERATION WHICH WOULD

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ADD FURTHER DELAY. THUS ARGENTINE INSISTENCE UPON THE USE OF MONTEVIDEO WILL SLOW DOWN THE WHOLE PROCESS OF REPATRIATION. IT WILL INCREASE THE SAILING TIME CONSIDERABLY, THEREBY DELAYING FURTHER TRIPS. THE ARGENTINE INSISTENCE UPON MONTEVIDEO DISPLAYS AN INCOMPREHENSIBLE LACK OF INTEREST ON THEIR PART IN THE WELL-BEING OF THEIR OWN PEOPLE.

3. THE CANBERRA WILL BE LOADED AND READY TO SAIL LATE THIS EVENING. PLEASE THEREFORE SPEAK IMMEDIATELY TO THE SWISS AND ASK THEM TO PUT THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE (EXCLUDING MENTION OF PUNTA ARENAS) TO THE ARGENTINES AS A MATTER OF GREAT URGENCY. THEY SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS NOT A QUESTION OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. OUR MOTIVES ARE HUMANITARIAN, MOTIVES WHICH WE WOULD EXPECT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO SHARE.

4. (FOR BRASILIA AND WASHINGTON). GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ASK THE BRAZILIAN AND US GOVERNMENTS URGENTLY TO REINFORCE THE POINTS ABOVE WITH THE ARGENTINE JUNTA. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT, OUR ONLY ALTERNATIVE FOR RAPID REPATRIATION IS THE USE OF PUNTA ARENAS. BUT FOR THIS THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND CHILE. IF IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE ARGENTINES IT IS CLEAR THAT AGREEMENT TO THE USE OF ARGENTINE PORTS IS OUT OF THE QUESTION, THE AMERICANS AND BRAZILIANS COULD, AS A FALL-BACK, URGE THE ARGENTINES TO MAKE IMMEDIATE ARRANGEMENTS WITH CHILE. PLEASE ALSO TELL THE AMERICANS AND BRAZILIANS THAT WE ARE EXAMINING URGENTLY THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME EVACUATION BY AIR. THE PROBLEM IS LACK OF AIRCRAFT. ONE POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE FOR THE AMERICANS AND BRAZILIANS TO LEND TO THE ARGENTINES C-130 TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT FOR THIS PURPOSE. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THIS IDEA IS MERELY UNDER CONSIDERATION AT THE PRESENT MOMENT AND WE ARE NOT ASKING THEM TO TAKE ANY ACTION. A PRELIMINARY REACTION TO THE IDEA WOULD, HOWEVER, BE HELPFUL.

5. (FOR SANTIAGO). PLEASE REHEARSE AGAIN WITH THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT, ON THE LINES SET OUT ABOVE, THE REASONS WHY THE USE OF PUNTA ARENAS MAY BE OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE.

EXPLAINING THAT WE ARE MAKING ANOTHER ATTEMPT THROUGH THE SWISS
TO OBTAIN ARGENTINE AGREEMENT TO THE USE OF ARGENTINE PORTS AND,
FAILING THAT, WITH THE CHILEANS FOR THE USE OF PUNTA ARENAS: BUT
THAT WE MAY IN THE END NEED TO ASK THEM URGENTLY FOR AGREEMENT
TO THE USE OF MONTEVIDEO. OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT, ALTHOUGH
THE CANBERRA CANNOT DOCK IN MONTEVIDEO, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO
BRING THE SHIP SUFFICIENTLY CLOSE TO HARBOUR TO ALLOW RELATIVELY
RAPID DISEMBARCATION OF THE POWS BY SMALL BOATS. PLEASE STRESS
THAT THIS IS A PRELIMINARY WARNING ONLY. WE SHALL, OF COURSE,
LET YOU KNOW AS SOON AS THE SITUATION IS CLEARER. MEANWHILE
PLEASE EXPRESS GRATITUDE TO THE URUGUAYANS FOR THEIR READINESS
TO TAKE THE NORLAND. A FINAL DECISION ON THIS WILL DEPEND ON
WHAT CAN BE DONE WITH THE CANBERRA.

7. (FOR UKMIS GENEVA): SEPARATE INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN SENT.

PYM

NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL

OO ATHENS
OO ROME
OO CARACAS
OO CANBERRA
OO WELLINGTON
GRS 505
CONFIDENTIAL
PM FCO 171545Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 153 OF 17 JUNE
AND TO IMMEDIATE COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, PARIS, BONN, ATHENS, ROME,
LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE, OSLO, STOCKHOLM, WASHINGTON, BRASILIA,
CARACAS, BOGOTA, LIMA, QUITO, SANTIAGO, MONTEVIDEO, MEXICO CITY,
OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLMINGTONG
FOR INFO MADRID, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA, BERNE, UKDEL NATO
FALKLANDS: CEASEFIRE AND PRISONERS

1. THERE REMAINS WIDESPREAD INTERNATIONAL CONFUSION ABOUT THE
   BASIC ISSUES INVOLVED IN OUR CURRENT PROBLEM OF REPATRIATING
   THE ARGENTINE POWS AND ACHIEVING AN END TO HOSTILITIES. THIS
   CONFUSION IS BEING WORSE CONFOUNDED BY DELIBERATE ARGENTINE
   MISREPRESENTATION OF OUR POSITION. MINISTERS ARE TAKING EVERY
   OPPORTUNITY TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT. MEANWHILE YOU SHOULD
   ENSURE THAT THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED IS LEFT
   IN NO POSSIBLE DOUBT ABOUT THE FOLLOWING BASIC TENETS OF OUR
   POSITION:

   (I) WHAT WE ARE DEMANDING FROM ARGENTINA NOW IS A CEASEFIRE
       AND AN END TO HOSTILITIES: IF WE WANT PEACE, WE ARE NOT
       DEMANDING A 'PEACE SETTLEMENT', NOR THAT THEY SHOULD EXPLICITLY
       RENOUNCE THEIR SOVEREIGNTY CLAIMS OVER THE FALKLANDS, NOR
       THAT THEY SHOULD GIVE ANY LONG TERM UNDERTAKINGS.

   (II) WE ARE NOT USING THE POWS AS HOSTAGES OF A BARGAINING
       COUNTER TO ACHIEVE THIS CEASEFIRE. ARTICLE 11(8) OF THE GENEVA
       CONVENTION DOES NOT ENVISAGE A RETURN OF POWS UNTIL A CESSATION
       OF HOSTILITIES HAS BEEN AGREED. PREMATURE RETURN RISKS
       PRISONERS BEING RECYCLED FOR WAR.

   (III) DESPITE THIS, WE ARE PREPARED AS A HUMANITARIAN ACT,
TO RETURN THE VAST BULK OF THE ARGENTINE POWS EVEN IN ADVANCE OF A CEASEFIRE PROVIDING ONLY THAT WE HAVE A GUARANTEE OF SAFE PASSAGE. REPORTS FROM PORT STANLEY (ALREADY AVAILABLE TO YOU) HAVE SHOWN THAT THE ARGENTINE PRISONERS WERE IN VERY BAD CONDITION WHEN CAPTURED AND THAT LOCAL RESOURCES ARE QUITE INADEQUATE TO PROVIDE SHELTER AND NOURISHMENT IN THE PREVAILING BLIZZARD CONDITIONS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE WANT TO BEGIN TO EVACUATE THEM NOW, WITH NO STRINGS ATTACHED OTHER THAN A GUARANTEE OF SAFE PASSAGE, TO EASE A SITUATION WHICH COULD ASSUME DISASTER' PROPORTIONS.

(IV) OUR EVACUATION PLANS ARE BEING DANGEROUSLY FRUSTRATED BY THE ARGENTINE REFUSAL EVEN TO GIVE THIS SAFE-CONDUCT FOR THE SHIPS ON WHICH WE WOULD PROPOSE TO RETURN THEIR PRISONERS. WE ARE PREPARED TO SEND THESE TO ANY PORT IN ARGENTINA OR A NEIGHBOURING COUNTRY WHERE THEY MAY BE SAFELY DELIVERED. BUT THE CLOSER THE PORT TO THE FALKLANDS THE FASTER WE CAN UNDER-TAKE THE OPERATION AND THEREFORE THE MORE CHANCE WE HAVE OF AVOIDING EVER MORE SEVERE HARDSHIP AND EVEN FATALITIES AMONG THE POWS.

(V) THE ARGENTINE JUNTA'S INTRANSIGENCE DEMONSTRATES THEIR LACK OF REGARD FOR THE SAFETY AND WELL-BEING OF THEIR OWN TROOPS: THEY APPEAR TO BE USING POWS AS AN EXPENDABLE FACTOR IN THEIR OWN EFFORTS TO AVOID POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT.

1. WASHINGTON, BRASILIA, SANTIAGO AND ANY OTHER POSTS WHERE ACTION WOULD BE EFFECTIVE, SHOULD (AGAIN) URGENTLY URGE THEIR HOST GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE UP WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT URGENTLY THE QUESTION OF CEASEFIRE AND SAFE-CONDUCT FOR OUR POW EVACUATION SHIPS.
10 JUN 73

FM BERNE 182112Z
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 177 OF 18 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, SANTIAGO, BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO, UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK (DS5, DS11, SC AND L), C IN C FLEET

MYTEL NO 175: REPATRIATION OF ARGENTINE POWS

1. THE FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF A MESSAGE FROM THE SWISS EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES TO THE SWISS FDFA REFERRING TO THE MESSAGE CONTAINED IN YOUR TELNO 124 AND THAT FROM THE SWISS EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES FORWARD IN MY TELNO 169.

BEGIN

1. I HAVE JUST GIVEN TO DEPUTY MINISTER RCS OF THE MFA A NOTE DERIVED FROM (REFERENCE TO MESSAGE IN YOUR TELNO 124). HIS REACTION WAS TO CONFIRM THE INFORMATION THAT I PASSED TO YOU YESTERDAY (REFERENCE TO MESSAGE FORWARD IN MY TELNO 169 OF 17 JUNE) THAT IT IS ABSOLUTELY FORBIDDEN FOR ANY BRITISH SHIP TO DOCK IN ARGENTINE CONTINENTAL TERRITORY. HE ADDED INCIDENTALLY THAT ARGENTINA WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY
169 Of 17 June) That it is absolutely forbidden for any British ship to dock in Argentine continental territory. He added incidentally that Argentina will not accept any British proposal for a cease-fire as long as there is no mention of the possibility of being able to reopen the discussion over sovereignty.

2. I have at the same time obtained the following information from General Cerdá, Auditor-in-Chief of the Army and the senior officer charged by the Joint General Staff as responsible for relations with the ICRC. He took into account the agreement between Argentina and Uruguay to authorise the Canberra to sail to Montevideo, declaring that that port had sufficient space and draught for a ship of that size. In addition he claimed that the Argentine government had requested two days ago authorisation from the British Government to allow hospital and transport ships to go to the Falkland Islands to repatriate soldiers to the mainland of Argentina. Up till now no response to this request had been given.

3. I wish to inform you that General Galtieri has just renounced his functions as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Army and thus as a member of the Junta. It is probable that he will also shortly resign from the presidency and until the nomination of his successor by the new junta General Saint-Jean, currently Minister of the Interior, will preside in the interim. Galtieri is replaced at the head of the land army by General Nicolaides, at present Commander of the Army First Corps, that of Buenos Aires. I met him some months ago at his HQ in Cordoba when he was Commander of the Army Third Corps. He is reputed to be a man of the right considered as hard and unimaginative.

E.N.S.

POWELL-JONES
CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 185835Z TO FCO

FROM MONTEVIDO 185805Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 494 OF 18 JUNE 1982.

AND TO IMMEDIATE BERNE WASHINGTON SANTIAGO BRASILIA AND UKMIS GENEVA

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK MODUK (DS 5 DS 11 SC AND L) AND CINCFLEET.

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 124 TO BERNE PARA 5.

IF NECESSARY THE URUGUAYANS ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE CANBERRA WITH ITS PASSENGERS.
CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 13:00Z22 JUN 62
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 236 OF 13 JUNE

AND TO FLASH MODUK (255, 2511, SC AND L), CINCFLEET
REPEATED INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS NEW YORK,
MONTEVIDEO, SANTIAGO, WASHINGTON, BERNE

MY TELMOS 282 AND 285: REPATRIATION OF ARGENTINE POWS

1. ACTING HEAD OF AMERICAS DEPT SUMMONED COUNSELLOR THIS EVENING
   AND SHOWED HIM, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE
   TEXT OF A MEMORANDUM FROM THE ARGENTINE EMBASSY TO ITAHARATY WHICH
   REHEARSES THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES' PREFERENCE FOR MONTEVIDEO AS
   PORT OF DESEMBARKATION FOR REPATRIATING ARGENTINE POWS AND THEN
   GOES ON TO SAY (IN SPANISH):

   QUOTE. IN THE EVENT THAT IT PROVES NECESSARY TO USE A PORT ON
   THE BRASILIAN COAST FOR THE REPATRIATION, THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT
   WILL HAVE NO OBJECTION TO MAKING THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS WITH
   THE INTERVENTION OF BRAZIL IN ITS CAPACITY AS PROTECTING POWER.
   UNQUOTE.

2. LYRA WAS UNABLE TO OFFER ANY INTERPRETATION OF THIS RATHER
   SURPRISING ARGENTINE MODIFICATION OF THE HASH HASH LINE TAKEN IN THEIR
   NOTE OF 16 JUNE (MY TELMO 282). BUT IT SEEMS TO ME PERHAPS
   SIGNIFICANT THAT MENTION OF THE RED CROSS IS OMITTED IN THIS
   CONTEXT WHILE THE INTERVENTION OF BRAZIL IN ITS CAPACITY AS
   PROTECTING POWER IS SPECIFICALLY PRESCRIBED.

3. LYRA WAS NOT AUTHORISED AT THIS STAGE TO GIVE THE GREEN LIGHT
   FROM THE BRASILIAN GOVERNMENT FOR THE USE OF A BRAZILIAN PORT,
   NOR COULD HE SAY WHETHER RIO GRANDE (THE MOST OBVIOUS CHOICE,
   BEING ONLY SOME 300 MILES BY SEA FROM MONTEVIDEO) COULD COPE WITH
   A SHIP OF CANBERRA'S SIZE AND DRAFT. HE PROMISED TO LOOK INTO
   THESE POINTS URGENTLY AND HAVE AN ANSWER READY IF POSSIBLE
   TOMORROW (FRIDAY) MORNING.

4. IF YOU WISH ME TO PURSUE THIS OPTION WITH THE BRAZILIANS,
   PLEASE TELEGRAPH ACCORDINGLY.
GVA/FCO 9

22 FCO

CO MONTEVIDEO

CO MODUK (DS 5 AND 11, SC AND L)

1E JUN 1982

CO CINCFLIGHT

GRS 210

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS GENEVA 171730Z JUN 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 338 OF 17 JUNE 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO, MODUK (DS 5 AND 11, SCAND L)

CINCFLIGHT

YOUR TELNO 124 TO BERNE AND MY TEL 336 ; REPATRIATION OF
POWS.

1. AS REPORTED BY TELEPHONE TO THE EMERGENCY UNIT THE ICRC
HAVE JUST GIVEN US THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WHICH THEIR DELEGATE
IN BUENOS AIRES HAS RECEIVED FROM GENERAL SUAREZ NELSON
OF THE ARGENTINE GENERAL STAFF.

(A) THE ARGENTINES CONFIRM THERE IS NO (NO) OBJECTION TO THE
CANBERRA AND NORLAND GOING TO MONTEVIDEO.

(B) THIS WOULD BE UNDER THE SAME GUARANTEES AS FOR THE REPATRIATION
OPERATION LAST WEEK.

(C) THE BAHIA PARAISO IS AT PRESENT IN A SOUTHERN ARGENTINE
PORT (DETAILS NOT KNOWN) AND COULD SAIL FORTHWITH FOR PORT
STANLEY TO PICK UP SOME 1500 POWS.

(D) TWO MERCHANTMEN COULD ALSO BE SENT (DETAILS NOT KNOWN).

IF WE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THE ARGENTINES WOULD PROVIDE THE
TECHNICAL INFORMATION WE REQUIRED.

2. THE ICRC WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR AN URGENT
REACTION TO THE FOLLOWING TO PASS ON TO THEIR DELEGATE IN BUENOS
AIRES.

MARSHALL

NNNNN
CONTRARY TO US EXPECTATIONS, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS TOLD THE US AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES THAT HE IS RECOMMENDING THAT THE CANBERRA SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO DISCHARGE P.O.W.'S AT PUERTO MADRYN. IN THE PRESENT STATE OF CONFUSION IN B.A. THE AMERICANS ARE UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHAT PROSPECT THERE IS OF THIS RECOMMENDATION BEING ACCEPTED BY THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

2. COMMUNICATION: PLEASE PASS FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION TO EMERGENCY UNIT.
GR 100
CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 182530Z
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2178 OF 18 JUNE 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE BERNE, SANTIAGO, BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO, UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK, CINCFLEET.

MY TELNO 2174: REPATRIATION OF ARGENTINE P O W

THE US MILITARY ATTACHE IN BUENOS AIRES HAS NOW BEEN ABLE TO SEE GEN WEHNER DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE ARMY STAFF. DURING THE CONVERSATION WEHNER WAS IN TOUCH WITH GEN NICOLAIDES. THEY SAID THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO GUARANTEE SAFE CONDUCT FOR THE CANBERRA AND ANOTHER SHIP TO ENTER PLERTO MADRYN.

HENDERSON
CC MODUK

CINC Fleet

GFS 840
CONFIDENTIAL
FM SANTIAGO 172132 JUN 82
TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 327 OF 17 JUNE 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BERNE, BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO, UKMIS GENEVA,
UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK (DS5, DS11, S.C. AND L), CINC Fleet.

YOUR TELNO 124 TO BERNE: REPATRIATION OF ARGENTINE POWS.

1. I SAW ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER GENERAL COVARRUBIAS AT 1930Z,
spoke as instructed and handed him an aide mem ope fully rehearsing
our arguments. He confirmed again that Chile was willing to offer
PUNTA ARENAS as a staging point for the return of Argentine POWs,
if Argentina was agreeable and so informed the Chilean government.
Speaking personally, he thought it unlikely Argentina would agree,
as they would not want Chileans or others to see the state the
Argentine prisoners are in.

2. Covarrubias suggested that we bring maximum pressure to bear
through the International Red Cross not only to persuade Argentina
of seriousness of situation, but also to publicise this as widely
as possible and enlist help of others, eg UN Secretary-General,
Peru and Venezuela, who should carry some weight in Buenos Aires.

3. I also mentioned possibility of Chile supplying ships to
evacuate Argentine POWs (your TELNO 266, not to all). Covarrubias
seemed well-disposed to this idea, always provided the Argentines
gave their agreement. He stressed that the Chilean Navy’s Antarctic
research ship QUOTE PILOTO PARDO UNQUOTE had very limited capacity,
but said he would look into this. My DA has mentioned this idea
independently to Admiral Poisson (Chief of Naval Staff) who reacted
similarly, and said that QUOTE PILOTO PARDO UNQUOTE was only
suitable ship for this purpose. Grateful to know whether this
requirement still exists in view of recent reassessment of numbers
of Argentine prisoners on the Falklands.

HICKMAN
Dear Prime Minister,

Please accept my warmest congratulations on your success in the Falklands. It has been an unparalleled combination of military skill and political resolution.

I suggest that we now need to show the same flair and imagination as the task force in the period of reconstruction ahead, and to marshal and deploy our national resources in a speedy and effective manner. Obviously one of the immediate essential tasks will be the rehabilitation and enlargement of the airport at Stanley, and here I think we can help.

One of our subsidiaries, Plessey Airports, is a specialist company providing complete airport facilities from design through to construction. It has done this, or is doing so, in countries as far apart as the Caribbean, West Africa and the Pacific. By an amazing coincidence it also happens to have as its Chief Engineer (civils) the man who designed and supervised the construction of Port Stanley Airport and the consulting engineers have access through him to all the previous Port Stanley survey and design work. In that context I enclose a short paper showing the relevance of all this to the Stanley requirement which we could take on forthwith.

Please forgive me for approaching you directly on this, but it has been difficult for us to identify which part of Government to approach in this connection, and I feel the matter is of such national interest as to justify my writing to you personally. We shall, of course, be happy to pursue more detailed discussions with any Minister or officials whom you care to name, with a view to bringing our expertise quickly to bear on this vital task. Meanwhile, I am sending copies of this letter to John Nott, Francis Pym and Lord Cockfield.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

JAC/dls

Registered in England and Wales Number 203848 at Vicarage Lane, Ilford, Essex.
Plessey Airports Ltd is a company that was formed within the Plessey Group to provide a total design and construct capability in airport work anywhere in the world.

The Group contains "inhouse" expertise in virtually every form of electronic, navigation, radar and communication system needed in airports. However, the range of disciplines involved in airfield planning and construction is substantially wider than is normally required in a purely electronic group of companies. To provide this total service, qualified staff with significant experience in civil works design and in construction management are part of the company's resources.

Plessey Airports has entered into contracts across the world and is currently operating in the Caribbean, West & Southern Africa and in the South Pacific.

The engineer who designed and supervised the construction of Port Stanley Airport is the Chief Engineer (civils) of the company! Through his previous association with the consulting engineers, Rendel, Palmer & Tritton, Plessey Airports has access to all the previous Port Stanley Airport survey and design work.

It is believed that, for the foreseeable future, the Falkland Islands will need to be independent of supply from, or communication through, any part of Latin America including Chile. To provide an airport that will enable the above objective to be realised, the following factors are mentioned by way of example but not limitation.

(a) Substantial payloads flown in by C130, VC10 or B747 from Ascension Island will call for an extension of the Port Stanley runway from the present 4,100 ft to 10,000 ft. Previous surveys show this to be possible.

(b) Navigational Aids

Cloud Cover at Port Stanley can frequently be as low as 300 ft. Therefore, trans-ocean aircraft will require the assistance of navigational aids additional to those that were previously there. Specifically, an ILS and a VOR/DME, in addition to the previously existing NDB and VASI, will be needed.

(c) Fuel Storage

Aviation fuel facilities can be provided initially by using an oil tanker as a bunkering facility from which supplies can be pumped and then trucked by, say, three aircraft refuelling tankers to the airport. Storage, and an adequate road from the jetty to the airport is an obvious concomitant to this interim measure and settling tanks must be built.

Continued...../2
(d) **Power Supply**

The new airport buildings, the communication and navigational and airfield lighting systems must all be served by independent diesel generators. 3 x 250KVA and 1 x 30KVA (for off-peak running) are the forecastable need.

(e) **Communications**

If the operational criteria is to provide a high grade system for military as well as civil communications, a satellite communication circuit will be the best solution. We also recommend VHF ground to air communication with aircraft (250 mile range) and HF single side band air to ground communication with aircraft (long range). There will need to be point to point communication between Ascension Island and Port Stanley - an AFTN system is proposed. There should also be a radio relay link between Port Stanley airport and the town of Port Stanley to carry telephone and teletype services.

(f) **Meteorological Station**

The previous met. services will need to be up-graded. This can be achieved by introducing weather and wind-finding radars together with receiving equipment to access internationally maintained weather satellites.

(g) **Fire & Rescue Equipment and other Group Equipment**

This will have to match the size and scale of the larger aircraft which henceforth will be using Port Stanley airport. Materials handling facilities appropriate for large aircraft will also be needed to be introduced.

(h) **Airport Buildings**

Plessey Airports Limited would design and supply and erect all the necessary buildings for the airport, both in the context of short-term requirements and making due allowance for future development plans. It would provide its own accommodation requirements which will be of such a type that, upon completion of the works, they could be made available, if required, to the Islanders.

Plessey Airports Limited, in consultation with Rendel, Palmer & Tritton will, if required, not only design, supply and supervise the construction of all the airport and other airfield requirements, but also the associated infrastructure needs of the Falklands. The re-opening of the previously developed quarries will have to be part of the programme.

Continued.../3
Summary

Plessey Airports Limited have the necessary site data to commence immediately the design of a runway of appropriate length. Were the civils and building works to proceed through the conventional civil contractor/invitation to bid route, our experience is that the preliminary consultations would certainly take not less than four months. The rapid and more practical route would be to use the Royal Engineers to perform the civil works with Plessey Airports Limited acting as the specialist contractor and the co-ordinating body.
17 June 1982

Dear Sir,

I enclose a copy of a telegram received yesterday by Mr Rex Hunt from Mr Harold Rowland (formerly Financial Secretary, now acting head of civilian administration), and the people of the Falklands.

Mr Rowland asks that the message contained in the telegram should be conveyed to the Prime Minister and British Government.

Yours ever,

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
Dear John,

Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has received a message for the Prime Minister from Sir J Hassan, the Chief Minister of Gibraltar. It reads:

'Gibraltar rejoices in your victory over aggression and offers you its warmest congratulations on your unwavering and successful defence of freedom, human rights and self-determination'.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary thinks it would be appropriate to send a short message in reply which could refer to Gibraltar's support for Britain throughout the crisis. I attach a draft telegram.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
1. Please give the following message from the Prime Minister to Sir J Hassan:

BEGINNS: Thank you for your kind message of congratulations on the repossession of the Falkland Islands. Gibraltar's sturdy support during the recent difficult weeks has been warmly appreciated. ENDS

PYM

NNNN
FURTHER BRAZILIAN PRESS COMMENT

1. THE PRESS ON 16 JUNE CONTAINED SOME INTERESTING REMARKS BY THE ITAMARATY PRESS SPOKESMAN ON THE ROLE BRAZIL MIGHT PLAY IN THE FUTURE OVER THE FALKLANDS CRISIS. PERICAS IS REPORTED AS SAYING THAT BRAZIL COULD ONLY CONSIDER PARTICIPATING IN A FUTURE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FALKLANDS (REFERRED TO IN LOCAL PRESS REPORTS AS A POSSIBILITY BEING MOOTED IN LONDON) IF THE ARRANGEMENT HAD THE AGREEMENT OF BOTH BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA, OR WAS ORGANISED UNDER THE AUSPICIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS. HE ADDED THAT THE BRAZILIAN POSITION "WOULD BE DETERMINED BOTH BY THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROBLEM AND BY OUR (IE BRAZIL'S) GENERAL POSITION IN RELATION TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC". THIS IS INTERPRETED BY THE CORREIO BRASILEIENSE TO MEAN THAT BRAZIL, WHICH HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED THE ARGENTINE CASE FOR SOVEREIGNTY, WILL DO NOTHING WHICH COULD PREJUDICE THIS.
SUPPORTED THE ARGENTINE CASE FOR SOVEREIGNTY, WILL DO NOTHING WHICH COULD PREJUDICE THIS.

2. YESTERDAY'S PRESS ALSO INCLUDED FURTHER EDITORIAL COMMENT TO THAT REPORTED IN OUR TUR. THE MAIN THEME IS THAT THE GALTIERI REGIME HAS NOW GOT WHAT IT DESERVED. THERE IS NO CRITICISM OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S POLICY IN THE WAKE OF THE CEASEFIRE, AND IN PARTICULAR, NO CALLS TO EXERCISE MODERATION OR TO INVOLVE THE UNITED NATIONS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY NOTEWORTHY IN THE O GLOBO EDITORIAL - A PAPER WHICH NEVER STRAYS FAR FROM HIGH LEVEL GOVERNMENT - OR AT LEAST MILITARY - THINKING. O GLOBO NOTES THAT BRITISH POLICY IS NOW TO OFFER THE "HELPERS" SELF-DETERMINATION AND SUBSEQUENTLY INDEPENDENCE. THIS, THE PAPER COMMENTS WITH IMPLIED APPROVAL, IS IN LINE WITH THE TRADITIONAL BRITISH POLICY OF DECOLONISATION. BRITAIN, IT IS NOTED, HAS FOUGHT AN "ETHICAL WAR", DELIBERATELY LIMITING CASUALTIES AND MEANWHILE OFFERING PERSUASIVE WAYS OUT FOR ARGENTINA. THE MAIN THING NOW, THE EDITORIAL ARGUES, IS FOR FENCES TO BE MENDED ON THE AMERICAN CONTINENT AND FOR FELLOW SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO HELP ARGENTINA RETURN TO NORMALITY AND OVERCOME THE TRAUMA PROVOKED BY DEFEAT IN A SENSELESS WAR.

3. A MAJOR EDITORIAL IN THE ESTADO DE SAO PAULO IS EVEN MORE FORCEFUL (FULL TEXT BY BAG ON 18 JUNE). LOOKING TO THE FUTURE IT NOTES THAT THE RULES OF THE GAME WILL NOW RIGHTLY BE DETERMINED BY MRS THATCHER. VICTORY, IT SAYS, CONFER THIS PRIVILEGE. ABOVE ALL, THE FUTURE WILL NOW DEPEND, THE EDITORIAL CONTINUES, ON THE REACTION OF BUENOS AIRES - PEOPLE, ARMED FORCES AND GOVERNMENT - TO THE SURRENDER. LATIN AMERICA CAN ONLY EXPRESS AUDACITY AND RECOMMEND PRUDENCE. BRITAIN, BY DefENDING A PRINCIPLE WITHOUT WHICH INTERNATIONAL LIFE WOULD BECOME IMPOSSIBLE, HAS DONE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AN EXEMPLARY FAVOUR.

HARDING

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 17:1911Z AD//WD
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BONN 1721402 JUNE 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 575 OF 17 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKREP BRUSSELS

MY TELNO 575: FALKLANDS

SUMMARY
1. FOLLOWING MY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH BULLARD TODAY, I HAVE HAD A LONG TALK WITH STATE SECRETARY VON STADEN. I TOLD HIM THAT THE INEXPICIBLE FRANCO-GERMAN INITIATIVE ON AN IMMEDIATE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS (TELECON FISCHER/BRIDGES) WAS LIKELY TO DO GRAVE DAMAGE TO NATO, EC AND ANGOLO-GERMAN RELATIONS. I THINK THAT I MADE A STRONG IMPRESSION. I THINK VON STADEN WAS SHAKEN, AND AGREED THAT I SHOULD TRY TO TALK WITH GENSCHER: I HAVE A PROMISE OF A MEETING WITH HIM TOMORROW.

DETAIL
2. I EXPLAINED OUR CONVERN AT THE NATURE OF THE ARGENTINE REPLY AND OUR HUMANITARIAN ANXIETY TO GET RID OF THE CONSCRIPTS. I EXPRESSED MY ASTONISHMENT AT THE GERMAN LINE, EMPHASIZED THE POLITICAL DAMAGE THAT THIS WOULD DO, AND CRITICISED GERMAN WILLINGNESS
2. I explained our concern at the nature of the Argentine reply and our humanitarian anxiety to get rid of the conscripts. I expressed my astonishment at the German line, emphasized the political damage that this would do, and criticized German willingness to take decisions without checking the facts with us. I stressed Argentine intransigence, their apparent lack of concern for their men in our hands, and their unwillingness so far to agree to cease all hostilities. I said there was a grave risk of the Germans sending the wrong signals.

3. Von Staden did not have a lot to say in reply. He repeated arguments about the need to repair relations with Latin America. I replied that we also wished to repair relations there, but the Latin Americans were deeply engaged with Western Europe and the US. The Soviet Union could not replace us.

4. I also explained that concessions we had earlier offered to Argentina were not now on the table.

5. Von Staden said that the Cabinet had felt upset by our reference in our message to the Junta to asking our partners to lift sanctions. But he made no great thing of this. I took him through the text to show that we were not pre-empting the Community. I also told him that others were proving stancher than the Germans.

Taylor

NNNN

Sent at 17/22152 DW
ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (40)

PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2)
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
PS/CHANCELLOR
MR ILETT TREASURY
MR LITTLER
MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY
SIR R ARMSTRONG
SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO
DIO
ROOM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

[Passed to E.R.]
[Typists a.a.]
TOUCHY SENSE OF HONOUR. THEY FELT THAT THEIR WORD (IE PROMISE TO RESPECT THE END-USER CERTIFICATES) WAS BEING QUESTIONED. DORIN ALSO SAID THAT THE PERUVIANS CATEGORICALLY DENIED HAVING TRANSFERRED MIRAGES TO ARGENTINA.

3. MARTIN THEN SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT FOR THE PRESENT FRANCE WOULD CONTINUE TO RESPECT THE UK'S WISHES. CHEYSSON HAD ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO THAT EFFECT. HOWEVER HE (MARTIN) WANTED US TO UNDERSTAND THAT FRANCE'S STAND CAUSED GREAT PROBLEMS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY PERU.

4. BEFORE MY CALL ON MARTIN, FOUQUET, HEAD OF SOUTH AMERICA DEPARTMENT, HAD LET SLIP WHEN ACTION WAS BEING TAKEN WITH HIM ON YOUR GUIDANCE TELNO 131 THAT THE FRENCH WERE THINKING OF MAKING A STATEMENT ON THE FALKLANDS WHICH WOULD CALL FOR APPLICATION OF SCR582. FOUQUET SAID THE STATEMENT WAS UNLIKELY TO BE MADE BEFORE THE MEETING OF THE TEN FOREIGN MINISTERS ON 21 JUNE. WE POINTED OUT THAT A STATEMENT OF THAT SORT WOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD IN LONDON AND DREW HIS ATTENTION TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS ON RESOLUTION 582 IN PARLIAMENT ON 15 JUNE. WHEN I ASKED MARTIN ABOUT A POSSIBLE FRENCH STATEMENT HE SAID AT FIRST THAT NONE WAS ENVISAGED. HE THEN ADDED THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE ONE AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER THE MEETING ON 21 JUNE.

FRETWELL

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 17,- 1747Z DA
DEATH OF AN ARGENTINIAN PRISONER OF WAR ON SOUTH GEORGIA

1. I have seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute to you of 16 June in which he raises, and seeks my views on, the question whether our report to the Protecting Power need be accompanied by the statements of all witnesses or whether we could transmit only the statements of the other prisoners of war.

2. With some hesitation, I endorse the view that the narrower interpretation could be defended. Purely as a matter of construction of the text of Article 121, the wider interpretation (i.e. that the statements of all witnesses should be transmitted) is the more natural one but the narrower interpretation is not manifestly unreasonable and there is some support for it in a commentary on the Convention by an unquestionably reputable authority. If there are good practical reasons for our basing ourselves on it, I therefore would not wish to argue against our doing so. But I ought to point out that we may well be criticised for it (not only by the Argentinians themselves) and it may be difficult to explain our reluctance to make available the statements of the only witnesses who have a direct personal knowledge of what actually happened. This could give rise to reasonable suspicion that we were trying to cover something up. All this points, in my view, to the need, if we do withhold the statements of our own witnesses, to making the report as full and detailed as possible.

3. I am copying this minute to the other members of OD(SA) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

17 June 1982
Law Officers Department
Argentina: Release of Detained British Personnel

As I told Francis Richards on the telephone this afternoon, the Prime Minister believes that we should find some way of using our willingness to repatriate prisoners to Argentina to obtain the release of the one British prisoner of war and the three British journalists who are detained. She was asked a question in Parliament this afternoon about the journalists and rather implied in her reply that we should be trying to make such an arrangement.

Mrs. Thatcher would be grateful if the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Defence Secretary could consider how this objective can best be achieved. It might be useful to have a preliminary discussion at OD/SA tomorrow morning.

I am copying this letter to Nick Evans (to whom I have already spoken) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
17 June, 1982.

Dear Mr. Adams,

Thank you for your letter of 16 June extending the sympathy of the Government and people of Barbados to the families and friends of those who lost their lives in the fighting in the South Atlantic. I hope and believe that their sacrifice, and the efforts we have made to demonstrate that aggression must not pay, will indeed help, as you suggest, to protect small and vulnerable societies elsewhere.

Many thanks for your timely message.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

The Hon. J.M.G.M. Adams, M.P.
THE PRIME MINISTER

17 June, 1982.

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your message about the ending of the fighting in the Falkland Islands. Earlier attempts to resolve the dispute by negotiation having failed, owing to Argentine intransigence, we had no alternative but to use force to repossess British territory and restore to the Islanders the way of life which they wished to follow. The first of these objectives has been achieved and we shall now do our utmost to secure the second.

It was good of you to write. My very best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

His Excellency Dr. Siaka Stevens
10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 June, 1982.

Dear Mr. President,

Now that the Argentine armed forces in the Falklands have surrendered and we can proceed to reconstruction and rehabilitation of the islands, I should like to thank you most warmly for the staunch support which the Togolese Government has given to us from the outset of the crisis.

During these difficult times it has been immensely reassuring to know that we can count on our friends in Africa in upholding the principles to which we attach importance, in particular the unacceptability of the use of force to change frontiers and the right to self-determination.

I greatly appreciated the support which your Government gave to Security Council Resolution 502 and, more recently, your decision to abstain on 4 June on the Security Council resolution which called for a ceasefire without adequate guarantees of Argentine withdrawal.

I hope and believe that in demonstrating clearly that the use of force to change frontiers does not pay, we have done a service not just to the Falkland Islands and Britain but to the wider international community.

May I take this opportunity to convey to you my warm good wishes and renewed thanks for your support.

His Excellency General Gnassingbe Eyadema
CONFIDENTIAL

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION),
0730 HOURS, 17 JUNE 1982

Cessation of Hostilities

A (Berne telno 169)

1. An interim report from the Swiss Ambassador in Buenos Aires indicated that the Argentine response on a cessation of hostilities and readiness to accept direct repatriation of Argentine POWs to Argentine Ports was likely to be negative. Our proposal was described as 'cruel' by the Argentine Foreign Ministry. The rejection in effect of our proposal was confirmed by a formal note from the Argentine Government passed through the Brazilians. The Argentine Government hoped that the transfer of prisoners would continue to be carried out by the well-tried procedure via Montevideo. Any attempts to impose unilaterally other conditions of a political character were "unacceptable" and we would bear the responsibility for "using the fate of these thousands of people for political purposes".

Repatriation of POWs

B (Brasilia telno 232)

2. The Uruguayan Foreign Minister has informed HM Ambassador Montevideo that, subject to a few nuts and bolts, Uruguay is prepared to accept the Norland and her passengers. Miss Hutchinson thinks that the Uruguayans might be prepared to transit more. However the Chileans were initially reluctant to accept Argentine POWs. Chile was prepared to allow repatriation through Punta Arenas, if the Swiss were able to persuade Argentina to agree. The Brazilians too would clearly prefer the repatriation to take place through Uruguay, although they have also not yet turned the idea of repatriation down.

Maintenance of Economic Measures

C (Montevideo telno 487 to FCO)

3. The FRG passed an oral message that after discussion in Cabinet the Germans and French had jointly approached the EEC Presidency to ask for consensus to be established by the written procedure for the end of sanctions. This would permit an early start on the end of the EEC economic measures even before the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Ten scheduled for 20 June and 21 June.

Comment

4. The Argentine response received through the Brazilians effectively rejects any linking between a total ceasefire and the repatriation of POWs. It is now clear that (despite Chilean and Brazilian willingness in principle to help), Montevideo is the only acceptable port for repatriation.

5. A decision is needed on whether:

/(a)
(a) In view of the urgency of the POW problem, we should accept a de-linking of repatriation from Argentine agreement to a total ceasefire;

(b) Arrangements should now be pushed ahead for repatriation of POWs through Montevideo (the ability of Canberra to use Montevideo needs to be clarified).

6. We shall also need to consider how to deal with EC moves to end sanctions against Argentina.

P.R. Pearn
Emergency Unit

17 June 1982
RR TRAFFIC RELAY

GRS 410
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BONN 1617132 JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCDO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 575 OF 16 JUNE
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO ATHENS
UKREP BRUSSELS EMBASSY BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE DUBLIN
LUXEMBOURG PARIS ROME
INFO SAVING OTTAWA TOKYO CANBERRA WELLINGTON OSLO UKMIS GENEVA
BERNE

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 049: FALKLANDS: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

1. THIS MESSAGE WAS DELIVERED LAST NIGHT, BUT THE GERMANS HAVE
   NOT YET TAKEN ANY DECISION.

2. AS I TOLD MALLABY BY TELEPHONE, I WAS CONCERNED THAT THE
   GERMANS MIGHT TURN OUR MESSAGE ON ITS HEAD AND ARGUE THAT WE WERE
   ENDEavourING TO USE THE PLIGHT OF THE PRISONERS TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL
   ENDS. IN A LONG TELEPHONE CONVERSATION I HAVE HAD WITH GORENFLO,
   MFA DEPUTY SECRETARY RESPONSIBLE FOR LATIN AMERICA, THIS VIEW WAS
   UNFORTUNATELY MORE THAN CONFIRMED. HE ARGUED THAT, APART FROM OUR
   OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE GENEVA AGREEMENT, WE WOULD SURELY NOT BE
   PREPARED TO ALLOW THE ARGENTINES TO DIE OF EXPOSURE OR MALNUTRITION
   IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL OBJECTIVE:

   AND THAT THE ARGENTINES
   WOULD NEVER ATTACK ANY SHIP THAT WE MIGHT USE TO TRANSPORT ARGENTINE
   PRISONERS HOME. HE SAID THAT, AS PEREZ DE CuELLAR HAD TOLD SCHMIDT
   IN NEW YORK, IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THE ARGENTINE JUNTA
   TO TAKE A DECISION ON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AT PRESENT. THEY WERE
   NOT CAPABLE OF DECISION. HE ALSO MAINTAINED THAT THE
   PRISONERS WERE

[Passed to E.R.]
[Typists a.a.]
3. I rebutted all these arguments strongly, emphasising that the commander was facing an emergency situation and that we were not in a position to provide food and shelter for the unexpectedly vast number of prisoners. That we could not risk sending ships to take off prisoners while the Argentines refused to give any undertaking concerning their safety and that the situation was so bad and urgent that even leaving other political considerations apart, we would certainly not now start negotiations about this issue. I doubted whether the Argentine government gave a damn about the fate of their prisoners. They would probably be happy to exploit their plight if they could. What we looked for was help from our allies to persuade the Argentines to make possible a repatriation of the conscripts who were in a terrible state. I cannot say how much of an impression I made but at least I inculcated a sense of urgency.

4. We have learnt on a personal basis from a source in the chancellor’s office that discussion at the federal cabinet this morning did not address the question of the prisoners, but concentrated on the reference in HMG’s message to the Argentine government (your TELNO 147 to Brussels) to getting our partners to bring economic measures to an end when hostilities were ended. It appears that ministers were upset by this passage, and that they had not been consulted about it.

FOO please pass saving above addressees.

TAYLOR

NNNN

SENT AT 161810Z LCD
CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 161736Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2151 OF 16 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN, BRASILIA, BERNE, UKMIS GENEVA

MY TELNO 2143 (NOT TO ALL): FALKLANDS: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

1. THE U.S AMBASSADOR IS DOING HIS BEST TO GET THIS MESSAGE ACROSS TO THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES. IN THE PRESENT SITUATION IN BUENOS AIRES, HOWEVER, THE AMERICANS DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THE JUNTA WILL BE ABLE TO NERVE THEMSELVES TO MAKE A DECLARATION OF THIS KIND.

2. THE AMERICANS HAVE ALSO TAKEN ACTION IN BRASILIA. THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WAS RELUCTANT TO INTERCEDE WITH THE ARGENTINES. HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD HAVE TO REACH THIS DECISION THEMSELVES.

3. THE AMERICANS REMAIN READY IN PRINCIPLE TO HELP EG WITH C130 AIRCRAFT, BUT RECOGNISE THAT IT WILL PROBABLY BE BEST TO PROCEED WITH SHIPPING ALREADY IN THE AREA. THEY ARE AWARE OF PLANS TO REPATRIATE IMMEDIATELY 4-500 OF THE WORST AFFECTED PRISONERS ON THE
REPARTRIATE IMMEDIATE 4-500 OF THE WORST AFFECTED PRISONERS ON THE
CANBERRA AND NORLAND AND WELCOME THIS.

HENDERSON
FM WASHINGTON 1620362 JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2155 OF 16 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE UK HIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK.

FALKLANDS: U.S. PUBLIC REACTIONS

1. THE WHITE HOUSE ISSUED A STATEMENT YESTERDAY WELCOMING THE CEASE-FIRE, HOPING THAT THE LOSS OF LIFE WHICH HAS OCCURRED CAN NOW BE BROUGHT TO AN END AND STATING THAT THE U.S. QUOTE CONTINUES TO STAND READY TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY IT CAN TO HELP RESOLVE THIS CONFLICT UNQUOTE.

2. THE MEDIA COVERAGE PAYS TRIBUTE TO WHAT WEINBERGER DESCRIBED IN AN ADDRESS TO THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE LAST WEEK AS THE QUOTE MAGNIFICENT PERFORMANCE OF BRITISH ARMS UNQUOTE. THE NEW YORK TIMES IN AN EDITORIAL YESTERDAY DESCRIBED IT AS A QUOTE MERCIFUL FALKLANDS FINISH UNQUOTE. IN THE TIMES TODAY DREW MIDDLETON ATTRIBUTES THE BRITISH VICTORY TO THE PROFESSIONALISM OF THE BRITISH FORCES AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY WERE LED. EMPHASIS IS PLACED ON THE EXTRAORDINARILY DIFFICULT CONDITIONS IN WHICH THEY WERE OPERATING, THE MUCH LARGER NUMBERS OPPOSING THEM, AND THE SKILL WITH WHICH THE FINAL BATTLES ON PORT STANLEY WERE CONDUCTED, RESULTING IN A COMPLETE
Larger numbers opposing them, and the skill with which the final
attacks on Port Stanley were conducted, resulting in a complete
Argentinian collapse with relatively little loss of life. The
press also emphasize the determination shown by the Prime Minister
and the Government in leading to this result and the strength of
public support in Britain.

3. Throughout the editorial comment, attention is focussed on
the political aftermath of the victory. The fact that the
Junta are now divided and in deep trouble within Argentina is
emphasized throughout the press which also notes, however, that any
successor regime will continue to try to pursue the Argentine claim
to the Falklands. The Prime Minister's statements on the future
of the islands are widely reported, as is the decision to send back
the Governor. The press note that greater self-government may now
be granted and government statements that there may be scope for
U.S. and some Latin American involvement in arrangements for their
longer term security. They point to the longer term costs of a
simple return to the status quo ante for Britain and for Western
interest in Latin America and continue to urge the need for a
quote sensible settlement unquote (without, however, coming
up with any suggestions for a status for the islands which could
reconcile the principle of self-determination with Argentinian
pretensions). Concern is expressed about the resources needed to
defend the islands in the absence of a settlement and the
implications for NATO of the British naval and air defence resources
which will need to be committed. The Washington Post, in another
hand-wringing editorial, argues that on the basis of present policy
Britain will have to continue indefinitely to divert a substantial
part of its military resources to defend the islands. The New York
Times contends that the prospects for reconciliation will depend
on British policy in the aftermath of the military victory.

4. A further general theme is the suggestion that the United States,
having sided with Britain during the conflict as it was right to do,
should now move quickly to re-build relations with Latin America
and - when it is possible to do so - with Argentina. The press note
that Argentine rancour seems to be directed against the United States
rather than Britain. The desirability of avoiding driving the
Argentines towards a Peronist regime or greater dependence on the
Soviet Union is emphasized, as is the fact that the United States,
while opposing any attempt to change their present status by force
has a neutral position on the question of sovereignty over the
islands.
UNCLASSIFIED
FM BRASILIA 162338Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 170030Z
TELEGRAM NUMBER 281 OF 16 JUNE

MIPT: FALKLANDS: BRAZILIAN STATEMENT

BEGINs

AT THIS TIME BRAZIL CANNOT FAIL TO EXPRESS TO THE BROTHER NATION ITS SOLIDARITY AND ITS CONVICTION THAT JUST AS THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE HAS THE RIGHT AND THE DUTY TO FEEL PRIDE IN THE PATRIOTISM AND COURAGE OF ITS SONS, SO IT WILL ALSO, UNITED AND STRENGTHENED, OVERCOME THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE MOMENT AND MAKE A FUNDAMENTAL CONTRIBUTION TO ITS OWN PEACE AND PROGRESS AND TO THAT OF THE ENTIRE REGION.

SINCe 1833 ARGENTINA HAS NEVER CEASED TO CLAIM SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE MALVINAS. BRAZIL HAS ALWAYS RECOGNISED THE JUST TITLE TO THAT CLAIM. AT ALL TIMES, WE FAVOUR AND CONTINUE TO FAVOUR A POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION FOR THE ISSUE, FOR WE BELIEVE THAT CONTROVERSY CANNOT BE EXTINGUISHED BY THE FORCE OF ARMS.
THAT CONTROVERSY CANNOT BE EXTINGUISHED BY THE FORCE OF ARMS.
IN THIS SITUATION IT IS THE DUTY OF ALL OF US TO ACCEPT AND SUPPORT
THE PATH OF NEGOTIATION INDICATED BY RESOLUTION 502 OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WHICH IS JURIDICALLY
MANDATORY, OR OTHER MEANS TOWARDS PEACEFUL SOLUTION PROVIDED
FOR IN THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.

ENDS

HARDING

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 170000Z ED//RW
CONFIDENTIAL

FM MONTEVIDEO 162214Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 484 OF 16 JUNE
INFO PRIORITY BRASILIA, SANTIAGO, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
UKMIS GENEVA AND MODUK.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 367.

FALKLAND ISLANDS THIRD COUNTRY FACILITIES.

1. DESPITE THE HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS, URUGUAYANS WOULD
BE UNABLE TO PROVIDE STAGING FACILITIES FOR C-130 FLIGHTS FOR
AS LONG AS THERE IS NOT A GENERAL CESSION OF HOSTILITIES.

HUTCHINSON
ACTION COPY

16 JUN 1982

FALKLANDS CEASEFIRE

The Swiss FDFA passed to us at 2355Z on 15 June a message received from the Swiss Ambassador in Buenos Aires, our translation of which is as follows:

begins.

for the information of the British embassy and as an indication of our attempts to obtain answers I inform you that

1. The contents of our communication of 15 June 82 were handed in the form of a note personally to Ambassador Keller Sarmiento (responsible for Western Europe) by Herr Iten at 12.15 hrs local time yesterday.

2. This morning this embassy enquired as to the situation regarding the Argentine answer.
7. AFTER RECEIPT OF YOUR COMMUNICATION OF 15 JUNE YOUR ITEM AT
16.22 HRS REQUESTED AN INTERVIEW WITH KELLEF SARMIENTO OR AMBASSADOR
RUIZ. ACCORDING TO JAREQUI AN OFFICIAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
BOTH WERE IN CONFERENCE. THE MINISTRY OFFICIAL PROMISED TO PUT
FORWARD YOUR ITEM'S REQUEST AS SOON AS THEY LEFT THE MEETING.

4. AT 1415 HRS MY COLLEAGUE TELEPHONED JAREQUI AGAIN WHO EXPLAINED
THAT BOTH AMBASSADORS WERE AWAY FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND
WOULD NOT RETURN BEFORE 1600 HRS. AS REGARDS THE CEASEFIRE HE
SAID THE DECISION LAY WITH THE JUNTA AND THEY WERE STILL STUDYING
THEIR ANSWER. YOUR ITEM THEN DISCUSSED THE CONTENTS OF YOUR
COMMUNICATION OF 16 JUNE WITH HIM. AT 1520 HRS MY COLLEAGUE
TOOK A NOTE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WHICH INCLUDED THE
SIGNIFICANT PART OF YOUR LAST MESSAGE (A COPY OF WHICH I SENT AS
USUAL BY COURIER). AT THE SAME TIME HE REQUESTED A MEETING FOR ME
WITH DEPUTY MINISTER RGS AND KELLEF SARMIENTO.

5. AT 1630 I SPOKE TO BOTH ON THE TELEPHONE. IN THE JUNTAS' VIEW IN
NO EVENT COULD A BRITISH SHIP ENTER AN ARGENTINE PORT. MOREOVER
THE INFRASTRUCTURE HERE FOR THE RECEPTION OF THE SOLDIERS WAS NOT
READY. THE PROPOSAL BY GREAT BRITAIN WAS DESCRIBED AS
QUITE CRUEL UNQUOTE. AS SOON AS THE JUNTA HAD REACHED A DECISION,
THIS EMBASSY WOULD BE INFORMED.

6. THE DRIFT OF THE ARGUMENTS OF KELLEF SARMIENTO
AND RGS INDICATE TO ME THAT IT IS MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO ARRIVE AT A DECISION NOW THAN IT APPEARED
THIS MORNING. I WOULD NOT LIKE TO CONCEAL FROM YOU THAT I AM
WORRIED ABOUT POSSIBLE INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
THE BRITISH TERMS.

ENDS

P locked-JONES
CONFIDENTIAL
FM SANTIAGO 162231Z JUN 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 332 OF 16 JUNE 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE BERNE, UKMIS GENEVA, BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO, MOBUK
AND CINCLFEEET

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 270.
REPATRIATION OF POWS.

1. COVARRUBIAS INFORMED ME AT 162222Z THAT HE HAD MADE ENQUIRIES
ABOUT OUR PROPOSAL IN BUENOS AIRES AND CONSULTED WITH PINOCHET
THE ATTITUDE OF THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES WAS THAT THERE WAS
A WORKABLE AND WELL-ESTABLISHED CHANNEL FOR REPATRIATION OF PRISON-
ERS THROUGH MONTEVIDEO AND THAT THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO CHANGE
THIS. THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT THEREFORE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO
ACCEPT THE ARGENTINE VIEW AND THEY COULD NOT TAKE UP OUR PROPOSAL TO
USE PUNTA ARENAS. COVARRUBIAS ALSO SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE
ARRANGEMENTS IN MONTEVIDEO INVOLVED THE ICRC WHICH WAS ALSO SATIS-
FACTORY TO THE ARGENTINES.

2. WHEN COVARRUBIAS SPOKE TO ME I HAD NOT SEEN YOUR TELNO 369 TO
MONTEVIDEO STATING THAT THE CANBERRA COULD NOT ENTER PORT THERE.
I HAVE SINCE TOLD HIM THIS AND PRESSURIZED HIM HARD TO RE-CONSIDER,
PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE LATEST INFORMATION ABOUT THE VERY
SERIOUS CONDITION OF THE ARGENTINE POWS ON THE ISLANDS AND THE LONGER
STEAMING TIME WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SEND THEM TO MONTEVIDEO IN
ANY CASE.

3. COVARRUBIAS REPEATED THAT CHILE WAS VERY WILLING TO HELP IN THIS
WAY IF ARGENTINA AGREED BUT THAT, AS A THIRD PARTY IN THE MATTER
THEY DID NOT FEEL THEY SHOULD BE ASKED TO NEGOTIATE SUCH AN ARRANGE-
MENT. SURELY IT WAS FOR BRITAIN, THROUGH THE SWISS, TO ARRANGE THE
REPATRIATION OF ARGENTINE PRISONERS OVER. I COULDN'T SHIFT HIM FROM
THIS VIEW. HE DID, HOWEVER, AGREE TO INSTRUCT THE CHILEAN AMBASSADOR
IN BUENOS AIRES TO CONTACT THE SWISS THERE AND EXPLAIN THAT CHILE WAS
PREPARED TO ALLOW REPATRIATION THROUGH PUNTA ARENAS IF THE SWISS WERE
ABLE TO PERSUADE ARGENTINA TO AGREE.

HICKMAN
CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 161545Z JUN 82
IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 273 OF 16 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE BERNE, UKMIS GENEVA, SANTIAGO, MONTEVIDEO, MODUK, GINCFLIGHT

YOUR TELNO 196: FALKLANDS CEASEFIRE

1. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED TO THE HEAD OF THE AMERICAS DEPARTMENT AT THE MFA AT 151430Z, LEAVING WITH HIM A SCUT DE PAPIER. I ALSO SHOWED HIM THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT CONTAINED IN YOUR TELNO 122 TO BERNE. AMBASSADOR RICUPERO UNDERTOOK TO INFORM THE FOREIGN MINISTER IMMEDIATELY. ALTHOUGH I URGED HIM TO PRESS FOR A VERY RAPID REPLY, I DOUBT IF ONE WILL BE FORTHCOMING BEFORE TOMORROW.

2. RICUPERO ENQUIRED WHETHER WE HAD CONSIDERED MAKING A SIMILAR APPROACH TO THE URUGUAYAN GOVERNMENT. I SAID THAT I WAS NOT INFORMED ON THIS POINT, BUT I ASSUMED THAT BOTH THE URUGUAYAN AUTHORITIES AND OUR OWN EMBASSY IN MONTEVIDEO HAD BEEN PLACED UNDER SOME STRAIN BY THE RECENT OPERATIONS TO REPATRIATE PRISONERS OF WAR, MANY OF THEM SERIOUSLY WOUNDED, AND THE SHEER SCALE OF THE PRESENT REQUIREMENT WAS PROBABLY BEYOND THE RESOURCES THAT THE URUGUAYANS COULD MOBILISE.

3. RICUPERO SUGGESTED (AS BAENA SOARES HAD DONE YESTERDAY) THAT IT MIGHT BE CONVENIENT TO BRING THE BRAZILIAN RED CROSS IN ON THE GAME, IN THE EVENT THAT APPROVAL WAS GIVEN FOR REPATRIATION FACILITIES TO BE PROVIDED IN BRAZIL. I SAID THAT THE HEAD OF THE BRAZILIAN RED CROSS HAD ALREADY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE EMBASSY TO OFFER THEIR SERVICES. IT SEEMED TO ME A GOOD IDEA TO ENLIST THEIR HELP, BOTH PRESENTATIONALLY AND BECAUSE ALL HANDS TO THE PUMP WILL BE NEEDED.

4. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE HAS JUST TOLD ME THAT, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON, HE HAD SPOKEN ON THE TELEPHONE LAST NIGHT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER, URGING THAT THE BRAZILIANS SHOULD PRESS THE ARGENTINES FOR A RAPID AND POSITIVE REPLY TO OUR MESSAGE. GUERREIRO HAD SAID FLATLY THAT THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT WISH TO GET INVOLVED IN AN ISSUE WHICH SHOULD BE DEALT WITH BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA.
NOT WISH TO GET INVOLVED IN AN ISSUE WHICH SHOULD BE DEALT WITH BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA.

5. DESPITE THE UNHELPFULNESS OF GUERRERO’S REACTION, MY IMPRESSION FROM BAENA AND RICUPERO IS THAT THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT THE BRAZILIAN AUTHORITIES WILL DECIDE TO CO-OPERATE OVER REPATRIATION, BUT THEY MAY FIRST WISH TO ASSURE THEMSELVES THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD NOT OBJECT. THEY ARE STILL CAUGHT ON THE HOOK OF THEIR OFTEN-REPEATED SUPPORT FOR THE ARGENTINE CLAIM TO THE FALKLANDS, AND THEY WILL NOT WISH TO MAKE ANY MOVE WHICH MIGHT SEEM TO ENDORSE OUR RE-ASSERTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, SO LONG AS IT IS UNDILUTED BY ANY OFFER OF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ARE SCARED STILL OF THE PROSPECT OF A COLLAPSE OF AUTHORITY IN BUENOS AIRES, WITH UNFATHOMABLE RESULTS FOR THEIR OWN SECURITY. WHAT THEY FAIL TO SEE AS YET IS THAT THEIR OWN RELUCTANCE TO CHANCE THEIR ARMS MAY WELL BRING NEARER THE DANGER THEY FEAR.

HARDING

WNNN

SENT/RECD AT 16:

16122 ED//CAW
CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 232 OF 17 JUNE
AND TO FLASH MODUK CINCFLIGHT
REPEATED TO INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON DESKBY 171300Z,
UKMIS NEW YORK DESKBY 171300Z, BERNE DESKBY 170900Z
IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO, SANTIAGO

YOUR TELMO 119 TO BERNE AND MY TELMO 280: FALKLANDS CEASEFIRE

1. MFA HAVE RECEIVED FROM BRAZILIAN EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES THE
TEXT IN SPANISH OF A NOTE DATED 15 JUNE WHICH READS (IN OUR
TRANSLATION) AS FOLLOWS:

BEGINS
(USUAL BEGINNING)
THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT IS READY TO RECEIVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
THE ARGENTINE PERSONNEL WHO ARE NOW IN THE MALVINAS ISLANDS. FOR
THIS PURPOSE, IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED UP TO
THIS MOMENT SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT SHOULD CONTINUE TO
BE APPLIED.

THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HOPES THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL
CONFIRM IN THIS RESPECT TO THAT WELL-TRIED PROCEDURE, CARRIED
OUT IN COOPERATION WITH THE URUGUAYAN GOVERNMENT AND WITH THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, WHICH HAS ENABLED
TRANSFER IN A VERY FEW HOURS TO ARGENTINE TERRITORY.

ANY ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE UNILATERALLY OTHER CONDITIONS OF A
POLITICAL CHARACTER ASIDE FROM THE HUMANITARIAN PURPOSE IS
UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. OTHERWISE, THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR USING THE FATE
OF THESE THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES.
(USUAL ENDING)
ENDS.

2. ITAMARATY WERE UNABLE TO OFFER ANY COMMENT ON THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THIS OBVIOUSLY UNHELPFUL REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE PASSED TO THE
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THROUGH BOTH THE BRAZILIANS AND THE SWISS
ON 15 JUNE.

3. TO MY KNOWLEDGE, WE HAVE NOT YET MADE IT CLEAR EITHER TO THE
3. To my knowledge, we have not yet made it clear either to the Brazilians or to the Argentines that the US Canberra cannot enter Montevideo (your Telno 369 to Montevideo and Paragraph 2 of my Telno 278 refers). You may wish to instruct me to make this point clear to the Brazilians. Otherwise, they will consider this uncompromising Argentine reply as closing the door to the participation of Brazil — or any other country, save Uruguay — in the repatriation process.

HARDING

HHHH

SENT/RECD AT 17:05:15Z AD/KJM
00 FCO DESKBY 170835Z
00 SANTIAGO
CO BRASILIA
00 UKMIS GENEVA
00 BERNE
00 MOBUK
00 CINC FLEET

GRS 100A
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 170835Z TO FCO
FROM MONTEVIDEO 170145Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 487 OF 17 JUNE 1982.

INFO IMMEDIATE SANTIAGO, BRASILIA, UKMIS GENEVA, BERNE,
MOBUK (DS11 DS5 (CPL)), CINC FLEET.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 486: REPATRIATION OF P O W'S.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS JUST PHONED TO SAY THAT SUBJECT TO
A FEW NUTS AND BOLTS, URUGUAY IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE KORLAND
AND HER PASSENGERS. HE HAS ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE ARGENTINIAN
AMBASSADOR.

2. FURTHERMORE, I WAS GIVEN A HINT BUT NO MORE THAN A HINT,
THAT THE URUGUAYANS MIGHT REPEAT MIGHT BE PREPARED TO TRANSIT MORE.

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

SENT AT 17/31:52 TWW
GRS 210
CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKMIS GENEVA 171700Z JUN 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 338 OF 17 JUNE 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE MONGEVIDEO, MODUK (DS 5 AND 11, SCAND L)
CINC Fleet.

YOUR TELNO 124 TO BERNE AND MY TEL 336 5 REPATRIATION OF POWS.

1. AS REPORTED BY TELEPHONE TO THE EMERGENCY UNIT THE ICRG HAVE JUST GIVEN US THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WHICH THEIR DELEGATE IN BUENOS AIRES HAS RECEIVED FROM GENERAL SUAREZ NELSON OF THE ARGENTINE GENERAL STAFF.
   (A) THE ARGENTINES CONFIRM THERE IS NO (NO) OBJECTION TO THE CANBERRA AND NORLAND GOING TO MONGEVIDEO.
   (B) THIS WOULD BE UNDER THE SAME GUARANTEES AS FOR THE REPATRIATION OPERATION LAST WEEK.
   (C) THE BAHIA PARALSO IS AT PRESENT IN A SOUTHERN ARGENTINE PORT (DETAILS NOT KNOWN) AND COULD SAIL FORTHWITH FOR PORT STANLEY TO PICK UP SOME 1500 POWS.
   (D) TWO MERCHANTMEN COULD ALSO BE SENT (DETAILS NOT KNOWN).

IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS THE ATTACHMENTS BELOW PROVIDE THE
(c) They would like to report (details not known) and could sail forthwith from Stanley to pick up some 1500 POWs.
(d) Two merchantmen could also be sent (details not known). If we agreed in principle the Argentines would provide the technical information we required.

2. The ICRC would be grateful for an urgent reaction to the following to pass on to their delegate in Buenos Aires.

MARSHALL

NNNNN

SENT/RECD AT 171730Z MDH/DA
FALKLANDS: AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL APPEAL

1. FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF MR FRASER'S ANNOUNCEMENT –

FALKLAND ISLANDS APPEAL

THE GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO SUPPORT A NATIONAL APPEAL TO ASSIST FAMILIES OF BRITISH SERVICE MEN WHO HAVE SUFFERED IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE AND FALKLAND ISLANDERS WHO MIGHT BE IN SEVERE HARDSHIP AS A RESULT OF THE DISPUTE.

I HAVE DISCUSSED THE PROPOSAL WITH THE NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE RSL, SIR WILLIAM KEYES, WHO HAS INDICATED THAT THE RSL IS WILLING TO ORGANISE AND CO-ORDINATE THE APPEAL NATIONALLY.
NATIONALLY.

THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT WILL BE CONTRIBUTING DOLLAR 257,000 TOWARDS THE NATIONAL APPEAL.

IN ADDITION, THE GOVERNMENT HAS AGREED THAT CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARDS THE APPEAL MADE DURING THE COURSE OF THE PRESENT FINANCIAL YEAR AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL YEAR WILL BE TAX DEDUCTIBLE.

I WELCOME THE DECISION OF THE RSL TO ACCEPT THE NATIONAL CO-ORDINATING ROLE AND THANK SIR WILLIAM KEYES AND HIS EXECUTIVE FOR THEIR PART IN LAUNCHING THE APPEAL.

SIR RT

NNNN
PS/No 10 DOWNING ST (2)
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
PS/CHANCELLOR
MR ILETT TREASURY
MR LITTLE
MISS DICKSON D/ENERGY
SIR R ARMSTRONG CABINET OFFICE
SIR M PALLISER
MR WADE-GERY
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO
DIO

Room 8 FOR MODUK C IN G FLEET

[Passed to E.R.]
[Typists a.a.]

IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY

FM DUBLIN 171045Z JUNE 1982
TO IMMEDIATE F CO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 183 OF 17 JUNE

AND TO INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS, BRUSSELS, PARIS, COPENHAGEN,
THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, BONN, ATHENS, ROME.

YOUR TELNO 149 TO BRUSSELS: FALKLANDS

1. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO THE IRISH WHO ON 16 JUNE INSTRUCTED THEIR
AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES TO DRAW THE PLIGHT OF ARGENTINE PRISONERS
TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT
AGREEMENT WILL BE REACHED QUICKLY ON THEIR REPATRIATION.

FIGG
1. THE FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF A REPORT TO THE SWISS FDFA BY M. GROB OF THE SWISS EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES ABOUT THE CONSULAR VISIT WHICH HE MADE FROM 11 TO 13 JUNE.
DARROJO GAVE ME FREE ACCESS TO THE PRISON AND THE THREE DETAINNEES WITHOUT ANY RESTRICTION. MEETINGS WITH THE THREE JOURNALISTS TOOK PLACE IN THE EVENING OF 11 JUNE, DURING THE DAYTIME AND EVENING OF 12 JUNE AND AT DAWN ON SUNDAY, 13 JUNE.

MY CONVERSATIONS WITH GRIECO AND BURROJO PERMITTED THE FOLLOWING IMPROVEMENTS TO CONDITIONS OF DETENTION TO BE OBTAINED:

(A) PRACTICE OF SPORT OR PHYSICAL EXERCISE AT LEAST ONCE A WEEK AT THE POLICE GYMNASIUM SEMI COLON

(B) USE OF A TELEVISION SET, WHICH I HANDED TO THE DETAINNEES SEMI COLON

(C) TELEPHONE CALLS WITH THEIR FAMILIES CAN HENCEFORTH BE RECEIVED IN A SEPARATE OFFICE AND NOT AS AT PRESENT IN THE GENERAL HUBBUB.

THE DAY OF MY ARRIVAL THE DETAINNEES HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER PART OF THE PRISON, WHICH HAD BEEN FRESHLY REPAINTED. SINCE THEN THEY HAVE HAD TWO CELLS, EACH OF THREE METRES SQUARE (ONE A DORMITORY, THE OTHER A LIVING-ROOM), PLUS THEIR OWN BATHROOM.

AFTER TWO MONTHS DETENTION, THE PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STATE OF THE THREE JOURNALISTS CAN BE CONSIDERED GOOD. THEY TOLD ME OF HAVING HAD A FEW SHORT MOMENTS OF DEPRESSION. FOOD IS CONSIDERED DECENT. THEY ARE PERMITTED TO HAVE FRUIT AND OTHER PRODUCTS BOUGHT FOR THEM. THEY SAY THAT THEY ARE WELL TREATED EXCEPT FOR THE RARE INCIDENT WITH SUBORDINATE PERSONNEL IN THE PRISON, POST REACHES THEM UNCENSORED.

I ALSO HAD A SHORT INTERVIEW WITH THE FEDERAL JUDGE, DR. SAGASTUME, WITHOUT INDICATING PRECISE DATES, HE HINTED TO ME OF AN EARLY RESUMPTION OF THE ENQUIRY. THE EVIDENCE IS BEING RE-EXAMINED BY THE NAVAL AUTHORITIES.

AS IN THE PAST THE EMBASSY WILL CONTACT THE THREE DETAINNEES EACH WEEK BY TELEPHONE TO ENSURE THAT THE PROMISES MADE BY THE PRISON AUTHORITIES ARE BEING KEPT.

ENDS
My dear Ambassador,

Thank you for your kind and thoughtful letter of 16 June. I, too, take great pride in the achievement of our Forces and share the sorrow which has been expressed about the losses they have sustained in advancing the cause of freedom. We are most grateful for the support extended to us by the United States and know that we can count on it in tackling the problems which still lie ahead.

His Excellency the Honourable John J Louis Jr.,
10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 June, 1982.

Dear Mr. Needham,

Thank you for your letter of 15 June. Our forces have indeed performed wonderfully and there can be no greater reward for our efforts than the knowledge that the Falkland Islanders will now soon be free to resume the way of life which they chose and wish to pursue.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

E. Needham, Esq.
Principal Commanders

Commander Land Forces  Maj-Gen Jeremy Moore
Task Force Commander  R Adm 'Sandy' Woodward
Commander 3 Commando Brigade  Brigadier Julian Thompson
Commander 5 Inf Brigade  Brigadier Tony Wilson

29 Qda Royal Artillery Regt.
40 Cdo  Col Mike Holroyd-Smith
42 Cdo  Col Malcolm Hunt
45 Cdo  Col Nick Vaux
2 Para  Col Andrew Whitehead
3 Para  Col David Chaundler
1/7 Gurkhas  Col Hugh Pike
36 Engr Regt  Col David Morgan
Welsh Guards  Col Geoff Field
2 Scots Guards  Col John Rickett

[22 SAS  Col Mike Scott  Col Mike Rose]

SECRET - NOT TO BE USED IN PUBLIC
FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP 0730 Hours 17 June

Cessation of Hostilities

1. There is still no response to our request to the Argentine Government for confirmation of the total cessation of hostilities.

Repatriation of POWs

2. MOD state that there are fewer Argentine prisoners of war than the original total of 15,000, given by General Menendez.

3. The Argentine Government has refused to allow POWs to be landed at her ports. Uruguay has now agreed to M/V Norland disembarking POWs in Montevideo.

17 June 1982

EMERGENCY UNIT
17 juin 1982

Madame le Premier Ministre,

Je vous adresse mes plus chaleureuses félicitations pour le succès que la Grande-Bretagne a remporté aux Falkland.

Votre pays est resté fidèle à ses grandes traditions. Son attitude est un exemple et un encouragement pour tous les Européens.

Le succès de votre pays est aussi le fruit de votre détermination et de votre courage.

Je suis heureux que nous ayons obtenu le soutien de votre pays et de la Communauté dans cette période difficile.

Veuillez agréer, Madame le Premier Ministre, avec mes sincères remerciements, l'expression de mes hommages.
FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION),
0730 HOURS, 17 JUNE 1982

Cessation of Hostilities

A (Berne telno 169)
1. An interim report from the Swiss Ambassador in Buenos Aires indicated that the Argentine response on a cessation of hostilities and readiness to accept direct repatriation of Argentine POWs to Argentine Ports was likely to be negative. Our proposal was described as 'cruel' by the Argentine Foreign Ministry. The rejection in effect of our proposal was confirmed by a formal note from the Argentine Government passed through the Brazilians. The Argentine Government hoped that the transfer of prisoners would continue to be carried out by the well-tried procedure via Montevideo. Any attempts to impose unilaterally other conditions of a political character were "unacceptable" and we would bear the responsibility for "using the fate of these thousands of people for political purposes".

Repatriation of POWs

B (Brasilia telno 232)
2. The Uruguayan Foreign Minister has informed HM Ambassador Montevideo that, subject to a few nuts and bolts, Uruguay is prepared to accept the Norland and her passengers. Miss Hutchinson thinks that the Uruguayans might be prepared to transit more. However the Chileans were initially reluctant to accept Argentine POWs. Chile was prepared to allow repatriation through Punta Arenas, if the Swiss were able to persuade Argentina to agree. The Brazilians too would clearly prefer the repatriation to take place through Uruguay, although they have also not yet turned the idea of repatriation down.

Maintenance of Economic Measures

D (Santiago telno 302 to FCO)
E (Brasilia telno 278 to FCO)
3. The FRG passed an oral message that after discussion in Cabinet the Germans and French had jointly approached the EEC Presidency to ask for consensus to be established by the written procedure for the end of sanctions. This would permit an early start on the end of the EEC economic measures even before the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Ten scheduled for 20 June and 21 June.

Comment

4. The Argentine response received through the Brazilians effectively rejects any linking between a total ceasefire and the repatriation of POWs. It is now clear that (despite Chilean and Brazilian willingness in principle to help), Montevideo is the only acceptable port for repatriation.

5. A decision is needed on whether:

/(a/)
(a) In view of the urgency of the POW problem, we should accept a de-linking of repatriation from Argentine agreement to a total ceasefire;

(b) Arrangements should now be pushed ahead for repatriation of POWs through Montevideo (the ability of Canberra to use Montevideo needs to be clarified).

6. We shall also need to consider how to deal with EC moves to end sanctions against Argentina.

P R Fearn
Emergency Unit

17 June 1982
ACTION COPY

16 JUN 1982

Falklands Ceasefire

The Swiss FDFA passed to us at 2355Z on 15 June a message received from the Swiss Ambassador in Buenos Aires, our translation of which is as follows:

begins,

For the information of the British Embassy and as an indication of our attempts to obtain answers I inform you that

1. the contents of our communication of 15 June 82 were handed in the form of a note personally to Ambassador Keller Sarmiento (responsible for Western Europe) by Herr Iten at 12.15 hrs Local Time yesterday.

2. This morning this Embassy enquired as to the situation regarding the Argentine answer.
5. After receipt of your communication of 16 June, Herr Iten at 16.23 hrs requested an interview with Keller Sarmento or Ambassador Püber. According to Jaeggi, an official of the Foreign Ministry, both were in conference. The Ministry official promised to put forward Herr Iten's request as soon as they left the meeting.

4. At 1415 hrs my colleague telephoned Jaeggi again who explained that both ambassadors were away from the foreign ministry and would not return before 15.00 hrs. As regards the ceasefire, he said the decision lay with the junta and they were still studying their answer. Herr Iten then discussed the contents of your communication of 16 June with him. At 15.30 hrs my colleague took a note to the Foreign Ministry which included the significant part of your last message (a copy of which I sent as usual by courier). At the same time he requested a meeting for me with Deputy Minister Ros and Keller Sarmento.

Ps. P.J.

5. At 16.30 I spoke to both on the telephone. In the junta's view in no event could a British ship enter an Argentine port. Moreover, the infrastructure here for the reception of the soldiers was not ready. The proposal by Great Britain was described as quite cruel. To quote, as soon as the junta had reached a decision, this embassy would be informed.

6. The drift of the arguments of Keller Sarmento and Ros indicate to me that it is more difficult for the Argentine government to arrive at a decision now than it appeared this morning. I would not like to conceal from you that I am worried about possible internal political consequences of the British terms.

ENDS

Powell-Jones
CO SANTIAGO

RS 275
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BRASILIA 17:0430Z JUN 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 232 OF 17 JUNE
AND TO FLASH MODUK CINCFLIGHT
REPEATED TO INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON DESKEY 17130CZ,
UKMIS NEW YORK DESKEY 17130CZ, BERNE DESKEY 170800Z
IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO, SANTIAGO

YOUR TELNO 119 TO BERNE AND MY TELNO 280: FALKLANDS CEASEFIRE

1. MFA HAVE RECEIVED FROM BRAZILIAN EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES THE TEXT IN SPANISH OF A NOTE DATED 15 JUNE WHICH READS (IN OUR TRANSLATION) AS FOLLOWS:

BEGINS
(USUAL BEGINNING)
THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT IS READY TO RECEIVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE ARGENTINE PERSONNEL WHO ARE NOW IN THE MALVINAS ISLANDS. FOR THIS PURPOSE, IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED UP TO THIS MOMENT SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE APPLIED.

THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HOPES THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL CONFORM IN THIS RESPECT TO THAT WELL-TRIED PROCEDURE, CARRIED OUT IN COOPERATION WITH THE URUGUAYAN GOVERNMENT AND WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, WHICH HAS ENABLED TRANSFER IN A VERY FEW HOURS TO ARGENTINE TERRITORY.

ANY ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE UNILATERALLY OTHER CONDITIONS OF A POLITICAL CHARACTER ASIDE FROM THE HUMANITARIAN PURPOSE IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. OTHERWISE, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR USING THE FATE OF THESE THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES.
(USUAL ENDING)
ENDS.

2. ITAMARATY WERE UNABLE TO OFFER ANY COMMENT ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS OBVIOUSLY UNHELPFUL REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE PASSED TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THROUGH BOTH THE BRAZILIANS AND THE SWISS ON 15 JUNE.

3. TO MY KNOWLEDGE, WE HAVE NOT YET MADE IT CLEAR EITHER TO THE
3. TO MY KNOWLEDGE, WE HAVE NOT YET MADE IT CLEAR EITHER TO THE BRAZILIANS OR TO THE ARGENTINES THAT THE SS CANBERRA CANNOT ENTER MONTEVIDEO (YOUR TELNO 369 TO MONTEVIDEO AND PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELNO 278 REFERS). YOU MAY WISH TO INSTRUCT ME TO MAKE THIS POINT CLEAR TO THE BRAZILIANS. OTHERWISE, THEY WILL CONSIDER THIS UNCOMPROMISING ARGENTINE REPLY AS CLOSING THE DOOR TO THE PARTICIPATION OF BRAZIL — OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY, SAVE URUGUAY — IN THE REPATRIATION PROCESS.

HARDING

NHNN

SENT/RECD AT 17:0515Z AD/KJM
GEO(321) - 7/8, 5017/52, JT

00 FCO DESKBY 17/8152
00 SANTIAGO
00 BRASILIA
00 UKMIS GENEVA
00 BERNE
00 MODUK
00 CINC FLEET

GRS 155A
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 17/8152 TO FCO
FROM MONTEVIDEO 17/8152 JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 487 OF 17 JUNE 1982.
INFO IMMEDIATE SANTIAGO, BRASILIA, UKMIS GENEVA, BERNE,
MODUK (DS11 DS5 (CPL)), CINC FLEET.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 486: REPATRIATION OF P O W'S.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS JUST PHONED TO SAY THAT SUBJECT TO
A FEW NUTS AND BOLTS, URUGUAY IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE NORLAND
AND HER PASSENGERS. HE HAS ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE ARGENTINIAN
AMBASSADOR.

2. FURTHERMORE, I WAS GIVEN A HINT BUT NO MORE THAN A HINT,
THAT THE URUGUAYANS MIGHT REPEAT MIGHT BE PREPARED TO TRANSIT MORE.

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

SENT AT 17/8152 TWN
CONFIDENTIAL
FM SANTIAGO 162821Z JUN 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 362 OF 16 JUNE 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE BERNE, UKMIS GENEVA, BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO, MODUK AND CINCFLFET

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 276.
REPARTITION OF POWS.

1. COVARRUBIAS INFORMED ME AT 162822Z THAT HE HAD MADE ENQUIRIES ABOUT OUR PROPOSAL IN BUENOS AIRES AND CONSULTED WITH PINOCHET THE ATTITUDE OF THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES WAS THAT THERE WAS A WORKABLE AND WELL-ESTABLISHED CHANNEL FOR REPARTITION OF PRISONERS THROUGH MONTEVIDEO AND THAT THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO CHANGE THIS. THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT THEREFORE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ACCEPT THE ARGENTINE VIEW AND THEY COULD NOT TAKE UP OUR PROPOSAL TO USE PUNTA ARENAS. COVARRUBIAS ALSO SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS IN MONTEVIDEO INVOLVED THE ICRC WHICH WAS ALSO SATISFACTORY TO THE ARGENTINES.

2. WHEN COVARRUBIAS SPOKE TO ME I HAD NOT SEEN YOUR TELNO 369 TO MONTEVIDEO STATING THAT THE CANBERRA COULD NOT ENTER PORT THERE. I HAVE SINCE TOLD HIM THIS AND Pressed HIM HARD TO RE-CONSIDER, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE LATEST INFORMATION ABOUT THE VERY SERIOUS CONDITION OF THE ARGENTINE POWS ON THE ISLANDS AND THE LONGER STEAMING TIME WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SEND THEM TO MONTEVIDEO IN ANY CASE.

3. COVARRUBIAS REPEATED THAT CHILE WAS VERY WILLING TO HELP IN THIS WAY IF ARGENTINA AGREED BUT THAT, AS A THIRD PARTY IN THE MATTER THEY DID NOT FEEL THEY SHOULD BE ASKED TO NEGOTIATE SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT. SURELY IT WAS FOR BRITAIN, THROUGH THE SWISS, TO ARRANGE THE REPARTITION OF ARGENTINE PRISONERS' GUES. I COULD NOT SHIFT HIM FROM THIS VIEW. HE DID, HOWEVER, AGREE TO INSTRUCT THE CHILEAN AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES TO CONTACT THE SWISS THERE AND EXPLAIN THAT CHILE WAS PREPARED TO ALLOW REPARTITION THROUGH PUNTA ARENAS IF THE SWISS WERE ABLE TO PERSUADE ARGENTINA TO AGREE.

HICKMAN
CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 161545Z JUN 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 273 OF 16 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE BERNE, UKHIS GENEVA, SANTIAGO, MONTEVIDEO, MODUK,
CINCFLIGHT

YOUR TELNO 196: FALKLANDS CEASEFIRE

1. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED TO THE HEAD OF THE AMERICAS DEPARTMENT
   AT THE MFA AT 151430Z, LEAVING WITH HIM A SCOUT DE PAPIER.
   I ALSO SHOWED HIM THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT CONTAINED IN YOUR
   TELNO 122 TO BERNE. AMBASSADOR RICUPERO UNDERTOOK TO INFORM THE
   FOREIGN MINISTER IMMEDIATELY. ALTHOUGH I URGED HIM TO PRESS FOR
   A VERY RAPID REPLY, I DOUBT IF ONE WILL BE FORTHCOMING BEFORE
   TOMORROW.

2. RICUPERO ENQUIRED WHETHER WE HAD CONSIDERED MAKING A SIMILAR
   APPROACH TO THE URUGUAYAN GOVERNMENT. I SAID THAT I WAS NOT
   INFORMED ON THIS POINT; BUT I ASSUMED THAT BOTH THE URUGUAYAN
   AUTHORITIES AND OUR OWN EMBASSY IN MONTEVIDEO HAD BEEN PLACED UNDER
   SOME STRAIN BY THE RECENT OPERATIONS TO REPATRIATE PRISONERS OF
   WAR, MANY OF THEM SERIOUSLY WOUNDED, AND THE SHEER SCALE OF THE
   PRESENT REQUIREMENT WAS PROBABLY BEYOND THE RESOURCES THAT THE
   URUGUAYANS COULD MOBILISE.

3. RICUPERO SUGGESTED (AS BAENA SOARES HAD DONE YESTERDAY)
   THAT IT MIGHT BE CONVENIENT TO BRING THE BRAZILIAN RED CROSS
   IN ON THE GAME, IN THE EVENT THAT APPROVAL WAS GIVEN
   FOR REPATRIATION FACILITIES TO BE PROVIDED IN BRAZIL. I SAID
   THAT THE HEAD OF THE BRAZILIAN RED CROSS HAD ALREADY BEEN IN TOUCH
   WITH THE EMBASSY TO OFFER THEIR SERVICES. IT SEEMED TO ME A
   GOOD IDEA TO ENLIST THEIR HELP, BOTH PRESENTATIONALLY AND BECAUSE
   ALL HANDS TO THE PUMP WILL BE NEEDED.

4. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE HAS JUST TOLD ME THAT, ON INSTRUCTIONS
   FROM WASHINGTON, HE HAD SPOKEN ON THE TELEPHONE LAST NIGHT TO THE
   FOREIGN MINISTER, URGING THAT THE BRAZILIANS SHOULD PRESS THE
   ARGENTINES FOR A RAPID AND POSITIVE REPLY TO OUR MESSAGE.
   GUERREIRO HAD SAID FLATLY THAT THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD
   NOT WISH TO GET INVOLVED IN AN ISSUE WHICH SHOULD BE DEALT
   WITH BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA.
I DO NOT WISH TO GET INVOLVED IN AN ISSUE WHICH SHOULD BE DEALT WITH BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA.

5. DESPITE THE UNHELPFULNESS OF GUERREIRO’S REACTION, MY IMPRESSION FROM BAENA AND RICUPERO IS THAT THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT THE BRAZILIAN AUTHORITIES WILL DECIDE TO CO-OPERATE OVER REPATRIATION, BUT THEY MAY FIRST WISH TO ASSURE THEMSELVES THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD NOT OBJECT. THEY ARE STILL CAUGHT ON THE HOOK OF THEIR OFTEN-REPEATED SUPPORT FOR THE ARGENTINE CLAIM TO THE FALKLANDS; AND THEY WILL NOT WISH TO MAKE ANY MOVE WHICH MIGHT SEEM TO ENDORSE OUR RE-ASSERTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, SO LONG AS IT IS UNDILUTED BY ANY OFFER OF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ARE SCARED STILL OF THE PROSPECT OF A COLLAPSE OF AUTHORITY IN BUENOS AIRES, WITH UNFATHOMABLE RESULTS FOR THEIR OWN SECURITY. WHAT THEY FAIL TO SEE AS YET IS THAT THEIR OWN RELUCTANCE TO CHANCE THEIR ARMS MAY WELL BRING NEARER THE DESTRUCTION THEY FEAR.

HARDING

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 161

16122 ED//CAW
PART 24 ends:

16.6.82

PART 25 begins:

17.6.82