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PREM 19/630
PART 19 ends:

24-5-82

PART 20 begins:

25-5-82
Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard, 24 May 1982, columns 647-652

Signed [Signature] Date 19 April 2012

PREM Records Team
24 May, 1982

Prime Minister

Agree that message may be sent. A.S.C. 24.

Dear John,

[Amended]

Falkland Islands: Message to the Prime Minister from President Guzman of the Dominican Republic

President Guzman of the Dominican Republic has sent a message to the Prime Minister. I enclose a translation. The message is rhetorical and makes no specific proposals. The Dominican Republic has not so far played any forward role during the crisis and carries little influence in Latin America.

We understand from our Ambassador in Santo Domingo that a similar message has been sent to President Galtieri, with copies to the UN Secretary-General.

I enclose a draft telegram to Santo Domingo containing a proposed reply from the Prime Minister to President Guzman. Mr Pym has not been able to see this draft himself.

Yours etc.,

(Private Secretary

J E Holmes)

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
Dear Willie,

Thank you for your letter of 20 May about Senor Esquivel's visit to Britain.

I am afraid your decision to allow him to come is too late. He returned to Argentina from Geneva on 20 May.

I regret your delay in responding to my request of some four weeks ago.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Rt Hon William Whitelaw MP
MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

1. You will wish to know that on 22 May No 10 received a
message in Spanish, and through commercial channels, from
the President.

Text of message begins:

Her Excellency Mrs Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, London, SW1.
The Government of the Dominican Republic, having regard for the
latest statements made by the UN Secretary General, feels it
necessary to express its great concern over the South Atlantic
problem involving two friendly States, the United Kingdom and
the Argentine Republic. The Dominican Republic is very deeply
concerned that the efforts made to date have failed to secure
any formula for the solution of the conflict.
The Government over which I am honoured to preside and the
people of the Dominican Republic will not waver in their moral
and juridical support for a search for a solution. I still
trust that a formula can be found which will halt the military
confrontation, thus sparing the world community from catastrophe,
and that the principles of the United Nations organization can
be reaffirmed without weakening those established by the inter-
American regional system. My Government's foreign policy will
continue to be unswerving in its desire to see the reaffirm-
ation of those principles which constitute the bonds of peace
and unity between all States, as well as the re-establishment
of normality through negotiations.
I appeal to Your Excellency to make a supreme effort to preserve
peace and continue negotiations with a view to reaching a just,
worthy and honourable understanding for both sides.
Please be assured of my highest and most distinguished regards.
Antonio Guzman, President of the Dominican Republic.

Ends.

PYM
NNNN

NNNN ends

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Catchword
FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE SANTO DOMINGO

TELEGRAM NUMBER

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 21 (NOT TO ALL) AND YOUR TELNO 43: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GUZMAN

Please deliver the following reply from the Prime Minister to President Guzman.

2. Begins: I am most grateful to Your Excellency for your message. I appreciate your deep concern over the situation in the South Atlantic. It is a concern which I fully share. I also share your hope that a peaceful solution can be found even at this late stage. The tragic conflict which has developed has not been of the United Kingdom's seeking. Over the seven weeks since Argentina launched its unprovoked and unlawful aggression against the small and peaceful population of the Falkland Islands, the British Government have sought urgently, and with open-mindedness and flexibility, to reach a peaceful negotiated settlement, based on the fundamental principles of international law and of the United Nations Charter - principles to which all

NNNN ends

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democratic

Catchword

File number

Dept Private Office

Distribution Falklands General

Drafted by (Block capitals)

J E Holmes

Telephone number

233 4641

Authorised for despatch

Comcen reference

Time of despatch
Out Telegram (Cont)

ZCZC

democratic nations must attach the greatest importance. The road to a peaceful solution has regrettably been blocked by Argentina. Argentina has shown no readiness to comply with the Security Council's mandatory Resolution 502 and to withdraw its forces; instead it has sought only to consolidate its aggression and to prevaricate in negotiation. The United Kingdom has throughout made clear its determination to bring to bear all necessary diplomatic, economic and military pressures on Argentina so as to bring to an end its occupation. We have at every stage stated our position with clarity; and, using our right to self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, have confined ourselves to using only what force proved necessary to achieve an Argentine withdrawal and to protect our Task Force.

3. It is still open to Argentina to comply with the clearly expressed international will and to withdraw its forces in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502, bringing to an end the present dangerous conflict. I hope that Your Excellency can do all in your power to persuade the Argentine Government of this. You would be making a major contribution to the cause of peace. Ends

PYM

NNNN
24 May 1982

Prime Minister
Contact with this message as amended
A. Y. C. 24

Dear John,

Falkland Islands: Message to the Prime Minister from the President of Colombia

The Colombian Ambassador delivered to the FCO on 22 May a message from President Turbay. The original was sent to you on 22 May, but I enclose a copy for reference. Although delivered on 22 May, the message appears to have been composed before the news broke about the British landings on 21 May.

The Colombian Ambassador called at the FCO again on 23 May, on instructions from his President, to urge that an early reply be sent to the message, particularly since President Galtieri had already replied (the Ambassador could give no details of this reply). The Ambassador relayed President Turbay's fears that the conflict could have not only grave consequences for British and European relations with South America in general but also for inter-American institutions and democracy in the region. Now that Britain was again in strength on the Islands, there might be a new opportunity to begin a new round of talks. The Colombians wished to do all they could to promote negotiations and end the hostilities: Colombia had a profound wish to preserve its friendly relations with both parties.

Since the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, Colombia has maintained a moderate position even when that has meant departing from the ranks of Latin American solidarity, eg in abstaining on the resolution adopted by the Rio Treaty signatories on 28 April. She is proud of her democratic traditions in a region not noted for them.

The President's message, although it contains nothing specific which could usefully be built on in present circumstances, was clearly sent with the best of intentions and it deserves a full reply. With further Rio Treaty action possible this week, it will be important for us that Colombia continues to act as a counterweight to the more extreme Latin American positions.

/I enclose
I enclose a suggested draft reply to President Turbay, which we would propose, if the Prime Minister agrees, to transmit to him through our Ambassador in Bogota. It would be helpful if this could be sent today, given the evident Colombian anxiety for an early reply.

Mr Pym has not seen this draft.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esa
10 Downing Street
"BOGOTA, 21 DE MAYO DE 1982
SEÑORA MARGARET THATER
PRIMER MINISTRO DEL REINO UNIDO
LONDRES.

APRECIADA PRIMER MINISTRO:

CONOCE BIEN VUESTRO GORIerno CUAL HA SIDO LA POSICION
QUE EL GOBIERNO COLOMBIANO HA ADOPTADO EN EL CONFLICTO ENTRE VUES-
TRA PATRIA Y LA ARGENTINA ALREDEDOR DE LA SOBERANIA DE LAS ISLAS
MALVINAS. NO FUIMOS PARTIDARIOS DE LA CONVOCATORIA DEL ORGANO DE
CONSULTA POR CONSIDERAR QUE ANTES QUE INTENTAR APLICAR LAS MEDIDAS
PREVISTAS EN EL TIAR RESULTABA ABSOLUTAMENTE INDESPENSABLE AGOTAR
TODOS LOS RECURSOS POLITICOS, JURIDICOS Y DIPLOMATICOS PARA EVITAR
UNA GUERRA DE IMPREVISIBLES CONSECUENCIAS NO SOLO POR EL NUMERO DE
VICTIMAS INOCENTES SACRIFICADAS EN LA CONFRONTACION ARMADA, SINNO
POR LAS GRAVES TENSIONES QUE SE PRESENTARIAN ENTRE VUESTRO PAIS Y
LATINOAMERICA QUE COMPARE A ESCALA UNIVERSAL CON EL REINO UNIDO
LA DEFENSA DEL SISTEMA DEMOCRATICO.

SE QUE YA SE HAN PRODUCIDO LOS PRIMEROS ENCuentROS MILI-
TAES ENTRE ARGENTINOS Y BRITANICOS Y CONTEMPLO CON HORROR LA EXTEN-
SION DE LA GUERRA Y SUS FATALES CONSECUENCIAS. PIENSA MI GOBIERNO
QUE LAS NACIONES DEMOCRATICAS TIENEN LA OBLIGACION DE FORTALECER EL
SISTEMA CONTRA LOS RIESGOS QUE LO AMENAZAN Y DICHA FINALIDAD NO SE
LOGRA A NUESTRO JUICIO DEBITANDONOS EN GUERRAS CRUENTAS Y ESTE-
RILES, SIN REVISTIendonOS DE LA PACIENCIA NECESARIA PARA DIAlOGAR
HASTA ENCONTRAR UN PUNTO DE APROXIMACION QUE LE DEVUELVA AL MUNDO
LA CONFIANZA EN LA ELIMINACION DE LOS PELIGROS DE UNA NUEVA CONFLA-
GRACION.

SON MUCHAS LAS FORMULAS QUE PODRIAN SERVIR SI NO PARA
RESOLVER DESDE EL PRINCIPIO LA TOTALIDAD DEL PROBLEMA, POR LO MENOS
PARA AVANZAR EN NUEVOS CONTACTOS DIPLOMATICOS QUE PERMITAN TRABA-
JAR SOBRE EL CAMINO DE LAS SOLUCIONES PACIFICAS.

ESTOY ENTERADO DE QUE EL PRESIDENTE DEL PERU HA ENVIADO
A VUESTRO GOBIERNO Y AL DE LA ARGENTINA UNA PROPUESTA QUE PODRIA
DAR PIE A MAS AVANZADAS CONVERSACIONES. ESA FORMULA U ÓTRA CUAL-
QUER QUE HAGA POSSIBLE EL ALEJAMIENTO DEL PELIGRO DE LA GUERRA,
OBIVIAMENTE ESTIMULA NUESTRO INTERES DE DEMOCRATAS. EL GOBIERNO
COLOMBIANO QUE HA OBSERVADO UNA POSICION DE RESPETO A SU TRADICION JURIDICA CREE QUE EL VUESTRO ENTENDERÁ MUY BIEN LA PREOCUPACION QUE A COLOMBIA LE ASISTE PARA ENCONTRAR SOLUCIONES PACIFICAS QUE EVITEN QUE SE AGRAVE EL YA BIEN PELIGROSO CONFLICTO ENTRE EL REINO UNIDO Y LA ARGENTINA.

DESDE AHORA OFRECEMOS LA COADYUVANCIA DEL GOBIERNO DE COLOMBIA PARA LA FORMULA DE PAZ QUE MEJOR SE ACOMODE A LOS INTERESES DE LA GRAN BRETAÑA Y DE LA ARGENTINA, PAISES A LOS CUÁLES NOS SENTIMOS UNIDOS POR VIEJOS Y FUERTES VINCULOS.

ME SUSCRIBO COMO VUESTRO CORDIAL AMIGO,

JULIO CESAR TURBAY-AYALA
PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA."
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister
London

Dear Prime Minister,

Your Government is well aware of the position that the Colombian Government has adopted in the conflict between your country and Argentina on the sovereignty of the Malvinas Islands. We did not agree to the convocation of the Organ of Consultation as we felt that before trying to apply the measures provided for in the TIAR (Interamerican Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance) it was absolutely essential to exhaust every political, juridical and diplomatic resource in order to avoid a war of unforeseeable consequences, not only because of the number of innocent victims that would be sacrificed in an armed confrontation, but also because of the very serious tensions that would arise between your country and Latin America, a continent that shares the defence of the worldwide democratic system with the United Kingdom.

I know that the first military clashes between the Argentines and the British have already taken place, and I regard the escalation of the war and its fatal consequences with horror. My Government believes that democratic nations have the obligation of strengthening the system against the risks threatening it and, in our opinion, this aim is not achieved by weakening ourselves in unproductive wars involving

//. 
a lot of bloodshed, but rather through endowing ourselves with the necessary patience to persevere in dialogues until it is possible to find suitable meeting points which would restore the world's confidence in the elimination of the dangers of a new conflagration.

There are many formulas that could be useful, if not to resolve the whole problem from the outset, at least to make progress in new diplomatic contacts which would allow peaceful solutions to be worked towards.

I am aware that the President of Perú has sent your Government and the Argentine one a proposal which could lead to more advanced talks. This proposal or any other which might drive away the danger of war is obviously of interest to us as democrats. The Colombian Government that has always maintained a position of respect to its own juridical tradition believes that your Government will well understand the concern prompting Colombia to find peaceful solutions that would avoid the escalation of the already very dangerous conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina.

From now on we offer the Colombian Government's assistance for the achievement of a peace formula which would be in the best interests of both Great Britain and Argentina, countries to which we feel linked by old and strong ties.

Yours sincerely,

JULIO CESAR TURBAY-AYALA
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA
OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby

IMMEDIATE

1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE BQDOTA

TELEGRAM NUMBER

RFI UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TUBAY

1. Please deliver, as soon as possible, the following reply
from the Prime Minister.

BEGINS:

Dear Mr President,

I was most grateful for your thoughtful message of 21 May
about the Falkland Islands. We have been much aware in recent
weeks of the constructive approach which you and your
Government have adopted towards this tragic event and
your concern that blood has been shed and your hope that, even
at this late stage, the way to a peaceful solution can be found.

I agree wholeheartedly with you that it should be for
democratic nations to set the world an example, by the patience
with which they pursue peaceful negotiations and by their
reluctance to resort to military force. I am sure you will
recognise that in the seven weeks of negotiations in which we

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Catchword

despatch

File number

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Distribution

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Time of despatch
have engaged in good faith since Argentina invaded British territory, we have shown the greatest patience, as well as the utmost open-mindedness and flexibility consistent with the basic principles of international law and of the United Nations Charter. These are principles which Britain and Colombia, as democratic nations, share.

The difficulty throughout has been Argentina's refusal to match our constructive approach. President Galtieri and his colleagues have rejected every proposal which has been put to them which would have led to a ceasefire coupled with a withdrawal of Argentine forces, as required by Security Council Resolution 502. We remain ready to consider any proposal from any quarter which offers a real possibility of a satisfactory negotiated solution of this crisis. We looked closely and urgently at President Belaunde's recent proposals, which you mention, and I remain grateful to President Belaunde for his continued concern and active interest.

The essential first stage must however be a firm indication that Argentina is ready to comply with Security Council Resolution 502 and withdraw its forces from the Islands. Negotiations could then resume in good faith on a basis which did not predetermine or prejudice their outcome.

It is because there has hitherto been no sign that Argentina is willing to negotiate that we have been obliged to increase our military, as well as our diplomatic and economic, pressure on Argentina. We have at every stage in this conflict stated our position with clarity, and have confined ourselves to using the absolute minimum of force necessary to impose pressure on Argentina, and to protect our own forces in accordance with our rights of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

I share your own anxieties on the possible effect of this crisis on relations between my country and those of Latin

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America. As you know, we attach great importance to our relations with the region and our consistent objective has been to foster and strengthen them. It is no wish of ours that they should be put at risk. But I hope that you can agree that no country should be allowed to seek a resolution of territorial disputes by force, if democratic freedoms are to be maintained. If aggression is not firmly resisted, the consequences throughout the world would be grave.

The point at issue has been and remains Argentine aggression. No-one regrets more than I do that Argentina has so far resisted all our efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement. We have never wanted to resort to military action: but Argentine obduracy has left us no choice. The decision to end the present conflict rests squarely with Argentina.

If you, Mr President, can bring home to the Argentine Government not only the extent of our determination to achieve a just solution to this crisis, but also the imperative need to withdraw their forces from the Falkland Islands in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502, you would be making a contribution to the peace of South America and of the world which it would be hard to exaggerate.

Yours sincerely, Margaret Thatcher.

ENDS

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NNNN ends

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Catchword
FALKLANDS : FRENCH ATTITUDE

1. SPEAKING ABOUT THE FALKLANDS IN THE COURSE OF A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 24 MAY IN THE IVORY COAST, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND IS QUOTED BY LE MONDE AS SAYING THAT "BRITAIN IS OUR ALLY, IT IS A COUNTRY WITH WHICH WE HAVE LIVED OVER THE COURSE OF THIS CENTURY THROUGH THE MOST TRAGIC MOMENTS OF OUR EXISTENCE. WE HAVE LIVED THROUGH A PERIOD OF INTENSE SOLIDARITY WITH BRITAIN AND BRITAIN WITH US. ALL THESE LINKS BETWEEN US CANNOT BE AT THE MERCY OF EVENTS, HOWEVER REGRETTABLE, SUCH AS THOSE GOING ON AT THE MOMENT". AFTER DESCRIBING LATINO AMERICAN VIEWS THAT BRITAIN'S BEHAVIOUR WAS COLONIALIST AS "RATHER EXCESSIVE", MITTERRAND WENT ON: "FRANCE HAS VERY STRONG STRONG LINKS WITH LATIN AMERICA WHICH GO BEYOND TRADE LINKS, WHICH DERIVE FROM FACTORS OF CIVILISATION. WE THEREFORE WANT THE FRIENDSHIP OF THESE PEOPLES, WE HAVE IT AND WE DON'T WANT TO LOSE IT". MITTERRAND ADDED THAT THE ARGENTINE INITIATIVE HAD OFFENDED "BRITAIN, OUR FRIEND" IN ITS INTERESTS AND ITS PRIDE. HE OBSERVED THAT FROM THE MOMENT WHEN BRITAIN IT COULD NOT ACCEPT THE FAIT ACCOMPLI IN THE FALKLANDS, ITS FLEETS COULD NOT RETURN HOME WITHOUT FULFILLING ITS MISSION WHICH COULD NOT BE JUST ONE OF INTIMIDATION. MITTERRAND CONCLUDED: "FRANCE WILL ALWAYS BE A FIRM SUPPORTER OF A RETURN TO A JUST PEACE ("PAIX DANS LE RESPECT DU DROIT"). THIS MEANS THAT EVERYTHING THAT MIGHT BE DONE AND SAID TO BRING ABOUT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE END TO THE FIGHTING WHILE RESPECTING THE LAW WILL BE DONE BY FRANCE. HOWEVER WE WILL NOT DO IT OUT OF INDULGENCE TOWARDS ONE PARTY OR THE OTHER, WE WILL DO IT BECAUSE THE RETURN TO A JUST PEACE IS A CONSTANT THEME OF FRENCH DIPLOMACY". IN THIS CONNECTION, MITTERRAND RECALLED FRANCE'S ATTACHMENT TO RESOLUTION 582.

2. SPEAKING IN SIMILAR VEIN AT AIX-EN-PROVENCE ON 23 MAY, THE FRENCH DEFENCE MINISTER SAID "IF WE WANT PEACE THAT MEANS A JUST PEACE ALLOW THE DEFENCE MINISTER TO SAY IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE AGRESSOR IS ARGENTINA, AND THE VICTIM IS BRITAIN, AND THAT BRITAIN IS DEFENDING ITS RIGHTS".

3. HERNU IS ALSO QUOTED AS SAYING THAT HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY OFFICIAL REQUEST FROM MR NOTT OR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE LOAN OF FRENCH PLANES TO BRITAIN. HE WAS COMMENTING ON REPORTS STEMMING APPARENTLY FROM A CLAIM
MARCEL DASSAULT HAD MADE ON THE RADIO THAT BRITAIN HAD ASKED FOR THE LOAN OF SUPER-ETANDARDS AND MIRAGES TO STUDY THEIR STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES.

4. FRENCH PRESS COVERAGE OF THE PANDINGS HAS BEEN REASONABLY FAVOURABLE. LE FIGARO AND LE QUOTIDIEN (BOTH RIGHT-WING) HAVE CARRIED STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE EDITORIALS AND EVEN LE MONDE IN ITS EDITORIAL ON 23 MAY ADMITTED THAT WHATEVER ARGENTINA'S RIGHTS MIGHT BE OVER THE FALKLANDS IT HAS BEEN THE AGGRESSOR.

FRETWELL

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]
FM WASHINGTON 2421502 MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1879 OF 24 MAY.

FALKLANDS: PRESIDENT REAGAN’S VISIT TO LONDON

1. AN ARTICLE IN TODAY’S WASHINGTON POST ARGUES THAT THE FALKLANDS WAR WILL EXPOSE AS SYMBOLISM WITHOUT SUBSTANCE THE ECONOMIC AND NATO SUMMITS TO BE ATTENDED BY THE PRESIDENT AND GOES ON TO SUGGEST THAT, IF THE FALKLANDS BATTLE IS RAGING ON 7 JUNE, THE PRESIDENT MAY DECIDE NOT TO GO TO LONDON, OR AT LEAST TO REDUCE HIS SCHEDULE IN BRITAIN. AN UNNAMED WHITE HOUSE ADVISER IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT EVEN THOUGH CERTAIN COMMITMENTS HAD BEEN MADE THE PRESIDENT’S PRESENCE IN LONDON COULD BE PRETTY UP-SETTING TO AMERICA’S LATIN AMERICAN FRIENDS.

2. DEAVER RANG ME TO SAY THAT THERE WAS NO TRUTH IN THE WASHINGTON POST STORY BUT HE SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT ALL CONCLUDE THAT, IF THERE WERE SERIOUS FIGHTING AT THE TIME OF THE PRESIDENT’S VISIT, SOME OF THE MORE GLITTERMING ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAMME MIGHT HAVE TO BE TONED DOWN, BY WHICH HE MEANT THAT THE BANQUET MIGHT NOT BE TELEvised AND THAT THE PRESIDENT’S RIDE WITH THE QUEEN MIGHT HAVE TO BE CANCELLED.

3. IN RESPONSE TO PRESS ENQUIRIES, THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN HAS SAID THERE IS NOTHING TO THE WASHINGTON POST STORY AND THAT NO CONSIDERATION WAS BEING GIVEN TO ALTERING THE PRESIDENT’S SCHEDULE. THE SPOKESMAN ADDED THAT THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT WOULD BE AN ITEM OF CONCERN ON THE AGENDA. BUT THERE WOULD BE OTHER ISSUES AS WELL. THE PRESIDENT HAD AN EXTREMELY BUSY SCHEDULE DURING HIS EUROPEAN JOURNEY. HE WAS LOOKING TO THE NATO SUMMIT AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO STRENGTHEN THE EUROPEAN ALLIANCE. THE PRESIDENT’S EUROPEAN MEETINGS WOULD BE EVEN MORE BENEFICIAL THIS TIME AROUND BECAUSE OF THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP DEVELOPING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE HEADS OF STATE
4. The President himself has since been asked whether he was planning to cancel or curtail his visit. He replied: Quote we haven't seen anything as yet that would suggest that. Obviously if something unforeseen happened, we would have to consider whether to go or not. But no, I see no reason. Unquote

HENDERSON
As at 8 o'clock there had been no attacks reported since the MOD issued their last statement.

Sir Lancelot and Sir Galahad still had their unexploded bombs aboard. Further reports are awaited – the MOD may put out a further statement for the 10 o'clock news.

In the attacks reported earlier this afternoon:

- 2 Argentine aircraft were downed by Harriers
- 3 by Rapiers
- 2 by missiles from HMS Fearless
- 1 aircraft was seen departing damaged.

Of the above, 2 were definitely Mirages. Of the remaining 5, the balance between Mirages and Skyhawks is not known because the attacking force was a mixture of both.

A.F.C.

24 May, 1982.
UNCLASSIFIED
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 241606Z MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 833 DATED 24 MAY 82
AND TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, WASHINGTON, DUBLIN

MY 21PTS: FALKLANDS; SECURITY COUNCIL

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PANAMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION.

The Security Council,

Deeply concerned with the grave situation in the South Atlantic

Noting with great appreciation the efforts being made by the

Secretary-General.

Emphasizing the primary responsibility of the Security

Council for the maintenance of international peace and Security.
EMPHASIZING THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

1. CALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO CEASE ALL FIRING AND TERMINATE ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY IMMEDIATELY:

2. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO START IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982) IN ALL OF ITS PARTS:


PARSONS

NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKM13 NEW YORK 241626Z MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 835 DATED 24 MAY 82
AND TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, TOKYO, DUBLIN

MIPT: FALKLANDS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,


2. REGRETTING THAT RESOLUTION 502 HAS NOT YET BEEN IMPLEMENTED,

3. GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE STALEMATE OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE DIFFERENCES TO THE PARTIES, AND THE SUBSEQUENT DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE AREA.
3. Gravely concerned at the stalemate of diplomatic efforts to seek a peaceful solution of the differences to the parties, and the subsequent deteriorating situation in the area,

4. Reaffirming the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular non-use of force and settlement of international disputes by peaceful means,

1. Urges once again that Resolution 502 be implemented in its entirety as soon as possible,

2. Supports once again the good offices of the Secretary-General and requests him to renew the use of his good offices on the basis of his previous efforts as reported in his statement at the 2360th meeting of the Council with a view to achieving the earliest possible cessation of hostilities and realizing a peaceful settlement of the dispute,

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report regularly to the Council on the implementation of this resolution.

Parsons
UNCLASSIFIED
FROM UK MISSION NEW YORK 241604Z MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 832 OF 24 MAY
AND TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR S/S PARTY)
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, WASHINGTON, DUBLIN.
MIPT: FLAKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.
1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF IRISH DRAFT RESOLUTION:
   THE SECURITY COUNCIL
   RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 502.
   NOTING WITH THE Deepest CONCERN THAT THE SITUATION IN THE REGION
   OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS/ISLAS MALVINAS HAS SERIOUSLY DETERIORATED.
   HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO
   THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 2360TH MEETING ON 21 MAY 1982, AS
   WELL AS THE STATEMENTS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA AND
   OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AT
   THE SAME MEETING.
   NOTING FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL’S STATEMENT THE EXTENT TO
   WHICH POINTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAD ALREADY BEEN
   ESTABLISHED THROUGH HIS EFFORTS.

Advance Copy
NOTING FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL’S STATEMENT THE EXTENT TO WHICH POINTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAD ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED THROUGH HIS EFFORTS.

CONCERNED TO ACHIEVE AS A MATTER OF THE GREATEST URGENCY A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND AN END TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND.

1. EXPRESS APPRECIATION TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR THE EFFORTS WHICH HE HAS ALREADY MADE TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982), AND THEREBY TO RESTORE PEACE TO THE REGION.


3. URGES THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS MISSION, AND, AS A FIRST STEP TO AGREE TO A COMPLETE SUSPENSION OF PRESENT HOSTILITIES FOR A PERIOD OF 72 HOURS.

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, WITHIN THAT PERIOD, TO ENTER INTO CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES WITH A VIEW TO THE NEGOTIATION OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CONTINUING CEASE-FIRE, INCLUDING IF NECESSARY, ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DISPATCH OF UN OBSERVERS TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE.

5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE COUNCIL BY THE END OF THE PERIOD INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 3.

PARSONS

NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UK MISSION NEW YORK 2416252 MAY 78

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 834 OF 24 MAY

AND TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR S/S PARTY)

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, TOKYO, DUBLIN.

MY TELNO 832: FALKLANDS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. MY JAPANESE COLLEAGUE (WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS AND ON A PERSONAL BASIS) HAS PREPARED A DRAFT (TEXT IN MIFT) IN THE REALISATION THAT WE WOULD VETO THE PANAMIAN AND IRISH TEXTS.

2. IT IS CERTAINLY PREFERABLE TO THE OTHER TWO TEXTS ALTHOUGH THE PHRASE "ON THE BASIS OF HIS PREVIOUS EFFORTS.......

OUT OF DATE, AND THE GENERAL MANDATE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD BRING US UNDER STRONG PRESSURE TO CEASE MILITARY ACTION (BUT THIS PRESSURE ALREADY EXISTS).

3. MEANWHILE OTUNNU (UGANDA) HAS TOLD PANAMA THAT, IF THEY GO AHEAD WITH THE DRAFT WITHOUT GIVING THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL A CHANCE TO MAKE AN INPUT (AS PANAMA DID LAST TIME) THEY WOULD HAVE "TO TAKE THE CONSEQUENCES".

4. IT IS GOING TO BE A DAY WITH RESOLUTIONS EMERGING FROM ALL POINTS IN THE WOODWORK FOLLOWED BY FRANTIC ATTEMPTS TO MARRY THE
4. IT IS GOING TO BE A DAY WITH RESOLUTIONS EMERGING FROM ALL
   POINTS IN THE WOODWORK FOLLOWED BY FRANTIC ATTEMPTS TO MARRY THE
   VARIOUS TEXTS.
4. I NEED NO INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE MOMENT. I WILL TRY TO PULL THE
   THREADS TOGETHER AT THE END OF THE DAY.

PARSONS

NNNN

NATURAL HABITATS' COLONY 21 DUGONG ROAD 25 B. B. STREET 75
   YAK OR GO ANYWHERE
   LUCY 13 E. 82
   GOOD STUFF FOR THE HOUSE, TELL HER TO
   TELL THE PARTY
   CG 000
   CG 0234
   CG 1230
   CG 0432
   IN 1133
   IN 0000
   IN 0000
   IN 0000
   IN 0000
   [Redaction]

XXX
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 24/6/82 MAY 82
TO FLASH F CO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 831 DATED 24 MAY 82
AND TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, WASHINGTON, DUBLIN

MYTELNO 828: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. BEFORE THIS MORNING'S MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DRAFT
RESOLUTIONS WERE HANDED AROUND INFORMALLY BY IRELAND AND PANAMA.
THEIR TEXTS ARE IN MY TWO IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS.
THEY HAVE NOT BEEN FORMALLY TABLED. THERE IS ALSO TALK OF A
UGANDAN DRAFT.

2. I AM CONTINUING TO TAKE THE LINE, WITH COLLEAGUES AND WITH THE
PRESS, THAT ANY CEASEFIRE WHICH SIMPLY LEFT THE ARGENTINE FORCES
ON THE ISLANDS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

3. DE WASTEUIL (FRANCE) TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HE HAD spoken TO
2. I AM CONTINUING TO TAKE THE LINE, WITH COLLEAGUES AND WITH THE PRESS, THAT ANY CEASEFIRE WHICH SIMPLY LEFT THE ARGENTINE FORCES ON THE ISLANDS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

3. DE NANTEUIL (FRANCE) TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO CHEYSSON. CHEYSSON HAD SAID THAT HE DID NOT WANT ANYTHING TO HAPPEN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS WERE COMPLETED.

DE NANTEUIL REALISED THAT IF EITHER THE IRISH OR THE PANAMANIAN DRAFT WAS PUT TO THE VOTE WE WOULD VETO. HE WAS WORRIED THAT SOMETHING WOULD COME TO A VOTE BEFORE WE HAD 'CLEANED UP' THE ARGENTINES.

4. SINCE THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED I HAVE SPOKEN TO DORR (IRELAND). HIS INTENTION IS:
(A) TO GET THE IRISH POSITION ON THE TABLE;
(B) TO PRE-EMPT PANAMA;
(C) TO OFFER (AS HE PUTS IT) A POSSIBLE WAY OUT IF BOTH PARTIES AT ANY TIME NEEDED IT.

I TOLD HIM THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO VETO HIS RESOLUTION AS IT STOOD. HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS THIS. IT LOOKS AS THOUGH HE MAY TABLE HIS DRAFT THIS AFTERNOON (24 MAY), FOR A POSSIBLE VOTE ON TUESDAY. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD BE GETTING IN TOUCH WITH YOU PERSONALLY.

PARSONS

NNNN
ZZ UKREP BRUSSELS
GRS 564
SECRET
FM FCO 24L330Z MAY 82
TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 456 OF 24 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM BUS
WASHINGTON TELNO 1869: HAIG'S VIEWS ON THE FALKLANDS
1. OD(SA) THIS MORNING THOUGHT THAT SIR N HENDERSON SHOULD SPEAK TO HAIG AGAIN TODAY. I RECOMMEND THAT HE SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING.
2. IT IS DISCONCERTING THAT HAIG SHOULD BE SO VOLATILE. AS HENDERSON HAS POINTED OUT, HAIG WAS URGING US ONLY A FEW DAYS AGO TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION. HENDERSON SHOULD DO ALL HE CAN TODAY AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO KEEP HAIG STEADY. HE MAY WISH TO TRY THE TECHNIQUE OF ASKING SPECIFIC QUESTIONS (SOME ARE SUGGESTED BELOW) SO AS TO ENCOURAGE HAIG TO FOCUS ON THE ACTUAL SITUATION RATHER THAN TO INDULGE IN RAPIDLY CHANGING GENERALITIES.
3. HENDERSON SHOULD POINT OUT TO HAIG THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BRITISH BRIDGEHEAD IN THE FALKLANDS IS BOUND TO HAVE A MAJOR EFFECT ON OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION. PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC OPINION WOULD TOLERATE NOTHING LESS. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID IN THE HOUSE ON 20 MAY THAT OUR DRAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT WAS WITHDRAWN. WE CANNOT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES CONSIDER THE IDEA OF BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FALKLANDS OR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. THE PARALLEL WITH OUR REPOSSESSION OF SOUTH GEORGIA, AFTER WHICH HAIG AGREED THAT THE DEPENDENCIES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM ANY INTERIM AGREEMENT, IS OBVIOUS. HENDERSON SHOULD ADD THAT WE HOPE THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK'S INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE AMENDED (PARA 2 OF WASHINGTON TELNO 1870), IN THE SENSE THAT SHE WOULD VETO ANY RESOLUTION WHICH CALLED FOR A CEASEFIRE WITHOUT ALSO CALLING FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCR 502, OR ANY RESOLUTION WHICH CALLED FOR BRITISH WITHDRAWAL.
4. HENDERSON SHOULD CONTINUE THAT WE ARE DETERMINED TO BRING ABOUT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WITH THE FEWEST POSSIBLE CASUALTIES, AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT MADE CLEAR IN PARLIAMENT ON 20 MAY THAT WE REMAIN INTERESTED IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502. THE ESSENTIAL HOWEVER IS THAT ARGENTINA DEMONSTRATE A REAL CHANGE OF POSITION, FOR INSTANCE BY INDICATING A WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW WITHIN A FIXED TIME LIMIT.

5. HENDERSON SHOULD ASK HAIG WHETHER HE SEES ANY SIGN THAT ARGENTINA'S WILL TO CONTINUE FIGHTING MAY FAIL AND WHETHER, IF THIS HAPPENED, ARGENTINA WOULD CHANGE HER POSITION REGARDING SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. WHAT IS THE US EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES SAYING ON THESE POINTS?

6. HENDERSON COULD ALSO ASK HAIG ABOUT LIKELY EVENTS IN THE OAS AND WHETHER HAIG WOULD ATTEND ANY MEETING.

7. HENDERSON COULD POINT OUT THAT THE EC'S INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA IS A MAJOR DEMONSTRATION OF SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN'S POLICIES IN THIS CRISIS. THE ADMINISTRATION TOO CAN GIVE A HELPFUL LEAD TO INTERNATIONAL OPINION, AND INDEED TO DOMESTIC OPINION IN THE US, BY CONTINUING TO REITERATE THAT ARGENTINA BEGAN THIS CRISIS BY COMMITTING AGGRESSION, AND THEN REFUSED FOR SEVEN WEEKS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY: AND THAT BRITAIN IS NOW ENGAGED, AS A LAST RESORT, IN USING MILITARY MEANS TO END THE ARGENTINE OCCUPATION AND IS SUFFERING CASUALTIES IN THE PROCESS WHICH SHE WOULD FAR RATHER HAVE AVOIDED.

OUR MILITARY ACTION IS IN NO WAY A REASON FOR THE US CLIMBING BACK ON THE FENCE. WE GREATLY HOPE THAT HAIG WILL BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS IN THIS SENSE.

PYM
CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKREP BRUSSELS 241412Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2063 OF 24 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE ROME DUBLIN PARIS
BONN LUXEMBOURG ATHENS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO OSLO
OTTAWA CANBERRA WELLINGTON TOKYO ROUTINE STRASBOURG LISBON MADRID
UKMIS GENEVA

EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION:
MEETING OF MINISTERS OF THE TEN, BRUSSELS 24 MAY 1982

FALKLANDS

SUMMARY

1. MINISTERS AGREED TO EXTEND THE IMPORT BAN FOR AN
   UNSPECIFIED PERIOD UNTIL THE SITUATION SHOULD PERMIT
   ITS REMOVAL: THIS TO BE DONE ON THE SAME BASIS AS
   THE DECISION AT LUXEMBOURG ON 17 MAY. THE COMMISSION
   WILL NOW PUT A FORMAL PROPOSAL TO COREPER AND THE
   DECISION WILL BE TAKEN AS A 'A' POINT IN THE COUNCIL.

2. THE PRESIDENCY IN SPEAKING TO THE PRESS WILL
   CONFIRM THE TEN'S POSITION AS STATED AT LUXEMBOURG,
   AND IN PARTICULAR THEIR WISH TO SEE SCR 502 IMPLEMENTED
   AND THEIR CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION
   TO THE CRISIS.

DETAIL

3. MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION WAS BRIEF AND THERE WAS NO
   DISAGREEMENT. FOR THE UK YOU RECALLED THE SECRETARY
   GENERAL'S STATEMENT OF 21 MAY AND THE DOCUMENT
   PUBLISHED BY THE UK WHICH DEMONSTRATED HOW FAR THE UK
   HAD BEEN PREPARED TO GO IN THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL
   SETTLEMENT. THIS WAS NOT THE END OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY.
   WE WERE READY TO TALK AT ANY TIME. HOWEVER THE ARGENTINE
   POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED IN ANY IMPORTANT WAY SINCE THE
   BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND WITHOUT SOME SIGN OF
   CHANGE THERE COULD BE NO HOPE OF A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT.
   THE MILITARY POSITION WAS WELL KNOWN. THE UK HAD USED
   MINIMUM FORCE IN ITS LANDINGS AND HAD SUFFERED LESS DAMAGE
   THAN EXPECTED.

A. CLESEN (DENMARK) SAID THAT THE DANISH SANCTIONS BILL WAS BEFORE
4. OleSEN (DENMARK) said that the Danish sanctions Bill was before parliament today. It imposed no time limit. He suggested the community should do the same. Cheysson (FRANCE) agreed. It would be "shocking" for the community to suggest that it expected that it would take as much as a month to reach a negotiated settlement, he insisted that there should be no declaration today by the ten since this would either consist of banalities or would have to take a position on questions such as ceasefire, withdrawal, which were delicate and were currently under discussion at the security council.

5. Others were content to accept an extension of a month, or indefinitely, van der Stoel (Netherlands) expressed a preference for a limited period but withdrew this without protest. Only Colombo (ITALY) wanted a declaration which he said should underline the political unity of the ten. It was therefore agreed that the presidency should speak briefly to the press on the line in para 6.

6. In an earlier meeting of the political committee Bullard gave a brief survey of the situation, including the various initiatives for a diplomatic solution and the position in the security council. He asked that more of the ten should speak there so as to give the debate a better balance. He stressed that the UK's landing had changed the situation fundamentally and although the UK remained willing to negotiate the new situation would need to be reflected in any terms for a ceasefire.

7. Others said that their views were not changed on sanctions as well as other aspects. Andreani (France) asked if the UK thought the results of the Secretary-General's efforts had completely disappeared. He asked how the UK would react to a security council resolution referring to the Secretary General's talks and calling for the parties to build on the results of these. Others echoed this question.

8. Bullard and others speakers drew attention to the undesirable polarisation between Europe and Latin America which seemed to be creeping into the security council debate. Devlin (Ireland) stressed that the Irish approach
8. BULLARD AND OTHERS SPEAKERS DREW ATTENTION TO THE UNDESIRABLE POLARISATION BETWEEN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA WHICH SEEMED TO BE CREEPING INTO THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. MACKERNAN (IRELAND) STRESSED THAT THE IRISH APPROACH IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS TO TRY TO MOVE TOWARDS A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES AS A BASIS FOR A CEASEFIRE. THIS MIGHT INCLUDE REAFFIRMATION OF SCR 502 A, DIRECT OR INDIRECT CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE, A FORMAL MANDATE FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS AND POSSIBLY TO REPORT BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AN ENDORSEMENT OF THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT ALREADY ACHIEVED IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL’S TALKS.

IN REPLY BULLARD POINTED OUT THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL’S TALKS HAD RESULTED IN AGREEMENT ONLY ON A NUMBER OF POINTS WHICH COULD SET A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATION. THE MAIN POINTS OF SUBSTANCE WERE STILL FAR FROM SOLUTION WHICH THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD ADMITTED FAILURE. THE COST TO THE UK IN EFFORT AND LIVES OF THE MILITARY OPERATION COULD NOT BE IGNORED. IT WAS NOW DIFFICULT FOR EXAMPLE TO EXPECT THE UK TO WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM THE ISLANDS LEAVING ONLY A SMALL LIASON OFFICE AS PROPOSED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS NOT MEETING AT UK REQUEST AND THE UK WAS NOT CONVINCED ITS ACTIVITIES COULD BE HELPFUL. THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND BEEN ABLE HITHERTO TO ACT CONSTRUCTIVELY WITHOUT A SPECIFIC SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE.

FCO ADVANCE TO:-
FCO – PS, EMERGENCY ROOM, CROWE, YOUNG (ECD(E)), PS/PUS PS/MR ONSLOW

BUTLER

NNNN
SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER HAIG SUGGESTS THAT BRITAIN'S SUCCESSFUL LANDING ON THE FALKLANDS - PLUS THE SACRIFICES SUSTAINED BY BOTH SIDES - MAY MAKE ENOUGH OF A DIFFERENCE TO PERMIT NEGOTIATIONS TO RESUME. SURELY HE IS RIGHT. IN ITS BRIDGEHEAD AND
SUCCESSFUL LANDINGS ON THE FALKLANDS - PLUS THE SACRIFICES SUSTAINED BY BOTH SIDES - MAY MAKE ENOUGH OF A DIFFERENCE TO PERMIT NEGOTIATIONS TO RESUME. SURELY HE IS RIGHT. IN ITS BRIDGEHEAD AND IN ITS EVIDENT CAPACITY TO SUSTAIN OPERATIONS ASHORE, BRITAIN HAS SOMETHING REAL TO CONVERT INTO POLITICAL COIN. ARGENTINA MAY HOPE TO RAISE THE COST TO THE BRITISH AND LIMIT THEIR MILITARY GAINS, BUT IT CANNOT EXPECT TO BOOT THEM OFF THE ISLANDS AGAIN. THE 40 ISOLATED MARINES IT SWEEP UP ON APRIL 2 ARE ONE THING; THE 5,000 TROOPS ASHORE, WITH THEIR FLEET PROTECTION, ARE QUITE ANOTHER.

MR HAIG TOLD CBS YESTERDAY THAT WHAT HELP ARGENTINA IS GETTING FROM ITS LATIN FRIENDS DID NOT YET AMOUNT TO MUCH AND THAT HE ACCEPTED AT FACE VALUE ARGENTINA'S WORD THAT IT IS NOT RECEIVING SOVIET ASSISTANCE. IT RUNS COUNTER TO JUST ABOUT EVERYTHING KNOWN ABOUT THE ARGENTINE JUNTA AND ARGENTINE PRIDE, HOWEVER, TO ASSUME THAT BUENOS AIRES WOULD FORGO AVAILABLE OUTSIDE AID IF IT FELT IT WERE FACING HUMILIATION IN ITS QUOTE MALVINAS UNQUOTE CAMPAIGN. PERU, FOR ONE, COULD HELP ON ONE LEVEL, THE SOVIET UNION ON ANOTHER. THAT COULD COMPLICATE THE CURRENT DETERMINATION OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, IN BACKING THE BRITISH, TO AVOID QUOTE ANOTHER SUEZ UNQUOTE. PRESIDENT EISENHOWER UNDERCUT HIS BRITISH AND FRENCH ALLIES WHEN THEY INVADED SUEZ IN 1956.

IN THAT CONNECTION, WE MUST ASK AGAIN: JUST WHAT IS BRITAIN FIGHTING FOR? MRS. THATCHER HAS MADE CLEAR THE PRINCIPLE, OR THE COLLECTION OF PRINCIPLES - DEMOCRACY, SELF DETERMINATION, RESISTANCE TO AGGRESSION - BUT NOT THE INTEREST, NOR THE PARTICULAR OUTCOME, IT WISHES TO SEE IN THE FALKLANDS. HER FOREIGN SECRETARY, FRANCIS PYM, COULD HAVE CLARIFIED THIS MATTER YESTERDAY, ON ABC, BUT DID NOT. THE LONG-TERM ARRANGEMENTS TO BE MADE AFTER BRITISH TROOPS QUOTE REPOSSESS UNQUOTE THE ISLANDS, HE SAID, ARE QUOTE UNCERTAIN. QUOTE THERE WILL BE A BRITISH MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE SHORT RUN AND, IN THE LONG, QUOTE BROADER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. QUOTE LONDON WILL CONSULT WITH THE ISLANDERS AND WILL TALK WITH QUOTE MANY NATIONS QUOTE - HE DID NOT CITE ARGENTINA - ABOUT QUOTE SOME PATTERN OF DEFENSE. QUOTE MR. PYM APOLOGIZED A BIT FOR NOT BEING SPECIFIC. QUOTE HOW CAN I BE? QUOTE HE ASKED.

IN ALL DUE RESPECT TO AN ALLY UNDER DURESS, WE MUST ASK: HOW CAN HE NOT BE? DOES THE THATCHER GOVERNMENT EXPECT TO RETAIN THE SUPPORT IT NOW ENJOYS FOR WAR AIMS IT HAS YET TO DEFINE? DOES IT BELIEVE THERE IS ANY ULTIMATE WAY TO ENSURE THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS WITHOUT CONSULTING THE ARGENTINES DIRECTLY? IT WAS, AFTER ALL, INATTENTION TO THE ARGENTINE INTEREST AND THE ARGENTINE PASSION IN THE FIRST PLACE THAT GOT MRS. THATCHER INTO THE SITUATION SHE IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO REDEEM BY ARMS. SHE HAS RIGHT AND REASON TO OPPOSE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION BUT, NOW THAT SHE IS FIGHTING, SHE CANNOT IGNORE THE CENTRAL POLITICAL REALITY: THERE IS REALLY ONLY ONE OTHER
ATTEMPTING TO REDEEM BY ARMS. SHE HAS RIGHT AND REASON TO OPPOSE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION BUT, NOW THAT SHE IS FIGHTING, SHE CANNOT IGNORE THE CENTRAL POLITICAL REALITY: THERE IS REALLY ONLY ONE OTHER NATION WITH WHICH BRITAIN MUST WORK OUT THE FATE OF THE ISLANDS—ARGENTINA. THE SOONER THAT PROCESS CAN RESUME, THE FEWER MEN WILL DIE.
ENDS

HENDERSON
SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 2415522 MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1874 OF 24 MAY
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE)

YOUR TELNO 1034 FALKLANDS U S ASSISTANCE

1. AS YOU WILL BE AWARE, WEINBERGER ACTED IMMEDIATELY LAST NIGHT TO APPROVE THE SUPPLY OF THE LARGE AMOUNT OF AM2 AIRFIELD MATTING WE REQUESTED. AT HIS PERSONAL DIRECTION THE PENTAGON HAVE ALSO MOVED RAPIDLY OVER THE SUPPLY OF VULCAN PHALANX FOR OUR NEW CARRIER, THE LARGE AMOUNT OF PRE-FABRICATED ACCOMMODATION REQUIRED ON ASCENSION ISLAND AND THE CONVERSION OF S.S. STENA INSPECTOR AS AN AUXILIARY FOR THE TASK FORCE. THEY ALSO OFFERED ALL THE ASSISTANCE THEY COULD OVER THE WEEKEND WITH ADVICE ON DEFUSING THE UNEXPLODED BOMBS ON OUR FRIGATES. OUR VERY LARGE VOLUME OF REQUESTS FOR MATERIAL ARE BEING DEALT WITH PROMPTLY AND POSITIVELY. I HAVE EXPRESSED MY APPRECIATION TO WEINBERGER FOR ALL HE HAS BEEN DOING TO HELP.

HENDERSON
CONFIDENTIAL

FM PANAMA CITY 241312Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 241500Z MAY
TELEGRAM NUMBER 84 OF 24 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 827 TO YOU. FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. I HAVE NOT YET SEEN ILLUECA’S STATEMENTS BUT YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THE GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED PRESS HERE HAS INCREASINGLY INDULGED IN PERSONAL ATTACKS ON THE PRIME MINISTER. AN EDITORIAL IN CRITICA ON 22 MAY, FOR EXAMPLE, DESCRIBES HER AS A QUOTE HITLER WITH SKIRTS UNQUOTE WHOSE QUOTE INFINITE OBSTINACY UNQUOTE LEFT YOUNG IRISH REBELS TO DIE OF HUNGER.

2. THE TELEGRAM TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL ABOUT WHICH, ON INSTRUCTIONS, I PROTESTED ON 14 MAY (MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 80) WAS, WHOEVER THE AUTHOR, SIGNED BY ROYO AND ONE MUST ASSUME HE CONCURRED IN ITS LANGUAGE. I SUSPECT THAT HE IS EITHER UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO CURB ILLUECA AND I DOUBT WHETHER REPRESENTATIONS TO HIM WOULD BE ANY MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THOSE MADE ON 14 MAY.

3. IF, HOWEVER, YOU DECIDE THAT ILLUECA’S OUTPOURINGS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PASS WITHOUT COMMENT, YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER, AS
3. IF, HOWEVER, YOU DECIDE THAT ILLUECA'S OUTPOURINGS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PASS WITHOUT COMMENT YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER, AS AN ALTERNATIVE, CALLING IN THE PANAMANIAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON AND DELIVERING A FORMAL PROTEST TO HIM. IF NEWS OF THIS WERE GIVEN TO THE MEDIA — ESPECIALLY THE NEWS AGENCIES — IT WOULD QUICKLY FIND ITS WAY TO PANAMA. WE COULD ALSO PASS THE TEXT OF ANY PROTEST NOTE TO THE PANAMANIAN MEDIA. WHILE THIS WILL NOT ENDEAR US TO ROYO AND ILLUECA OR WEAKEN PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA (OF WHICH THERE IS NO HOPE ANYWAY) IT MAY AT LEAST SERVE TO AROUSE DECENT PANAMANIAN OPINION AND THUS HELP CURB FURTHER EXCESSES.

FCO PLEASE PASS UKMIS NEW YORK

STEPHENSON
SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 240258Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1878 OF 24 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 456 TO BRUSSELS: FALKLANDS

1. I SAW HAIG TODAY AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED. HAIG SAID THAT HE
   THOUGHT THAT THE BRITISH ATTITUDE WAS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE: BUT
   NEVERTHELESS, ALTHOUGH IT WAS PRESUMPTUOUS OF HIM TO DO SO, HE FELT
   OBLIGED TO POINT OUT THAT THERE WERE LONG TERM ISSUES AT STAKE
   THAT MIGHT WELL BE JEOPARDISED IF A BREATH OF VISION WERE NOT
   SHOWN AT THIS STAGE.

2. HE HIMSELF WAS CONVINCED THAT WE WOULD SUCCEED QUITE QUICKLY
   IN DEFEATING THE ARGENTINIAN GARRISON ON THE ISLANDS: BUT HE
   WAS ALSO CERTAIN THAT THIS WOULD NOT END THE PROBLEM. ON THE
   CONTRARY IT WOULD CREATE ANOTHER ONE THAT COULD GET US INTO
Contrary it would create another one that could get us into increasing difficulties unless an effort was made now to forestall it.

3. Haig spoke of the various resolutions that were under consideration in the corridors of the Security Council. One of these involved a ceasefire and renewal of the Secretary General's mandate without any reference to Argentine withdrawal. There would be no problem in vetoing that but there were other resolutions that included withdrawal as well as a ceasefire and that also proposed, in one resolution, an interim administration by the UN and in another resolution the establishment of a contact group of four nations under Article 29 of the Charter. These, Haig thought, would be more difficult to handle but Haig said his main problem was the forthcoming meeting of the Rio Treaty. The Argentinians were calling this for next Thursday unless by tomorrow there had been a satisfactory resolution in the Security Council.

4. Haig's concern about the Rio Treaty organisation was that the USA might become completely isolated if it opposed the sanctions resolution that he thought would be put down. The only support they might get would be from Guyana and Trinidad. This activity in the OAS would reflect the movement, about which Haig spoke with great concern, of Latin American solidarity dedicated to supporting Argentina in preparing for a war of revenge and opening the way to increased Soviet and Cuban involvement.

5. Haig said that Costa Mendez, whose treachery knew no bounds, was advocating the adoption by BA of a policy of rebuilding Argentine military capability with the help of the Soviets and Cubans.

6. Haig said that the US Government, by coming down on the British side, had already greatly jeopardised US interests in Latin America. What was at stake in the future was enormous. It was not simply a question of the economic sacrifices involved but of the enormous increase in Soviet and Communist influence.

7. I interjected that Haig had told me several times that Galtieri had always promised him that he would never accept the Soviet option. To which Haig said that things had moved on from there. Argentinians were now desperate and would become more so and would stop at nothing in the pursuit of revenge.

8. Haig's problem therefore was somehow to avoid a resolution
8. Haig's problem therefore was somehow to avoid a resolution under the Rio Treaty later this week that would isolate the USA still further from the rest of the American Hemisphere. He suggested that the clue lay in close involvement with Brazil. He implied that it should be possible for the USA to maintain a tough stance in the Security Council if, but only if, the USA could be seen to be active in trying to bring about a settlement of the Falkland's issue elsewhere: the same applied in the OAS. Haig did not believe that any good could come of solutions suggested either by the Security Council or the OAS, but that this did not preclude great damage to the USA in both organisations unless they were seen to be pursuing some active line of diplomacy. Hence his idea of trying to get together with Brazil to float new ideas for a settlement.

9. Haig then suggested the sort of plan which I have already hinted to you might be in his mind (Washington Telno 1373) ceasefire and withdrawal, US/Brazilian interim administration and discussions without prejudice regarding the future - ideas that I told Haig have gone down in London like a lead balloon.

10. Haig repeated his view about the need to keep the Brazilians in play. If this did not happen the OAS would get out of control and this would spell the end of the inter-American system for which the USA would be blamed. Again he dilated upon the great dangers of increased Soviet penetration of the American Hemisphere. It would be a disaster if the outcome of the Falklands crisis was an intensification of communism and Soviet influence in the American Hemisphere. He quite realised the difficulty for us in contemplating withdrawal at this stage. Nevertheless he believed that we could not contemplate remaining on the islands in great force indefinitely. In the long run the only security for the islands was some agreement in which the USA had participated. It would be impossible, Haig said, to get a US guarantee for a return to the status quo ante.

11. I reminded Haig how often he had assured me that this would not be another Suez. If the US Government now took action which could have the effect of trying to bring our forces to a halt before their mission was accomplished, the charge of another Suez could be raised. Furthermore considerable sacrifices had already been made by Great Britain: these must not be rendered vain by premature termination of the task. I told Haig that we naturally recognised the importance of the USA's relations with its Latin
12. Haig said that he accepted all this. That was why he did not want to do anything that would cause difficulties for Britain: indeed he wanted to act now in concert with Britain. He would like to think that a joint appeal by the US and Brazilian governments to both sides could be devised in advance so as to make it acceptable to Britain. I repeated that if he was thinking of an appeal for withdrawal by both sides and the establishment of an interim administration this was just not on. Security Council Resolution 502 demanded the withdrawal of the Argentinians not the British. The Falkland Islands were our territory. How would it be if the Cubans occupied Puerto Rico and we then said that as part of any settlement the Americans must withdraw as well as the Cubans. Resolution 502 was the sheet-anchor.

13. Haig acknowledged the difficulties for us but insisted upon the need to have the long-term in mind in deciding about the immediate future. He added that the problem — by which I think he meant exercising pressure on us — would have to be faced by the USA at some stage so perhaps it was better to do so now. He would give the matter further thought in the light of our conversation and either try to speak to you on the secret telephone or send you a message.

14. I left him in no doubt about the strength of feeling in London and the conviction that we were now operating on a different basis from that of the early stages of his negotiations. Haig said that he recognised that the Argentinians were not likely to get now the terms that they might have got had they been more far-sighted in early April.

15. To sum up: what really worries Haig at the moment is the prospect of a serious deterioration in the US government's relations with Latin America and the chances this may offer the Soviets to increase their influence in the American hemisphere. This would be the opposite of what the Reagan administration set as their first priority at the time of the inauguration. The US government therefore must take some initiative now which, even if it does not bring about a resolution of the Falkland Islands problem, will at least limit the damage that can be done to US interests by
BRING ABOUT A RESOLUTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS PROBLEM, WILL AT LEAST LIMIT THE DAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE TO US INTERESTS BY ACCUSATIONS OF BEING PRO-BRITISH AND NON-UNDERSTANDING OF THE LATIN AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW.

HENDERSON

NNHH

RGRG NOTE FCO
CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 250110Z MAY 82
TO FLASH F CO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 844 OF 24 MAY 1982
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, TOKYO, DUBLIN.


1. Since my telegrams under reference were drafted at a time in 1982 and I have had two telephone conversations, he said that the non-aligned members (excluding Panama) were annoyed with Dorr for going ahead and tabling a draft which he and everyone else knew that we would veto. The three Africans, Jordan and Guyana were desperately anxious to avoid a deadlock in the Security Council which could be followed by a major row generated by the Latin Americans in an emergency special session of the General Assembly. This would only polarise relations between the regions, benefit the radicals and damage any prospect there might be of a peaceful outcome to the present crisis in the short and long term. They had accordingly overlooked the amendments below to Dorr's draft.
OUTCOME TO THE PRESENT CRISIS IN THE SHORT AND LONG TERM. THEY
HAD ACCORDINGLY WORKED OUT THE AMENDMENTS BELOW TO DORR'S DRAFT.
IF, AS HE WAS AT PRESENT INSISTING, DORR WOULD NOT BE DRIVEN OFF,
THEY MIGHT TABLE THESE AS AMENDMENTS IF THERE WAS ANY CHANCE OF
THEIR BEING ACCEPTABLE TO US.

2. THE AMENDMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
SUBSTITUTE FOR OPERATIVE 3 THE FOLLOWING NEW LANGUAGE:
"URGES THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS MISSION WITH A VIEW TO ENDING
THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES IN AND AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
(ISLAS MALVINAS)".
AMEND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4 TO READ:
"REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ENTER INTO CONTACT IMMEDIATELY
WITH THE PARTIES WITH A VIEW TO ENSURING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS
FOR A CEASEFIRE, INCLUDING IF NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE
DESPATCH OF UN OBSERVERS TO MAINTAIN COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS
OF THE CEASEFIRE".
DORR'S OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 5 WOULD ALSO BE AMENDED TO REQUEST
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT ON HIS EFFORTS WITHIN A LIMITED
PERIOD, SAY TWO OR THREE DAYS.

3. OTUNNU URGED ME TO PUT THESE AMENDMENTS TO YOU AND I AGREED
TO DO SO. I SAID TO HIM, SPEAKING VERY FRANKLY, THAT I THOUGHT
HE WAS SETTING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK WHICH
THE LATTER WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO UNDERTAKE. I HAD TOLD PEREZ DE
CUELLAR AS RECENTLY AS THIS MORNING (24 MAY) THAT, FOR US, A
CEASEFIRE COULD ONLY TAKE PLACE IF COMBINED WITH IMMEDIATE
ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, AND THAT THE QUESTION OF MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL
WAS A NON-STARTER. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD CONCLUDE THAT THIS
POSITION WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO ARGENTINA AND WOULD BE MOST RELUCTANT
TO CHALK UP A SECOND FAILURE. MEANWHILE, THE CONFLICT WOULD
CONTINUE.

4. OTUNNU TOOK MY POINT BUT ARGUED THAT A BRIEF TIME LIMIT FOR
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT MIGHT ENCOURAGE PEREZ DE CUELLAR
TO HAVE ONE MORE GO: A FORMAL MANDATE FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL
MIGHT GIVE HIM FURTHER ENCOURAGEMENT; AND WE WOULD AT LEAST
POSTPONE THE HORRORS OF AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE
ASSEMBLY.

5. OTUNNU HAS SINCE TELEPHONED ME FOR A THIRD TIME TO SAY THAT
PANAMA (RELUCTANTLY) AND THE OTHER LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN
MINISTERS (INCLUDING COSTA MENDEZ) WOULD ACCEPT THE IRISH DRAFT
WITH THESE AMENDMENTS. I DO NOT REGARD THIS AS EVIDENCE OF GOOD
FAITH; THE MOST LIKELY POSSIBILITY IS THAT THEY WANT TO GET OUT
MINISTERS (INCLUDING COSTA MENDEZ) WOULD ACCEPT THE IRI CH DRAFT WITH THESE AMENDMENTS. I DO NOT REGARD THIS AS EVIDENCE OF GOOD FAITH; THE MOST LIKELY POSSIBILITY IS THAT THEY WANT TO GET OUT OF THE UN QUICKLY BECAUSE THEY ARE BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT THEY WOULD HAVE THE VOTES TO JACK UP AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY FOLLOWING A UK VETO AND/OR THAT THEY WANT THEIR HANDS FREE FOR THE RIO TREATY MEETING DUE TO START ON 27 MAY.


7. IF WE DECIDED TO SUPPORT A DRAFT RESOLUTION SO AMENDED, I WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO MAKE AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE COVERING THE FOLLOWING POINTS. FIRST, I WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE 4TH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH AS IN THE IRI CH DRAFT (MY TELNO 832) AND WITH THE LAST PHRASE IN OPERATIVE PARA 2, ON THE LINES I PROPOSED FOR DEALING WITH THE JAPANESE DRAFT – PARAGRAPH 7 OF MY TELNO 842 I WOULD ALSO MAKE CLEAR THAT, WHILE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUED HIS MISSION, WE WOULD BE IN NO WAY INHIBITED FROM TAKING MILITARY ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER.

8. AS SEEN FROM THIS END, THIS WOULD BE A CLEVER WAY OF GETTING OUT OF THE COUNCIL WITHOUT A VETO, AT LEAST FOR SOME DAYS. HOWEVER, IF YOU WILL FORGIVE ME GOING BEYOND MY BRIEF, YOU MIGHT FEEL THAT OUR SUPPORT OF SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD REVIVE PRESSURE ON US AT HOME TO SUSPEND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO GIVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL A CHANCE (COSTA MENDEZ WOULD BE BOUND TO SAY AFTER THE VOTE THAT ARGENTINA WOULD DO SO. I COULD OF COURSE DEAL WITH THIS EASILY). OBVIOUSLY THIS WOULD BE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE SINCE IT WOULD ONLY BENEFIT ARGENTINA.

9. TO SUM UP, I NOW NEED THE FOLLOWING LIST OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR WHAT WILL PROBABLY BE A FAIRLY MESSY DAY:
   (1) CONFIRMATION THAT I SHOULD VOTE AGAINST THE IRI CH DRAFT AS IT STANDS WITH AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE AS IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF MY TELNO 842.
   (II) CONFIRMATION THAT I SHOULD VOTE AGAINST THE PANAMANIAN
MY TELNO 842.

(II) CONFIRMATION THAT I SHOULD VOTE AGAINST THE PANAMANIAN DRAFT WITH AN APPROPRIATE EXPLANATION OF VOTE (OTUNNU TELLS ME THAT THE PANAMANIANS – EVEN ILLUECA – HAVE DECIDED NOT TO PURSUE THEIR DRAFT, BUT WE CAN NEVER EXCLUDE SUCH A CONTINGENCY).

(III) INSTRUCTIONS ON THE JAPANESE DRAFT.

(IV) INSTRUCTIONS ON THE IRISH DRAFT, AS AMENDED BY THE NON ALIGNED. IF YOU THINK THAT SUPPORT FOR THIS DRAFT WOULD OFFER AN ACCEPTABLE WAY OUT OF OUR PROBLEMS HERE, AT LEAST FOR A SHORT TIME, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF I COULD HAVE INSTRUCTIONS BY 1400Z 25 MAY, SO THAT I CAN MUDDY DORR’S WATERS AT THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS.

PARSONS

NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL

DESBY 250100Z

FM UK101 NEW YORK 250100Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C C

TELEGRAM NUMBER 839 OF 24 MAY 1982

AND TO UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR SOFS PARTY)

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BRASILIA.

MY TELS NOS 831 TO 835 (NOT TO ALL): FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. THE LATEST ADDITION TO THE LIST OF RESOLUTION-DRAFTERS IS BRAZIL. THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY (24 MAY) SENT THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL A LONG LETTER (TEXT IN MIFT) WHICH INCLUDES AN EXPANDED VERSION OF THE PIECE OF PAPER MY BRAZILIAN COLLEAGUE SHOWED ME YESTERDAY (MY TELNO 828, PARA 3). YOU WILL SEE THAT THIS CONTAINS THE FAMILIAR INGREDIENTS OF AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL, AND A UN ADMINISTRATION, WITH THE NEW IDEA OF A COMMITTEE APPOINTED UNDER ARTICLE 29 OF THE CHARTER TO CARRY OUT THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT. WE HAVE TOLD THE BRAZILIANS HERE THAT THE TIME FOR SUCH ARRANGEMENTS IS NOW PAST AND THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF OUR ALLOWING A RESOLUTION ON THESE LINES TO BE ADOPTED.
ON THESE LINES TO BE ADOPTED.

2. SEE MIFT.

PARSONS

NNNN
UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 250100Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 250011Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 840 OF 24 MAY

AND TO UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR S OF SJ S'S PARTY).

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BRASILIA.

MIPT: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S LETTER OF
24 MAY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

BEGIN

EXCELLENCY,

EVER SINCE THE MALVINAS CRISIS BEGAN, BRASIL HAS ACCOMPANIED
DEVELOPMENTS WITH PROFOUND INTEREST AND EVER-INCREASING
PREOCCUPATION.

THIS CRISIS DEEPLY AFFECTS BRAZIL AND THE BRAZILIAN PEOPLE, NOT
ONLY BECAUSE IT IS TAKING PLACE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, AN AREA WHICH
THIS CRISIS DEEPLY AFFECTS BRAZIL AND THE BRAZILIAN PEOPLE, NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT IS TAKING PLACE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, AN AREA WHICH IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE FOR BRAZIL, BUT ALSO BECAUSE IT INVOLVES TWO OF OUR TRADITIONAL FRIENDS, BOTH OF THEM COUNTRIES WE CARE DEEPLY ABOUT.

THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT HAS MADE UNTIRING REPRESENTATIONS TO THE TWO PARTIES AND TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THIRD PARTIES, TO SEEK FOR A PEACEFUL, JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT FOR THIS QUESTION. WE MAINTAINED FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTACTS, UP TO THE HIGHEST LEVEL, WITH THE COUNTRIES THAT, IN OUR OPINION, COULD MAKE THE MOST DIRECT CONTRIBUTION TO AN UNDERSTANDING. WE DECIDEDLY SUPPORTED THE MEDIATION EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. ONCE THIS INITIATIVE HAD BEEN THwarted, WE VIGOROUSLY SUPPORTED THE NEGOTIATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AS WELL AS HIS PEACE PROPOSALS.

PRESIDENT JOAO BAPTISTA DE OLIVEIRA FIGUEIREDO MADE A PERSONAL APPEAL TO THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. HE ALSO REQUESTED THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES TO HELP IN ACHIEVING THIS OBJECTIVE.


IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ITSELF, AS WELL AS IN THE MEETING OF THE ORGAN OF CONSULTATION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE, BRAZIL, THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE CRISIS, HAS BEEN A VOICE FOR MODERATION, UNDERSTANDING AND PEACE.

NOW THAT ALL VOLUNTARY EFFORTS SEEM TO HAVE FAILED, NOW THAT HUNDREDS OF LIVES OF YOUNG ARGENTINES AND BRITISH SUBJECTS HAVE BEEN LOST, NOW THAT WE FACE THE PROSPECT OF THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR LATIN AMERICA AND FOR THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, BRAZIL BELIEVES THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS CAN NO LONGER DELAY TAKING A FIRM AND DECISIVE ACTION TO RESTORE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

IN THE SAME SPIRIT THAT HAS GUIDED BRAZIL THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS, AND SPEAKING FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF A COUNTRY THAT HAS GIVEN PROOF OF ITS UNCONDITIONAL ADHERENCE TO THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, I BELIEVE THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST TAKE A DECISION TO PUT AN IMMEDIATE END TO THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND TO ESTABLISH THE BASES FOR A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.
THE BASES FOR A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS HELD BY THE PARTIES, THE
BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WISHES TO SUBMIT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE
FOLLOWING POINTS WHICH I Firmly believe CAN BE THE BASIS FOR A
COUNCIL RESOLUTION THAT WILL ENSURE A JUST AND HONOURABLE PEACE,
WITHOUT WINNERS OR LOSERS:

1. IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES:
2. SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES TO CONTINENTAL
   ARGENTINE TERRITORY AND OF BRITISH FORCES IN THE NORTHEAST
   DIRECTION TO A DISTANCE EQUIVALENT TO THAT BETWEEN ARGENTINE
   CONTINENTAL TERRITORY AND THE MALVINAS ISLANDS:
   A) THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE BRITISH AND ARGENTINE FORCES SHOULD BE
      INITIATED 48 HOURS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION:
   B) ALL ARGENTINE AND BRITISH FORCES SHOULD HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN
      FROM THE AREA WITHIN 21 DAYS, ONE-THIRD OF THE FORCES OF
      EACH PARTY BEING WITHDRAWN AT SEVEN-DAY INTERVALS, IN ACCORD-
      ANCE WITH CRITERIA ESTABLISHED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL:
3. APPOINTMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS OF A
   PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION FOR THE ISLANDS, WITH EXCLUSIVE
   COMPETENCE, WHICH WILL HOLD CONSULTATIONS WITH THE REPRESENTAT-
   IVES OF THE INHABITANTS, TO BE DESIGNATED BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF
   ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM:
   A) THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS WILL BE ESTABLISHED
      SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE BEGINNING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF
      ARGENTINE AND BRITISH FORCES:
   B) ALL UNITED NATIONS MEMBER STATES WILL GRANT THE SECRETARY
      GENERAL THE SUPPORT REQUIRED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
      PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND FOR THE SUPERVISION OF THE
      IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION.
   A COMMITTEE PRESIDED OVER BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED
   NATIONS AND COMPOSED OF THE TWO PARTIES AND OF FOUR OTHER MEMBER
   STATES, TWO OF WHICH ARE TO BE APPOINTED BY EACH OF THE PARTIES,
   WITH THE MANDATE OF CONDUCTING URGENT NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO A
   PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF THE QUESTION. THE COMMITTEE WILL BEGIN
   ITS WORK THE DAY FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF
   THE FORCES FROM THE AREA AND WILL SUBMIT ITS REPORT TO THE
   SECURITY COUNCIL NOT LATER THAN 31 JANUARY 1983.

BRAZIL IS CONVINCED THAT THESE ELEMENTS, AS A WHOLE, CONSTITUTE
AN HONEST, JUST AND EQUITABLE BASIS FOR THE CESSATION OF THE
SHEDDING OF BLOOD AND TRAGIC LOSS OF LIVES.

THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT FERVENTLY APPEALS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF
ARGENTINA AND TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO, PLACING THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND
ARGENTINA AND TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO, PLACING THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND
HUMANITY ABOVE ALL ELSE, DETERMINE TO CEASE HOSTILITIES FORTHWITH
AND ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS.

THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT LIKewise APPEALS TO ALL STATES MEMBERS
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO SUPPORT, BY THEIR WORDS, BY THEIR ACTIONS
AND BY THEIR VOTES, A SOLUTION ALONG THE LINES HEREWITH PRESENTED.

LET US RENEW OUR DEDICATION TO THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF
THE CHARTER AND DEMONSTRATE IN AN EFFECTIVE MANNER THAT OUR WORDS
WERE NOT EMPTY WORDS WHEN WE ALL PROMISED, AT THE MOMENT THIS
ORGANIZATION WAS CREATED, THAT:

"WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DETERMINE TO SAVE
SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS FROM THE SCOURGE OF WAR.......

WITH HIGHEST CONSIDERATION,

RAMIRO SARAIVA GUERREIRO
MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE
FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL.

ENDS

NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY PARIS 250630Z
DESKBY MOSCOW 250500Z
DESKBY PEKING, TOKYO 250130Z
DESKBY DUBLIN, ACCRA 250830Z
DESKBY MADRID, KINSHASA, WARSAW 250730Z
DESKBY KAMPALA, AMMAN, NAIROBI 250700Z
DESKBY PANAMA CITY, WASHINGTON, GEORGETOWN 251300Z
DESKBY UKDEL NATO 250300Z
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 242025Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F CO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 836 OF 24 MAY 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING, DUBLIN, MADRID,
KAMPALA, KINSHASA, ACCRA, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, WARSAW,
AMMAN, TOKYO, UKDEL NATO, NAIROBI.

MY TELNO 825: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

SUMMARY
1. THE DEBATE WAS RESUMED AT 1530Z TODAY (24 MAY). IT WAS A

DEBATE BROUGHT TO THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION.
THE DEBATE WAS RESUMED AT 1530Z TODAY (24 MAY). IT WAS A MAINLY AFRICAN SESSION: UGANDA, ZAIRE, KENYA, LAOS, LIBERIA, GREECE AND CHINA SPOKE. KENYA WAS MAGNIFICENT, EVEN BETTER THAN THE OLD COMMONWEALTH. OTHER AFRICANS WERE EVEN-HANDED, CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND A NEW MANDATE FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL. CHINA LEANED STRONGLY TOWARDS ARGENTINA BUT WAS NOT TOO BAD. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER IF GREECE HAD NOT SPOKEN. THE DEBATE WILL BE RESUMED AT 1430Z TOMORROW, WHEN COSTA MENDEZ IS TO MAKE A MAJOR STATEMENT.

DETAIL

2. OTUNNU (UGANDA) SAID THAT UGANDA SHARED THE TWO-PRONGED APPROACH OF THE NAM: ON THE SUBSTANCE, IT RECOGNISED THE JUSTICE OF ARGENTINA'S CLAIM; ON PROCEDURE, IT FAVOURED NEGOTIATIONS. IT HAD VOTED FOR SCR 502 BECAUSE OF ITS POSITION ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE. THE CRISIS HAD SINCE EXPANDED. UGANDA'S PRESENT ATTITUDE WAS: SUPPORT FOR SCR 502; REJECTION OF THE USE OF FORCE OR WAR AS A METHOD OF RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES; A CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS; REGRET THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NEGOTIATIONS HAD BROKEN DOWN; AND A WISH THAT HE SHOULD MANDATED TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS, AS THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO NEGOTIATIONS.

3. KAMANDA (ZAIRE), WHO FANCIES HIMSELF FOR HIS ELOQUENCE, MADE A LONG AND VAPID STATEMENT ABOUT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NON USE OF FORCE AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS OF DISPUTES; ABOUT PEACE AND WAR; ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE UN; ABOUT NATIONAL HONOUR AND SO ON. HE CONCLUDED BY URGING THE COUNCIL TO BRING ABOUT AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS TO IMPLEMENT SCR 502, ON THE BASIS OF THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT ALREADY ACHIEVED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL, WHO SHOULD BE GIVEN A FORMAL MANDATE.

4. MAINA (ENYA) MADE AN ADMIRABLY ROBUST STATEMENT WHICH WAS AN EFFECTIVE ANTIDOTE TO ALL THE LATINOS HAVE BEEN SAYING ABOUT A CULTURAL CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE WEST AND LATIN AMERICA (PARAGRAPH 4 OF MY TELNO 828 - NOT TO ALL). HE SAID THAT THE BREACH OF PEACE HAD STARTED WITH ARGENTINA'S AGGRESSION ON 2 APRIL. THAT WAS A SEPARATE QUESTION FROM THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF ARGENTINA'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY. SOME OF THOSE WHO ''FELT OBLIGED'' TO SUPPORT ARGENTINA'S CASE ON SOVEREIGNTY HAD TRIED TO TREAT THE TWO PROBLEMS AS ONE. KENYA WAS FRIENDLY TO BOTH SIDES BUT HAD TO SPEAK OUT IN THE INTERESTS OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. THE DECOLONISATION ARGUMENT WAS IRRELEVANT. ALL (UNDERLINED) OF NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA HAD BEEN COLONISED IN THE 18TH
DECOLONISATION ARGUMENT WAS IRRELEVANT: ALL (UNDERLINED)
OF NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA HAD BEEN COLONISED IN THE 18TH
AND 19TH CENTURIES. THE TWO CONTINENTS HAD BEEN PEOPLED
AS A RESULT OF COLONIALISM: THAT WAS FACT OF THE WORLD’S
UNFORTUNATE PAST. THIS WAS NOT A COLONIAL ISSUE: ARGENTINA
WAS ENGAGED IN THE PURELY TERRITORIAL CLAIM, IN TOTAL
DISREGARD OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE ISLANDS. THE ARGENTINE
CLAIM COULD NOT BE SETTLED AT THEIR EXPENSE: THEIR INTERESTS
WERE PARAMOUNT. IF THE PRINCIPLE OF DECOLONISATION WAS
DISTORTED IN ORDER TO REDISTRIBUTE PEOPLES, THE UNITED NATIONS
WOULD BE IN REAL TROUBLE: THERE WOULD BE ENDLESS WAR AND
DESTRUCTION. ARGENTINA HAD FLOUTED THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT; YET ONLY EIGHT MONTHS AGO SHE HAD INSISTED ON
ENTERING RESERVATIONS ON A PASSAGE IN THE NAM COMMUNIQUE OF
SEPTEMBER 1981 ABOUT SUPPORT FOR THE ARMED STRUGGLE OF NATIONAL
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. WHATEVER SOME DELEGATIONS MIGHT HAVE SAID,
THE NAM HAD NEVER SUPPORTED ARGENTINE USE OF FORCE TO SETTLE
THE DISPUTE. THERE HAD BEEN A DELIBERATE CAMPAIGN OF DISTORTION
IN SOME OF THE INTERVENTIONS IN THE DEBATE. THE FACT WAS THAT
ARGENTINA HAD IGNORED CALLS FOR RESTRAINT FROM THE SECURITY
COUNCIL AND PRESIDENT REAGAN. IT WAS PERVERTED REASONING
TO SAY THAT AGGRESSION HAD BEGUN WHEN THE UK FORCES MOVED
TOWARDS THE AREA. ARGENTINA HAD NO RIGHT TO IMPOSE ITS OWN
FORM OF COLONIALISM ON THE FALKLANDS. THE UN SHOULD NOT CONDONE
ARGENTINE AGGRESSION; THE MATTER SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THE ICJ.
THE UN’S REACTION TO THE PRESENT CRISIS WAS BEING VERY KEENLY
WATCHED: THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST TAKE CONCERTED ACTION TO
PREVENT ANYONE FROM DRAWING THE CONCLUSION THAT AGGRESSION PAID.

5. LAOS WAS BRIEF AND POISONOUS (TO THE US, AS WELL AS TO THE UK).
LIBERIA WAS CONFUSED AND EVEN-HANDED. SHE GOT A LAUGHS FOR SAYING
THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS LIKE A MAN WITH TWO WIVES: PRESIDENT
REAGAN HAD TO DECIDE WHETHER BRITAIN OR ARGENTINA WAS THE HEAD
WIFE. SHE REGISTERED A COMPLAINT ABOUT THE IMPROPERITY OF
ILLUECA’S REMARKS ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTER YESTERDAY.

6. DOUTAS (GREECE) SAID THAT GREECE WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT
THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE WHICH WAS BEING FLAGRANTLY
VIOLATED IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. ALL FORCES SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND A PROVISIONAL UN ADMINISTRATION INTRODUCED
IN ORDER TO MAKE NEGOTIATIONS POSSIBLE. MILITARY INVASION SHOULD
NEVER BE CONDONED. GREECE TOOK NO POSITION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF
THE QUESTION AT ISSUE. SCR 502 AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL’S REPORT
OF 21 MAY PROVIDED A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR
SHOULD BE GIVEN A NEW MANDATE.
7. The President, Líng qíng (China), speaking in his national capacity, said that the failure of the Secretary General's efforts and the arrival of British forces had brought about an escalation which China deeply deplored. It was regrettable that the Secretary General's negotiations had had to stop because of the gap between two parties and because "the party with military strength had taken a tough stand". There should be an immediate cease-fire and resumption of negotiations. The substantive problem was a legacy of colonialism, on which the General Assembly and the NAM had adopted resolutions. China always supported the struggle of third world countries to safeguard their sovereignty the territorial integrity. The Council should respect the decisions of the NAM and the Tiar Consultative Organ and support Argentina's claim to sovereignty. But the immediate requirement was a cessation of hostilities.

PARSONS
SECRET
FM WASHINGTON 242282 MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1881 OF 24 MAY
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS (PRO-SECRETARY OF STATE'S STAFF)
UKMIS NEW YORK
MY TELNO 1878: FALKLANDS

1. HAIG HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME AGAIN EVIDENTLY IN AN EASIER FRAME OF MIND. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN REFLCETTING ON OUR CONVERSATION AND HAD ALSO HAD A CHAT WITH THE PRESIDENT. THE LATTER, HE ASSURED ME, WAS QUITE VERY SOLID, MORE SO THAN THOSE AROUND HIM. THERE IS NO PROBLEM WITH HIM. UNQUOTE HOWEVER HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO BE CAUGHT UNAWARES AT THE KEY MOMENT. HE SAW A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY AT THE MOMENT WHICH HE THOUGHT SOMEONE SHOULD FILL BECAUSE OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE A VACUUM TAKEN OVER BY THE FORCES OF EVIL. HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR LONDON TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE.
2. He interjected that he had sent an extremely tough message to Havana to warn them off from any quote hanky panky unquote and a more diplomatic message to the other party (by which I presume he meant the Soviet Union).

3. He was now proposing to send you a personal message this evening, but he would not be putting anything forward that would be disturbing to you. His aim was to hold out the prospect for a positive move and to keep Brazil from being distracted to the wrong side.

4. I told him that my reports of my conversations with him today and Saturday would certainly have been disturbing to London. He said that we had been talking very frankly and he would be more subtle in the message he sent you.

5. Having just seen Zablocki, Chairman of the House of Represent-atives Foreign Affairs Committee, I told Haig that he had indicated no sense of disquiet on the Hill about British activities and the US government’s attitude to them. Zablocki had admitted that America might not do well out of the whole business but US opinion was strongly behind Britain. Had we not taken the action we have done this would have set a dangerous precedent from which every country might suffer. Haig said that he was not surprised that this had been Zablocki’s attitude. He did not repeat to me the warnings he had given me on Saturday about murmurings on the Hill.

HENDERSON

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Use the card for one piece/item number only

Enter the Lettercode, Series and Piece/Item references clearly e.g.

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MOD PRESS STATEMENT 2130 24 May 1982

HMS ANTELOPE HAS SUNK

As the Secretary of State for Defence announced in the House of Commons earlier today, HMS ANTELOPE sustained severe damage after an attack yesterday.

Despite strenuous efforts by the ship's company, fires caused by the attack became uncontrollable. The ship's company were forced to abandon her and were safely transferred to other ships.

There are no further reports of casualties.

It has now been reported that HMS ANTELOPE has sunk.
24. May 1982

Dear Mike

I enclose a copy/copies of a Statement to be made in the House this afternoon by Mr John Nott, the Secretary of State for Defence.

Yours Sincerely

Harry Kentish

M.A. Pattison Esq.
(H KENTISH)
Parliamentary Clerk
Mr Speaker,

Seven weeks ago when Argentinian forces invaded the Falkland Islands, my rt honourable Friend the Prime Minister stated that the Falkland Islands remained British territory, that no aggression and no invasion could alter that simple fact, and that it was the Government's objective to see that the Islanders were freed from occupation.

On the night of Thursday 20th May Her Majesty's forces re-established a secure base on the Falkland Islands and the Union Flag is today flying over the settlement of San Carlos in East Falkland — where it will remain. The whole House will have been delighted to see the expressions of delight on the faces of the Islanders and their children - published widely yesterday.

The amphibious landing was the culmination of a long period of planning by the Force Commander and of preparation by the Royal Marine Commanders, members of the Parachute Regiment and supporting arms during their six weeks voyage into the South Atlantic. Whilst they sailed south, the Government worked unremittingly to persuade Argentina to withdraw peacefully and honourably from the Falkland Islands. But the government met only with Argentine intransigence.

Last week it became clear that the only possible course left open to us was the re-possession of the Falkland Islands by military means. In this the Government has been encouraged - as I think has the country as a whole - that Her Majesty's Opposition and the other main political parties in the House have supported us.
Certainly I believe that our Servicemen have been greatly encouraged by the support that they have received from rt honourable and honourable Members of this House.

Mr Speaker - I will not go over all the details of the amphibious landing; the approach by the Task Force under the cover of darkness, widespread raids on Argentine military targets, the entry into Falkland Sound and the disembarkment into landing crafts leading to assault in the San Carlos area, but I think I can say that it was an exploit which captured the imagination of our people.

Argentinian forces did not interfere to any significant extent with the landing itself. The amphibious ships involved in the first stages of the operation were able to withdraw without incident to safer waters to the East of the Falkland Islands and I must here pay tribute to the men and women of the merchant marine for their heroism and skill in these dangerous operations; their role is a vital one.
The landing itself was complemented by attacks in other parts of the Falklands including the airfield at Goose Green and bombardment of military installations south of Port Stanley. Carrier based RAF Harriers launched attacks against Argentine defences at Port Stanley airfield. These operations were an essential part of the overall plan. I deeply regret, however, that in the course of these operations 3 Royal Marines were killed when their Gazelle helicopters were shot down and that 1 RAF Harrier pilot is missing. And as we have announced, 21 men were tragically lost when a Royal Navy Sea King ditched in the sea shortly before the operations began.

To protect the landing operation the Royal Navy maintained a gun-line of destroyers and frigates in the Falkland Sound. Other warships provided close protection for our amphibious forces; overhead, Sea Harriers from our Carriers provided continuous combat air patrols. The waves of Argentine air attacks had to run the gauntlet of these air defences. The Sea Harriers shot down 8 of their aircraft and total Argentine losses that day are estimated at 14 Mirages and Sky Hawks, 2 Pucaras and 4 helicopters. These losses represent more than a third of their combat aircraft taking part that day.
During these continuous air attacks the Royal Navy fought with great skill and bravery. Nevertheless those Argentine aircraft which had penetrated our air defence screen inflicted damage on 5 of our ships. Of these, the Type 21 frigate HMS ARDENT was severely damaged but despite the efforts of her crew to control the damage she sank in the course of Friday night. 22 of her crew died and 17 were injured. The injured are now receiving full medical attention in hospital ships of the Fleet.

Since that action the Task Force has been reinforced by the arrival of more, highly capable, warships, more than compensating for those damaged or lost in action so far.
The following day, Saturday, saw a lull in the fighting. Although the weather was good the Argentine airforce launched only one attack by 2 Skyhawks on our ships which was not pressed home. Yesterday the Argentine airforce resumed their attacks on ships of the Task Force in San Carlos Water. The aircraft were engaged by missiles from ships, by shore based Rapier batteries and by the combat air patrols of Sea Harriers. 6 Mirage aircraft and 1 Skyhawk are known to have been shot down - one aircraft more than was first announced - and there have been unconfirmed reports of a further 1 Mirage and 2 Skyhawks also shot down. Yesterday's events involved the loss of two-thirds of the Argentine aircraft taking part.

In the meantime, action to make the blockade effective has continued. Sea Harriers from the Task Force yesterday destroyed 2 Argentine helicopters and caused serious damage to another. Task Force action also resulted in the beaching of a ship used by the Argentines to ferry troops and ammunition around the Islands. With the loss of re-supply ships and 6 helicopters the Argentine Commander has lost all but a very limited capability to supply his forces and move them around the Islands.
Mr Speaker, I regret to confirm that in yesterday's action, the frigate, HMS ANTELOPE, sustained severe damage. Our latest information - and this is based on preliminary reports - is that one of her ships company was killed and 7 others were wounded. I must also inform the House, with great regret, of the loss of one of our Sea Harrier's last night. This aircraft met with an accident shortly after launching from one of our carriers and the pilot was killed. This accident was not as a result of Argentine action and the cause has yet to be established. Next of kin have been informed.

Mr Speaker - the intensive fighting of the last few days has produced tragic loss of life on our side, and the House will join with me in conveying the deep sympathy of the whole nation to the relatives and friends of those killed and injured.

We all feel deeply too for the constant concern and worry of the families and friends of our Servicemen. They are showing great patience and understanding in very difficult circumstances.
Names of casualties will not be released until the next-of-kin have been informed although to counter the false propaganda coming out of Argentina we have had to give some general information on the progress of military action as soon as it is confirmed.

Mr Speaker - Our forces are now established on the Falkland Islands with all the necessary supplies, together with their heavy equipment and air defence missiles. They have mobility with a large number of helicopters at their disposal - and their spirits are high.

But I must emphasise that our men still face formidable problems in difficult terrain with a hostile climate. We must expect fresh attacks upon them, and there can be no question of pressing the Force Commander to move forward prematurely - the judgement about the next tactical moves must be his - and his alone.

But, one thing is certain, the days of the occupying Argentine garrison are numbered and it will not be long before the Falkland Islanders once again have their democratic rights restored.
We share the anguish which you express at the loss of life in the tragic conflict over the Falkland Islands. I deeply respect the which led you to send me your message and should like to reply in the same spirit of frankness and candour.

The conflict was not of our making. It was the Argentine forces who invaded the Islands and broke the peace. We have striven for seven weeks to secure a negotiated settlement but Argentina has shown no disposition to match our endeavours in good faith. A ceasefire has to be accompanied by withdrawal of Argentine troops. To do otherwise would leave the aggressor in occupation and in possession of the rewards of military adventure.

That our cause is just and that the principles which we uphold are shared and understood by democratic nations, I have not the slightest doubt. Aggression must not be allowed to succeed. International law must be upheld. Sovereignty cannot be achieved by armed invasion. The liberty which the Falkland Islanders previously enjoyed must be restored. The world has seen too often in this century the tragic consequences of failure to defend the principles of justice, civilised values and international law. We seek peace with freedom, not peace at the expense of freedom.

The conflict could be ended immediately if Argentina were to withdraw its forces in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502. The authority of the United Nations would thereby be reasserted.

I hope that such counsels may yet prevail in Buenos Aires before more lives are lost.
UN

(a) Security Council Debate

1. The Security Council resumed its debate at 1500Z on 23 May. There were 13 speakers: France, Poland, Honduras, Nicaragua, New Zealand, Equatorial Guinea, Paraguay, Colombia, El Salvador, Belgium, Indonesia, Peru and Panama (again). Sir Anthony Parsons spoke in right of reply to Panama. The statements by New Zealand and Belgium were excellent, but France was awful. Apart from Nicaragua, the Central Americas were strikingly moderate and Paraguay and Colombia were also better than might have been expected. Peru was strongly pro-Argentine, and said that its latest initiative was still alive. The Panamanian Foreign Minister was again intolerably offensive, and Sir Anthony has suggested consideration of an approach to the President of Panama. The Council is to meet again at 1430Z today.

(b) Draft Resolution?

2. The Irish Ambassador expects the Panamanians to table a draft Resolution today.

(c) Sir A Parsons' Assessment

3. The elastic of our support, even from our close friends (with the exception of the old Commonwealth), is stretching very thin; not simply because of natural UN pacifism and a desire to see the UN play a part in stopping the fighting and bringing about a peaceful solution, but more seriously a view is developing (exploited by the Argentines) that the crisis is bringing about a kind of cultural confrontation between Latin America and Western Europe/North America. If we have to veto a ceasefire resolution and are thereafter dragged into the General Assembly, we are going to be very isolated indeed.

(d) Securing Speakers Favourable to our Cause

4. Earlier yesterday we had conducted a lobbying exercise in certain European and Third World capitals to encourage governments to speak in the debate. A similar exercise was conducted in London with many Ambassadors of the Ten.

The Pope's Message

5. The Prime Minister's reply to the Pope's message has been sent by telex to the Vatican and our Ambassador to the Holy See has been instructed to deliver a confirmatory copy. The reply stresses that aggression must not be allowed to succeed and that the conflict could be ended if Argentina complied with SCR 502. Buenos Aires Radio broadcasted the text of President Galtieri's reply to the Pope: 'We listen with Christian humbleness to Your call for peace, understanding and prudence. Our people and our Government have made all possible efforts to avoid a military confrontation and bloodshed .......!'
US Attitude

6. Secretary of State Haig saw Sir Nicholas Henderson privately on 22 May. He said that the US Government is increasingly concerned at the consequences for US interests in the continuing battle over the Falkland Islands and that the Americans believe that thought should be given by both Washington and London at a very early date to a way of bringing an end to the conflict that will in some way prevent a hostage to fortune for the future. This possible shift in US attitude is echoed in yesterday's 'New York Times' editorial.

Uruguay

7. The Uruguayan Foreign Minister summoned our Ambassador yesterday to deliver a stiff reply to our earlier Note on the 12-mile limit. The Uruguayans are being sensitive over our reference to the River Plate 'estuary' as opposed to 'river'. The Minister said that he would be leaving for Washington, not New York, on Tuesday and that there was likely to be a further meeting with regard to the Rio Treaty on Thursday.

Comment

8. Although a Resolution calling for a ceasefire only still seems unlikely to command sufficient support, pressures are developing for action to halt the conflict through a mutual withdrawal and reversion to the idea of an interim UN or other presence to hold the ring while a negotiated settlement is pursued. As the fighting develops, so the solidity of our support is shifting. A further meeting of Rio Treaty States may take place later this week.

9. The underlying Western concerns, put clearly by Mr Haig (and probably shared by many in Europe), is that a military defeat for Argentina will make the sovereignty issue harder to resolve, will lead to continuing tension in the region, will inflict lasting damage on Western relations with Latin America and will provide openings for the spread of Soviet influence.

10. Action for consideration today, arising from overnight developments, is whether:-

(a) a message might be sent to Mr Haig to stiffen his resolve;

(b) a message should be sent to the Uruguayan Foreign Minister (Montevideo telegram No.360);

(c) whether we should take up with the Panamanian Government the offensive comments of their UN Representative.

24 May 1982

P R Fearn

Emergency Unit
FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP : 0700 HOURS, 24 MAY

UN

1. Yesterday's session of the Security Council debate failed to give rise to a draft Resolution. The debate will resume at 1430Z today.

Military Action

2. A frigate was seriously damaged and six Argentine aircraft were shot down in further attacks against Task Force ships in San Carlos waters. In a separate incident, Sea Harriers shot down one Argentine helicopter and forced down another in flames. A third was damaged.

The Pope's Message

3. The Prime Minister has sent a reply to the Pope. It makes clear that a ceasefire must be accompanied by Argentine withdrawal. Argentine Radio has broadcast the text of President Galtieri's reply to the Pope.

24 May 1982
Emergency Unit
PRIME MINISTER

The Foreign Secretary has now considered the question of a reply to the Pope. He feels strongly that we should not reply too quickly. Like our Ambassador to the Holy See he feels a reply would best go on Monday.

Content?

Duty Clerk informed is letting Willie know.

SK.

23/5

WILLIE RICKETT
23 May 1982
Covering UK SECRET/US TOP SECRET

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2111 (Direct Dialing)
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MO 5/21

23rd May 1982

Dear John,

I attach a self-explanatory message from Mr Nott to Secretary Weinberger. I should be grateful if you could arrange for its onward transfer to Washington.

A copy goes to John Coles (No 10) and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Nick Evans

(N H R EVANS)

J Holmes Esq
MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY OF STATE NOTT TO SECRETARY FOR DEFENSE WEINBERGER

UK OPERATION CORPORATE

I am very grateful for the helpful way in which, following our talks in Brussels earlier this month, your Department has approached the question of material support for UK forces. In particular, my officials have been in touch with yours about the possible release of 150,000 square yards of AM2 Airfield Matting, which I understand the US Marine Corps hold as war reserve. I should be very grateful if you could agree to this release at a very early date, in which case our officials could jointly work out the details.

We would propose that the matting should be transported from the United States in a ship we would charter. We should also look to you for any special training required. As to the financial basis of the release, perhaps this could also be discussed between our officials: since you would need, I understand, to arrange for resupply you may wish to consider an arrangement under which you would supply to us initially on the basis that the matting would be returned if unused. If it were used, then when the Port Stanley airfield was permanently repaired we would recover it to become a useful enhancement of the UK's capability, for use either within NATO or out of area.
During the early afternoon in the Falkland Islands the Argentine Air Force launched a number of raids on ships of the Task Force in San Carlos Waters. The aircraft were engaged by missiles from surface vessels, shore-based Rapier and by Sea Harriers. Five Mirage and one Sky Hawk are known to have been shot down; a further one Mirage and two Sky Hawks were probably shot down.

During these attacks one of our frigates sustained some damage. No reports on the extent of the damage have been received, nor have we any indication of casualties. We have had no reports of other damage to British ships or aircraft.

In a separate incident earlier, Sea Harriers from the Task Force on routine patrol saw two Argentine Puma and one Bell helicopters in the Falkland Sound just off the coast of West Falkland. The Harriers attacked and one Puma exploded; the Bell helicopter landed but was seen to be on fire and the second Puma may have been damaged.

We have no reports of further action at present.

Ministry of Defence
23 May 1982
Further news from San Carlos:

There were two further attacks by aircraft. In the first attack there was the possible downing of an A4.

The second wave was of four mirage aircraft. One was shot down by Sea Wolf on HMS Broadsword, one was shot down by 20 mm cannon on either Antelope or Plymouth, and one further possible shot down, but this is not confirmed.

There was a third wave of mirage, two of which were shot down by sea harriers. Therefore the total in the present wave of attacks is as follows:

1 A4 definitely shot down.
1 possible A4 shot down.
4 mirage definitely shot down.
1 possible mirage shot down.
+ 3 helicopters (as previously reported: Shag Cove)

Our only casualties have been as previously reported, that of the unexploded bomb in HMS Antelope (still no further news about casualties).
First incident was reported by Nicholson and Hanrahan:

Two A4 aircraft were sighted at approximately 1745 hours. No bombs were observed. One shot down by HMS Antelope which is a type 21 frigate.

There were also two further reports that have not been broadcast:

The first involves a further A4 attack on the fleet in the San Carlos area where HMS Antelope was hit by an unexploded bomb on the starboard. Casualties are unknown. It is believed that there were four A4 aircraft and these are being pursued by sea harriers.

There was also an engagement by sea harriers from HMS Hermes. They attacked three helicopters in the area of Shag Cove on West Falkland. The sea harriers shot down one Bell helicopter and attacked two Puma helicopters. One crashed and the other has landed – damage not known.
TEXT OF GALTIERI'S MESSAGE TO THE POPE

BBC MONITORING SERVICE REPORT

Buenos Aires Radio at 1530 GMT broadcast a message sent today to Pope John Paul II by President Galtieri of Argentina which said: 'Grieved like Your Holiness over the loss of human lives, we listen with Christian humbleness to Your call for peace, understanding and prudence. Our people and our Government have made all possible efforts to avoid a military confrontation and bloodshed, and we have participated with a spirit of renunciation and flexibility in the negotiations to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict. In his peace efforts during the past few days, the UN Secretary-General found understanding and a spirit to negotiate in our country.

The call made by Your Holiness strengthens us in our unwavering desire to support all efforts which may lead to stopping a bloody confrontation we have not sought, and which is the result of an obstinate and intransigent attempt to restore an illegal colonial situation.

The Argentine Nation endorses the desire of Your Holiness and, with responsibility before history, is ready to take part in a cessation of hostilities which would allow the re-establishment of peace, and in this climate, to seek a peaceful, honourable and just agreement.'.

(Monitored at 1650Z on 23 May 1982)
FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0715 HOURS 23 MAY

UN
1. The Security Council debate continued but without a draft resolution appearing.

Military Action
2. The MOD issued a statement which reported further consolidation of our bridgehead on E. Falkland. There were no reports of enemy action. Sea Harriers attacked and severely damaged an Argentine patrol boat.

Pope's Message
3. The Prime Minister received a message from the Pope calling for an immediate ceasefire to open the way to a peaceful solution of the dispute.

NATO
4. A meeting of the North Atlantic Council reaffirmed support for the British position.

Latin America
5. The President of Colombia and the President of the Dominican Republic have both sent messages to the Prime Minister. The President of Peru has said that the Argentines have accepted his peace proposals. The Government of Mexico in a public statement appealed for an immediate cessation of hostilities and a renewal of the search for a negotiated settlement.

EMERGENCY UNIT
23 May 1982
[Due to late transmission UN/US material is placed at the end of today's Sitrep]

North Atlantic Council Meeting, 22 May

1. This resulted in a public reaffirmation of alliance support for us and an expression of solidarity with our recent action. The statement was weaker than a draft circulated by our Ambassador which ran into trouble with the French, Italians and Germans although it received US support.

The Pope's message to the Prime Minister

2. The Pope appeals to the Prime Minister to 'act decisively in order to secure an immediate ceasefire that will open the way to a peaceful solution of the dispute'.

Latin America

(a) Peruvian Initiative

3. According to President Belaunde the Argentines have accepted, in principle, the latest Peruvian ideas with certain reservations which President Belaunde thinks may not be insuperable. Reportedly the Argentines are receptive to the idea of an 'equidistant' withdrawal of forces and are not opposed to a UN administration for one year while negotiations take place. In the event of negotiations failing, the Argentines would return the problem to the UN. The text of the Peruvian proposal is at Flag F

(b) Colombian President's message to the Prime Minister

4. The President expresses interest in the Peruvian initiative and also offers Colombian assistance in achieving peace. HM Ambassador Bogota reports that the Colombian and Peruvian Presidents spoke to each other recently and that knowledge of the Colombian President's message to the Prime Minister is public there.

(c) Dominican President's message to the Prime Minister

5. The President expresses deep concern about the crisis, appealing to the Prime Minister to make a supreme effort to preserve peace through negotiations leading to an honourable understanding for both sides. An identical message has been sent to President Galtieri and a similar message to the UN Secretary-General.

UN

(a) Security Council Debate

6. Spain, Uruguay, Venezuela, Soviet Union, Mexico, Cuba, Bolivia, Panama, Canada, United States and Guatemala spoke. Sir A Parsons spoke in right of reply and drew a mild rejoinder from Ros (Argentina). Most speakers said the Security Council

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should adopt a resolution providing for an immediate ceasefire and a mandate for the Secretary-General to resume his efforts. Of the Latins the Venezuelan and Panamanian Foreign Ministers were abusive; the others made reasonably moderate statements, notably Guatemala. The Soviet Union was hostile but not abusive. Canada was excellent. The US statement was a little too even-handed (a point which our Embassy, who had been given an advance text, had already made to the State Department). Mrs Kirkpatrick made small but important changes to the advance text.

(b) Sir A Parsons' assessment

O UKmis New York tel 822

7. The Council is in a jam. It is clear that a large number of delegations are anxious to avoid precipitating a British veto but there is an overwhelming desire to bring about an end to the fighting. It seems unlikely that there will be a vote before 24 May at the earliest. Sir A Parsons has been asked to say what sort of language we could live with. He has refused to be drawn into discussion except to say "Argentina withdrawal".

(c) Securing speakers favourable to our cause

P FCO tel no 451 to UKmis New York tel no 822 at flag 'O', so that... they will be able to speak in the Council on 24 May providing some balance to Latin American rhetoric. Sir A Parsons is in contact with the Commonwealth Secretary-General who is being helpful.

(d) UK Statement on military action

S UKmis New York 824

8. As suggested by London, Sir A Parsons is seeking to promote helpful speeches. Some of our partners and allies are claiming they need instructions from capitals. Sir A Parsons has asked our missions to urge that instructions should be sent today (UKmis New York tel no 822 at flag 'O'), so that... they will be able to speak in the Council on 24 May providing some balance to Latin American rhetoric. Sir A Parsons is in contact with the Commonwealth Secretary-General who is being helpful.

9. The Argentines have circulated their version of military events as documents of the Security Council. In order to set the record straight Sir A Parsons would be grateful for a self-contained document covering events since 19 May. He asks that this should reach him by 231330Z.

Comment

10. The Pope's message, which we understand has also gone to Galtieri comes amid growing confidence that the visit to UK will take place. It may help the Pope to justify a favourable decision on the visit.

11. Since the stalling of the UN Secretary-General's efforts on 19/20 May it has become open season for Latin American initiatives. The Presidents of Peru, Colombia and the Dominican Republic have sent messages to the Prime Minister. The Presidents of Mexico and Brazil did so earlier. All will have seen advantage in such moves for Latin American solidarity and their own relations with Argentina. So far none of these initiatives contains new elements, or offers more than token help. It will nevertheless be important to maintain good relations with individual Latin American capitals if possible.
12. The Security Council debate has so far lived up to Sir A Parsons' expectations. We will do what we can to secure helpful interventions today. Ramphal's help is of value. Talk of resolutions is circulating in corridors but if the tabling of texts can be put off until tomorrow, this would suit us well. We are producing urgently the summary of military events since 19 May for which Sir A Parsons has asked.

A J Payne
Emergency Unit

23 May 1982
UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON 291633Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1867 OF 23 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, BIS NEW YORK AND MODUK

FALKLANDS: US PRESS FOR 23 MAY

AMID CONTINUING MASSIVE COVERAGE OF MILITARY ACTION ON THE FALKLANDS
A NUMBER OF ARTICLES REFLECT ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISPUTE
FOR US INTERESTS.

2. GWERTZMAN, IN THE NEW YORK TIMES, IN TWO ARTICLES REFLECTING
ADMINISTRATION BRIEFING, NOTES US FEARS THAT ITS RELATIONS WITH
LATIN AMERICA HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY AND ADVERSELY AFFECTED; ARGENTINA'S
NOW MORE LIKELY THAN EVER TO DEVELOP AN ATOMIC BOMB AND BRAZIL MAY
DO THE SAME; US EFFORTS TO LIMIT CONVENTIONAL ARMS SALES IN THE
REGION WILL BE FRUITLESS; US LEADERSHIP IN THE REGION HAS BEEN
DEALT A SERIOUS BLOW, AFFECTING ATTEMPTS TO CURB CUBAN INFLUENCE;
THE SOVIET UNION WILL INCREASE ITS INFLUENCE AS A TRADING PARTNER
AND ARMS SUPPLIER IN THE REGION. GWERTZMAN ARGUES THAT, PRIVATELY,
HAIG DOES NOT VIEW A BRITISH MILITARY VICTORY AS NECESSARILY THE
BEST OUTCOME OF THE CRISIS. HAIG IS SAID TO FEAR AN OUTCOME WHICH

HAIG DOES NOT VIEW A BRITISH MILITARY VICTORY AS NECESSARILY THE
BEST OUTCOME OF THE CRISIS. HAIG IS SAID TO FEAR AN OUTCOME WHICH
WOULD COMMIT BRITAIN TO MAINTAINING A LARGE MILITARY PRESENCE IN
AND AROUND THE ISLANDS INDEFINITELY, WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE REVANCH-
IST SENTIMENT, A MASSIVE PROGRAMME OF REARMAMENT IN ARGENTINA AND
PROVIDE A MASSIVE OPENING FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA. NEXT
SATURDAY'S NONALIGNED MEETING IN HAVANA HAD BEEN SEEN BY WASHING-
TON AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR MEMBERS TO QUESTION SOVIET AND CUBAN
MILITARY ADVENTURISM. NOW, THE US GOVERNMENT FEAR THAT THE ONE
TOPIC WILL BE THE FALKLANDS AND CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF THE US ROLE.
ACCORDING TO GWERTZMAN ALL THESE FEARS HELP EXPLAIN WHY THE US
HAS BEEN WILLING TO HELP BRITAIN PRIVATELY BUT NOT TO CHEER HER ON
PUBLICLY.

3. AN EDITORIAL IN THE NEW YORK TIMES SAYS THAT THE PRINCIPLES AT
ISSUE JUSTIFIED SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN BY DEMOCRATIC NATIONS BUT NOW
THE POINT HAS BEEN MADE, THE AGGRESSOR HAS BEEN PUNISHED AND IF
THE CONFLICT EVEN JUSTIFIED THE LOSS OF LIFE, IT NO LONGER DOES.

4. OTHER COMMENTATORS IN THE NEW YORK TIMES TAKE A DIFFERENT VIEW.
JOHN OAKES WRITES THAT THE VENOMOUS FURY DIRECTED AGAINST THE UNITED
STATES BY LATIN AMERICA DEMONSTRATES, NOT THAT AMERICA WAS WRONG
TO SUPPORT BRITAIN, BUT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S LATIN AMERICAN
POLICY HAS BEEN PERVERSELY WRONG.

5. JAMES RESTON REGRETS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE NOT MADE IT
ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO ARGENTINA THAT IT WILL DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY
TO DELIVER MILITARY SERVICES AND WEAPONS TO THE BRITISH. RESTON
REMINDS PRESIDENT REAGAN, ON THE EVE OF HIS VISIT TO EUROPE, THAT IF
HE DOES NOT MAKE CLEAR THAT THE US WILL OPPOSE THE USE OF FORCE AND
DEFEND HIS CLOSEST ALLY IN BRITAIN, HE WILL SOON BE IN AS MUCH
TROUBLE ABROAD AS HE IS WITH HIS ECONOMIC POLICY AT HOME.

6. JACK ANDERSON IN THE WASHINGTON POST WRITES THAT US SUPPORT FOR
BRITAIN HAS CAUSED DAMAGE TO US INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA THAT
HAVE BEEN DISASTROUS BEYOND THE WILDEST IMAGININGS OF THE STATE
DEPARTMENT. KRAFT ALSO IN THE POST, SAYS THAT DAMAGE TO US RELATIONS
IN LATIN AMERICA WILL NOT BE MATCHED BY IMPROVED TIES WITH BRITAIN.
ON THE CONTRARY, AMERICA'S IMPARTIAL STANCE DURING ITS MEDIATION
EFFORTS WAS SEEN IN LONDON AS A VIOLATION OF THE SPECIAL RELATION-
SHIP.

HENDERSON
CONFIDENTIAL

FM MONTEVIDEO 2317 φφZ MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F CO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 355 OF 23 MAY
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (C IN C FLEET AND DS8)
AND TO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 277: EVACUATION OF CASUALTIES.

AS MUCH HAS HAPPENED SINCE MY TELEGRAMS NO 222 AND NO 213,
I DECIDED TO PUT IN A FORMAL NOTE SEEKING PERMISSION FOR CASUALTIES
TO BE EVACUATED VIA MONTEVIDEO BY ONE OF OUR HOSPITAL SHIPS.
AFTER ALL AS REPORTED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELEGRAM NO 213,
ONLY IN PRINCIPLE DID URUGUAY AGREE TO ACCEPT HOSPITAL SHIPS.

2. AFTER SUBMISSION OF MY NOTE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER WHO THEN
REFERRED TO THE PRESIDENT, I HAVE BEEN GIVEN AN AFFIRMATIVE
REPLY, WITH THE CAVEAT THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE THAT ARRANGE-
MENTS COULD BE MADE THROUGH THE I C R C. WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT
GIVEN THE TIME SCALE THIS MIGHT NOT BE PRACTICABLE I WAS TOLD
THAT I C R C INVOLVEMENT WAS NOT (REPEAT NOT) A SINE QUO NON BUT
WOULD BE PREFERABLE.
3. ON NUTS AND BOLTS I WAS ASKED THE OBVIOUS QUESTION NAMELY

(A) HOW MANY CASUALTIES?
(B) WOULD THEY HAVE TO BE HOSPITALISED IN MONTEVIDEO? — WE KNOW THAT THE BRITISH HOSPITAL AND CERTAIN OTHER HOSPITALS HAVE CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR THE RECEPTION OF CASUALTIES FROM EITHER SIDE.
(C) WHAT WERE OUR PLANS FOR THE REPATRIATION OF CASUALTIES?

4. FROM THE ABOVE IT WILL BE CLEAR THAT WHILE FOR THE PRESENT THE URUGUAYANS WILL CONTINUE TO PERFORM AN INVALUABLE HUMANITARIAN ROLE WE MUST BE SCRUPULOUS IN NOT TAKING THEM FOR GRANTED. AS I SUSPECTED, THEY CLEARLY EXPECT TO BE ASKED FOR PERMISSION ON EACH OCCASION AND FOR PRACTICAL REASONS TO BE GIVEN AS FULL DETAILS AS POSSIBLE IN ADVANCE.

5. WHILE I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS OF C IN · C FLEET AND DSS, I HOPE THAT THEY AND YOU UNDERSTAND MY PROBLEMS HERE. IN THE WIDER CONTEXT IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT AT NO TIME WE GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF TRYING TO PUSH THE URUGUAYANS. THEY ARE BEING PUSHED BY THE ARGENTINIANS SO MY CREDIT WITH THE MFA IS BASED ON SCRUPULOUS ATTENTION TO DIPLOMATIC NICETIES. PROVIDED WE CONTINUE TO ABIDE BY THESE WE CAN FOR THE PRESENT STILL OBTAIN FAST AND HELPFUL ANSWERS ON HUMANITARIAN ISSUES. BUT TO REPEAT WE MUST NOT TAKE SUCH RESPONSES FOR GRANTED.

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

SENT AT 23172ØZ NCG
REQUEST FOR US MATERIAL SUPPORT

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM MR NOTT TO MR WEINBERGER:

BEGIN:

I AM VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE HELPFUL WAY IN WHICH, FOLLOWING OUR TALKS IN BRUSSELS EARLIER THIS MONTH, YOUR DEPARTMENT HAS APPROACHED THE QUESTION OF MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR UK FORCES. IN PARTICULAR, MY OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH YOURS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE RELEASE OF 150,000 SQUARE YARDS OF AM2 AIRFIELD MATTING, WHICH I UNDERSTAND THE US MARINE CORPS HOLD AS WAR RESERVE. I SHOULD BE VERY GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD AGREE TO THIS RELEASE AT A VERY EARLY DATE, IN WHICH CASE OUR OFFICIALS COULD JOINTLY WORK OUT THE DETAILS.

WE WOULD PROPOSE THAT THE MATTING SHOULD BE TRANSPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES IN A SHIP WE WOULD CHARTER. WE SHOULD ALSO LOOK TO YOU FOR ANY SPECIAL TRAINING REQUIRED. AS TO THE FINANCIAL BASIS OF THE RELEASE, PERHAPS THIS COULD ALSO BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN OUR OFFICIALS: SINCE YOU WOULD NEED, I UNDERSTAND, TO ARRANGE FOR RESUPPLY YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER AN ARRANGEMENT UNDER WHICH YOU WOULD SUPPLY TO US INITIALLY ON THE BASIS THAT THE MATTING WOULD BE RETURNED IF UNUSED. IF IT WERE USED, THEN WHEN THE PORT STANLEY AIRFIELD WAS PERMANENTLY REPAIRED WE WOULD RECOVER IT TO BECOME A USEFUL ENHANCEMENT OF THE UK'S CAPABILITY, FOR USE EITHER WITHIN NATO OR OUT OF AREA.

ENDS

PYM

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

PALESTINE SELECTIVE

LIMITED
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/EO (E)
HD/PUSD
DEP HD/PUSD
PS

PS/PS HURD
PS/PS ONSLOW
PS/LORD REILSTHEAD
PS/PUS
MR BUILLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR UHE
MR BARRETT

PS/HOME SECRETARY
PS/S OF S DEFENCE
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG
PS/SIR M PALLISER
PS/SIR A DUFF
MR WADE-GERY
MR FULMER
MR O'NEILL
MR ASSESSMENTS STAFF
MR OLIVIN
MR DIO
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE
DIRECTOR GCHQ

SECRET
Prime Minister
You spoke to Mr Rickett about the attached preliminary draft and agreed that FCO should have more time to consider your response.

Duty Clerk
22/5/82

Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

Dear Private Secretary,

I submit a draft reply from the Prime Minister in answer from the Pope's telegram received this afternoon.

This draft has been conveyed to the Secretary of State's Private Office by telephone but has not been seen by Mr Pym. Nor has it been seen by the PUS or Supervising DUS, both of whom are in transit to weekend addresses.

Since there is a possibility that the Pope may intend to give wide publicity to the Prime Minister's reply in announcing his decision on the visit to the UK, I am sure that it would be prudent for us to clear the draft here before the Prime Minister's reply is sent. We would also like to consider whether Cardinal Hume needs to be warned of this exchange. There is the further possibility that the Pope may make reference to the Prime Minister's reply in his Sunday address at St Peter's, if it is sent this afternoon.

I will proceed urgently with clearance of the draft here, and will telephone to the Duty Clerk as soon as possible with suggested amendments. I would hope that we could before this evening provide any comments which the Secretary of State or the PUS may have.

A J Payne
Emergency Unit

CONFIDENTIAL
REPLY

DRAFT: 

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: 

TEL. NO: 

TO:
His Holiness John Paul The Second

SUBJECT:

Your urgent appeal, and the anguish which you express at the loss of life in the tragic conflict over the Falkland Islands finds immediate echo here in London. We do not seek to continue the conflict. We have striven for 7 weeks to secure in peace a negotiated settlement. That our cause is just, and that the principles which we uphold are shared and understood by democratic nations throughout the world I have not the slightest doubt. I am ready for a ceasefire, so urgently needed for the reasons of compassion and humanity which are uppermost in your mind, but the conditions for this must not leave an aggressor in possession of the rewards of military adventure. The world has seen too often in this century the tragic consequences of failure to defend the principles of justice, civilized values, and international law.

We have always been ready, and still remain ready to seek to end the conflict through negotiations. But Argentina has shown no disposition to match our endeavours in good faith. Aggression must not be allowed to succeed. International law must be upheld.

/Sovereignty
Sovereignty cannot be achieved by armed invasion. The liberty of the Falkland Islanders must be restored.

We earnestly desire a reasonable, peaceful and honourable settlement. We are ready to do all in our power to achieve it but we cannot succeed alone. The conflict was not of our making. It could be ended immediately if Argentina were to withdraw its forces in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502 and reassert by so doing the authority of the United Nations. I pray that such counsels may yet prevail in Buenos Aires before more lives are lost.
889/113 PO SW C
CSEAGRAM LN LFTC

LFT062 CLF3869 LEE407 ELB7504 ROCO43 GRT0642 RCV264 SAB061
GBXX BY IUVS 235 ITOLB
SSS CITTAVATICANO 236/226 2 1300 VATGOVT

ETAT PRIORITY
THE RIGHT HON. MARGARET THATCHER PRIME MINISTER 10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1

IN DEEP ANGUISH AT THE NEWS FROM THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, WHERE THE ARMED
CONFLICT WITH ARGENTINA IS CAUSING GREIOUS LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE AND
MAY PROVE ALARMINGLY DETERIORATION CONSEQUENCES FOR THE TWO
COUNTRIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED AND EVEN FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE IN
GENERAL, I URGENTLY APPEAL TO YOU TO ACT DECISIVELY IN ORDER TO
SECURE AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE THAT WILL OPEN THE WAY TO A
PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE. MAY THE LEADERS OF BOTH
COUNTRIES HEED THE EARNEST DESIRE OF MANKIND AND STRIVE WITH
ALL THE MEANS AT THEIR DISPOSAL TO AVERT FURTHER SACRIFICES
AND BLOODSHED. MAY TRUE LOVE FOR THEIR PEOPLES, A DEEP
SENSE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE HISTORY AND THE JUSTIFIED
APPREHENSION OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY INSPIRE IN THEM AN ATTITUDE
CAPABLE OF LEADING TO A MAGNANIMOUS ACCEPTANCE OF REASONABLE
RENUNCIATIONS FOR THE SAKE OF THE SUPREME GOOD OF PEACE, THUS
AVOIDING THE LOSSES BROUGHT BY WAR, WHICH ALWAYS FOSTERS HATRED AND
ENDANGERS THE VALUES THAT ARE MOST GENUINELY HUMAN.
I ASK GOD, THE FATHER OF ALL, TO GRANT THAT SENTIMENTS OF WISDOM AND
UNDERSTANDING WILL PREVAIL, IN ORDER THAT THE ARMED CONFLICT MAY BE
HALTED BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE AND THAT PEACE MAY BE RESTORED IN A
GENERAL SEARCH FOR A RESONABLE, PEACEFUL AND HONOURSABLE
SETTLEMENT.

IOANNES PAULUS PP II

COL 10 LONDON SW1

CHECK WORDS AND COL
Mr Payne

1. Mr Gibson, UK Delegation, NATO, Brussels, telephoned at 1050 to inform us that there will be a NATO Council Meeting at 1600 hours Brussels time (1500 UK time). Sir John Graham proposes to circulate a draft statement for use by the NATO Secretary-General - text is as follows:

'Falkland Islands

Draft Statement for use by Secretary-General of NATO, 22 May 1982

The Council met at 1600 hours on Saturday, 22 May 1982 and heard a statement by the British Permanent Representative about the latest situation in the Falkland Islands. The Council noted the Argentine Government's rejection of the British Government's proposal of 7 May for a diplomatic settlement of the issue. The Council noted also that British forces have landed on the Falkland Islands. They expressed their support for the British Government's determination to turn back the Argentine aggression of 2 April, 'in the exercise - failing compliance by Argentina with Security Council Resolution No 502 - of the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter."

2. Sir John Graham would like clearance or any amendments to the above text. His aim is to circulate it to all members prior to the meeting. He is optimistic that he can get it through.

3. I undertook to inform UKDEL NATO by telephone (Security Desk, extension 3001) as soon as possible.

22 May 1982

P A Penfold
Emergency Unit

22 May 1982

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NATO 221615Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 251 OF 22 MAY
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
INFO PRIORITY ANKARA ATHENS BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE
LISBON LUXEMBOURG OSLO OTTAWA PARIS REYKJAVIK ROME WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKREP BRUSSELS
YOUR GUIDANCE TELNO 105: THE FALKLANDS
BY AGREEMENT WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL I CALLED FOR A MEETING
OF THE NAC AT 1400HRS GMT TODAY, WITH THE OBJECT OF OBTAINING AN
EXPRESSION OF SOLIDARITY. I CIRCULATED A POSSIBLE TEXT IN
ADVANCE BUT THIS RAN INTO TROUBLE WITH THE FRENCH, ITALIANS AND
GERMANS. THE FRENCH OBJECTIONS RELATED TO FORM RATHER THAN
SUBSTANCE AND THE DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING INSTRUCTIONS IN TIME.
THE ITALIANS, WHO CONSULTED COLOMBO BY TELEPHONE, TOLD ME THAT
THEY COULD NOT GO BEYOND A STATEMENT RECALLING THEIR SOLIDARITY
FROM THE START, NOTING OUR LANDING ON THE ISLANDS, AND EXPRESSING
THE HOPE FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THE GERMANS, ALSO ON INSTRUCTIONS
SUGGESTED THAT SINCE THE LUXEMBOURG COMMUNIQUE WAS SO RECENT, THE
SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD CONFINE HIMSELF TO REITERATING THE
THE ALLIANCE'S POSITION AS SET OUT IN PARA 14 OF THAT COMMUNIQUE.
MEANWHILE THE US RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM HAIG TO SUPPORT OUR
TEXT.
2. LUNS SPOKE TO ME ABOUT THIS JUST BEFORE THE MEETING AND
STRONGLY ADVISED ME TO DROP MY DRAFT AND TO LEAVE IT TO HIM.
OTHERWISE WE SHOULD HAVE A WRANGLE. I AGREED AND EXPLAINED MATTERS
TO THE AMERICANS.
3. IN THE EVENT THINGS WENT AS LUNS HAD FORECAST. I MADE A
STATEMENT, BASED ON VARIOUS TELEGRAMS ESPECIALLY THE TELEGRAM
UNDER REFERENCE, AND STRESSING THAT WE HAD NOT TURNED OUR BACK
ON NEGOTIATIONS. MILREP'S STAFF GAVE A BRIEFING DRAWING ON MR
NOTT'S STATEMENT AND A FEW OTHER SNIPPETS. (WE ARE ARRANGING THAT
THE COUNCIL SHALL RECEIVE ON A REGULAR BASIS COPIES OF THE
SITREPS WHICH MILREP DISTRIBUTES TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE).
MOST PERMREPS WERE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS BUT NORWAY, CANADA,
US (ON INSTRUCTIONS) BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS AND TURKEY MADE STRONG
STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR THE UK. FRG, ITALY, DENMARK AND FRANCE
WERE MORE RESERVED BUT WERE READY TO SUPPORT A STATEMENT BY
THE SECRETARY GENERAL REITERATING PARA 14 OF THE LUXEMBOURG
COMMUNIQUE. LEDOGR (US) POINTED OUT THAT SINCE 13 MAY THERE HAD
BEEN DEVELOPMENTS: SINCE NOBODY CONTRADICTED HIM A REITERATION,

4. I WAS ASKED TO SAY WHAT OUR MILITARY OBJECTIVES WERE AND WHAT ACTION WE FORESAW IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I QUOTED FROM MR NOTT'S STATEMENT FOR THE FIRST, THAT OUR TROOPS WOULD ADVANCE TO HARASS THE ARGENTINE TROOPS AND THAT WE WOULD TIGHTEN THE BLOCKADE WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING ABOUT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. I ALSO RECALLED THAT YOU HAD SAID IN THE NAC ON 17 MAY THAT WE WERE DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE THAT WITHDRAWAL, IF POSSIBLE BY PEACEFUL MEANS, BUT IF NOT, BY ARMS. AS FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL, I SAID I HAD NO UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION BUT I POINTED OUT THAT A CEASE-FIRE IN (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) SITU, WHICH LEFT THE ARGENTINES IN OCCUPATION OF ANY PART OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE.

5. TEXT OF SECRETARY GENERAL'S STATEMENT IS IN M I F T.

GRAHAM

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 2216562 JW/VPA
FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO STTREP (DETAILED VERSION): 0700 HRS, 22 MAY

UN

(a) Developments on 21 May

1. In informal consultations of the Security Council it was quickly agreed, on the proposal of Ireland, that the Council should meet formally. But about an hour's wrangling then followed on a US proposal that the formal meeting should be held in private. This proposal fell when the President announced that Argentina was not prepared to participate in a private meeting.

2. At the formal meeting the Secretary-General gave an account, in neutral terms, of his activities since the adoption of SCR.502. He concluded by saying that efforts must continue to restore peace. Ros (Argentina) gave a wordy and repetitive speech seeking to contrast Argentine willingness to negotiate with our alleged rigidity. Sir A Parsons, in a speech which was well received, gave an account of recent events and of the course of negotiations. He also drew attention to the Argentine's violations of the basic principles of the Charter (peaceful settlement, non-use of force) while for our part we were acting within the terms of the Charter, specifically the inherent right of self-defence and the right of self-determination for the people of non-self-governing territories.

3. Dorr (Ireland) was not particularly helpful but he at least condemned Argentina for using force and held to SCR.502. Nisibori (Japan) made a helpful statement asking only for a resumption of negotiations. Correa da Costa (Brazil) made a careful statement calling for full implementation of SCR.502. Albornoz (Ecuador) spoke strongly, but in somewhat confused terms, for Argentina. Street (Australia) gave a superb speech on the theme that Argentina began the crisis and is responsible for the consequences of its own recklessness. Jacob (Antigua and Barbuda) made a brief and helpful statement. The Council will resume at 221900Z.

(b) Sir A Parsons' Assessment

4. The first day has not gone badly. A number of delegations are thinking about Draft Resolutions; the Irish in terms of reaffirming SCR.502 with a ceasefire combined with a fresh mandate for the Secretary-General. The Spanish are floating an idea of a Security Council Commission, possibly including UN observers, which should go to the Falklands immediately to stop the fighting and enable negotiations to start for mutual withdrawal. Sir A Parsons has left the Irish and the Spanish in no doubt as to our views. Sir A Parsons believes it will be hard for anyone to bring a Draft Resolution to a vote today and that with luck Argentine, Venezuelan and Panamanian Foreign Ministers, who are expected in New York today, will produce a sufficiently extreme Resolution for the 9 votes to be in question and for us to secure negative votes from the US and the French.

(c) Message from the Secretary-General

5. The Secretary-General thanks the Secretary of State for his very kind message and expresses the hope that, in spite of the present impasse, it will be possible to resolve the crisis peacefully before too long.
SECRET

- 2 -

(d) Press

6. The Argentine Mission are giving copies of their final paper to journalists (the 'Sunday Times' have a copy). Sir A Parsons suggests we might use this as grounds for giving copies unattributably to our customers and exploiting the openings which it offers.

Peruvian Initiative

7. HM Ambassador spoke to President Belaunde along the lines of paragraph 1 of FCO telegram No.122 to Lima. In reply Belaunde said that he had studied the documents explaining our position and this confirmed his belief that a ceasefire and a mutual and phased withdrawal of forces should be negotiated, leaving the substance and detail of the dispute for subsequent negotiations. The President said he could not give up his peace efforts and implied that the third sentence of our message to him (paragraph 1 of FCO telegram No.122 to Lima at Flag H) could be used to keep his initiative alive in the event of Argentine acceptance.

8. The Dutch Ambassador, Lima, has been told by his Argentine colleague that Argentina believes the Peruvian initiative is 'interesting' but that the Argentines understand we have rejected it and that therefore there would be no further point in an Argentine response. But according to an Argentine press report the Argentines have told the Peruvians that they accept the Peruvian proposal although they have also made minor observations on it.

US

9. The US Embassy, Buenos Aires, has reported that the Argentines are talking about breaking off relations with the US; one pretext being American matériel support for us and the publicity given to this in the American press. While admitting American responsibility for press leaks, Mr Haig hopes we will continue to avoid making public details of the support we are receiving. On instructions our Embassy had already raised the question of official comments on press leaks with both the State Department and the Pentagon. The US view is that they prefer to hold to present guidelines refusing to discuss specific requests for assistance from the UK or the response to these. The National Security Council issued a statement on 21 May which, inter alia, said 'we will, however, not address reports of specific requests for assistance or how we respond'.

Brazil and Exocet

10. The Secretary-General of the MFA has told our Ambassador that to his knowledge no Exocet missiles of any kind have been supplied from Brazilian official sources to Argentina; nor did he know of any intention to supply them in the future. (The Brazilians claim they have only the surface version of Exocet). The Secretary-General was less certain of the position concerning Exocets being sent through Brazilian intermediaries by a third country supplier, but he said he would see what he could do to check this.
FRG

11. Herr Genscher has been unusually forthcoming and has invited our Ambassador to see him at any time concerning any help he might give us. HM Ambassador suggests we should consider whether we would wish to use this opening to pass Falklands or EC messages or attempts to argue our case.

Comment

12. Proceedings in the Security Council have so far gone more or less as predicted and do not in themselves point to a need for new instructions to Sir A Parsons. It is fortunate that the Australian Foreign Minister was on hand to give such strong support.

13. The Argentine position on the latest Peruvian proposals is unclear. But Belaunde is unlikely to leave matters as they now stand, especially if he receives encouragement from Buenos Aires. His ideas of a partial Argentine withdrawal to West Falkland in particular have no attraction. The Colombian Ambassador is to deliver a message from his President this morning; we have no details of its contents. We will need to consider how to respond.

14. Argentine release to the media of their final paper gives us a welcome opportunity to underline their inflexibility. We need to consider early action on this.

22 May 1982

A J Payne
Emergency Unit
CONFIDENTIAL

FM LIMA 2214542 MAY 82

TO: ASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 192 OF 22 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TEL NO 189: Falklands.

1. THE PRESIDENT HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME (AT 0915) TO SAY THAT HE HAD A LONG TELEPHONE CONVERSATION LAST NIGHT WITH GALTIERI, WHO SAID THE ARGENTINES HAD ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE LATEST PERUVIAN IDEAS WITH CERTAIN RESERVATIONS WHICH PRESIDENT BELAUNDE THOUGHT MIGHT NOT BE INSUPERABLE. IN PARTICULAR, PRESIDENT BELAUNDE SAID THAT GALTIERI HAD SHOWN HIMSELF TO BE RECEPTIVE TO THE IDEA OF AN QUOTE EQUIDISTANT UNQUOTE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES. THE ARGENTINES FEEL THAT 150 MILES IS TOO NEAR BECAUSE THEIR OWN BASES ARE FURTHER AWAY. BUT THE PRESIDENT EMPHASISED THAT HIS OWN INSISTENCE ON AN EQUIDISTANT WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN QUOTE WELL RECEIVED UNQUOTE BY GALTIERI.

2. THE PRESIDENT ALSO SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES ARE NOT (NOT) OPPOSED TO A UN GROUP GOVERNING THE ISLANDS FOR SIX MONTHS OR EVEN ONE YEAR DURING WHICH NEGOTIATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE. IF AT THE END OF THIS PERIOD THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT, THE ARGENTINES WOULD PROPOSE TO RETURN THE PROBLEM TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

3. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE HAD NOT SO FAR INFORMED THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN OF THESE DETAILS, BUT THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT COSTA MENDEZ WAS ON HIS WAY TO THE UN, AND THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT YOU SHOULD BE INFORMED STRAIGHT AWAY OF THE NATURE OF GALTIERI'S RESPONSE.

4. THE PRESIDENT ASKED ME AGAIN TO KEEP IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH HIM ON ANY ASPECT OF THE SITUATION. HE SAID HE COULD SPEAK ON THE TELEPHONE TO MEMBERS OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AT ANY TIME.

WALLACE

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL
UN

1. The Security Council met in a formal session at which the Secretary-General gave a detailed account of his activities since the adoption of SCR.502. Statements were then made by Senor Ros (Argentina) and Sir A Parsons. The Australian Foreign Minister made a strong speech in support of the British case and other helpful speeches were made by the Representatives of Japan, Brazil and Antigua and Barbuda. The Council will resume the debate later today.

Military Action

2. The Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Nott, in a statement to the press announced the establishment of a British bridgehead on East Falkland. Our ships had come under heavy attack and two were seriously damaged. The Argentines had lost sixteen aircraft and had suffered casualties.

Argentina

3. The British Interests Section of the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires has reported that there have been no reports of any incidents involving British citizens in Argentina.
Falklands Selective Advances

PS (6)
PS/KR HURD
PS/KR ONSLOW
PS/FUS
PS/BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
MR BARRETT
PS/S AM D
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/EOD(E)
HD/PUSD
EMERGENCY ROOM
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)
PS/S OF S DEFENCE
PS/HOME SECRETARY
PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DST)
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG
PS/SIR M PALLISER
PS/SIR A DUFF
MR WADE-GERY
MR FULLER
MR O’NEILL. HD ASSESS-
MR. COVENS STAFF
DIO
MR J M STEWART: AUSD STAFF MOD
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY: DIGI MOD
DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Rosub G):

GR 558
CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 223046Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1956 CF 22 MAY 1982
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS: CONGRESS

1. I made separate calls on Senators Percy and Tower today. Both continue to support our position though they hope that we can achieve our military purpose quickly and warned that there is a fear among some Senators that our military action could spread to the mainland or that we might, if we got bogged down, ask the US government for assistance going beyond materiel support. The strong implication was that we would lose Senate and indeed public backing in either eventuality.

2. I had a long talk this evening with Senator Biden, a leading Democratic member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who was the author of the resolution of support for us adopted by the Senate on 29 April. Biden said that even back in April there had been some reluctance, especially among Republicans, to support any resolution on the grounds that it would cut across Haig’s efforts and involve the US ill advisedly in a dispute which could damage US relations with Latin America. When Haig had given the go-ahead to the resolution, support had rallied but only after changes to the draft had been made, including removal of any reference to the right of the Falkland Islanders to self-determination.
THE RIGHT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS TO SELF-DETERMINATION.

3. BIDEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT SENATE SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION REFLECTED THE CLOSENESS OF ANGLO/US RELATIONS RATHER THAN A FEELING THAT IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES WERE AT STAKE. HAD THE FALKLANDS BELONGED TO BRAZIL, FOR EXAMPLE, NO AMERICAN WOULD HAVE CARED A BIT ABOUT ARGENTINE AGGRESSION, LET ALONE BEEN PREPARED TO SUPPORT ATTEMPTS TO RETAKE THE ISLANDS. WE SHOULD NOT THEREFORE ASSUME THAT THE SENATE WOULD SUPPORT GREATER US INVOLVEMENT — OR EVEN MAINTAIN ITS PRESENT LEVEL OF SUPPORT FOR US INDEFINITELY. THE LONGER THE DISPUTE LASTED THE MORE AMERICANS WOULD BECOME CONCERNED ABOUT BEING SUCKED IN MILITARILY OR ABOUT THE DETERIORATION IN US RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA. HE HAD HAD SOME CRITICISM FROM CONSTITUENTS ON THIS SCORE ALREADY.

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, BIDEN SAID WE SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED THAT SO MANY SENATORS HAD TAKEN THE VIEW THAT THE US COULD NOT AFFORD TO IMPAIR ITS INTERESTS FOR THE RIGHTS OF SELF DETERMINATION OF 1583 SHEEP FARMERS. IF, IN ANY RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS, SELF DETERMINATION FOR THE ISLANDERS WERE TO BECOME THE ONE ISSUE ON OUR SIDE STANDING IN THE WAY OF A SETTLEMENT, US SUPPORT FOR US WOULD EVAPORATE.

5. I SAID THAT I WAS ASTONISHED THAT SELF DETERMINATION COULD COUNT FOR SO LITTLE IN THE COUNTRY THAT HAD INVENTED IT. THE LOGIC OF WHAT BIDEN HAD SAID WAS THAT THE ISLANDERS SHOULD BE TOLD THAT THEY MUST EITHER LEAVE OR AGREE TO LIVE UNDER A DICTATORSHIP. BIDEN SAID HE AGREED WITH ME AND WOULD CONTINUE TO BE OUR STRONGEST SUPPORTER BUT WE SHOULD NOT DELUDE OURSELVES THAT CONGRESSIONAL OPINION WAS ALTOGETHER SOLID. HE THOUGHT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RATHER TEPID EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR US REFLECTED, NOT JUST REAGAN'S STYLE, BUT A POLITICAL SENSE OF THE MOOD WITHIN HIS OWN PARTY.

6. COMMENT: BIDEN WAS NOT SAYING THAT WE HAD LOST SENATE SUPPORT BUT THAT IF WE GOT INTO DIFFICULTIES MILITARILY OR IF WE APPEARED TO BE UNREASONABLE IN NEGOTIATIONS, THEN FEAR OF THE US GETTING INVOLVED OR OF DAMAGE TO US INTERESTS WOULD START TO OUTWEIGH OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.

HENDERSON

NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 22161202 MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 817 OF 22 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE OTTAWA, WELLINGTON, KINGSTON, PARIS, WASHINGTON,
PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN.

YOUR TELNO 451 : FALKLANDS

1. MANY THANKS FOR THE FIRST SENTENCE OF YOUR PARA 1.
2. WE HAVE ALREADY GOT CANADA AND NEW ZEALAND ON BOARD.

THEY WILL PROBABLY SPEAK TODAY, THUS TO SOME EXTENT OFFSETTING THE
TORRENT OF LATIN AMERICAN RHETORIC WHICH IS IN STORE FOR US
(NO BAD THING IN A WAY TO GET MOST OF IT OVER IN ONE AFTERNOON —
IT WILL BORE THE COUNCIL TO DEATH). WE ARE WORKING ON CARIBBEANS,
AFRICANS AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY. UNFORTUNATELY, THE JAMAICAN
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IS AN ANCIENT FOSSIL, APPARENTLY ALMOST
INCAPABLE OF HUMAN SPEECH. ABDULLAH (TRINIDAD) IS ON OUR SIDE,
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IS AN ANCIENT FOSSIL, APPARENTLY ALMOST INCAPABLE OF HUMAN SPEECH. ABDULAH (TRINIDAD) IS ON OUR SIDE, BUT GUTLESS. I DOUBT IF HE WILL SPEAK UNLESS HE RECEIVES ABSOLUTELY UNEQUIVOCAL INSTRUCTIONS TO DO SO FROM HIS CAPITAL.

THE NEW BARBADIAN AMBASSADOR IS A MAN OF STERNER STUFF AND I HAVE SOME HOPES OF HIM. OUR AFRICAN FRIENDS – ZAMBIA, BOTSWANA, KENYA ETC. ARE CHEERING US VIGOROUSLY FROM THE PAVILION BUT ARE RELUCTANT TO GO TO THE WICKET. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO WORK ON NOBLE.

A DIRECT INSTRUCTION FROM PRESIDENT KAUNDA TO PAUL LUSAKA MIGHT JUST DO THE TRICK WITH ZAMBIA. THE US AND FRANCE ARE BOUND TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE STATEMENTS AT SOME STAGE BUT, GIVEN THE PERSONAL QUALITIES OF MRS KIRKPATRICK AND DE NANTEUIL, I SUSPECT THAT THE GUYANAN STATEMENT MAY BE MORE HELPFUL THAN THEIRS (I HOPE I AM DOING THEM AN INJUSTICE).

3. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF GETTING OUT THIRD WORLD COMMONWEALTH SPEAKERS, IT MIGHT BE WORTH YOUR SEEING IF RAMPHAL WOULD HELP, BOTH THROUGH HIS CONTACTS IN CAPITALS AND HIS DIRECT CONTACTS WITH PERM. REP'S. HERE.

PARSONS
2. The President also said that the Argentines are not (not) opposed to a UN group governing the Islands for six months or even one year during which negotiations could take place. If at the end of this period there was no agreement, the Argentines would propose to return the problem to the United Nations.

3. The President said that he had not so far informed the Secretary General of the UN of these details, but that he understood that Costa Mendez was on his way to the UN, and that he thought it was therefore important that you should be informed straight away of the nature of Galtieri's response.

4. The President asked me again to keep in direct touch with him on any aspect of the situation. He said he could speak on the telephone to members of the Argentine Government at any time.

Wallace

FCO Please pass to all.

NNNN
FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES

PS 6
PS/ER HURD
PS/ER ONSLow
PS/PUS
LR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
LR GIFFARD
LR WRIGHT
LR GILLIKERE

MR BARRETT
ES/S AM D
ED/DEF D
ED/PLANNING STAFF
ED/UND
ED/NEWS D
ED/EDU
ED/ECD (2)
ED/FUSD (2)

RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)
PS/S OF 3 DEFENCE
PS/HOME SECRETARY
PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DST)
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG
PS/SIR R PALLISER
PS/SIR A DUFF
MR WADE-GERBY
MR FULLER
MR O’NEILL - HD ASSESSMENTS STAFF
DIO
MR J K STEWARD - AUSD STAFF MOD
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGL MOD
DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

CONFIDENTIAL
FM LIMA 221454Z MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 192 OF 22 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UK/US NEW YORK
MY TEL NO 189; FALKLANDS.

1. THE PRESIDENT HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME (AT 0915) TO SAY THAT HE HAD A LONG TELEPHONE CONVERSATION LAST NIGHT WITH GALTIERI, WHO SAID THE ARGENTINES HAD ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE LATEST PERUVIAN IDEAS WITH CERTAIN RESERVATIONS WHICH PRESIDENT BELAUNDE THOUGHT MIGHT NOT BE INSUPERABLE. IN PARTICULAR, PRESIDENT BELAUNDE SAID THAT GALTIERI HAD SHOWN HIMSELF TO BE RECEPTIVE TO THE IDEA OF AN QUOTE EQUIDISTANT UNQUOTE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, THE ARGENTINES FEEL THAT 150 MILES IS TOO NEAR BECAUSE THEIR OWN BASES ARE FURTHER AWAY, BUT THE PRESIDENT EMPHASISED THAT HIS OWN INSISTENCE ON AN EQUIDISTANT WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN QUOTE WELL RECEIVED UNQUOTE BY GALTIERI.
FCO's initial reaction is that there is nothing new in the President's comments. However, they will consider a response and submit advice in advance of Monday's OD(SA).

Duty Clerk
22.5.82
PP THE HAGUE
PP LUXEMBOURG
PP ROME
PP DUBLIN
PP BONN

GRS 129
CONFIDENTIAL
FM PARIS 221119Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 537 OF 22 MAY 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO AND OTHER EC POSTS

MY TELNO 519: FALKLANDS: EC IMPORT BAN

1. MINISTER PURSUED THE QUESTION YESTERDAY EVENING WITH GUTMANN, WHO SAID HE COULD NOT AT THIS STAGE SAY WHAT THE FRENCH POSITION WOULD BE. HOWEVER HE EXPECTED CHEYSSON TO RETURN TO PARIS DURING THE WEEK-END, POSSIBLY ON SATURDAY.

2. MOREL IN THE ELYSEE COMMENTED THAT, AS MITTERRAND HAD INDICATED AT HIS MEETING ON 17 MAY WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, FRENCH SUPPORT WAS UNEQUIVOCAL EVEN IF THE MILITARY SITUATION BECAME MORE ACTIVE. THE FRENCH LINE WOULD BE FINALISED WHEN CHEYSSON RETURNED FROM AFRICA OVER THE WEEK-END.

FRETWELL

WNN

SENT/RECD 221146Z BC/ABD
1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ARGUS REPORT OF 21 MAY.

BEGINNS

SOUTH AFRICA HAS SURPRISED - AND DELIGHTED - THE WESTERN FIVE NEGOTIATORS BY VIRTUALLY IMMEDIATELY ACCEPTING PHASE TWO OF THE SWA/NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT PLAN WITHOUT ANY FUSS.

EVEN THE ISSUE OF UNITED NATIONS IMPARTIALITY, SOMETHING SOUTH AFRICA HAS SHOWN STRONG FEELINGS ABOUT, SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SOLVED SATISFACTORILY.
THERE IS EVERY INDICATION THAT THE COUNTDOWN TOWARDS AN ELECTION COULD BEGIN AS EARLY AS JULY THIS YEAR.

OFFICIALLY, THE SECOND PHASE OF THE WESTERN PLAN HAS NOT YET BEEN PRESENTED TO SOUTH AFRICA AND WILL THEN WAIT A REPLY, BUT MOST DIPLOMATS KNOW WHAT THE ANSWER IS GOING TO BE.

MUCH OF THE CREDIT FOR THE EASY TRANSITION FOR PHASE TWO THROUGH THE SOUTH AFRICAN SIDE COULD BE GIVEN TO DR KENNETH KAUNDA OF ZAMBIA, WHO ASKED TO MEET MR P W BOTHA SO AS TO SORT OUT THE SWA/NAMIBIA ISSUE.

IT IS BELIEVED THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN WILL GO HAND IN HAND WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA, AFTER WHICH AMERICA MIGHT GRANT DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION TO LUANDA.

WHILE SOUTH AFRICA HAS ACCEPTED VIRTUALLY ALL OF PHASE TWO, THERE MIGHT STILL BE SOME QUIBLING ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE.

SOUTH AFRICA APPEARS READY TO ACCEPT A FORCE OF 6,000, WHILE THE NUMBER BEING SUGGESTED MAY BE 7,000.

ONCE PHASE TWO, WHICH DEALS WITH THE SIZE OF THE UN FORCE, THE IMPARTIALITY OF THE UN AND THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE, HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES, PHASE THREE - IMPLEMENTATION - CAN IN THEORY BEGIN.

HOWEVER PHASE ONE HAS NOT BEEN AGREED UPON YET AS SWAPO HAS REJECTED BOTH ALTERNATE VOTING PROCEDURES PUT FORWARD BY THE FIVE.

ENDS

FERGUSSON
Yesterday (Friday) we established a bridgehead on the Falkland Islands. During the night we consolidated this position against the possibility that the Argentines might attack it today. In the event we have had no reports of such an attack taking place so that throughout the day we have been able without interruption to continue our consolidation of the position.

There have been no reports of any Argentinian action against the task force or disembarked British forces.

The only reported operational incident today involved two Harriers on routine patrol south of Port Stanley. The Harriers attacked and severely damaged an Argentine patrol boat in the Chosseul Sound.

END
TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 453 OF 22 MAY 1982
AND TO FLASH WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO BRUSSELS, LISBON

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT MADE BY MR NOTT AT 1215Z TODAY 22 MAY.
BEGINS.

2. THIS MORNING THE UNION JACK IS ONCE AGAIN FLYING ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. AND I HOPE THAT YOU HAVE ALL SEEN THIS PHOTOGRAPH - SHOWING THE EVIDENT PLEASURE OF THE FALKLAND ISLAND CHILDREN.

3. A MAJOR BRIDGEHEAD HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE AREA OF SAN CARLOS ON EAST FALKLAND. THE MAJOR AMPHIBIOUS LANDING YESTERDAY WAS A COMPLETE SUCCESS. TACTICAL SURPRISE WAS ACHIEVED AND OUR TROOPS LANDED SAFELY WITH ALMOST NO INTERFERENCE FROM ARGENTINE FORCES. WE ARE NOW ASHORE ON BRITISH SOVEREIGN TERRITORY IN CONSIDERABLE FORCE AND HAVE THREE ROYAL MARINE COMMANDOS AND TWO BATTALIONS OF THE PARACHUTE REGIMENT FIRMLY IN PLACE WITH THEIR SUPPORTING ARMS INCLUDING ARTILLERY AND RAPIER AND OTHER AIR DEFENCE WEAPONS. FROM THEIR SECURE BASE OUR FORCES WILL ADVANCE TO PLACE THE OCCUPYING ARGENTINE TROOPS UNDER INCREASING HARASSMENT, WHILST THE ROYAL NAVY maintains and tightens its blockade around the islands.

4. TO COMPLEMENT THE LANDINGS THERE WERE RAIDS YESTERDAY IN OTHER PARTS OF EAST AND WEST FALKLANDS. IN ONE OF THESE ROYAL MARINES CAPTURED AN ARGENTINE POSITION ON FANNING HEAD OVERLOOKING FALKLAND SOUND. IN ANOTHER THE AIRFIELD AT GOOSE GREEN
AND ARGENTINE POSITIONS CLOSEBY WERE RAIDED BY OUR FORCES. CARRIER BASED RAF HARRIERS LAUNCHED ATTACKS IN THE COURSE OF THE MORNING AGAINST ARGENTINE INSTALLATIONS AT PORT STANLEY AIRFIELD AND THE HELICOPTERS ON THE GROUND NEARBY, AS WELL AS MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AT FOX BAY. DURING THESE OPERATIONS WE LOST TWO GAZELLE HELICOPTERS, AND ONE RAF HARRIER IS MISSING.

5. THE ARGENTINE NAVY HAS SO FAR MADE NO ATTEMPT TO INTERVENE. ITS SURFACE SHIPS REMAIN BOYOTLED UP IN COASTAL WATERS. THE ARGENTINE AIRFORCE HAS AS EXPECTED LAUNCHED HEAVY RAIDS ON OUR SHIPS. AIR ATTACKS STARTED AT ABOUT 10.30 LOCAL TIME AND CONTINUED THROUGHOUT DAYLIGHT. A SUCCESSION OF ATTACKS WERE MADE BY MIRAGE, SKY HAWKS AND PUCARAS. COMBAT AIR PATROLS BY SEA HARRIERS FROM THE TASK FORCE WERE FLOWN CONTINUOUSLY AND WERE SUCCESSFUL IN SHOOTING DOWN A LARGE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT. WE BELIEVE THAT TOAAL ARGENTINE LOSSES SO FAR ARE 9 MIRAGE, 5 SKY HAWKS, 2 PUCARAS AND 4 HELICOPTERS. THESE LOSSES MUST REPRESENT A VERY SIGNIFICANT BLOW TO THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE.

6. NEVERTHELESS ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT PENETRATED OUR AIR DEFENCE SCREEN AND CARRIED OUT ATTACKS ON OUR SHIPS. THREE WARSHIPS SUSTAINED MINOR DAMAGE, BUT THIS IS BEING REPAIRED AND THE SHIPS REMAIN OPERATIONAL. ONE WARSHIP HAS BEEN DAMAGED IN THE ENGINE ROOM BY AN UNEXPLODED BOMB BUT ALL HER WEAPONS REMAIN EFFECTIVE. A TYPE 21 FRIGATE, HMS ARDENT WAS ALSO HIT BY BOMBS AND ROCKETS, AND AFTER VALIANT EFFORTS TO CONTAIN THE DAMAGE SANK IN THE COURSE OF THE NIGHT. WE DO NOT YET HAVE FURTHER DETAILED CASUALTY FIGURES TO ADD TO THOSE ALREADY ANNOUNCED BY THE MINISTRY BUT FIRST REPORTS INDICATE THAT ABOUT 20 MEN ARE MISSING FROM HMS ARDENT, AND ABOUT 30 ARE INJURED.

7. I SHOULD LIKE TO PAY GREAT TRIBUTE TO THE MEN OF OUR TASK FORCE WHOSE ACTIONS YESTERDAY WERE IN THE HIGHEST TRADITIONS OF HER MAJESTY'S FORCES, AND TO MEN AND WOMEN OF THE MERCHANT NAVY. OVER THE NEXT DAY OR SO OUR FORCES WILL UNDOUBTEDLY SEE ACTION AGAIN, AND WE MUST EXPECT FRESH ATTACKS UPON THEM. BUT THEY
ARE FIGHTING NOW FROM A SECURE BASE, AND THE HAZARDOUS HOURS
OF THE INITIAL AMPHIBIOUS LANDING ARE BEHIND THEM. WE ARE BACK
ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, AND BACK IN STRENGTH. WE INTEND TO
ENSURE THAT AGGRESSION DOES NOT PAY.

PYM
STATEMENT BY MOD 0700 22 MAY 1982

1. Further reports on yesterday's operations in the Falklands up-date Argentine aircraft losses as follows:

9 Mirages, 5 Skyhawks, 2 Puccaras and 4 helicopters.

2. We have not received final casualty reports for yesterday's operations. Initial reports indicate British casualties of 27 wounded, 2 missing and 3 dead.

3. The two ships reported yesterday as being seriously damaged were hit by bombs in the series of air attacks launched against our forces. The other three damaged ships remain operational.
I have decided to stay at home to do housework.

I think the PM has played it beautifully so far.

I agree not the time for photographs inside.

Better if John Nott handles events from PR point of view for the moment.

I think PM should be quiet with media this weekend pending clarification, success and news of casualties.

Tomorrow may be a better time for her to say something; but I am inclined to think we should wait until Monday before she makes herself available for radio or television.

But so far so good.

I shall be around at home all the time except when at the hospital. I will be in the office Sunday afternoon from 1530 (Lobby briefing at 1700 and Americans at 1800).

22 May 1982

Bernard Ingham
FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES

PS
PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)
PS/S OF S DEFENCE
PS/HOME SECRETARY
PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DST)
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG
PS/SIR M. PALLISER
PS/SIR A DUFF
CABINET
MR WADE-GERY
MR FULLER
OFFICE
MR O’NEILL HD ASSESS-
MENTS STAFF
DIO
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
ADMLR SIR ROY HALLIDAY DG1 MOD
DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via ROSS/S)

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 221655Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1861 OF 22 MAY
INFO TEL AVIV

YOUR TELNO 2119032

FALKLANDS: ISRAELI EQUIPMENT

1. HAIG HAS TELEPHONEED TO SAY THAT HE SPOKE LAST NIGHT TO THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR, WHO IN TURN SPOKE TO SHARON, BOTH OF WHOM ARE IN NEW YORK. HAIG WAS TOLD THAT NO EQUIPMENT WOULD BE SUPPLIED TO ARGENTINA BEYOND THAT ALREADY PROVIDED FOR UNDER EXISTING CONTRACTS, AND EVEN THAT WOULD NOT BE SENT BY AIR. I SAID THAT THAT MEANT THAT THE CONSIDERABLE SUPPLIES OUTSTANDING ON EXISTING CONTRACTS COULD BE SENT TO ARGENTINA AND THAT THEY COULD MAKE NEW SUPPLIES AVAILABLE THROUGH THIRD COUNTRIES. HAIG ADMITTED THIS WAS SO BUT SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN VERY FIRMLY TO THE ISRAELIS.

HENDERSON
O R 241300Z MAY 82
FM ADMINISTRATOR ASCENSION
TO RBDWDA/FCO [IMMEDIATE]
INFO MODUK (D3 11)
BT
SECRET
SIC 19F
MY TEL 221630Z MAY. ASTIZ
1. CBFSU TSCHIFFELI AND I WENT ABOARD DUNBARTON CASTLE TODAY.
   TSCHIFFELI HAD PERSONAL INTERVIEW WITH ASTIZ FOR HALF HOUR. HE
   EXPRESSED HIMSELF SATISFIED WITH ALL ASPECTS OF ASTIZ'S DETENTION
2. IN MY PRESENCE BUT ABSENCE OF TSCHIFFELI WHO DECLINED TO BE
   PRESENT, CBFSU PUT QUESTIONS TO ASTIZ AS INSTRUCTED. HE REPLIED QUOTE
   I DO NOT KNOW WHY THEY ASK THESE QUESTIONS. I REFUSE IN ACCORDANCE
   WITH GENEVA CONVENTION UNQUOTE. HE ALSO SAID HE HAS EVERY CONFIDENCE
   IN THE TREATMENT HE WILL RECEIVE FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
   AND EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR TSCHIFFELI'S VISIT. PAUNCEFORT
BT
PART 18 ends:

21 May '82

PART 19 begins:

22 May '82