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PART 8

Relations with Argentina

The Position of the Falkland Islands

Argentina

Part 1 Sept 1971

Part 8 April 1972
PART 8 ends:

19.4.82

PART 9 begins:

20.4.82
Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard, 19 April 1982, columns 21-28

Signed [Signed] Date [12 April 2012]

PREM Records Team
Thank you for your message. You express your disappointment at the outcome after so much effort on your part. The Prime Minister and I fully share your disappointment. Your herculean efforts have clearly met with a firm determination on the part of the Argentines to hold on to what they have taken by force. We are deeply disturbed by their intransigence.

I won't comment in detail now but the steps back to which you refer are very significant indeed. First reading of the draft leaves the clear impression that the sovereignty issue is greatly weakened from our point of view, that the withdrawal is on a very unequal basis in favour of the Argentines and that the wishes of the Islanders are not protected. You know the basic principles on which we have been working here, and I fear that on any interpretation of the text they cannot be met.

On the next immediate steps I am sure that you are right to go to Washington and report to the President. We will try to minimise comment for as long as possible but since you had to say (rightly) that you had given us a full report, we must give some very general indication of our first reaction. The Argentines appear to be telling the media that they have reached an agreement with you and that now it is up to Britain to accept it. I think that you and we should counter this by indicating that there are major difficulties but that we shall remain in consultation with you. To hold the press tonight we are giving the following off the record guidance:-

"We have just received the proposals which Mr. Haig has brought out of Buenos Aires. They are complex and difficult, and at first sight they do not meet the requirements strongly expressed by Parliament, particularly on the need to regard as paramount the wishes of the Islanders. We shall be studying them carefully, however, and shall be getting in touch again with Mr. Haig."

I will be sending you a detailed commentary as quickly as possible and will of course consult with you about the next steps.

/ I am sure
I am sure that on the basis of what you and the President have said to us, you will be reinforced in your view that this outcome is unsatisfactory and that further pressure must be exerted. It may take time to move the Argentines further but we count on you to be with us.
19 April 1982

MRS. GANDHI

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mrs. Gandhi about her recent visit to London.

This would not normally call for a reply but you may wish to consider whether the reference to the Falkland Islands situation creates an opening for a further attempt to influence the Indian attitude. If so, perhaps you would kindly let me have a draft reply for signature by the Prime Minister by Friday, 23 April.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
No. 138-5/DHC/82

19th April 1982

Dear Mr. Coles,

I am enclosing a sealed cover addressed to the Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from Shrimati Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, with the request that this may kindly be placed before the Prime Minister.

Yours sincerely,

(P. Johari)

Mr. A.J. Coles,
Private Secretary to
Prime Minister
Prime Minister's Office
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Encl: one cover
10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 19 April 1982

Falkland Islands

I enclose a copy of a telegram which the Prime Minister has received from Dr. M.F. Perutz.

I should be grateful for your comments on the suggestion in the newspaper article to which he refers that General Galtieri visited Washington three times prior to his overthrow of President Viola, in order to obtain the approval of President Reagan and the Pentagon for the Falklands' takeover.

I should also be grateful for a draft reply to Dr. Perutz for my signature on behalf of the Prime Minister.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A.J. COLES

TO THE PRIME MINISTER, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER
M.P. FROM DR. M.F. PERUTZ, CH, FRS.
DEAR PRIME MINISTER,
MAY I DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO THE
EDITOR IN YESTERDAYS NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE
DOES THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT NOT KNOW THAT GENERAL GALTIERI
VISITED WASHINGTON THREE TIMES PRIOR TO HIS OVERTHROW OF
PRESIDENT VIOLA, IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THE APPROVAL OF PRESIDENT
REAGAN AND THE PENTAGON FOR THE FALKLANDS TAKEOVER? THIS WAS
GALTIERI'S PRICE FOR OVERTHROWING THE GALTIERI REGIME,
WHICH WASHINGTON CONSIDERED A DANGER TO THE STABILITY OF
THE SOUTHERN CONE DUE TO ITS PLANS FOR ELECTIONS WHICH WOULD
ENSURE THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PERONISTS IN THE GOVERNMENT.
(SIGNED) MICHAEL T. WELLS, LONDON.

I HAVE NO MEANS OF CHECKING THIS ALLEGATION, BUT IT DOES NOT
READ AS THOUGH THE AUTHOR HAD INVENTED IT. AFTER THIS REVOLTING
BETRAYAL, THE PRESIDENT MAY WELL ORDER THE CIA TO ENSURE THAT
GALTIERI DOES NOT LOSE, AND THE DICE MAY BE LOADED HEAVILY
AGAINST THE BRAVE CHAPS OF THE BRITISH TASK FORCE. I KNOW THAT
IT IS NOT FOR ME TO GIVE YOU ADVICE, BUT THIS NEWS ITEM MADE ME
WONDER IF IT WOULD NOT BE WISER TO AGREE TO A COMPROMISE,
RATHER THAN RISK THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRITISH FORCE THROUGH
TREACHERY REPEAT TREACHERY WITH ALL THIS WOULD IMPLY FOR
YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THE COUNTY REPEAT COUNTRY.
YOURS SINCERELY SINCERELY
M.F. PERUTZ

81532 MRCLMB G
27582 CABOFF GV
We have just received the proposals which Mr. Haig has brought out of Buenos Aires. They are complex and difficult, and at first sight they do not meet the requirements strongly expressed by Parliament, particularly on the need to regard as paramount the wishes of the Islanders. We shall be studying them carefully, however, and shall be getting in touch again with Mr. Haig.
RESTRICTED

FM FCO 191400Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 63 OF 19 APRIL 1982

FALKLANDS: CREDIBILITY OF OUR POLICY

1. THERE IS A TENDENCY IN SOME GOVERNMENT AND PRESS CIRCLES
OVERSEAS ESPECIALLY IN WESTERN EUROPE, WHILE DEPLORING THE
ARGENTINE INVASION, TO CONSIDER THAT OUR RESPONSE IS EXCESSIVE
AND PUTS AT RISK WIDER WESTERN INTERESTS OVER AN INTRINSICALLY
MINOR ISSUE. YOU SHOULD REBUT THIS, POINTING OUT THAT ISSUES
OF PRINCIPLE ARE INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE UPHeld.

2. YOU SHOULD MAKE USE OF THE ARGUMENTS IN THE PRIME MINISTER’S
SPEECH IN PARLIAMENT ON 14 APRIL (VS 42/82). YOU MAY ALSO DRAW
ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) THE ARGENTINE INVASION IS AN ACT OF UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION;
TO IGNORE THIS WOULD UNDERMINE BRITISH AND WESTERN CREDIBILITY.
WE ARE OF COURSE STRIVING FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IF POSSIBLE:
IT WAS NOT WE WHO BROKE THE PEACE.

(B) TO CONDONE SUCH CYNICAL DEFERENCE OF THE RULE OF LAW AND OF
INTERNATIONAL OPINION WOULD ENCOURAGE FURTHER SIMILAR ACTS,
WHETHER BY THE ARGENTINES OR BY OTHERS. HISTORY AFFORDS MANY
EXAMPLES WHERE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S FAILURE TO TAKE
ACTION OVER COMPARATIVELY MINOR ACTS BY AGGRESSIVE POWERS LED TO
MUCH GRAPER CRISIS LATER.

(C) MANY OTHER STATES ARE SUBJECT TO CLAIMS BY NEIGHBOURS, WHICH
ARE BEING PURSUED PEACEFULLY (EG GUYANA-VENEZUELA, CHINA-INDIA,
MALAYSIA-PHILIPPINES, BELIZE-GUATEMALA). IF THE ARGENTINES GET
AWAY WITH THEIR USE OF FORCE, OTHERS WILL COPY THEM.

(D) THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UN IS AT STAKE IF A MANDATORY
RESOLUTION OF THE SC IS DEFIED.

(E) THE COMMUNITY ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, THOUGH SMALL, IS
FREE AND DEMOCRATIC. WESTERN DEMOCRACIES CANNOT BE INDIFFERENT
TO ITS BEING SUBJECT TO AN ALIEN MILITARY

/DICTATORSHIP

RESTRICTED
DICTATORSHIP.

(F) SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES HAS BEEN A CORNERSTONE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER AT LEAST SINCE THE FOUNDATION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT POINT OF PRINCIPLE WHICH MUST BE UPHeld.

(G) COLONIALISM IS NOT THE ISSUE. INDEED, IT IS ARGENTINA WHICH IS SEEKING TO SUBJECT AN ESTABLISHED POPULATION TO AN ALIEN RULE, AGAINST ITS CLEARLY EXPRESSED WISHES. DESPITE THE FACT THAT ARGENTINA FORMERLY HAD COLONIAL STATUS ITSELF, ITS INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IS TANTAMOUNT TO COLONIALISM.

BY TELEGRAPH

Bonn
Belgium
Paris
[IMMEDIATE]

Athens
UK/EP EC Brussels
Copenhagen
The Hague
Luxembourg

UK MIS New York
BIS New York
Washington
Ottawa

Rome
Berne
Dublin
Madrid

Canberra
Wellington
New Delhi
Lagos

UF/DEL NATO Brussels
Lisbon
Oslo
UK/DEL Strasbourg
UK MIS Geneva

Stockholm
Moscow
Warsaw
Caracas
Mexico City
Brasilia
Rio de Janeiro
Bogota
Havana
Lima
Montevideo

[SANTIAGO]
[ASUNCION]
[LA PAZ]
[QUANPA]
[QUITO]
[SAN JOSE]
[SANTO DOMINGO]
[TEGUCIGALPA]
[AMMAN]
[KUWAIT]
[CAIRO]
[DAR ES SALAAM]
[ENOSHA]
[CAPE TOWN]
[PRETORIA]

[PEKING]
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[ACCR]
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[LUSAKA]
[KINGSTON]
[PORT OF SPAIN]
[GEORGETOWN]
[BREDFICTOWN]
[ELMOFANE]
[SUVA]
[HONG KONG]
[GIBRALTAR (PERSONAL)]

AND SAVING TO CERTAIN OTHER POSTS

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FM FCO 192315Z APRIL 82
TO FLASH WASHINGTON
TELEGRAHM NUMBER 767 OF 19 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

1. FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO MR HAIG HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE
US EMBASSY HERE FOR ONWARD TRANSMISSION TO MR HAIG. PLEASE
TAKE SUPPORTING ACTION WITH STATE DEPARTMENT. BEGINS:
THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE. YOU EXPRESS YOUR DISAPPOINTMENT AT
THE OUTCOME AFTER SO MUCH EFFORT ON YOUR PART. THE PRIME
MINISTER AND I FULLY SHARE YOUR DISAPPOINTMENT. YOUR HERCULEAN
EFFORTS HAVE CLEARLY MET WITH A FIRM DETERMINATION ON THE PART
OF THE ARGENTINES TO HOLD ON TO WHAT THEY HAVE TAKEN BY FORCE.
WE ARE DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THEIR INTRANSIGENCE.

I WON'T COMMENT IN DETAIL NOW BUT THE STEPS BACK TO WHICH YOU
REFER ARE VERY SIGNIFICANT INDEED. FIRST READING OF THE DRAFT
LEAVES THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE IS GREATLY
WEAKENED FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, THAT THE WITHDRAWAL IS ON A
VERY UNEQUAL BASIS IN FAVOUR OF THE ARGENTINES AND THAT THE
WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS ARE NOT PROTECTED. YOU KNOW THE BASIC
PRINCIPLES ON WHICH WE HAVE BEEN WORKING HERE, AND I FEAR
THAT ANY INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT THEY CANNOT BE MET.
ON THE NEXT IMMEDIATE STEPS I AM SURE THAT YOU ARE RIGHT TO GO
TO WASHINGTON AND REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT. WE WILL TRY TO
MINIMISE COMMENT FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE BUT SINCE YOU HAD TO
SAY (RIGHTLY) THAT YOU HAD GIVEN US A FULL REPORT, WE MUST GIVE
SOME VERY GENERAL INDICATION OF OUR FIRST REACTION. THE
ARGENTINES APPEAR TO BE TELLING THE MEDIA THAT THEY HAVE REACHED
AN AGREEMENT WITH YOU AND THAT NOW IT IS UP TO BRITAIN TO
ACCEPT IT. I THINK THAT YOU AND WE SHOULD COUNTER THIS BY

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INDICATING THAT THERE ARE MAJOR DIFFICULTIES BUT THAT WE SHALL REMAIN IN CONSULTATION WITH YOU. TO HOLD THE PRESS TONIGHT WE ARE GIVING THE FOLLOWING OFF THE RECORD GUIDANCE. QUOTE: WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED THE PROPOSALS WHICH MR HAIQ HAS BROUGHT OUT OF BUENOS AIRES. THEY ARE COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT, AND AT FIRST SIGHT THEY DO NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS STRONGLY EXPRESSED BY PARLIAMENT, PARTICULARLY ON THE NEED TO REGARD AS PARAMOUNT THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS. WE SHALL BE STUDYING THEM CAREFULLY, HOWEVER, AND SHALL BE GETTING IN TOUCH AGAIN WITH MR HAIQ. UNQUOTE.
I WILL BE SENDING YOU A DETAILED COMMENTARY AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND WILL OF COURSE CONSULT WITH YOU ABOUT THE NEXT STEPS.
I AM SURE THAT ON THE BASIS OF WHAT YOU AND THE PRESIDENT HAVE SAID TO US, YOU WILL BE REINFORCED IN YOUR VIEW THAT THIS OUTCOME IS UNSATISFACTORY AND THAT FURTHER PRESSURE MUST BE EXERTED. IT MAY TAKE TIME TO MOVE THE ARGENTINES FURTHER BUT WE COUNT ON YOU TO BE WITH US. ENDS

PYM

FOO
S A M D
CABINET OFFICE

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NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. You may draw on the following, to supplement material sent by Pearce to Sizeland in last Friday’s bag. Almost all Latin American countries have supported Argentina’s claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, but many are deeply concerned by her use of force and have made clear their desire for a peaceful, negotiated solution. Many governments are under pressure from public opinion and in some cases from their military to take a stronger pro-Argentine position. As the prospects for Haig’s peace mission become more uncertain and as the risk of an armed clash grows the chance of a successful Argentine invocation of the Rio Treaty looms larger. However, even if Argentina receives the necessary 14 votes for binding measures, the action taken by parties to the treaty is certain to vary widely, from mere gestures to economic, and possibly in some cases military, assistance. Some parties will resist any action. The majority can expect to be affected by strong internal disagreement on policy.

2. An encouraging number of governments have so far managed to maintain a more or less neutral or conciliatory position. Brazil’s public position supported the Argentine claim, but she clearly disapproved of the Argentine use of force and has remained reasonably evenhanded. Influential elements of the Brazilian press have heavily criticised Argentina. Colombia began from a neutral position calling on both sides to avoid confrontation and bloodshed. In cooperation with Ecuador and Costa Rica she attempted to promote a mediation commission in the OAS, which resulted in the restrained OAS resolution of 13 April which we have welcomed. Mexico condemned the Argentine use of force and emphasised the MAND-
ATORY NATURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. SHE WISHES TO AVOID ANY RESORT TO THE RIO TREATY AND SAYS SHE WOULD RESIST SANCTIONS AGAINST BRITAIN. THE PARAGUAYAN LEADERSHIP, THEMSELVES WARY OF ARGENTINA, HAVE MAINTAINED A NEUTRAL STANCE, AND CLAIM THAT THIS WILL NOT CHANGE. URUGUAY HAS STRUGGLED TO SUSTAIN A SIMILAR POSITION BUT IS UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE FROM ARGENTINA. NONETHELESS, THE URUGUAYAN PRESIDENT WENT AHEAD WITH A VISIT TO CHILE AND SIGNED A JOINT STATEMENT WITH PRESIDENT PINOCHET ON 14 APRIL, EMPHASISING THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. CHILE OF COURSE HAS A UNIQUELY DELICATE POSITION, AND HAS SO FAR KEPT A VERY LOW PROFILE.

3. THE MIDDLE GROUND IS OCCUPIED BY ECUADOR, PERU AND BOLIVIA. ECUADOREAN STATEMENTS, AIMED PARTLY AT INTERNAL CONSUMPTION, HAVE BEEN STRONG IN DEFENCE OF THE ARGENTINE RIGHT TO REASSERT OLD TERRITORIAL CLAIMS (C.F. ECUADOR’S CLAIM AGAINST PERU), BUT IN THE DIPLOMATIC FIELD ECUADOR HAS COOPERATED WITH COLOMBIA IN PROMOTING THE IDEA OF MEDIATION THROUGH THE OAS. PERU IS TORN BETWEEN A PRO-ARGENTINE MILITARY AND THE MORE RESTRAINED CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. THE ARMY COMMANDER’S OFFER OF MILITARY HELP TO ARGENTINA WAS REPORTED TO HAVE ENRAGED PRESIDENT BELAUNDE AND THE LATEST PERUVIAN STATEMENT IS CAREFULLY DESIGNED TO BACKTRACK. THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY ALSO ATTEMPTED TO PREEMPT THEIR GOVERNMENT WITH OFFERS OF MILITARY AID, BUT THE GOVERNMENT HAVE SINCE PUBLICLY DENIED ANY INTENTION TO BECOME MILITARILY INVOLVED. EL SALVADOR AND CUBA HAVE ALSO GIVEN THEIR GENERAL SUPPORT TO ARGENTINA.

4. MANY COUNTRIES ARE INFLUENCED BY THEIR OWN TERRITORIAL CONCERNS AND ARE WATCHING THE REACTIONS OF THEIR TRADITIONAL ADVERSARIES CAREFULLY - CHILE AGAINST ARGENTINA; BOLIVIA AGAINST CHILE AND PERU; PERU AGAINST CHILE AND ECUADOR; ECUADOR AGAINST PERU; AND COLOMBIA AGAINST VENEZUELA. SIMILARLY THE STRONGEST SUPPORTERS OF ARGENTINA AND THE MOST LIKELY TO TAKE ANTI-UK MEASURES, ARE THOSE WITH IMMEDIATE TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS - VENEZUELA (GUAYANA AND COLOMBIA), GUATEMALA (BELIZE) AND PANAMA (THE CANAL ZONE). VENEZUELA IS THE BEST PLACED TO TAKE DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST US, THOUGH SHE MUST BE
CONSIDERING VERY CAREFULLY ANY MILITARY COMMITMENT. THE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION COULD INFLAME TERRITORIAL DISPUTE THROUGHOUT THE REGION WITH FAR REACHING CONSEQUENCES PERHAPS NOT YET FULLY APPRECIATED BY ALL LATIN AMERICANS, FOR THE STABILITY OF THE AREA.

PYM

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FROM UK MISSION NEW YORK 200121Z APRIL 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 504 OF 19 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.
FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY.
YOUR TELECON OF 19 APRIL: VISIT OF MR DENIS HEALEY MP.
1. WE HAVE ARRANGED FOR MR HEALEY TO SEE THE SECRETARY GENERAL AT
10.15 AM ON 23 APRIL AND URQUHART THEREAFTER. I OR A MEMBER OF MY
STAFF (DEPENDING ON FALKLANDS COMMITMENTS) WILL MEET MR HEALEY AT
THE AIRPORT. I LOOK FORWARD TO ACCOMPANYING HIM ON HIS CALL ON
PEREZ DE CUELLAR.
2. WE HAVE COMMUNICATED HIS WISHES TO WASHINGTON, WHO WILL LET YOU
KNOW DIRECT WHAT CAN BE ARRANGED THERE AND WHICH SHUTTLE MR HEALEY
SHOULD CATCH FROM NEW YORK TO WASHINGTON.

PARSONS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]
Dear John,

Falkland Islands: Government Savings Bank

Thank you for your letter of 15 April. I understand that the Government Savings Bank on the Falkland Islands is, to the best of our knowledge, still working normally and that therefore at the moment the Islanders' savings are safe.

Yours ever,

John Holmes
(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
Dear John,

Anglo-Argentine Negotiations on the Falklands Dispute 1965-82

As requested, I enclose a history of Anglo-Argentine negotiations on the Falklands dispute since 1965. The main text is inevitably lengthy, but seeks to identify all the main stages of negotiation over the last 17 years and the proposals made in them. A short summary covers the main text. A copy of the 1971 Communications Agreement is annexed.

The summary does not refer to Mr Ridley's secret meeting with his Argentine counterpart in Geneva in July 1980 at which agreement to pursue leaseback was reached in principle.

Yours ever,

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
19 April 1982

Dear John,

Falklands: Message from the British Chamber of Commerce in Argentina

Willie Rickett wrote to Francis Richards on 15 April enclosing a telegram from the Chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce in Argentina. I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister, in the form of a telegram to the British Interests Section in Buenos Aires.

There were suggestions at an earlier stage that the Chamber of Commerce might wish to send a delegation to London to press their case in person, but so far as we are aware no firm proposal to this effect has been received.

Yours ever,

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
1. The Prime Minister has received a telegram from the British Chamber of Commerce in Argentina. The text is in MIIF.

2. Please deliver following reply from the Prime Minister:

BEGINS: Thank you for your telegram about the situation in the Falkland Islands. I am aware of the important contribution which your Chamber has made to the development of industrial, commercial and financial links between Argentina and the UK, and the major role which these have played in the development of Argentina. The British Government is, like your Chamber, concerned that the good relations which have existed between the two peoples are now at risk. However, this situation has not been of our seeking: it has been caused by the unprovoked aggression by the Argentine Government against the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies.

We want a peaceful solution to the present crisis. We are making
every effort to achieve one. However this must be on the basis of the mandatory resolution passed by the Security Council of the UN, which calls for an immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces. Any intensity of feeling in Argentina on this subject is fully matched by the outrage at Argentina's invasion felt here. If the Argentine Government's attempt to impose its views by force on the people of the Falkland Islands, who have many times made quite clear their determination to remain British, were allowed to succeed, there would be the gravest consequences for peace, security and the rule of law, not only in the South Atlantic, but in the wider world also. ENDS

PYM

NNNN
FM FCO 191230Z APRIL 82
TO PRIORITY BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION BUENOS AIRES

TELEGRAM NUMBER
MIPT_ BRITISH CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

1. Following is text of telegram.

BEGINNS: The British Chamber of Commerce in the Argentine
Republic (Inc) represents many and important British and
Argentine companies with industrial, trading or financial
interests in Argentina and the United Kingdom. Within Argentina
its members employ over 10,000 persons and account for an
aggregate investment of over £500 million; they are primarily
responsible for generating a bilateral flow of goods and services
in the order of £1,000 million per year. Ever since its
foundation in 1913 the Chamber has been actively engaged in
the furtherance of economic relations between the two countries.

As such it has witnessed the development of a fruitful partner-
ship between Argentine and British interests. Generations of
Britons have chosen to work and live in Argentina and in many
cases have settled and integrated permanently into the local
community where they found respect and even admiration for

NNNN ends telegram
BLANK

File number
Dept

Drafted by (Block capitals)
PRIVATE SECRETARY

Telephne number 235 4641

Authorized for despatch

Comcen reference
Time of despatch

Catchword British

Distribution
Standard
SAmD
Emergency Unit
ERD

cc: PS/No 10
British values and way of life and never at any time have regretted their decision. Our Chamber is therefore most seriously concerned because that long history of friendship is now at stake to the detriment of the many individuals and companies of British origin or affiliation present in Argentina putting at risk a relationship developed over more than a century which may be destroyed in one day but would require decades to repair. This concern extends also to what we believe is a lack of awareness in the United Kingdom with respect to the sincerity and intensity of the feelings of the Argentine people towards the issue under discussion ever since it arose 150 years ago and their frustration after seventeen years of fruitless talks.

The Chamber is anxious that a peaceful settlement to this problem be reached. The highest sense of mutual respect and consideration must prevail. The undeniable duty of everyone and particularly those who wield power is to demonstrate the most sincere willingness to carry through to a speedy and successful conclusion the negotiations which have already been initiated, the failure of which no reasonable person can accept. We urge you to refrain from the use of force which at this point could only cause irreparable harm to all concerned and incalculable damage to the western world and to strive to achieve an understanding which will allow a positive future to be built in the best interests of all including the islanders. ENDS

PYM

NNNN

NNNN ends telegram    BLANK    Catchword
CONFIDENTIAL

FM HAVANA 191830Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 117 OF 19 APRIL,
AND INFO TO WASHINGTON, MEXICO CITY AND MOSCOW,
SAVING INFO TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

ANGLO-CUBAN RELATIONS : FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. PRIOR TO MY DEPARTURE ON LEAVE ON 26 APRIL I AM SEEKING
   INTERVIEWS WITH VICE PRESIDENT CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ AND
   FOREIGN MINISTER MALMIERCA (OR, IF HE IS STILL OUT OF THE COUNTRY,
   HIS DEPUTY, VIERA). I HAVE SUFFICIENT BRIEFING MATERIAL TO DEAL
   WITH THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. BUT IF THERE ARE ANY SPECIFIC POINTS
   YOU WOULD WISH ME TO PUT ACROSS, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR URGENT
   INSTRUCTIONS.

2. MY CANADIAN COLLEAGUE TELLS ME THAT IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION ON
   HE HAD WITH FIDEL CASTRO WHEN THE LATTER ATTENDED BARTLEMAN’S
   PATRIOTIC DAY RECEPTION ON 17 APRIL, MENTION OF THE FALKLAND
   ISLANDS LED CASTRO TO SPEAK AT LENGTH ABOUT THE INTELLIGENT WAY
   THE FRENCH INDO-CHINA PROTESTED THE VIETMINH'S TREATMENT OF THE
   FRENCH IN THE MING-AI INCIDENT.
CONTRASTING THE ENDURING STRENGTHS OF THE HERITAGE OF DICTATORSHIPS AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA, CASTRO WENT ON TO TALK DISPARAGINGLY ABOUT THE ARGENTINE MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND COMING TO THE PRESENT CRISIS, SAID, IN EFFECT, "A PLAGUE ON BOTH THEIR HOUSES". HE CONCLUDED JOCULARLY (BUT PROBABLY TRUTHFULLY) THAT THE BEST OUTCOME FOR CUBA MIGHT BE IF THE BRITISH AND ARGENTINE GOVERNMENTS SUCCEEDED IN DESTROYING EACH OTHER.

3. CASTRO MAY IN PART HAVE BEEN AT PAINS TO AVOID POLEMICS WITH HIS HOST ON WHAT WAS DEMONSTRATIVELY A COMMONWEALTH OCCASION, ALTHOUGH HIS ADMIRATION FOR BRITAIN'S DECOLONISATION RECORD IS, I BELIEVE, GENUINE. AND HIS CONCLUSION WAS NEITHER PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGING NOR INDICATIVE OF HOW THE CUBANS MAY BE PREPARING TO PLAY THE HAND (WHETHER OR NOT IN TANDEM WITH THE RUSSIANS) IF THINGS GET ROUGH IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. BUT BARTLEMAN WAS STRUCK BY THE ABSENCE OF ANY DIRECT CRITICISM OF HMG IN CASTRO'S REMARKS ON THE PRESENT SITUATION.

4. MEANWHILE OTHER SENIOR CUBANS TO WHO I HAVE SPOKEN CONTINUE TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND, WHILE MAINTAINING WITH DIFFERING DEGREES OF BLUNTNESS THAT CUBA IS BOUND TO SUPPORT ARGENTINA. THE CUBAN PRESS IS NOW PLACING MOST EMPHASIS ON ARGENTINE PREPARATIONS TO REPEL BRITISH "AGGRESSION" AND ONE OR TWO RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL COMMENTARIES HAVE REFLECTED THE LINE THAT THE CRISIS IS ALL PART OF A US PLOT TO SECURE MILITARY BASES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. BUT THERE HAS STILL BEEN APOFFICIAL GOVERNMENT STATEMENT.

FCO PASS SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

THOMAS

NEEN
MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. FOLLOWING IS PAPER HANDED TO ME BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TODAY:

INFORMAL NOTE

FOLLOWING THE ADOPTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF RESOLUTION 502 (1982) ON 3 APRIL, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS CONTINUED TO FOLLOW WITH CONCERN DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS) DISPUTE. HE IS
continued to follow with concern developments in relation to the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) dispute. He is confident that the timely implementation of the resolution will lead to a speedy reduction of tension in the area and effective steps towards the diplomatic solution of the problem as a whole. In this connexion, the Secretary-General has maintained contact with the permanent representatives to the United Nations of both parties. He has also followed closely the efforts currently being made by the government of the United States in providing its assistance to the parties with a view to facilitating a peaceful resolution of the dispute in the context of the Security Council resolution. He hopes that these efforts will succeed, and considers that in the meantime nothing should be done to interfere with the delicate process that is currently underway.

At the same time, it is incumbent on the Secretary-General to maintain a direct interest in the development of a situation that has given rise to action by the Security Council in pursuance of its Charter responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Secretary-General has indicated to all concerned that he is prepared to do all he can at the appropriate time, within the limits of his competence and authority, to be of assistance. Among other things, he considers that the parties and the government providing its good offices to them may find it useful to be aware of the services that the United Nations may be in a position to render in pursuance of any understanding or agreement that the parties may reach. Needless to say, services or arrangements of this kind would require the prior authorization of the Security Council and would, as a practical matter, presuppose the consent of the parties.

An appropriate United Nations presence could conceivably be used for any of the following purposes, or a combination thereof:

- Observe, verify and certify the withdrawal, as agreed upon, of armed forces from the area;
- Observe, verify and certify the withdrawal, complete or partial, as agreed, of civilian/administrative personnel;
- Observe, verify and certify continued compliance over a specified period of time, with any of the above arrangements;
- Observe, verify and certify implementation of such administrative arrangements as may be agreed upon;
- PROVIDE A UNITED NATIONS "UMBRELLA" FOR SUCH ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS;
- PROVIDE A UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION.

The exact nature, strength and composition of any United Nations presence would depend on the nature of the understanding arrived at by the parties and on the mandate given to it by the Security Council, and also on the situation prevailing at the time. Once the mandate for the UN presence has been determined, the establishment of such presence could follow, mutatis mutandis (underlined), the usual Security Council guidelines, including the responsibility of the Secretary-General for ensuring the integrity, impartiality and efficiency of a United Nations involvement of this kind. The capability and readiness of States to contribute personnel and/or logistic support to the UN presence and their acceptability to both parties would of course have to be fully taken into account.

A very small, symbolic presence of United Nations civilian and military observers under a United Nations representative on the islands might suffice. The precise number of observers to be deployed would depend on the actual mandate and it is not possible at this stage to give a definite figure. The civilians would be United Nations Secretariat officials; military observers would be drawn, at least initially, from among those currently serving with the United Nations in the Middle East and in Kashmir. Military observers qualified to undertake the responsibility envisaged and whose nationalities might be acceptable to both parties are currently serving with UNTSO and UNEOGIP.

The above types of arrangements and United Nations presence are indicated without prejudice to the possibility of other types of involvement that the Security Council may decide upon, in pursuance of its Charter responsibilities, if developments warrant.

PARSONS
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 192147 APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 498 DATED 19 APRIL 82

MY TELNO 489:

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY DRAFT LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN REPLY TO THE ARGENTINE LETTER OF 16 APRIL.

YOUR EXCELLENCY

I HAVE THE HONOUR, WITH REFERENCE TO THE LETTERS DATED 14 APRIL FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF PANAMA AND VENEZUELA AND THE LETTER DATED 16 APRIL FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA, TO STATE THE FOLLOWING.

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS BEEN EXPLAINED IN MR WHYTE'S LETTERS OF 9 AND 11 APRIL AND MY LETTER OF 13 APRIL. THE SALIENT FACTS ARE AS FOLLOWS.

1. ARGENTINA USED ARMED FORCE IN AN EFFORT TO SETTLE SEPARATE TERRITORIAL DISPUTES WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS DESPITE A CALL FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 1 APRIL TO AVOID THE USE OF FORCE. ARGENTINA'S USE OF ARMED
2. The Security Council characterised Argentina’s action as an "invasion" and determined that a breach of the peace existed in the region of the Falkland Islands. In the same Resolution 502(1982), the Security Council demanded the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands.

3. Argentina has not withdrawn its armed forces from the Falkland Islands and on the contrary has increased their numbers very considerably. Argentina has also purported to install an Argentinian administration.

4. The people of the Falkland Islands are a permanent population, the majority of them being able to trace their ancestry on the islands back to 1850. In free and fair elections, they have chosen to maintain a British administration in which they have been able to take part through elected representatives. The people speak English and have their own, British-style culture. They are not Argentinian and have expressed the wish not to be subjected to alien domination. The people have a right to self-determination as guaranteed by the Charter of the United Nations, as well as by Article 1 of the Convenant on Civil and Political Rights which the United Kingdom ratified on behalf of the Falkland Islands.

In the light of the foregoing, the United Kingdom will continue to take whatever measures may be needed in exercise of its inherent right of self-defence in the face of Argentina’s unlawful invasion of British territory and serious violations of the rights of the people of the Falkland Islands (who are practically all United Kingdom nationals).

As regards the reference in the letter from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the International Civil Aviation Organization, I have the honour to inform you that the true position is as follows. On the morning of 2 April, as the Argentinian invasion of Port Stanley was beginning, the Governor of the Falkland Islands declared a state of emergency. On 8 April, the United Kingdom representative on the Council of the International
FALKLAND ISLANDS DECLARED A STATE OF EMERGENCY. ON 8 APRIL, THE UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE ON THE COUNCIL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION MADE THE FOLLOWING NOTIFICATION:

"I AM DIRECTED BY HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO NOTIFY THE COUNCIL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 89 OF THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION SIGNED AT CHICAGO ON 7 DECEMBER 1944, THAT ON FRIDAY 2 APRIL 1982 A STATE OF EMERGENCY WAS DECLARED WITH REGARD TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS."

AS WILL BE APPARENT, THE FORMAL NOTIFICATION TO THE COUNCIL OF ICAO UNDER ARTICLE 89 HAD NOTHING WHATSOEVER TO DO WITH THE NOTIFICATION OF A MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE, WHICH FORMED THE SUBJECT OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF MR WHYTE'S LETTER OF 9 APRIL.

PARSONS
MY TELNO 488 (NOT REPEATED): FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SENT FOR MRS KIRKPATRICK, MYSELF AND
ROCA (ARGENTINA) SEPARATELY THIS AFTERNOON (19 APRIL). HE GAVE
EACH OF US A COPY OF THE PAPER IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.
AS YOU CAN SEE IT IS WELL AND CAREFULLY DRAFTED IN TERMS
OF IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS FEEDING
IN THESE IDEAS CONFIDENTIALLY IN CASE THEY MIGHT BE OF USE TO
HAIG ON HIS MISSION. HE WAS NOT INFORMING ANYONE ELSE, INCLUDING
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND (AT MY URGING) WOULD DO
EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PREVENT THE PAPER LEAKING. HE ASSURED ME
EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PREVENT THE PAPER LEAKING. HE ASSURED ME THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF CUTTING ACROSS WHAT HAIG WAS DOING BY STIMULATING PREMATURE ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

2. I SAID THAT I WAS GLAD TO KNOW THAT HIS JUDGEMENT AND THAT OF EVERYONE ELSE OF GOOD WILL IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS THAT HAIG SHOULD BE LEFT A CLEAR FIELD WITHOUT ANY ACTION IN THE COUNCIL. I MUST HOWEVER TELL HIM THAT, EVEN IF HAIG FAILED, HE OR DELEGATIONS SUCH AS IRELAND OR UGANDA OR ZAIRE SHOULD NOT IMMEDIATELY RUSH TO THE COUNCIL WITH WELL MEANING IDEAS FOR UN INVOLVEMENT. OUR POSITION WAS THAT THERE WAS A MANDATORY RESOLUTION WHICH ARGENTINE MUST IMPLEMENT. WE WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY UN INVOLVEMENT WHICH WOULD SIMPLY HAVE THE EFFECT OF PUTTING restrain on our rights under Article 51 of the Charter and allowing the situation to drift, thus enabling Argentina to consolidate her gains. I made clear that any such move might well be rejected by us and the prospects would thereby be irretrievably damaged, if at some future date such action seemed appropriate. I therefore urged him that anyone thinking of calling the Council, following a failure of Haig's mission, should not do so without genuine prior consultation with me.

I SAID THAT I WAS NOT BOTHERED SO MUCH ABOUT ADVERSARY DELEGATIONS. THEY WERE LIKELY TO PUT DOWN PROPOSITIONS DRAFTED IN LANGUAGE WHICH I WOULD FIND IT EASY TO REJECT. WHAT I WANTED TO AVOID IF POSSIBLE WAS HAVING TO REJECT WELL INTENTIONED MOVES WHICH WERE UNACCEPTABLE TO MY GOVERNMENT. BUT, FOR THE REASONS STATED ABOVE, WE WOULD NOT HESITATE TO DO SO IF WE JUDGED IT NECESSARY.

3. PEREZ DE CUCELLAR TOOK ALL THIS VERY WELL AND SAID THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION. HE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO PUT PRESSURE ON ME TO ACCEPT UN INVOLVEMENT.

PARSONS

NNNN
SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 200430Z APR 82
TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1353 OF 19 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. THE DELIBERATELY OVER-OPTIMISTIC IMPRESSION OF THE OUTCOME OF
HAIG’S LAST TALKS IN BA WHICH THE ARGENTINIANS ARE PROMULGATING IS
DESIGNED TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT AN AGREEMENT SHOULD BE
POSSIBLE: AND THIS MAY HAVE SOME EFFECT HERE. THE ARGENTINE PROPOSALS
ARE RECEIVING MUCH PUBLICITY HERE.

2. I SUGGEST THAT WE CANNOT LET THE INITIATIVE LIE WITH ARGENTINA
ON THE BASIS OF THE PROPOSALS BROUGHT BACK BY HAIG. OBVIOUSLY WE
DO NOT WANT TO GET INTO A PUBLIC DEBATE ABOUT THE DETAILS OF WHY
THE PROPOSALS AS THEY STAND ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO US BUT I THINK WE
SHOULD ASSUME THAT HAIG, WHEN HE HAS RETURNED HERE AND HAD
DISCUSSIONS AT THE WHITE HOUSE, MAY BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE THE
NEGOTIATION PROVIDED WE WISH HIM TO DO SO. HE HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
SHOULD ACCORD THAT HAYES, WHEN HE WAS RETURNED HERE AND THE DISCUSSIONS AT THE WHITE HOUSE, MAY BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATION PROVIDED WE WISH HIM TO DO SO. HE HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ARGENTINE PROPOSALS ARE DISAPPOINTING BUT I AM SURE HIS INSTINCT WILL BE TO TRY TO HANG ON AND SEEK TO SEE WHETHER SOMETHING CANNOT BE NEGOTIATED, THOUGH HE WILL NOT BE WANTING TO PUT PRESSURE ON US TO INVITE HIM IF WE ARE AGAINST IT. THE INTENTION OF ARGENTINA TO INVOKE THE RIO TREATY WILL CERTAINLY STRENGTHEN HAIG'S DESIRE TO KEEP HIS NEGOTIATION GOING, IF ONLY TO HEAD OFF THE AWKWARDNESS FOR THE AMERICANS THAT COULD ARISE IN THE OAS.

3. I THINK TOO THAT AMERICAN CONGRESSIONAL, MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION, ALTHOUGH STALWARTLY ON OUR SIDE ON THE PRINCIPLES AT ISSUE, MAY EXPECT THE US GOVERNMENT, HAVING ENGAGED THEMSELVES SO DEEPLY, TO STICK AT IT A BIT LONGER IF THE ALTERNATIVE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF A MAJOR MILITARY ENGAGEMENT.

4. IF YOU AGREE THAT OUR INTEREST LIES IN SHOWING READINESS TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS THE QUESTIONS ARISE A) ON WHAT BASIS AND B) WHERE. THE TROUBLE ABOUT A) IS THAT THE ARGENTINIANS ARE PUTTING OUT A FAIRLY EXTENSIVE ACCOUNT OF THEIR PROPOSALS, BUT THERE IS OBVIOUSLY NO REASON FOR US TO REGARD THESE PROPOSALS AS THE LAST WORD. AS REGARDS B) THE ARRIVAL OF HAIG ONCE AGAIN IN LONDON INEVITABLY PUTS THE SPOTLIGHT ON US. NEVERTHELESS I CANNOT HELP THINKING THAT OUR ADVANTAGE WILL LIE IN AGREEING THAT HE SHOULD COME IF HE IS PREPARED TO DO SO, AS REGARDS THE IMPORTANT QUESTION OF THE BASIS UPON WHICH SUCH A VISIT WOULD TAKE PLACE WE OBVIOUSLY WOULD NOT WANT IT TO BE STATED OR EVEN SUGGESTED THAT HE WAS COMING TO LONDON TO PRESS US TO ACCEPT THE ARGENTINE PROPOSALS. FROM THE TONE OF HIS MESSAGE FROM BA I DO NOT THINK THERE WOULD BE ANY QUESTION OF THIS.

HENDERSON
CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 192305Z
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 1351 OF 19 APRIL 1981,
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK,
INFO IMMEDIATE NASSAU, BRIDGETOWN, LA PAZ, BRASILIA, SANTIAGO,
BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, QUITO, KINGSTON, SANTO DOMINGO, TEGUCIGALPA,
MEXICO CITY, PANAMA CITY, ASUNCION, LIMA, PORT OF SPAIN,
MONTEVIDEO.

FALKLANDS - OAS

1. WE HAVE HEARD FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE IN THE OAS THAT
ARGENTINA HAS JUST REQUESTED THE HOLDING OF A SPECIAL MEETING
OF THE OAS PERMANENT COUNCIL TOMORROW, 20 APRIL, AT 10.30 LOCAL TIME.
THE REQUEST APPARENTLY CITES ARTICLE 12 OF THE RIO TREATY WHICH
PROVIDES FOR THE GOVERNING BOARD OF THE PAN AMERICAN UNION
(I.E. THE OAS PERMANENT COUNCIL) TO ACT AS A PROVISIONAL ORGAN OF
CONSULTATION UNTIL A MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF RIO.
1. The OAS Permanent Council to act as a provisional organ of consultation until a meeting of the foreign ministers of Rio Signatories can be assembled.

2. The request is also made under the terms of Article 6 of the Rio Treaty which deals with "aggression which is not an armed attack".

3. This being a meeting of the OAS Permanent Council rather than only the signatories of the Rio Treaty, the Anglophone Caribbeans will be able to participate in the debate.

4. We shall if possible attend as observers.

HENDERSON

NNNN
STEPHEN JOHN MARTIN OF THE BAS HAS INFORMED US THAT AS AT 3 APRIL THE WHEREABOUTS OF MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY AND OTHER CIVILIANS WAS AS FOLLOWS:

BIRD ISLAND 4 BAS  
P A U L  C O P E S T A K E  
P A U L  H U M P H R I E S  
J U L I A N  H E C T O R  
B A R R Y  W H E E L E R  

SCHLIEPER BAY 2 BAS  
P A U L  M A R T I N  
W I L L I A M  D O I G E  (C A N A D I A N  N A T I O N A L)  

S T  A N D R E W S  B A Y  3  B A S  2  A N G L I A  T V  
A N N E  P R I C E  A N G L I A  T V  
L U C I N D A  B U X T O N  A N G L I A  T V  
A N T H O N Y  N O R T H  

CIVILIANS.
ANNE PRICE ANGLIA TV
LUCINDA BUXTON ANGLIA TV
ANTHONY NORTH
PETER STARK
MILES PLANT

LYELL HUT 3 BAS 1 NERC STUDENT
CAMPBELL GEMMEL NERC STUDENT
IAN BARKER
TREFOR EDWARDS
DAMIEN SANDERS
(ABOVE NAMES NOW PROBABLY IN GRYTVIKEN)

15 PERSONS IN TOTAL.

THOSE AT SCHLIEPER BAY AND LYELL HUT COULD BE SHORT OF FOOD.
HOWEVER THOSE AT LYELL ARE WITHIN WALKING DISTANCE OF MAIN
BASE AT GRYTVIKEN, WHERE THEY PROBABLY NOW ARE. THOSE AT
BIRD ISLAND AND ST ANDREWS BAY SHOULD BE OK FOR FOOD.

HUTCHINSON

SEN|T/RCVD AT 181658Z TWW/RH
Falkland Islands

Mr Haig telephoned the Secretary of State on an open line at 1740 on 19 April. He said that he wanted to let us know in advance that he was sending a flash message to us containing the full text of the results of his talks in Buenos Aires, together with his own analysis in order "to assist our assessment". He would be guided by our response on this, which he hoped to receive as soon as possible. He expected to take off from Buenos Aires at 1600 local time, heading tentatively for Washington, but the direction of his flight would be subject to our advice. He hoped that we would read his message very carefully.

The Secretary of State said that we were grateful for all Mr Haig's efforts and would consider his message when it arrived as soon as we possibly could. He asked what Mr Haig intended to say, if anything, at Buenos Aires airport. Mr Haig replied that he would say only that he had now completed this stage of his discussions.

J. E. Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

19 April 1982

cc: PS
    PS/Mr Onslow
    PS/PUS
    Mr Giffard
    Mr Wright
    Mr Ure
    Mr Gillmore
    Defence Department
    Planning Staff
    NAD
    Sir I Sinclair
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM BISBA

TEL NO 19 OF 19 APRIL: MORE ATMOSPHERICS

1. THE ATMOSPHERE CONTINUES TENSE AND EXPECTANT. EVERYONE IS HANGING ON THE LATEST NEWS OF HAIG'S NEGOTIATIONS AND THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO OTHER TOPIC OF CONVERSATION. THE MEDIA PURSUE THEIR MILITARISTIC CAMPAIGN WITH THE MALVINAS SONG (QUOTE I AM YOUR FATHERLAND AND MAY NEED YOU TO DIE FOR ME UNQUOTE) PLAYED EVERY FIVE MINUTES OR SO ON SOME RADIO STATIONS. THERE IS NO APPARENT LET UP IN THE GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION TO HANG ON TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE ISLANDS.

2. BUT THERE ARE A FEW SIGNS OF A DAWNING REALISATION THAT THIS IS NOT MERELY A GAME BUT IN DEEPLY EARNEST AND THAT THE STAKES ARE VERY HIGH. THE POPULAR DAILY "CLARIN" CARRIED AN ADVERTISEMENT LAST WEEK BY A SMALL BUT INFLUENTIAL EXTREME RIGHTWING GROUP, THE ASSOCIATION FOR TRADITION, FAMILY AND FATHERLAND, RAISING THE SPECTRE OF A THIRD WORLD WAR WITH ARGENTINA'S ONLY ALLY BEING THE SOVIET UNION, AND POINTING UP THE POTENTIALLY STARK CHOICE BETWEEN RECOVERY OF THE MAL-

3. THERE HAVE BEEN A FEW UNSUBSTANTIATED REPORTS OF ANTI-BRITISH FEELING (EG TWO PEOPLE ORDERED OFF A BUS FOR SPEAKING ENGLISH), THOUGH NONE OF ANY SERIOUSNESS EXCEPT A SERIES OF TELEPHONE THREATS TO THE BRITISH EDITOR OF THE BUENOS AIRES HERALD AND HIS FAMILY WHO HAVE NOW MOVED OVER TO URUGUAY.

4. ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT OUR APPEAL TO U.K. CS TO LEAVE HAS BEEN WIDELY HEEDED BUT WE ARE MOUNTING A RE-REGISTRATION CAMPAIGN THIS WEEK TO TRY TO ESTABLISH MORE PRECISELY THE POTENTIAL SIZE OF ANY EVACUATION PROGRAMME. AN APPROPRIATE BBC WORLD SERVICE MESSAGE WOULD BE HELPFUL.

5. STAFF ARE IN GOOD HEART BUT THERE WAS A WAVE OF APPREHENSION WHEN SECURITY SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES CALLED ON SOME OF OUR DRIVERS' HOMES LAST WEEK, ALLEGEDLY TO ENSURE ADEQUATE PROTECTION. PAST SECURITY SERVICE EXCESSES DO NOT ENCOURAGE CONFIDENCE IN THIS RESPECT.

JOY. 19.4.
UNQUOTE

LEE

NNNN

SENT AT RECD AT 201448Z TWPM
/HK
CONFIDENTIAL
FM MOSCOW 1914002Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 210 OF 19 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO

MY TEL NO 193 : FALKLAND ISLANDS : SOVIET ATTITUDE

1. SINCE MY TUR SOVIET PRESS COVERAGE HAS PAID AS MUCH, IF NOT MORE, HOSTILE ATTENTION TO THE US AS TO THE UK, THE THEME OF WESTERN IMPERIALISM, LED BY THE US AND BRITAIN, GANGING UP AGAINST ARGENTINA HAS BEEN STEADILY DEVELOPED.

2. PRAVDA OF 17 APRIL REPORTED THAT THE US WAS SEEKING A MAJOR BASE ON THE ISLANDS. PRAVDA OF 19 APRIL SAID THAT IN THE VIEW OF POLITICAL OBSERVERS THE PROPOSAL FOR A TRILATERAL ADMINISTRATION WHICH HAIG WOULD BE PUTTING TO LONDON WAS MERELY A SLIGHTLY REVISED VERSION OF THE "NEO-COLONIALIST PLAN" ALREADY PROPOSED BY THE USA "WHOSE AIM IS TO STRENGTHEN WASHINGTON'S OWN POSITION IN THIS REGION". IZVESTIA OF 17 APRIL SPOKE OF WIDENING US INTERFERENCE WHILE PRAVDA OF 19 APRIL COMMENTED THAT IT WAS EVIDENT THAT WASHINGTON HAD BEEN ON THE SIDE OF ITS BRITISH NATO ALLY FROM THE BEGINNING.
NATO ALLY FROM THE BEGINNING.

3. THE THEME OF THE WEST VERSUS ARGENTINA WAS ELABORATED IN PRAVDA'S AUTHORITATIVE INTERNATIONAL REVIEW ON 18 APRIL. THE WEST CLAIMED THAT IT HAD REJECTED COLONIALISM, BUT THERE WAS STRIKING UNANIMITY IN NATO AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AGAINST THE RETURN OF THE ISLANDS TO ARGENTINA. MOREOVER, WESTERN CAPITAL WAS THREATENING TO EXPLOIT ARGENTINA'S 32 BILLION DOLLAR DEBT. THE US CLAIMED NEUTRALITY BUT ITS DUPPLICITY WAS CLEARER EVERY DAY AND IT WAS EVIDENT FROM THE US PRESS THAT IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES THE UNITED STATES WOULD SUPPORT BRITAIN. TO COVER ITS NEO-COLONIALIST PLAN FOR A TRILATERAL ADMINISTRATION THE UNITED STATES HAD PROPOSED A MULTINATIONAL FORCE FOR THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. THIS WAS JUST AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH A US MILITARY PRESENCE, AS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

4. AN UNEXPECTED VARIATION ON THE OTHERWISE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED LINE ABOVE WAS PROVIDED ON 19 APRIL BY THE 'INTERNATIONAL PANORAMA' TELEVISION PROGRAMME WHICH HAS GENERALLY A LESS DOCTRINAIRE APPROACH. BOVIN, A WELL-KNOWN COMMENTATOR, GAVE A REASONABLY OBJECTIVE HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE. HE ALSO REVEALED THAT SCR 502 CALLED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE TROOPS, THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD ABSTAINED IN THE VOTE (THE FIRST TIME, SO FAR AS WE KNOW, THAT THIS HAS BEEN MENTIONED IN THE MEDIA), THAT THE FALKLANDERS DID NOT WANT TO COME UNDER ARGENTINE RULE, AND THAT THE INVASION HAD BEEN PROMPTED BY SERIOUS INTERNAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES IN ARGENTINA. ALTHOUGH BOVIN'S CONCLUSION WAS THAT BRITAIN WAS IN THE WRONG FOR PROLONGING A COLONIAL SITUATION, A WIDE SOVIET AUDIENCE WILL HAVE REALISED THAT THE PICTURE IS FAR LESS BLACK AND WHITE THAN DEPICTED BY THE PRESS.

BROOKE TURNER
Dear Francis,

Here as you suggest in your latest message is the current text, along with our gloss on what it means. Costa Mendez has given me a letter saying that Argentina could accept it if the US proposes it, and Britain accepts.

My own disappointment with this text prevents me from attempting to influence you in any way. As you will see, there are significant steps back from the text you and I discussed in London in each of the areas of greatest importance: the longterm negotiations, the interim administration, and withdrawal.

What has been secured in each case is British control. You would undertake to negotiate and conclude a longterm agreement, but your principles as well as Argentine principles are asserted, and there is nothing in the Agreement (as the Argentines keep reminding us) that forces you to accept a negotiated settlement you don't want.

The Interim Administration is less advantageous than it was, yet here again the essential is saved. The local councils remain sovereign. Recommendations to you on more intercourse with the mainland requires a quick response. But can be turned down. If the temporary administration last, it will give full protection to the Islanders.

Finally, the withdrawal deal leaves you protected. Your submarines would be outside 150 nautical mile maximum – but they are your guarantee, and 150 NM is only five hours running time. The fleet must stand off to 1750 NM by seven days after agreement, but it could steam at 12 knots some 2100 NM after agreement, and thus in most cases (depending on when agreement were to take place) go on steaming towards the Falklands after agreement.

Francis, I do not know whether more can be wrung out of the Argentines. It is not clear who is in charge here, as many as 50 people, including Corps Commanders, may be exercising vetos. Certainly I can do no better at this point.

/ I would
I would not presume to speculate in the equities seen from your point of view. From mine, the Agreement, if accepted, would involve the Argentines far more intimately in the affairs of the Islands, yet leave you in charge of the current situation and the ultimate destiny. Above all, Argentina, the United States and the United Kingdom would be bound together in the search for an evolutionary solution to the problem, with obvious future costs to each of us if it cannot be found. Only you can judge that outcome against the advantages and disadvantages of armed action.

My best immediate judgement in this situation is that I should return to Washington and report to the President. I am available, of course, to go on immediately from there to London, or even to divert from Washington to London, if you wish.

Leaving here, I will refuse to characterise the text, and say only that I have finished this phase of my effort, and am returning to Washington to report to the President. I will say that I have given you a full report of the results of my stay in Buenos Aires.

I would be deeply grateful if you would be in touch with me before taking any public or other action on these results I am transmitting.

Warm regards, Al.

Haig
SUBJECT: DRAFT TEXT WORKED OUT IN BUENOS AIRES

There follows draft of Agreement on South Atlantic crisis worked out in Buenos Aires April 19 1982.

On the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 502, and the will of the Argentine Republic and of the United Kingdom to resolve the controversy which has arisen between them renouncing the use of force, both Governments agree on the following steps, which form an integrated whole:

1. Effective on the signature of this Agreement by both Governments, there shall be an immediate cessation of hostilities.

2. Beginning at 0000 hours of the day after the day on which this Agreement is signed, the Republic of Argentina and the United Kingdom shall not introduce nor deploy forces into the zones (hereinafter, "zones") defined by circles of 150 nautical miles radius from the following co-ordinate points (hereinafter, "co-ordinate points"):

A) LAT. 51 DEG 40 S
   LONG. 59 DEG 30 W

B) LAT. 54 DEG 20 S
   LONG. 36 DEG 40 W

C) LAT. 57 DEG 40 S
   LONG. 26 DEG 30 W

2.1. Within 24 hours of the date of this Agreement the United Kingdom will rescind its zone of exclusion and Argentina will not conduct operations in the zones.

2.2. Within 24 hours of the date of this Agreement, Argentina and the United Kingdom will commence the withdrawal of their forces in accordance with the following details.

2.2.1. Within seven days from the date of this Agreement, Argentina shall have withdrawn one half of its military and security forces / present
present in the zones on the date of this Agreement, including related equipment and armaments.

Within the same time period, the United Kingdom will have completed the withdrawal of all of its forces from the zones and the United Kingdom naval task force will stand off at a distance of at least 1750 nautical miles from any of the co-ordinate points.

2.2.2. Within 15 days from the date of this Agreement, Argentina shall remove all of its remaining forces, equipment and armaments from the zones. Within the same time period, units of the UK naval task force and submarines shall redeploy to their usual operating bases or areas.

3. After fifteen days after the date of this Agreement and pending a definitive settlement, no military or security forces shall be introduced by the signatories into any of the zones defined by circles of 150 nautical miles radius from the co-ordinate points.

4. From the date of this Agreement, steps shall be taken by the two Governments to terminate simultaneously, and without delay, the economic and financial measures adopted in connection with the current controversy, including restrictions relating to travel, transportation, communications, and transfers of funds between the two countries. The United Kingdom without delay shall request the European Community and Third countries that have adopted similar measures to terminate them.

5. The United Kingdom and Argentina shall each appoint, and the United States has indicated its agreement to appoint a representative to constitute a special interim authority which shall provide observers to verify compliance with the obligations of this Agreement.

6. A) Pending a definitive settlement, all decisions, laws and regulations hereafter adopted by the local administration on the Islands shall be submitted to and expeditiously ratified by the special interim authority, except in the event that the special interim authority deems such decisions, laws or regulations to be inconsistent with the purposes and provisions of this Agreement.
Agreement or its implementation. The traditional local administration shall continue through the executive and legislative councils which shall be enlarged in the following manner: the Argentine Government shall appoint two representatives, who shall serve in each council; the Argentine population whose period of residence on the Islands is equal to that required of others entitled to representation shall elect representatives to each council in proportion to their population, subject to there being at least one such representative in each council. The local police shall be continued under the administration of the councils, with a representation of the resident Argentine population, and shall be subject to the supervision of the special interim authority. The flags of each of the constituent members of the special interim authority shall be flown at its headquarters.

B) Pending a definitive settlement, neither Government shall take any action that would be inconsistent with the purposes and provisions of this Agreement or its implementation.

7. A) Pending a definitive settlement, travel, transportation, movement of persons and as, may be related thereto, residence and ownership and disposition of property, communications and commerce between the mainland and the Islands shall, on an equal basis, be promoted and facilitated. The special interim authority shall propose for adoption appropriate measures on such matters, including possible arrangements for compensation of Islanders who do not wish to remain. The two signatories undertake to respond promptly to such proposals. The special interim authority shall monitor the implementation of all such proposals adopted.

B) Pending a definitive settlement, the rights and guarantees which have heretofore been enjoyed by the inhabitants on the Islands will be respected, on an equal basis, in particular rights relating to freedom of opinion, religion, expression, teaching, movement, property, employment, family, customs, and cultural ties with countries of origin.

/ 8. A)
8. A) December 31, 1982, will conclude the interim period during which the signatories shall conclude negotiations on modalities for the removal of the Islands from the list of non self-governing territories under Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter and on mutually agreed conditions for their definitive status, including due regard for the rights of the inhabitants and for the principle of territorial integrity applicable to this dispute, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and Resolution 1514 (XV) and 2065 (XX) and in the light of relevant resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations on the "Question of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands". The negotiations hereabove referred to shall begin within fifteen days of the signature of the present Agreement.

B) The United States Government has indicated that, at the request of the two Governments, it would be prepared to assist them in bringing their negotiations to a mutually satisfactory settlement by the date stipulated in subparagraph (A).

Haig
Preamble:

This is a merger of texts we carried from London and received from the Argentines. It contains clear reference to UNSC Res. 502 as the basis for the agreement, and retains the important concept that the text is an integral whole.

Paragraph 1 (Cessation of Hostilities).

This implements operative paragraph 1 of the UNSC Resolution.

Paragraphs 2 and 3 (withdrawal and separation of forces). These provide the essential elements of withdrawal and non-introduction of forces. We were unable to get Argentine agreement to forego freedom of movement except for the three specified 150 NM withdrawal/non-introduction zones. The statement that Argentina will not operate its forces in the zones is designed to make clear that their so-called "theatre of operations" does not apply. The withdrawal schedule permits UK naval forces to remain within the zone for seven days, at which time Argentina must have withdrawn half of their forces. The idea of requiring the UK naval Task Force seven days to be at 1750 NM from the co-ordinates provides flexibility. The position of UK forces at the time of agreement will of course determine the closest point of approach of those forces to the co-ordinate points before having to turn back in order to be at 1750 NM on day seven. The UK will of course want to look very closely at the treatment of the submarines, which was a major point of controversy here. At the last minute, we detected a drafting issue in para 2.2.1 (text of draft agreement being sent Septel flash). We suggested that the two sentences regarding UK actions be combined by word "and" to make clear our intent that 1750 NM limit applies only "within the same time period". And therefore is not applicable until one week after agreement. At this writing, change is being reviewed by GOA.

/ Paragraph 4

The basic concepts have been retained from the draft we carried from London. The timing, however, has been altered at Argentine insistence. Steps are to be taken to terminate bilateral sanctions simultaneously and without delay, rather than any time in the two-week period we previously discussed. The operative commitment remains "to take steps". Simultaneity implies bilateral coordination, which would obviously bear on the timing of the actions in both sentences. We assume "without delay" includes time necessary to make such arrangements, a reasonable amount of time to complete domestic requirements, and the time necessary to consult the EC and third countries.

Paragraph 5 (Authority)

The concept of a tripartite special commission survives, with a change of name to special "interim authority". While the Commission's functions have not changed materially from the text we worked out in London, the change of name with its connotations is optically more appealing to Argentina. The authority is now to verify compliance with all obligations in the agreement. Awkwardly, the draft retains reference to "observers" to accomplish these tasks; in our London text, observers were intended to monitor force withdrawal and separation only. Staff limitations would be handled in the separate protocol creating the authority.

Paragraph 6 (Local Administration)

Here and elsewhere, we have attempted to divorce substantive provisions "pending a definitive settlement" from the interim period for negotiations, to promote a basis for continuing arrangements should negotiations not meet this deadline. This text retains the concept of automatic ratification of local administration actions, except where deemed inconsistent with
the agreement by the special interim authority. (The authority, as provided in the separate protocol, would decide by majority vote.) Local administration is to continue "through" the councils, underlining the termination of the office of Governor. While UK appointments to councils would continue, in this text Argentina would also have two official appointees who would serve in each council. Elected representation of the resident Argentine population would be provided for also, using the text worked out in London. All other links, administrative and legal to the UK which form the basis of the local administration, would also continue. This draft gives the special authority a supervisory role over the local police, who would be administered by the council's day-to-day, with "a representation" of the local resident Argentine population on the force contemplated. The flag provision is unchanged. Argentine concern at possible UK decisions or laws inconsistent with the agreement but not subject to special authority ratification has been met by a new sub-paragraph (b) which is intended to restate the obvious UK obligation to respect its commitments under the agreement.

Paragraph 7 (Travel, rights of inhabitants)

Paragraph 7(a) expands upon the subject covered in paragraph 6 of the text worked out in London, including residence and movement of persons and related property questions, and contains a general obligation to promote and facilitate such links on an equal basis. Specific measures however remain in the form of recommendations from the special authority. The scope of such recommendations would include possible arrangements for compensation of islanders wishing to depart. The text adds a requirement for governments to reply promptly (but not necessarily affirmatively) to such recommendations, and further empowers the authority to monitor implementation of proposals adopted.

Paragraph 7(b) had no counterpart in the text we discussed in London. It derives from an Argentine desire to document support of protection

/of islander
of islander rights (presumably under a future Argentine administration resulting from the agreement but the timing was unclear in their draft). It refers to various rights enjoyed by the inhabitants heretofore on the islands. And secures them pending a definitive settlement on an equal basis to both UK and Argentine residents.

Paragraph 8 (Negotiations)

This paragraph has seen a number of changes. The "interim period" has now been clearly linked to the negotiation process in an attempt to permit other substantive provisions to potentially survive December 31. The text describes the objective of an agreement on "modalities" by which the Islands might be removed from the list under Chapter XI of the UN Charter (following a UK suggestion), and on mutually agreed conditions for their definitive status. The "decolonization" reference theoretically would not preclude any kind of future status for the Islands, except perhaps the status quo ante. Mutual agreement was viewed as an important element by the Argentines to preclude unilateral steps. The conditions are stated to include "due regard" - which will obviously vary in weight in the eyes of the two signatories - for the right of the inhabitants and the principle of territorial integrity "applicable to this dispute". The Argentines will argue that the rights of the inhabitants refers only to individual rights, and not a "collective" right of self-determination. The Argentines will argue that a principle of territorial integrity with the mainland applies; the reference could equally be argued to mean the Islands should not be partitioned or dismembered in the process of change of status. These references in effect recall the differing positions of the two parties throughout this dispute. Self-determination is reinforced by UN Charter and Resolution 1514 references; the Argentines cite territorial integrity language in 1514 and insisted on reference to UNGA Resolutions on the Islands. Explicit reference to 2065 is retained (the UK accepted such a reference in the 1971 agreement with Argentina on the Islands), but there is a subordinate general
reference to the others (including Resolution 31/49 which the UK opposed). These Resolutions are described by the UN agenda heading under which they appear, within quotation marks and including the alternative names of the Falklands.

Paragraph 8(b) responds to Argentine concern that good faith negotiations may not occur to produce a result by the deadline. US assistance to the negotiations would be conditional on a request from both governments.
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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN BUENOS AIRES
TO RUHL/AM/EMBASSY LONDON FLASH
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASDC FLASH 6725
RUEADW/THE WHITE HOUSE FLASH
BT
ACTION: DCM 5-2D; JG

SECET USDEL SECRETARY IN BUENOS AIRES 6046

NODIS

1.0. 12065: RDS-3 4/19/12
TAGS: OVIF (HAIG ALEXANDER M.)
SUBJECT: LETTER TO FYM

1. SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEAR FRANCIS

3. HERE AS YOU SUGGEST IN YOUR LATEST MESSAGE IS THE CURRENT TEXT, ALONG WITH OUR GLOSS ON WHAT IT MEANS. COSTA MENDEZ HAS GIVEN ME A LETTER SAYING THAT ARGENTINA COULD ACCEPT IT IF THE U.S. PROPOSES IT, AND BRITAIN ACCEPTS.

4. MY OWN DISAPPOINT WITH THIS TEXT PREVENTS ME FROM FROM ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE YOU IN ANY WAY. AS YOU WILL SEE, THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT STEPS BACK FROM THE TEXT YOU AND I DISCUSSED IN LONDON IN EACH OF THE AREAS OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE: THE LONGTERM NEGOTIATIONS, THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION, AND WITHDRAWAL.

5. WHAT HAS BEEN SECURED IN EACH CASE IS BRITISH CONTROL. YOU WOULD UNDERTAKE TO NEGOTIATE AND CONCLUDE A LONGTERM AGREEMENT, BUT YOUR PRINCIPLES AS WELL A ARGENTINE PRINCIPLES ARE ASSERTED, AND THERE IS NOTHING IN THE AGREEMENT (AS THE ARGENTINES KEEP REMINDING US) THAT FORCES YOU TO ACCEPT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT YOU DON'T WANT.

6. THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION IS LESS ADVANTAGEOUS THAN IT WAS, YET HERE AGAIN THE ESSENTIAL IS SAVED.
THE LOCAL COUNCILS REMAIN SOVEREIGN. RECOMMENDATIONS TO YOU ON MORE INTERCOURSE WITH THE MAINLAND REQUIRE A QUICK RESPONSE, BUT CAN BE TURNED DOWN. IF THE TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION LAST, IT WILL GIVE FULL PROTECTION TO THE ISLANDERS.

7. FINALLY, THE WITHDRAWAL DEAL LEAVES YOU PROTECTED. YOUR SUBMARINES WOULD BE OUTSIDE 150 NAUTICAL MILE MAXIMUM -- BUT THEY ARE YOUR GUARANTEE, AND 150 NM IS ONLY FIVE HOURS RUNNING TIME.
THE FLEET MUST STAND OFF TO 1750 NM BY SEVEN DAYS AFTER AGREEMENT, BUT IT COULD STEAM AT 12 KNOTS SOME 2100 NM AFTER AGREEMENT, AND THUS IN MOST CASES (DEPENDING ON WHEN
AGREEMENT WERE TO TAKE PLACE) GO ON STEAMING TOWARDS THE
FALKLANDS AFTER AGREEMENT.

2. FRANCIS, I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER MORE
CAN BE WRUNG OUT OF THE ARGENTINES. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHO IS
IN CHARGE HERE, AS MANY AS 50 PEOPLE, INCLUDING CORPS
COMMANDERS, MAY BE EXERCISING VETOS. CERTAINLY,
I CAN DO NO BETTER AT THIS POINT.

3. I WOULD NOT PRESUME TO SPECULATE IN THE
EQUIPMENTS SEEN FROM YOUR POINT OF VIEW. FROM MINE. THE
AGREEMENT, IF ACCEPTED, WOULD INVOLVE THE
ARGENTINES FAR MORE INTIMATELY IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE
ISLANDS, YET LEAVE YOU IN CHARGE OF THE CURRENT SITUATION
AND THE ULTIMATE DESTINY. ABOVE ALL, ARGENTINA. THE UNITED
STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM WOULD BE BOUND TOGETHER
IN THE SEARCH FOR AN EVOLUTIONARY SOLUTION TO THE
PROBLEM, WITH OBVIOUS FUTURE COSTS TO EACH OF US IF IT
CANNOT BE FOUND. ONLY YOU CAN JUDGE THAT OUTCOME AGAINST
THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ARMED ACTION.

10. MY BEST IMMEDIATE JUDGEMENT IN THIS SITUATION IS THAT I
SHOULD RETURN TO WASHINGTON AND REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT. I AM
AVAILABLE, OF COURSE, TO GO ON IMMEDIATELY FROM THERE TO LONDON,
OR EVEN TO DIVERT FROM WASHINGTON TO LONDON, IF YOU WISH.

11. LEAVING HERE, I WILL REFUSE TO CHARACTERIZE
THE TEXT, AND SAY ONLY THAT I HAVE FINISHED THIS PHASE OF
MY EFFORT, AND AM RETURNING TO WASHINGTON TO REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT. I WILL SAY THAT I HAVE GIVEN YOU A FULL REPORT
OF THE RESULTS OF MY STAY IN BUENOS AIRES.

12. I WOULD BE DEEPLY GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH
ME BEFORE TAKING ANY PUBLIC OR OTHER ACTION ON THIS RESULTS I
AM TRANSMITTING.

13. TEXT BY SEPTE.

WARM REGARDS, ALL.

END MESSAGE.

HAIG
PASS WHITE HOUSE

E.O. 12065: RDS 3 (4/19/2012)
TAGS: OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER M., JR.)
SUBJECT: DRAFT TEXT WORKED OUT IN BUENOS AIRES

1. SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THERE FOLLOWS DRAFT OF AGREEMENT ON SOUTH ATLANTIC CRISIS WORKED OUT IN BUENOS AIRES APRIL 19, 1982

3. BEGIN TEXT:

ON THE BASIS OF UNITED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, AND THE WILL OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TO RESOLVE THE CONTROVERSY WHICH HAS ARisen BETWEEN THEM RENOUNCING THE USE OF FORCE, BOTH GOVERNMENTS AGREE ON THE FOLLOWING STEPS, WHICH FORM AN INTEGRATED WHOLE:

1. EFFECTIVE ON THE SIGNATURE OF THIS AGREEMENT BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS, THERE SHALL BE AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

2. BEGINNING AT 0000 HOURS OF THE DAY AFTER THE DAY ON WHICH THIS AGREEMENT IS SIGNED, THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM SHALL NOT INTRODUCE NOR DEFLECT FORCES INTO THE ZONES (HEREIN-AFTER, "ZONES") DEFINED BY CIRCLES OF 150 NAUTICAL MILES RADIUS FROM THE FOLLOWING COORDINATE POINTS (HEREIN-AFTER, "COORDINATE POINTS"):

A) LAT. 51 DEG 40' S
   LONG. 59 DEG 30' W

B) LAT. 54 DEG 20' S
   LONG. 36 DEG 40' W

C) LAT. 57 DEG 40' S
   LONG. 26 DEG 30' W

2.1. WITHIN 24 HOURS OF THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL RESISTRIBUT ZONE OF EXCLUSION AND ARGENTINA WILL NOT CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN THE ZONES.

2.2. WITHIN 24 HOURS OF THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT.
ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL COMMENCE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING DETAILS.

2.2.1. WITHIN SEVEN DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT, ARGENTINA SHALL HAVE WITHDRAWN ONE HALF OF ITS MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES PRESENT IN THE ZONES ON THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT, INCLUDING RELATED EQUIPMENT AND ARMAMENTS.

WITHIN THE SAME TIME PERIOD, THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL HAVE COMPLETED THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL OF ITS FORCES FROM THE ZONES. NEITHER THE UNITED KINGDOM NAVAL TASK FORCE WILL STAND OFF AT A DISTANCE OF AT LEAST 1750 NAUTICAL MILES FROM ANY OF THE COORDINATE POINTS.

2.2.2 WITHIN 15 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT, ARGENTINA SHALL REMOVE ALL OF ITS REMAINING FORCES, EQUIPMENT AND ARMAMENTS FROM THE ZONES. WITHIN THE SAME TIME PERIOD, UNITS OF THE UK NAVAL TASK FORCE AND SUBMARINES SHALL REDEPLOY TO THEIR USUAL OPERATING BASES OR AREAS.

3. AFTER FIFTEEN DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT AND ENDING A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT, NO MILITARY OR SECURITY FORCES SHALL BE INTRODUCED BY THE SIGNATORIES INTO ANY OF THE ZONES DEFINED BY CIRCLES OF 150 NAUTICAL MILES RADIUS FROM THE COORDINATE POINTS.

4. FROM THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT, STEPS SHALL BE TAKEN BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO TERMINATE SIMULTANEOUSLY, AND WITHOUT DELAY, THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MEASURES ADOPTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY, INCLUDING RESTRICTIONS RELATING TO TRAVEL, TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND TRANSFERS OF FUNDS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE UNITED KINGDOM WITHOUT DELAY SHALL REQUEST THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THIRD COUNTRIES THAT HAVE ADOPTED SIMILAR MEASURES TO TERMINATE THEM.

5. THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA SHALL EACH APPOINT, AND THE UNITED STATES HAS INDICATED ITS AGREEMENT TO APPOINT A REPRESENTATIVE TO CONSTITUTE A SPECIAL INTERIM AUTHORITY WHICH SHALL PROVIDE OBSERVERS TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS IN THIS AGREEMENT.

1/2
6. A) PENDING A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT, ALL DECISIONS, LAWS AND REGULATIONS HEREAFTER ADOPTED BY THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION ON THE ISLANDS SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO AND EXPEDITIOUSLY RATIFIED BY THE SPECIAL INTERIM AUTHORITY, EXCEPT IN THE EVENT THAT THE SPECIAL INTERIM AUTHORITY DEEMS SUCH DECISIONS, LAWS OR REGULATIONS TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT OR ITS IMPLEMENTATION. THE TRADITIONAL LOCAL ADMINISTRATION SHALL CONTINUE THROUGH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS WHICH SHALL BE ENLARGED IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER: THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT SHALL APPOINT TWO REPRESENTATIVES, WHO SHALL SERVE IN EACH COUNCIL; THE ARGENTINE POPULATION WHOSE PERIOD OF RESIDENCE ON THE ISLANDS IS EQUAL TO THAT REQUIRED OF OTHERS ENTITLED TO REPRESENTATION SHALL ELECT REPRESENTATIVES TO EACH COUNCIL IN PROPORTION TO THEIR POPULATION, SUBJECT TO THERE BEING AT LEAST ONE SUCH REPRESENTATIVE IN EACH COUNCIL. THE LOCAL POLICE SHALL BE CONTINUED UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNCILS, WITH A REPRESENTATION OF THE RESIDENT ARGENTINE POPULATION, AND SHALL BE SUBJECT TO THE SUPERVISION OF THE SPECIAL INTERIM AUTHORITY. THE FLAGS OF EACH OF THE CONSTITUENT MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL INTERIM AUTHORITY SHALL BE FLOWN AT ITS HEADQUARTERS.

B) PENDING A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT, NEITHER GOVERNMENT SHALL TAKE ANY ACTION THAT WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT OR ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

7. A) PENDING A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT, TRAVEL, TRANSPORTATION MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND AS, MAY BE RELATED THEREETO, RESIDENCE AND OWNERSHIP AND DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMERCE BETWEEN THE MAINLAND AND THE ISLANDS SHALL, ON AN EQUITABLE BASIS, BE PROMOTED AND FACILITATED. THE SPECIAL INTERIM AUTHORITY SHALL PROPOSAL FOR ADOPTION APPROPRIATE MEASURES ON SUCH MATTERS, INCLUDING POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMPENSATION OF ISLANDERS WHO DO NOT WISH TO REMAIN. THE TWO SIGNATORIES UNDERTAKE TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO SUCH PROPOSALS. THE SPECIAL INTERIM AUTHORITY SHALL MONITOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL SUCH PROPOSALS ADOPTED.

B) PENDING A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT, THE RIGHTS AND GUARANTEES WHICH HAVE HERETOFORE BEEN ENJOYED BY THE INHABITANTS ON THE ISLANDS WILL BE RESPECTED, ON AN EQUITABLE BASIS, IN PARTICULAR RIGHTS RELATING TO FREEDOM OF OPINION, RELIGION, EXPRESSION, TEACHING, MOVEMENT, PROPERTY, EMPLOYMENT, FAMILY, CUSTOMS, AND CULTURAL TIES WITH COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN.

RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE "QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND (MALVINAS) ISLANDS". NEOTIATIONS EHEREAFOVE REFERRED TO SHALL BEGIN WITHIN FIFTEEN DAYS OF THE SIGNATURE OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT.

B) THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS INDICATED THAT, AT THE REQUEST OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, IT WOULD BE PREPARED TO ASSIST THEM IN BRINGING THEIR NEOTIATIONS TO A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT BY THE DATE STIPULATED IN SUBPARAGRAPH (A).

END OF TEXT. HAIG

2/2 SECRET/NODIS SECTO 6050
PREFACE:

THIS IS A MERGER OF TEXTS WE CARRIED FROM LONDON AND RECEIVED FROM THE ARGENTINES. IT CONTAINS CLEAR REFERENCE TO UNSC RES. 582 AS THE BASIS FOR THE AGREEMENT, AND RETAINS THE IMPORTANT CONCEPT THAT THE TEXT IS AN INTEGRAL WHOLE.

PARAGRAPH 1 (CESSION OF HOSTILITIES).

THIS IMPLEMENTS OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE UNSC RESOLUTION.

PARAGRAPH 2 AND 3 (WITHDRAWAL AND SEPARATION OF FORCES).

THESE PROVIDE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF WITHDRAWAL AND NON-INTRODUCTION OF FORCES. WE WERE UNABLE TO OBTAIN ARGENTINE AGREEMENT TO FOREGO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT EXCEPT FOR THE THREE SPECIFIED 150 NM WITHDRAWAL/NON-INTRODUCTION ZONES. THE STATEMENT THAT ARGENTINA WILL NOT OPERATE ITS FORCES IN THE ZONES IS DESIGNED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THEIR SO-CALLED "THEATER OF OPERATIONS" DOES NOT APPLY. THE WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE PERMITS UK NAVAL FORCES TO REMAIN WITHIN THE ZONE FOR SEVEN DAYS, AT WHICH TIME ARGENTINA MUST HAVE WITHDRAWN HALF OF THEIR FORCES. THE IDEA OF REQUIRING THE UK NAVAL TASK FORCE SEVEN DAYS TO BE AT 1750 NM FROM THE COORDINATES PROVIDES FLEXIBILITY. THE POSITION OF UK FORCES AT THE TIME OF AGREEMENT WILL OF COURSE DETERMINE THE CLOSEST POINT OF APPROACH OF THESE FORCES TO THE COORDINATE POINTS BEFORE HAVING TO TURN BACK IN ORDER TO BE AT 1750 NM ON DAY SEVEN. THE UK WILL OF COURSE WANT TO LOOK VERY CLOSELY AT THE TREATMENT OF THE SUBMARINES, WHICH WAS A MAJOR POINT OF CONTROVERSY HERE. AT THE LAST MINUTE, WE DETECTED A DRAFTING ISSUE IN PARA 2.2.1 (TEXT OF DRAFT AGREEMENT BEING SENT SEPTEMBER FLASH). WE SUGGESTED THAT THE TWO SENTENCES REGARDING UK ACTIONS BE COMBINED BY WORD "AND" TO MAKE CLEAR OUR INTENT THAT 1750 NM LIMIT APPLIES ONLY "WITHIN THE SAME TIME PERIOD". AND THEREFORE IS NOT APPLICABLE UNTIL ONE WEEK AFTER AGREEMENT. AT THIS WRITING, CHANGE IS BEING REVIEWED BY GOA.

PARAGRAPH 4 (ECONOMIC SANCTIONS).

THE BASIC CONCEPTS HAVE BEEN RETAINED FROM THE DRAFT WE CARRIED FROM LONDON. THE TIMING, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN ALTERED AT ARGENTINE INSISTENCE. STEPS ARE TO BE TAKEN TO TERMINATE
LATERAL SANCTIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY AND WITHOUT DELAY,
RATHER THAN ANYTIME IN THE TWO WEEK PERIOD WE PREVIOUSLY DIS-
Cussed. THE OPERATIVE COMMITMENT REMAINS "TO TAKE STEPS".
SIMULTANEITY IMPLIES BILATERAL COORDINATION, WHICH WOULD CE-
VIously BEAR ON THE TIMING OF THE ACTIONS IN BOTH SENTENCES.
WE ASSUME "WITHOUT DELAY" INCLUDES TIME NECESSARY TO MAKE SUCH
ARRANGEMENTS, A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME TO COMPLETE DOMESTIC
REQUIREMENTS, AND THE TIME NECESSARY TO CONSULT THE EC AND THIRD
COUNTRIES.

PARAGRAPH 5 (AUTHORITY)

THE CONCEPT OF A TRIPARTITE SPECIAL COMMISSION SURVIVES,
WITH A CHANGE OF NAME TO SPECIAL "INTERIM AUTHORITY". WHILE
THE COMMISSION'S FUNCTIONS HAVE NOT CHANGED MATERIALLY FROM THE
TEXT WE WORKED OUT IN LONDON, THE CHANGE OF NAME WITH IT'S CON-
NOTATIONS IS OPTICALLY MORE APPEALING TO ARGENTINA. THE AUTHORITY
IS NOW TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH ALL OBLIGATIONS IN THE AGREE-
MENT. AWKWARDLY, THE DRAFT RETAINS REFERENCE TO OBSERVERS
TO ACCOMPLISH THESE TASKS; IN OUR LONDON TEXT, OBSERVERS WERE
INTENDED TO MONITOR FORCE WITHDRAWAL AND SEPARATION ONLY. STAFF
LIMITATIONS WOULD BE HANDLED IN THE SEPARATE PROTOCOL CREATING
THE AUTHORITY.

PARAGRAPH 6 (LOCAL ADMINISTRATION).

HERE AND ELSEWHERE, WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO DIVORCE SUBSTANTIVE
PROVISIONS "PENDING A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT" FROM THE INTERIM
PERIOD FOR NEGOTIATIONS, TO PROMOTE A BASIS FOR CONTINUING
ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD NEGOTIATIONS NOT MEET THIS DEADLINE.
THIS TEXT RETAINS THE CONCEPT OF AUTOMATIC RATIFICATION OF LOCAL
ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS, EXCEPT WHERE DEEMED INCONSISTENT WITH THE
AGREEMENT BY THE SPECIAL INTERIM AUTHORITY. (THE AUTHORITY AS
PROVIDED IN THE SEPARATE PROTOCOL, WOULD DECIDE BY MAJORITY VOTE).:
LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IS TO CONTINUE "THROUGH" THE COUNCILS.
UNDERLINING THE TERMINATION OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR. WHILE UK
APPOINTMENTS TO COUNCILS WOULD CONTINUE, IN THIS TEXT ARGENTINA
WOULD ALSO HAVE TWO OFFICIAL APPOINTEES WHO WOULD SERVE IN EACH
COUNCIL. ELECTED REPRESENTATION OF THE RESIDENT ARGENTINE
POPULATION WOULD BE PROVIDED FOR ALSO, USING THE TEXT WORKED CUT
IN LONDON. ALL OTHER LINKS, ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL, TO THE UK.
WHICH FORM THE BASIS OF THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION, WOULD ALSO
CONTINUE. THIS DRAFT GIVES THE SPECIAL AUTHORITY A SUPERVISORY
ROLE OVER THE LOCAL POLICE, "WHO WOULD BE ADMINISTERED BY THE
COUNCIL'S DAY-TO-DAY, WITH "A REPRESENTATION" OF THE LOCAL
RESIDENT ARGENTINE POPULATION ON THE FORCE CONTEMPLATED. THE FLAG
PROVISION IS UNCHANGED. ARGENTINE CONCERN AT POSSIBLE UK
DECISIONS OR LAWS INCONSISTENT WITH THE AGREEMENT BUT NOT SUBJECT
TO SPECIAL AUTHORITY RATIFICATION HAS BEEN MET BY A NEW SUB-
PARAGRAPH (E) WHICH IS INTENDED TO RESTATE THE OBVIOUS
UK OBLIGATION TO RESPECT ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE AGREEMENT.
Paragraph 7 (A) Expands upon the subject covered in Paragraph 6 of the text worked out in London, including residence and movement of persons and related property questions. And contains a general obligation to promote and facilitate such links on an equal basis. Specific measures however, remain in the form of recommendations from the Special Authority. The scope of such recommendations would include possible arrangements for compensation of islanders wishing to depart. The text adds a requirement for governments to reply promptly (but not necessarily affirmatively) to such recommendations, and further empowers the authority to monitor implementation of proposals adopted.
PARAGRAPH 7(b) HAD NO COUNTERPART IN THE TEXT WE DISCUSSED IN LONDON. IT DERIVES FROM AN ARGENTINE DESIRE TO DOCUMENT THE PROTECTION OF ISLANDER RIGHTS (PREVIOUSLY UNDER A FUTURE ARGENTINE ADMINISTRATION RESULTING FROM THE AGREEMENT BUT THE TIMING WAS UNCLEAR IN THEIR DRAFT). IT REFERS TO VARIOUS RIGHTS ENJOYED BY THE INHABITANTS HERETOFORE ON THE ISLANDS AND SECURES THEM FENDING A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT ON AN EQUAL BASIS TO BOTH UK AND ARGENTINE RESIDENTS.

PARAGRAPH 8 (NEGOTIATIONS)

THIS PARAGRAPH HAS SEEN A NUMBER OF CHANGES. THE "INTERIM PERIOD" HAS NOW BEEN CLEARLY LINKED TO THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN AN ATTEMPT TO PERMIT OTHER SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS TO POTENTIALLY SURVIVE DECEMBER 31. THE TEXT DESCRIBES THE OBJECTIVE OF AN AGREEMENT ON "MODALITIES" BY WHICH THE ISLANDS MIGHT BE REMOVED FROM THE LIST UNDER CHAPTER XI OF THE UN CHARTER (FOLLOWING A UK SUGGESTION), AND ON MUTUALLY AGREED CONDITIONS FOR THEIR DEFINITIVE STATUS. THE "DECOLONIZATION" REFERENCE THEORETICALLY WOULD NOT PRECLUDE ANY KIND OF FUTURE STATUS FOR THE ISLANDS; EXCEPT PERHAPS THE STATUS QUO ANTE. MUTUAL AGREEMENT WAS VIEWED AS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT BY THE ARGENTINES TO PRECLUDE UNILATERAL STEPS. THE CONDITIONS ARE STATED TO INCLUDE "DUE REGARD" - WHICH WILL OBVIOUSLY VARY IN WEIGHT IN THE EYES OF THE TWO SIGNATORY - FOR THE RIGHT OF THE INHABITANTS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY "APPLICABLE TO THIS DISPUTE". THE ARGENTINES WILL ARGUE THAT THE RIGHTS OF THE INHABITANTS REFERS ONLY TO INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, AND NOT A "COLLECTIVE" RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION. THE ARGENTINES WILL ARGUE THAT A PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY WITH THE MAINLAND APPLIES; THE REFERENCE COULD EQUALLY BE ARGUED TO MEAN THE ISLANDS SHOULD NOT BE PARTITIONED OR DISMEMBERED IN THE PROCESS OF CHANGE OF STATUS. THESE REFERENCES IN EFFECT RECALL THE DIFFERING POSITIONS OF THE TWO PARTIES THROUGHOUT THIS DISPUTE. SELF-DETERMINATION IS REINFORCED BY UN CHARTER AND RESOLUTION 1514 REFERENCES; THE ARGENTINES CITE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY LANGUAGE IN 1514 AND INSISTED ON REFERENCE TO UNGA RESOLUTIONS ON THE ISLANDS. EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO 2065 IS REATTAINED (THE UK ACCEPTED SUCH A REFERENCE IN THE 1971 AGREEMENT WITH ARGENTINA ON THE ISLANDS), BUT THERE IS A SUBORDINATE GENERAL REFERENCE TO THE OTHERS (INCLUDING RESOLUTION 31/49 WHICH THE UK OPPOSED). THESE RESOLUTIONS ARE DESCRIBED BY THE UN AGENDA HEADING UNDER WHICH THEY APPEAR, WITHIN QUOTATION MARKS AND INCLUDING THE ALTERNATIVE NAMES OF THE FAULKLANDS.

PARAGRAPH 8 (B) RESPONDS TO ARGENTINE CONCERN THAT GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS MAY NOT OCCUR TO PRODUCE A RESULT BY THE DEADLINE. US ASSISTANCE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE CONDITIONAL ON A REQUEST FROM BOTH GOVERNMENTS.

BAIG
PASS WHITE HOUSE

I.O. 12065: RDS 3 (4/19/2012)
TAGS: OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER M., JR.)
SUBJECT: DRAFT TEXT WORKED OUT IN BUENOS AIRES APRIL 19, 1982

1. SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THEREFOLLOWS DRAFT OF AGREEMENT ON SOUTH ATLANTIC CRISIS WORKED OUT IN BUENOS AIRES APRIL 19, 1982

3. BEGIN TEXT:

ON THE BASIS OF UNITED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, AND THE WILL OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TO RESOLVE THE CONTROVERSY WHICH HAS ARISEN BETWEEN THEM RENOUNCING THE USE OF FORCE, BOTH GOVERNMENTS AGREE ON THE FOLLOWING STEPS, WHICH FORM AN INTEGRATED WHOLE:

1. EFFECTIVE ON THE SIGNATURE OF THIS AGREEMENT BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS, THERE SHALL BE AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

2. BEGINNING AT 0020 HOURS OF THE DAY AFTER THE DAY ON WHICH THIS AGREEMENT IS SIGNED, THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM SHALL NOT INTRODUCE NOR DEFEND FORCES INTO THE ZONES (HEREINAFTER "ZONES") DEFINED BY CIRCLES OF 150 NAUTICAL MILES RADIUS FROM THE FOLLOWING COORDINATE POINTS (HEREINAFTER, "COORDINATE POINTS"):

A) LAT. 51 DEG 40' S
   LONG. 55 DEG 30' W

B) LAT. 54 DEG 20' S
   LONG. 36 DEG 40' W

C) LAT. 57 DEG 40' S
   LONG. 26 DEG 30' W

2.1. WITHIN 24 HOURS OF THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL RESIGN ITS ZONE OF EXCLUSION AND ARGENTINA WILL NOT CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN THE ZONES.

2.2. WITHIN 24 HOURS OF THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT.
Paragraph 7 (a) expands upon the subject covered in paragraph 6 of the text worked out in London, including residence and movement of persons and related property questions. And contains a general obligation to promote and facilitate such links on an equal basis. Specific measures however remain in the form of recommendations from the special authority. The scope of such recommendations would include possible arrangements for compensation of islanders wishing to depart. The text adds a requirement for governments to reply promptly (but not necessarily affirmatively) to such recommendations, and further empowers the authority to monitor implementation of proposals adopted.
ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL COMMENCE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING DETAILS.

2.2.1. WITHIN SEVEN DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT, ARGENTINA SHALL HAVE WITHDRAWN ONE HALF OF ITS MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES PRESENT IN THE ZONES ON THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT, INCLUDING RELATED EQUIPMENT AND ARMAMENTS.

WITHIN THE SAME TIME PERIOD, THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL HAVE COMPLETED THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL OF ITS FORCES FROM THE ZONES NAMED THE UNITED KINGDOM NAVAL TASK FORCE WILL STAND OFF AT A DISTANCE OF AT LEAST 120 NAUTICAL MILES FROM ANY OF THE COORDINATE POINTS.

2.2.2 WITHIN 15 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT, ARGENTINA SHALL REMOVE ALL OF ITS REMAINING FORCES, EQUIPMENT AND ARMAMENTS FROM THE ZONES. WITHIN THE SAME TIME PERIOD, UNITS OF THE UK NAVAL TASK FORCE AND SUBMARINES SHALL REDEPLOY TO THEIR USUAL OPERATING BASES OR AREAS.

3. AFTER FIFTEEN DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT AND FENDING A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT, NO MILITARY OR SECURITY FORCES SHALL BE INTRODUCED BY THE SIGNATORIES INTO ANY OF THE ZONES DEFINED BY CIRCLES OF 150 NAUTICAL MILES RADIUS FROM THE COORDINATE POINTS.

4. FROM THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT, STEPS SHALL BE TAKEN BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO TERMINATE SIMULTANEOUSLY, AND WITHOUT DELAY, THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MEASURES ADOPTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY, INCLUDING RESTRICTIONS RELATING TO TRAVEL, TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND TRANSFERS OF FUNDS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE UNITED KINGDOM WITHOUT DELAY SHALL REQUEST THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THIRD COUNTRIES THAT HAVE ADOPTED SIMILAR MEASURES TO TERMINATE THEM.

5. THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA SHALL EACH APPOINT, AND THE UNITED STATES HAS INDICATED ITS AGREEMENT TO APPOINT A REPRESENTATIVE TO CONSTITUTE A SPECIAL INTERIM AUTHORITY WHICH SHALL PROVIDE OBSERVERS TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS IN THIS AGREEMENT.
E) PENDING A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT, ALL DECISIONS, LAWS AND REGULATIONS HEREAFTER ADOPTED BY THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION ON THE ISLANDS SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO AND EXPEDITIOUSLY RATIFIED BY THE SPECIAL INTERIM AUTHORITY. IF THE EVENT THAT THE SPECIAL INTERIM AUTHORITY DEEMS SUCH DECISIONS, LAWS OR REGULATIONS TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT OR ITS IMPLEMENTATION, THE TRADITIONAL LOCAL ADMINISTRATION SHALL CONTINUE THROUGH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS WHICH SHALL BE ENLARGED IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER: THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT SHALL APPOINT TWO REPRESENTATIVES, WHO SHALL SERVE IN EACH COUNCIL; THE ARGENTINE POPULATION WHOSE PERIOD OF RESIDENCE ON THE ISLANDS IS EQUAL TO THAT REQUIRED OF OTHERS ENTITLED TO BE PRESENTATION SHALL ELECT REPRESENTATIVES TO EACH COUNCIL IN PROPORTION TO THEIR POPULATION, SUBJECT TO THERE BEING AT LEAST ONE SUCH REPRESENTATIVE IN EACH COUNCIL. THE LOCAL POLICE SHALL BE CONTINUED UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNCILS, WITH A REPRESENTATION OF THE RESIDENT ARGENTINE POPULATION, AND SHALL BE SUBJECT TO THE SUPERVISION OF THE SPECIAL INTERIM AUTHORITY. THE FLAGS OF EACH OF THE CONSTITUENT MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL INTERIM AUTHORITY SHALL BE FLOWN AT ITS HEADQUARTERS.

B) PENDING A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT, NEITHER GOVERNMENT SHALL TAKE ANY ACTION THAT WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT OR ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

7. A) PENDING A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT, TRAVEL, TRANSPORTATION MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND AS, MAY BE RELATED THEREETO, RESIDENCE AND OWNERSHIP AND DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMERCE BETWEEN THE MAINLAND AND THE ISLANDS SHALL, ON AN EQUIL BIAS, BE PROMOTED AND FACILITATED. THE SPECIAL INTERIM AUTHORITY SHALL PROPOSE FOR ADOPTION APPROPRIATE MEASURES ON SUCH MATTERS, INCLUDING POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMPENSATION OF ISLANDERS WHO DO NOT WISH TO REMAIN. THE TWO SIGNATORIES UNDERTAKE TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO SUCH PROPOSALS. THE SPECIAL INTERIM AUTHORITY SHALL MONITOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL SUCH PROPOSALS ADOPTED.

B) PENDING A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT, THE RIGHTS AND GUARANTEES WHICH HAVE HERETOFORE BEEN ENJOYED BY THE INHABITANTS ON THE ISLANDS WILL BE RESPECTED, ON AN EQUAL BASIS, IN PARTICULAR RIGHTS RELATING TO FREEDOM OF OPINION, RELIGION, EXPRESSION, TEACHING, MOVEMENT, PROPERTY, EMPLOYMENT, FAMILY, CUSTOMS, AND CULTURAL TIES WITH COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN.

Paragraph 7(e) had no counterpart in the text we discussed in London. It derives from an Argentine desire to document support of protection of islander rights (presumably under a future Argentine administration resulting from the agreement but the timing was unclear in their draft). It refers to various rights enjoyed by the inhabitants heretofore on the islands and secures them pending a definitive settlement on an equal basis to both UK and Argentine residents.

Paragraph 8 (Negotiations)
This paragraph has seen a number of changes. The "interim period" has now been clearly linked to the negotiation process in an attempt to permit other substantive provisions to potentially survive December 31. The text describes the objective of an agreement on "modalities" by which the islands might be removed from the list under Chapter XI of the UN Charter (following a UK suggestion), and on mutually agreed conditions for their definitive status. The "decolonization" reference theoretically would not preclude any kind of future status for the islands; except perhaps the status quo ante -- mutual agreement was viewed as an important element by the Argentines to preclude unilateral steps. The conditions are stated to include "due regard" -- which will obviously vary in weight in the eyes of the two signatories -- for the right of the inhabitants and the principle of territorial integrity "applicable to this dispute". The Argentines will argue that the rights of the inhabitants refers only to individual rights, and not a "collective" right of self-determination. The Argentines will argue that a principle of territorial integrity with the "mainland applies"; the reference could equally be argued to mean the islands should not be partitioned or dismembered in the process of change of status. These references in effect recall the differing positions of the two parties throughout this dispute.

Self-determination is reinforced by UN Charter and Resolution 1514 references; the Argentines cite territorial integrity language in 1514 and insisted on reference to UNGA resolutions on the islands. Explicit reference to 2065 is retained (the UK accepted such a reference in the 1971 agreement with Argentina on the islands), but there is a subordinate general reference to the others (including Resolution 31/49 which the UK opposed). These resolutions are described by the UN agenda heading under which they appear, within quotation marks and including the alternative names of the Falklands.

Paragraph 8(b) responds to Argentine concern that good faith negotiations may not occur to produce a result by the deadline, US assistance to the negotiations would be conditional on a request from both governments.

Haig

2/2

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET 6049
RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE "QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND (MALVINAS) ISLANDS". THE NEGOTIATIONS HEREABOVE REFERRED TO SHALL BEGIN WITHIN FIFTEEN DAYS OF THE SIGNATURE OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT.

B) THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS INDICATED THAT, AT THE REQUEST OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, IT WOULD BE PREPARED TO ASSIST THEM IN BRINGING THEIR NEGOTIATIONS TO A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT BY THE DATE STIPULATED IN SUBPARAGRAPH (A).

END OF TEXT. HAIG

2/2 SECRET/NODIS SECTO 6050
GRS 3IA

UNCLASSIFIED
FROM MONTEVIDEO 191435Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 152 OF 19 APRIL 1982
AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK MODUK AIR AND MODUK NAVY.

1. **RAF VC10 TOOK OFF 191414Z WITH 42 PASSENGERS NAMED IN OUR TELNO 147 PLUS MR AND MRS HURLEY.**

HUTCHINSON

NNNN
SENT/RCVD AT 19/1144Z TWW/ET
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 191800Z
FROM ROME 191715Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 176 OF 19 APR 82
INFO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 200800Z BRUSSELS, UKREP BRUSSELS
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
INFO SAVING ATHENS, BONN, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, PARIS, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG

FALKLANDS:

1. I SAW COLOMBO TODAY AND HANDED HIM THE MESSAGE IN YOUR TELNO 98 TO ATHENS FOR WHICH HE WAS GRATEFUL. HE SAID YOU HAD ALREADY SPOKEN TO HIM ON THE TELEPHONE.

2. I GAVE HIM THE MESSAGE ABOUT THE MEETING TOMORROW (YOUR TELNO 84 TO BRUSSELS) ABOUT WHICH HE HAD HEARD FROM THE PRESIDENCY. HE WAS DISPOSED TO ATTEND IF THE OTHER PRINCIPAL MINISTERS DID SO ALSO.
3. I requested the supply of information, as in your Telno 176 to Paris. He said that he was certainly willing to provide this. Present information was that the problem was the hawkish attitude of some of the military and indeed of the public. The attitude of the Italian community was his principal concern.

4. I asked about the socialist attitude towards the import ban (Para 5 of my Telno 169). He said this was settled for the present and the decree signed, but contracts were already being lost and industrialists were complaining. It was hoped that the measure would not have to last long. The socialists were now picking a quarrel on a fresh issue (Andreatta).

5. In his talk with Genscher, Colombo had discussed the crisis (Press communiqué in my Telno 173). They were both much concerned lest the negotiations broke down. This would aggravate the crisis and a failure by Haig could lead to his resignation, which would be bad for Europe. They were both nervous about the present state of affairs.

FCO please pass to all saving addressees

Arculus
IMMEDIATE

PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.

PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLET
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILLETT
MR McINTYRE

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN
CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER CABINET OFFICE

PS/00 ADVANCE COPY

ADVANCE COPY

GRS 3390
UNCLASSIFIED
FM OSLO 191416Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 74 OF 19 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, BRUSSELS. INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS GENEVA, COPENHAGEN. INFO ROUTINE
CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, OTTAWA, TOKYO, VIENNA, BERNE, STOCKHOLM,
HELSINKI, LISBON, MADRID, BONN, PARIS, ROME.
INFO SAVING REYKJAVIK AND OTHER EC POSTS.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 73 : FALKLANDS : NORWEGIAN BAN ON ARGENTINE
IMPORTS.

1. FOREIGN MINISTER MET STORTING FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
THIS MORNING AND OBTAINED OVERWHELMING SUPPORT FOR DECISION
TO BAN IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA. GOVERNMENT NOW AIM FOR APPROVAL
OF APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION BY KING-IN-COUNCIL ON FRIDAY 23 APRIL.

2. MFA ARE THIS AFTERNOON ISSUING FOLLOWING PRESS RELEASE:
MFA ARE THIS AFTERNOON ISSUING FOLLOWING PRESS RELEASE:

QUOTE AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF ARGENTINA'S ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ACCORDING TO A DECISION TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT ON 19 APRIL, WILL THIS WEEK PUT FORWARD A LAW TO IMPLEMENT A BAN ON IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA. AUTHORITY FOR PROHIBITING THE EXPORT OF ARMS TO ARGENTINA EXISTS ALREADY. THE IMPORT BAN WILL NOT INCLUDE CONTRACTS ENTERED INTO PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE LAW, NOR GOODS ALREADY IN TRANSIT FROM ARGENTINA UNQUOTE.

LEGISLATION ABOUT ARMS SALES REFERRED TO IN STATEMENT FORBIDS SUCH TRANSACTIONS WITH NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIMES.

3. IN HIS BIANNUAL STATEMENT ON FOREIGN POLICY IN THE STORTING ON 19 APRIL, BEFORE GOVERNMENT DECISION WAS ANNOUNCED, STRAY DESCRIBED ARGENTINA'S ACTION AS QUOTE PARTICULARLY SERIOUS BECAUSE IT FURTHER UNDERMINES THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF RULES DESIGNED TO PREVENT ARMED CONFLICT UNQUOTE. FOREIGN MINISTER URGED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY QUOTE TO MAKE BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INCREASINGLY COSTLY....A CLEAR RESPONSIBILITY RESTS ON ALL COUNTRIES WISHING TO PLAY AN ACTIVE PART IN THE DEFENCE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHICH MEASURES CAN CONTRIBUTE EFFECTIVELY TO PUTTING AN END TO THE ARBITRARY USE OF FORCE UNQUOTE. NORWAY HAD CONDUCTED QUOTE VERY DETAILED CONSULTATIONS WITH THE EC COUNTRIES TO CLARIFY THE MOST APPROPRIATE FORMS OF REACTION. WE HAVE CONSIDERED IT IMPORTANT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL REACTION BE OF SUCH A NATURE AS TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT UNQUOTE. ( FULL TEXT BY BAG )

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING REYKJAVIK AND OTHER EC POSTS.

PALMER

NNNN

SENT AT 191631Z MP
CONFIDENTIAL

FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 191015Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 272 OF 19 APRIL
INFO PRETORIA, JOHANNESBURG, MODUK (NAVY)

MY TELNO 258 FALKLANDS

1. THE PRIME MINISTER, PW BOTHA, SPOKE TWICE OVER THE WEEKEND
ABOUT THE FALKLANDS. ON THE EVENING OF 16 APRIL AT SEDGEFIELD
HE RESTATE SOUTH AFRICA'S NEUTRAL POSITION IN THE DISPUTE
(QUOTE IN VIEW OF OUR COMMON INTERESTS IN BOTH COUNTRIES UNQUOTE).
HE WENT ON TO REGISTER CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT (QUOTE
RUSSIA IS NOT ONLY WATCHING FROM THE SIDELINES BUT IS ALSO
ACTIVELY INVOLVED UNQUOTE). HE SAID THAT THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES
OF A WAR BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA WERE OF A SERIOUSNESS WHICH
COULD NOT AT PRESENT EVEN BE GUESSED AT.
2. ON 17 APRIL AT OUTSHOORN P W BOTHA SAID THAT IF THE CRISIS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA DETERIORATED THERE COULD BE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE WHOLE WORLD. HE USED THIS AS A LEAD-IN TO HIS MAIN THEME OF THE SOVIET UNION'S WORLD WIDE AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS, ESPECIALLY TOWARDS SOUTHERN AFRICA.

3. P W BOTHA MAY HAVE BEEN REACTING TO PRESS REPORTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION ARE SUPPLYING INTELLIGENCE TO THE ARGENTINIANS AND TRYING TO JAM ROYAL NAVY COMMUNICATIONS. THE SOUTH AFRICANS MAY ALSO OF COURSE HAVE INFORMATION OF THEIR OWN ABOUT THIS. RECOGNITION OF THE FACTOR OF SOVIET P W BOTHA'S INVOLVEMENT IS LIKELY TO ALIENATE HIM SOMEWHAT FROM THE ARGENTINIANS, THOUGH THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE CAN NOW EXPECT HIM TO COME OUT IN OUR SUPPORT.

4. THE (JOHANNESBURG) SUNDAY TIMES, IN A FURTHER ARTICLE YESTERDAY, 18 APRIL, QUOTED THE ARGENTINIAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AS SAYING THAT THERE WERE CONFIDENTIAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND ARGENTINA FOR EXCHANGES OF NAVAL OFFICERS AND OF TRAINING. (THIS CONFIRMS THE SURMISE IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF MY TUR). THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ALSO SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN AND ARGENTINIAN NAVIES ON RESEARCH IN ANTARCTICA. THE SOUTH AFRICANS DEFENCE FORCE HAVE REFUSED TO COMMENT ON THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DISCLOSURES, BUT INFORMED (AND OBVIOUSLY OFFICIAL) SOURCES ARE QUOTED AS CONFIRMING THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE BEEN TRAINING ARGENTINIAN OFFICERS QUITE IN INTELLIGENCE WORK, AND AS NAVAL AND ARMY COMMANDOS... IN VIEW OF THE TWO COUNTRIES' COMMON PROBLEMS IN COMBATTING INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM.... AND IN DEFENDING THE SOUTH ATLANTIC UNQUOTE.

FCO PSE PASS JOHANNESBURG AND MODUK (NAVY)

REID [PASSED BY G.O.D.]
CONFIDENTIAL

FM BONN 191600Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 348 OF 19 APRIL
INFO ROUTINE PARIS AND ROME

YOUR TELNO 176 TO PARIS: FALKLANDS: GERMAN REPORTING ON ARGENTINA

1. EDERER (MFA) HAS PROMISED US ACCESS TO DETAILED GERMAN REPORTING TOMORROW, AND REGULARLY THEREAFTER. IN THE MEANTIME HE SUMMARISED THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES AS FOLLOWS:
(A) ARGENTINE PUBLIC OPINION IS AT PRESENT SOLIDLY BEHIND GALTIERI ACROSS THE WHOLE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SPECTRUM. GALTIERI HAS HOWEVER PLAYED HIS HAND IN SUCH A WAY THAT HE HAS VIRTUALLY NO ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE. IF HIS POLICY FAILS HE WILL BE RUINED. THE TWO ENSUING POSSIBILITIES OF A TAKEOVER BY SECOND RANK MILITARY OFFICERS OR A RETURN OF POWER TO THE CIVILIAN POLITICAL PARTIES WOULD BOTH BE DISASTROUS FOR ARGENTINA:
(B) THE STATE OF THE ARGENTINE ECONOMY WAS ALREADY SO PRECAUROUS BEFORE THE CRISIS THAT IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO ASSESS ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST
BEFORE THE CRISIS THAT IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO ASSESS THE EXACT IMPACT OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST ARGENTINA BY BRITAIN AND HER PARTNERS. WHATEVER SOLUTION IS EVENTUALLY FOUND TO THE FALKLANDS CRISIS, IT IS CLEAR THAT ALEMANN’S PLANS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY HAVE BEEN RUINED.

(C) THE ARGENTINE PRESS IS CONCENTRATING ITS CRITICISM ON THE EC AND ITS SANCTIONS. THERE IS AT PRESENT NO PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION OF ANIMOSITY AGAINST EC NATIONALS IN ARGENTINA, BUT THE MOOD COULD CHANGE RAPIDLY IF A SHOOTING WAR STARTS. THE GERMAN EMBASSY IS TAKING SECURITY MEASURES ACCORDINGLY.

2. IN A TELEGRAPHIC ROUND-UP OF THE ARGENTINE PRESS SENT TODAY THE GERMAN EMBASSY COMMENTS QUOTE WHILE POLITICAL OBSERVERS IN SPITE OF THE PRESENT DEADLOCK IN NEGOTIATIONS TEND TOWARDS CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM, THE MOOD OF THE ARGENTINE PRESS IS MORE PESSIMISTIC THAN OPTIMISTIC. BUT NO DETAILS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE LEAKING TO THE PRESS AT THE MOMENT UNQUOTE.

TAYLOR

NNNN

SENT AT 19/1640Z DW
CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 191430Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 363 OF 19 APRIL 1982
INFO ROUTINE BONN AND ROME

YOUR TEL NO 176: FALKLANDS: REPORTING ON ARGENTINA

1. ACTION TAKEN WITH GUTMANN, QUAI SECRETARY GENERAL, AND FOUQUET, HEAD OF LATIN AMERICA DEPARTMENT.

2. THE QUAI SAY THEY WILL BE HAPPY TO GIVE US REGULAR ORAL ASSESSMENTS HERE IN PARIS, BUT NOT TEXTS OF THEIR TELEGRAMS FOR REASONS OF CYPHER SECURITY.


FRETWELL
SECRET
FM WASHINGTON 191746Z APR 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NO 1343 OF 19 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. I have just seen McFarlane at the White House who told me that Haig had been on the secure line. He was transmitting to the State Department and to the Foreign Office in London the latest text of what the Argentinians were prepared to accept. Clearly, Haig did not think that it would be satisfactory from our point of view. He would be leaving Buenos Aires in about two hours time (1902Z). If HMG thought it worthwhile having a meeting with him, having seen the Argentine proposals, he would fly direct to London. Otherwise he would return to Washington.
2. I told McFarlane of the terms of Haig's message (FCO telegram to Washington No. 758) after yesterday's session, and of your reply. I mentioned the considerable criticism in the UK about the US attitude on this issue and I underlined how important it was for Haig not to say anything about our negotiating position.

3. McFarlane thought that Haig, on departure from Buenos Aires, would confine public remarks to saying that he had completed this round of negotiations.

4. I emphasised to McFarlane how essential it was that the spotlight would be clearly on the Argentinians for their inflexibility and nothing should be said or done to suggest that we were holding things up.

5. McFarlane spoke about the extreme difficulty of dealing with the present Argentine leadership. His actual words were 'the ability to get a good faith interlocutor on their side has escaped us'.

Henderson

NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 191745Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 176 OF 19 APRIL 1982

INFO ROUTINE MONTEVIDEO
INFO SAVING BERNE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

UKMIS GENEVA TELNO 170 : FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ICRC

1. DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS AT ICRC ASKED HEAD OF CHANCERY TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON.

2. HOCKE SAID THAT THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES HAD NOW GIVEN THE ICRC A FORMAL REPLY TO THEIR WRITTEN APPROACH OF 7 APRIL. THE ARGENTINES HAD WELCOMED THE OFFER AND RECOGNISED THE SPIRIT IN WHICH IT WAS MADE, BUT SINCE THEY STILL HOPED FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS, SAW NO NEED FOR THE ICRC TO CARRY OUT A ROLE OF PROTECTION, AND DID NOT THEREFORE PROPOSE TO INVITE THEM TO VISIT THE ISLANDS.

3. HOCKE POINTED OUT THAT THIS LINE IMPLIED THAT THE ARGENTINES SOUGHT TO ARGUE THAT THEY WERE STILL AT PEACE AND THAT THEY WERE THEMSELVES READY TO PROVIDE THE BASIC NEEDS OF THE POPULATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

4. HOCKE SAID THAT THIS DEFINITIVE REPLY TO THEIR FIRST DEMARCHE POSED THE QUESTION OF WHAT ICRC SHOULD DO NEXT. ON THIS QUESTION THEY HAD CLEAR IDEAS, WHICH HE PROPOSED TO MENTION TO US, BUT WITH A RENEWED PLEA THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE GREAT CARE TO RESPECT THE CONFIDENTIALITY WHICH WAS ESSENTIAL IF ICRC
WITH A RENEWED PLEA THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE GREAT CARE TO RESPECT THE CONFIDENTIALITY WHICH WAS ESSENTIAL IF ICRC WAS TO PLAY A USEFUL ROLE. HE SAID THAT THE ICRC WOULD CONFIRM THE FACT OF ARGENTINE RESPONSE TO THE PRESS BRIEFLY AND IN GENERAL TERMS. BUT AS REGARDS THEIR OWN FUTURE PLANS, AND HERE HE WAS SPEAKING IN CONFIDENCE, THE ICRC DID NOT (NOT) INTEND TO LEAVE IT AT THAT, BUT WOULD CONTINUE TO WATCH DEVELOPMENTS VERY CLOSELY AND RENEW THEIR DEMARCHES AS THEY SAW THE NEED. IN PARTICULAR THEY INTENDED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE ARGENTINE RESPONSE AND TO RENEW THEIR SPECIFIC REQUEST TO VISIT THE ISLANDS, THIS TIME CITING ARTICLE 14 OF THE 4TH GENEVA CONVENTION. THE FIRST APPROACH TO THE ARGENTINES HAD BEEN BASED ON ICRC'S HUMANITARIAN ROLE AND NOT SPECIFICALLY ON THIS ARTICLE WHICH HAD HOWEVER BEEN MENTIONED IN AN EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM. THE ICRC NOW INTENDED TO BASE THEIR NEW APPROACH SQUARELY ON IT. IT COVERS THE MAKING OF ARRANGEMENTS IN PEACETIME FOR THE DESIGNATION OF SECURE ZONES IN TIMES OF CONFLICT WHETHER ON THE TERRITORY OF A STATE PARTY TO THE CONVENTION OR ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY OF ANOTHER PARTY. THERE WOULD BE NO (NO) NEED TO SPECIFY UNDER WHICH PART OF THE ARTICLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR SECURE ZONES WERE BEING MADE. THE ICRC WILL KEEP US INFORMED OF PROGRESS.

5. HOCKE RENEWED HIS REQUEST THAT WE SHOULD SAY NOTHING TO THE PRESS ABOUT ICRC'S FURTHER PLANS, AND THAT IF THEY BECAME KNOWN WE SHOULD CONFINE OURSELVES TO STRESSING THAT THE ICRC WERE ACTING ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BERNE WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK. 

MARSHALL

SENT AT 19/1635 Z   MAF/JW

AND WHOSE IT FROM PLSE U OMITTED TO TELL US   KK
SRI PAL   FM UKMIS GENEVA
RITO   TA V M
CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 191703Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 367 OF 19 APRIL 1982
INFO PRIORITY TO BONN ROME UKREP BRUSSELS BRUSSELS UKDEL NATO
WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK MODUK
INFO SAVING TO MOSCOW ANKARA LISBON OSLO OTTAWA REYKJAVIK DUBLIN LUXEMBOURG COPENHAGEN ATHENS THE HAGUE

BONN TEL NO 338: FALKLANDS: FRENCH OPINION

1. THERE ARE SEVERAL PARALLELS BETWEEN FRENCH AND GERMAN REACTIONS TO THE FALKLANDS CRISIS. BUT FRENCH ATTITUDES ARE ALSO COLOURED BY FRANCE'S PERCEPTION OF HER OWN INTERESTS AND BY HER EXPERIENCE AS A FORMER COLONIAL POWER.

2. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HAS GIVEN A FIRM POLITICAL LEAD IN HIS SUPPORT FOR THE BRITISH POSITION. THIS HAS BEEN LARGELY FOLLOWED BY COMMENTATORS IN THE MEDIA. EVEN BEFORE THE INVASION, THE ARGENTINE JUNTA WAS UNPOPULAR WITH THE FRENCH LEFT: WHEN IN OPPOSITION MITTERRAND PUBLICLY CRITICISED THE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. THIS HAS UNDOUBTEDLY HELPED TO ATTRACT FRENCH SYMPATHY FOR THE BRITISH POSITION. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS ALSO WELL AWARE THAT IF THE ARGENTINIANS ARE ALLOWED TO GET AWAY WITH THE ARMED SEIZURE OF THE FALKLANDS THIS COULD SET A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR THE SECURITY OF FRANCE'S OWN OVERSEAS POSSESSIONS. THIS CONSIDERATION CARRIES PARTICULAR WEIGHT ON THE
POSESSIONS. THIS CONSIDERATION CARRIES PARTICULAR WEIGHT ON THE FRENCH RIGHT. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT FINDS IT ALL THE EASIER TO SUPPORT THE BRITISH POSITION IN THAT BY DOING SO IT IS UPHOLDING THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND A MANDATORY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

3. FOR ALL THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT POLICY, MANY INFORMED FRENCHMEN REMAIN BEWILDERED THAT BRITAIN IS PREPARED TO RUN THE RISK OF ARMED CONFLICT WITH ARGENTINA SIMPLY IN ORDER TO UPHOLD THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. THERE IS A COMMON ASSUMPTION THAT THERE MUST BE IMPORTANT ECONOMIC INTERESTS AT STAKE. FRANCE ATTACHES IMPORTANCE TO FISHING AND TO THE POTENTIAL FOR MINERAL EXPLOITATION AROUND SOME OF HER OWN OVERSEAS ISLAND POSSESSIONS. TO THE EXTENT THAT BRITAIN'S POSITION IS NOT MOTIVATED BY HARD ECONOMIC SELF-INTEREST, FRENCHMEN TEND TO BE SCEPTICAL WHETHER THE ENDS JUSTIFY THE MEANS. THE FRENCH WELL UNDERSTAND BRITAIN'S NEED TO DEMONSTRATE HER RESOLVE BUT LIKE THE GERMANS THEY HOPE THAT A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND. THEY BELIEVE THAT TIME IS SHORT AND WONDER WHETHER HAIG IS THE RIGHT MAN TO WORK OUT A COMPROMISE, OR WHETHER SOME ALTERNATIVE — PERHAPS THE BRAZILIANS — MIGHT DO BETTER.

4. SO FAR THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRADE EMBARGO FOR FRENCH INDUSTRY HAVE NOT BEEN PLAYED UP EITHER BY FRENCH OFFICIALS, BY THE BUSINESS AND BANKING COMMUNITY, OR IN THE PRESS. THE OVER-RIDING IMPORTANCE FOR FRANCE OF THE BROADER POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE, AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S HOPE THAT THE CRISIS WILL BE SWIFTLY RESOLVED, NO DOUBT LARGELY EXPLAIN THIS RELATIVE RESTRAINT. FRENCH OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD US THAT AT PRESENT NO MAJOR FRENCH PROJECTS IN ARGENTINA ARE AT STAKE. IN 1981 FRENCH EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA AMOUNTED TO F1.4 BILLION (0.3% OF TOTAL FRENCH EXPORTS) AND CONSISTED MAINLY OF CAPITAL GOODS AND MOTOR VEHICLES. FRENCH IMPORTS AMOUNTED TO F0.7 BILLION GIVING FRANCE A BILATERAL TRADE SURPLUS OF F0.7 BILLION. IF THE CRISIS IS PROLONGED THE POSSIBLE LONGER TERM CONSEQUENCES FOR FRENCH EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA, AND TO SOUTH AMERICA IN GENERAL, AND THE VOLUME OF OFFICIALLY GUARANTEED EXPORT CREDIT AT RISK (F1.5 BILLION), MAY BEGIN TO LOOM LARGER IN FRENCH THINKING. A CRUCIAL FACTOR WILL BE THE ATTITUDE OF OTHER EC MEMBER STATES, SINCE THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WILL STILL BE CONCERNED NOT TO GET AHEAD OF THE THE PACK.

5. NEITHER THE FRENCH MINISTERS NOR OFFICIALS HAVE SOUGHT TO ESTABLISH A DIRECT LINK BETWEEN THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE UK AND CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS ON MAJOR COMMUNITY ISSUES. FRENCH MEDIA
NEGOTIATIONS ON MAJOR COMMUNITY ISSUES. FRENCH MEDIA
COMMENTATORS HAVE BEEN LESS RETICENT. A VIEW INCREASINGLY EXPRESSED
IS THAT COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY MANIFESTED IN RELATION TO THE FALKLANDS
SHOULD HAVE A BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON THE HANDLING OF OTHER PROBLEMS,
OR MORE BLUNTLY THAT BRITAIN OWES IT TO HER COMMUNITY PARTNERS TO
SHOW GREATER FLEXIBILITY ON THESE ISSUES IN RETURN FOR THEIR SUPPORT
OVER THE FALKLANDS.

6. IN THE PRESENT SITUATION THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS HAVING
NO PARTICULAR DIFFICULTY IN MAINTAINING ITS CLEAR-CUT SUPPORT
FOR THE BRITISH POSITION AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE SUBJECT TO
SUCH STRONG CONFLICTING PRESSURES AS SOME OTHER EC GOVERNMENTS.
IF HOWEVER ARMED CONFLICT AROSE, DOUBTS WOULD RAPIDLY GROW. TO KEEP
THE FRENCH ON BOARD WE WOULD NEED AT THAT POINT TO BE ABLE TO SHOW,
AT THE MINIMUM, THAT WE HAD MADE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO SECURE A
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND HAD BEEN FLEXIBLE OVER THE LONG TERM
STATUS OF THE ISLANDS. IF A CONFLICT THREATENED TO SPREAD OR TO
BRING ABOUT A GENERAL DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EUROPE
AND LATIN AMERICA OR A LARGE PART OF THE NON ALIGNED NATIONS,
THERE WOULD BE INFLUENTIAL VOICES TO ARGUE HERE AS ELSEWHERE THAT
IT WAS TIME TO CALL A HALT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVINGS TO ALL

FRETWELL

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 191808Z AH/CEM
Frozen Argentine Assets

The Prime Minister has noted without comment the Chancellor's minute of 16 April on the above subject.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

John Kerr, Esq.,
H.M. Treasury.
19 April 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS: THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister read the text of Mr. Fraser's message to President Reagan, contained in Canberra telegram 163. She has commented that it is an excellent message and that our thanks should be conveyed to Mr. Fraser. Unless you think that a further message from the Prime Minister is desirable, perhaps you could instruct the High Commission to convey the Prime Minister's thanks orally.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
19 April 1982

I write to acknowledge your letter of 19 April to Mr. Whitmore enclosing the original of the letter of 8 April from the Australian Prime Minister to Mrs. Thatcher.

JOHN COLES

Ms. Neroli Doust
19 April 1982

Dear Mr Whitmore,

Please find enclosed the original of the letter from the Australian Prime Minister to Mrs Thatcher dated 8 April 1982, the cabled text of which was passed to you on 8 April.

Yours sincerely,

(Neroli Doust)
Personal Secretary

Mr C.A. Whitmore,
Principal Private Secretary
to the Prime Minister,
No. 10 Downing Street,
LONDON SW1.
Falkland Islands

As you know, Mr. Needham of the Falkland Islands Company rang me on Sunday morning to say that he proposed to send a telex to his representative on the Falkland Islands asking whether it was felt in the Islands that some of the older people and children should leave. If so, and if they would be allowed to do so, this should be arranged and he (Mr. Needham) would find some means of raising the money. Mr. Needham told me that he was not seeking the Government's approval but wished to know that we would not object to such a telex being sent.

You consulted the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and in the light of your advice I rang Mr. Needham to say that the Government certainly had no objection to such a message being sent though it should be made clear that this was an entirely private initiative. Mr. Needham said that he fully understood this point.

I am copying this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence), John Halliday (Home Office) and Keith Long (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office).

A.J. Coles

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Falkland Islands

I enclose a copy of a telegram which the Prime Minister has received from Dr. M.F. Perutz.

I should be grateful for your comments on the suggestion in the newspaper article to which he refers that General Galtieri visited Washington three times prior to his overthrow of President Viola, in order to obtain the approval of President Reagan and the Pentagon for the Falklands' takeover.

I should also be grateful for a draft reply to Dr. Perutz for my signature on behalf of the Prime Minister.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. J. Coles

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
TO THE PRIME MINISTER, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER M.P. FROM DR M.F. PERUTZ, CH, FRS.

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

MAY I DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO THE EDITOR IN YESTERDAYS NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE.

DOES THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT NOT KNOW THAT GENERAL GALTIERI VISITED WASHINGTON THREE TIMES PRIOR TO HIS OVERTHROW OF PRESIDENT VIOLA, IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THE APPROVAL OF PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE PENTAGON FOR THE FALKLANDS TAKEOVER? THIS WAS GALTIERI'S PRICE FOR OVERTHROWING THE CARRIER REGIME, WHICH VIOLA CONSIDERED A DANGER TO THE STABILITY OF THE SOUTHERN CONE DUE TO ITS PLANS FOR ELECTIONS WHICH WOULD ENSURE THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PERONISTS IN THE GOVERNMENT. (SIGNED) MICHAEL T. WELLS, LONDON.

I HAVE NO MEANS OF CHECKING THIS ALLEGATION, BUT IT DOES NOT READ AS THOUGH THE AUTHOR HAD INVENTED IT. AFTER THIS REVOLTING BETRAYAL, THE PRESIDENT MAY WELL ORDER THE CIA TO ENSURE THAT GALTIERI DOES NOT LOSE, AND THE DICE MAY BE LOADED HEAVILY AGAINST THE BRAVE CHAPS OF THE BRITISH TASK FORCE. I KNOW THAT IT IS NOT FOR ME TO GIVE YOU ADVICE, BUT THIS NEWS ITEM MADE ME WONDER IF IT WOULD NOT BE WISER TO AGREE TO A COMPROMISE, RATHER THAN RISK THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BRITISH FORCE THROUGH TREACHERY REPEAT TREACHERY WITH ALL THIS WOULD IMPLY FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THE COUNTY REPEAT COUNTRY.

YOURS SINCERELY SINCERELY

M.F. PERUTZ

27582 CABOFF G
81532 MRCLMB G81532
81532 MRCLMB G
27582 CABOFF GV
**LETTERCODE/SERIES**

PREM 19

**PIECE/ITEM**

619

**Extract/Item details:**

Letter from Coles to Holmes dated 19 April 1982, with enclosed Heegar dated 18 April 1982

**CLOSED FOR**

4.0 YEARS

**UNDER FOI EXEMPTION**

29 May 2012

**RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4)**

OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

**TEMPORARILY RETAINED**

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**MISSING**

**NUMBER NOT USED**
SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Falkland Islands: Reagan/Galtieri Conversation

Thank you for your minute of 16 April. The Prime Minister read it with interest and commented that it was a pity that President Reagan did not make his telephone call earlier in the day.

JOHN COLES

19 April 1982
19 April 1982

CO-OPERATION WITH CHILE

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 18 April about this subject and has noted its contents.

I am copying this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Halliday (Home Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. J. Coles

D.B. Omand, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.
The FCO have been asked to telex the message, the letter to follow.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

SERIAL No. 779/82

19 April, 1982.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

His Excellency President Ngwazi Dr H Kamuzu Banda, GCB.
With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
SW1A 2AH
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 4/19/12
TAGS: CVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER M., JR.)
SUBJ: MESSAGE TO FOREIGN SECRETARY PYM FROM SECRETARY HAIG

1. DEAR FRANCIS:
WE HAVE COMPLETED ANOTHER VERY LONG SESSION TODAY—THIS ONE
RUNNING UNTIL 2 A.M. WE ARE FINALLY CLOSE TO WHAT IS
PROBABLY THE MAXIMUM OBTAINABLE FROM THE ARGENTINES. YOU
SHOULD UNDERSTAND THERE WILL BE SOME PROBLEMS FOR YOU AS
IT NOW READS BUT IT IS WORKABLE. THE ONLY REMAINING
ELEMENT WILL BE ADDRESSED LATER THIS MORNING AND COVERS
THE VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE OF WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES WHERE
SERIOUS PROBLEMS STILL REMAIN ALONG LINES ANTICIPATED IN
OUR DISCUSSIONS THERE. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THAT ROUND,
WE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO DECIDE—ON THE BASIS OF THE
TEXT IN HAND— WHETHER TO PROCEED TO LONDON AN UNBROKEN
CONTINUATION OF THE PROCESS OR TO RETURN BRIEFLY
TO WASHINGTON. TONIGHT I BELIEVE LONDON IS BEST
SO AS NOT TO CLOSE PERCEPTION OF CONTINUITY OF ACTION
AND STEADY MOMENTUM. I WILL KEEP YOU ABEREAST AFTER TODAY'S
MEETING.

HAIG
THE PRIME MINISTER

10 DOWNING STREET

19 April, 1982.

Dear Mr. Chuck,

Thank you very much for your letter of 11 April and for your appreciation of the Government's response to the terrible situation in which the Falkland Islands now find themselves. The Government are determined to bring to an end as speedily as possible the Argentine occupation of the Islands. This is our first priority and, as you will have seen, it has the full support of the British Parliament.

I was grateful for your interesting ideas on the kind of long term solution which might be applicable to the Falkland Islands. We shall give these very careful attention, particularly since they come from an elected representative of the Islanders (although I appreciate that you put them forward on a personal basis).

Once we have secured the withdrawal of the Argentine forces, we shall be in a position to consult the Islanders once again on their future. We have stressed / throughout
throughout the importance we attach to their wishes. As the Foreign Secretary made clear in this week's debate in the House of Commons, it is not our intention to rush any consultations through before the Islanders have had ample time to discuss the question amongst themselves.

May I assure you, and through you all Falkland Islanders, of our support in the present tragic situation. Our thoughts are with you.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

J. E. Cheek, Esq.
FALKLAND ISLANDS: SITREP BY FCO 0730 19 APRIL

Haig Initiative

1. No further reports were received from Mr Haig since the second of his two messages was received at 1625 GMT. In that message, he had hoped to have had a workable draft by the end of the day ie 4.00 am our time.

UN

2. UKmis New York telno 493 contains Sir A Parsons' latest views on the action we should take in the UN in the event of the failure of the Haig mission.

US

3. Mr Thomas, Washington, reported by telephone that the US press had evinced interest in reports of modifications being made to our Vulcan bombers and asked for a brief.

Argentina: Action

4. Two UK amateur radio enthusiasts reported that a Falkland Islands 'ham' had sent a message via Israel and Norway to say that the Argentines were mining Stanley Harbour.

Tailpiece

5. The 6.00 BBC radio news reflected the night's inactivity by demoting the Falkland Islands to their third item.

19 April 1982

M W Growcott
Emergency Unit
FM FCO 180930Z APRIL 82

TO FLASH WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER

FALKLANDS: CORRESPONDENCE WITH HAIG

1. I have this morning received the following further message from Haig in Buenos Aires.

Begins. Based on the unacceptable language which I received and sent to you last night (Friday), I threatened to break off this process. As a result, I was invited to meet with the junta, and spent two hours with them this morning (Saturday). The character of the group is essentially as I imagined: Galtieri is the least bright and given to bluster; the admiral is ultra hard-line; the air force general is bright. Politically reasonable - relatively speaking - but clearly third in influence.

I impressed on these men in the strongest terms that British resolve was beyond doubt, and that they were on a collision course with military humiliation and economic ruin. With the possible exception of the Admiral - whose definition of glory has little to do with the concept of military success - I would say these men are worried. They are feeling the pressure of your fleet,

---

NNNN ends telegram
BLANK

Catchword
though

File number
Dept Emergency Unit
Drafted by (Block capitals)
C Mallaby

Telephone number

Authorised for despatch

Comcen reference

Time of despatch

Distribution
Falkland Islands
No 10
Cabinet Office

Standard
8Am Emergency Unit

Copy 15
As/Have Secretaries
15/SofS for Defence.
though it would be a serious mistake for you to assume they are not prepared to fight.

The junta urged me to stay and try to "solve the problem" with the Foreign Minister. In hopes that they would impart flexibility to their negotiators I agreed to do so. The ten-hour session that ensued was excruciatingly difficult. We spent most of that time on the language dealing with the terms of reference for the negotiations on the definitive status of the islands. Your language was rejected out of hand. I pressed upon them language that avoids prejudging the sovereignty issue while preserving what you must have with regard to the rights of the islanders. The Argentines are now developing a new formulation but I expect it will be pregnant with the concept of assured Argentine sovereignty.

The issue of travel, trade, etc., in the interim period was also hotly contested. There will be no agreement unless it involves a clear prospect of genuine promotion of various forms of interaction, with the necessary safeguards to prevent what the Prime Minister fears could occur.

We are also encountering difficulty on the question of interim administration, though the integrity of the idea we discussed in London has been maintained.

Finally, though we did not discuss it at length there was a definite foreshadowing of serious problems on the question of military disengagement — ie stopping the fleet and removing the submarines. I think this matter can be settled in terms acceptable to the UK, though not without more flexibility than I encountered in London. All in all, as of now the situation is grim. I will receive a new Argentine text during the night and then decide whether or not to break off.

I will only consider coming to London if the Argentines give me a text that goes well beyond their position today. I do not want to shift the spotlight on to you if it is clear that...
the Argentine proposal is unacceptable. Even if I do not come
to London, I will of course send you the Argentine text.

If I suspend my mission tomorrow morning I will leave no
doubt where lies responsibility for the impasse. Ends.

2. Please deliver immediately the following reply from me.
Begins. Thank you very much for your message this morning about
your talks in Buenos Aires. You are clearly making super-human
efforts to achieve a reasonable result. We in London are most
grateful. Success would be a tremendous achievement and we very
much hope that you can bring the Argentines to see reason.

If, most regretfully, you were to conclude that you could
not continue your mission for the time being, we should need a
little time to consider what to do next. If you announced a
decision to suspend your efforts before we had decided with you
on next steps, the diplomatic initiative might pass to others.
We should therefore be most grateful to know your intentions in
good time before any announcement. One way of holding the
position might be for you to say on leaving Buenos Aires that
the Argentines had not tried seriously to negotiate a reasonable
outcome and that you would be reporting on the situation to the
President and discussing further steps with him. Ends.

3. Text in para 2 also passed to US Embassy.

NNNN
International Affairs section.

1. Introductory remarks on theme of conference - living with our neighbours.

2. Falklands. Events of past two months have raised issue in its most dramatic form. Throughout crisis have borne in mind one fundamental principle. We are fortunate in this country that in many areas of our lives we can rely on shared values; values such as self-restraint, respect for others, a commitment to freedom and to reaching decisions peacefully through the democratic process. These values are the foundation of our society. But they can never be taken for granted. We enjoy them only because past generations have been prepared to defend them; have put such values above easy opportunism, knowing that only in this way can the normal business of living be conducted in a civilised and safe manner.

Always possible to sacrifice principle in the apparent interests of a short-term solution, not pausing to count the long-term cost. It was suggested by some that we accept the invasion of the Falklands as a fait accompli. But whenever the rule of force as opposed to the rule of law succeeds in the world the whole international community moves a step nearer to anarchy.

We in the West live in a free society and in a community of nations which seeks to resolve disputes by civilised means. We cannot refuse to accept the responsibility for maintaining this state of affairs.

The freedoms of the Falkland Islanders are important enough. But we have been acting not only for them but in the interests of all peoples who believe in the rule of law. Upholding the values which are the only hope for a peaceful world and only guarantee that our civilised society will flourish in the future.

3. ? section on importance of both conventional forces and Trident ?
Economic section

1. Responsible government must take long-term view. Now seeing beginnings of recovery,
   productivity
   wages held
   output ?

Understandable that people are impatient but this is no boomlet born of inflation out of subsidy. It is first fruits of long-term restructuring. A more healthy economy that can sustain jobs with a real future.

2. Will not repeat mistakes of recent past; 70's booms and price payed for them. Instead, dismantling building blocks of socialist state.
   privatisation - real public ownership is ownership by real people
   trade unions brought gradually within reasonable legal framework, free from the coercion of wage and price controls and their members protected from the coercion of the closed shop
   home ownership
   other examples ?

Aim is smaller role for government, less politics, more decisions made by people on their own behalf.

3. Role of government is to create conditions in which people can build their own futures. Opposition still presenting the familiar, failed formulas for overnight transformations;

   Labour - £9bn reflation. Inevitable results to be prevented by level of controls (import bans, price controls) unprecedented in this country but familiar from Eastern Europe

   SDP - less of the same. The wishful thinking school of politics. Retreading the path of the sixties and seventies with all the commitment and good intentions with which they made exactly the same mistakes in previous incarnations.

   Reflation = inflation = socialism by degrees

Any need for comment on local government election results or is there a Scottish Conference speech?
Third section on values/creation of a Conservative consensus.

1. Defeat of inflation not just an economic priority. Only when currency is stable can society be stable. People have a stake in future. Values like personal dignity, independence, based on sound money.

2. Referred at beginning to fact that values on which a civilised society depends can never be taken for granted. As true at home as it is abroad. Last few years have seen an increasing number of challenges to the idea that disputes should be settled with reference to the law and to the ballot box; those who openly advocate defiance of the law for political advantage, politically motivated attacks on judges and the police, divisive attempts to suggest that those who are less well off or from a different cultural background need not or will not obey the same laws. What greater insult could there be to the vast majority of people of all incomes and backgrounds who are constructive, hard-working, law-abiding members of society?

Motives of those trying to destroy the shared values which are the cement of our society increasingly clear. The more overt their activities the more isolated they become. Already succeeded in breaking up the old Labour Party. We should see in this not only a challenge but also an opportunity: an opportunity for a new Conservative consensus to take root.

3. The signs are there;

disillusion with the legacy of the last ten decades

growing condemnation of selfish industrial actions - NHS?

less confusion between permissiveness and tolerance. A permissive society risks destroying freedom by abusing it. A tolerant society sets standards to protect its members while accepting it cannot intrude into genuinely private behaviour.

4. But truth needs its advocates. Up to us to stand by the values we share;

maintenance of law

Such values have to be fought for and won again in every generation. Two thousand years ago Pericles said "The secret of liberty is courage". We have that courage.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IF HAIG GIVES UP HIS MISSION

Once it became publicly known that Mr Haig was giving up his mission, there would be a major increase in tension. Many countries, including for instance the Europeans, would press us to say what we planned to do next. It is virtually certain that someone would put forward a Resolution in the UN which among other things would call upon Britain not to use force. If we had to veto this, and then did use force, the international support we have so far enjoyed would rapidly diminish. There would also no doubt be widespread domestic criticism.

A way of heading off the pressures and pre-empting an unfavourable UN Resolution would be to put one forward ourselves, immediately the abandonment of Haig's mission was known. There would be a chance, in circumstances of mounting tension, that a draft like the attached one would pass, thus producing an outcome to the present crisis which would be satisfactory to Britain. If the Resolution did not pass, because for instance of a Soviet veto, we would be in a much better position internationally and could more easily justify the use of force.
POSSIBLE DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

The Security Council:

Reaffirming its Resolution 502(1982).

Deeply disturbed about the failure so far to implement this resolution and to restore peace and security in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas).

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. Calls on Argentina to complete the withdrawal of all Argentine forces and administration from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). [South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands] by 0400 Greenwich Mean Time on (26 April 1982).

2. Takes note of the readiness of the United Kingdom to withdraw its armed forces from the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and to suspend immediately its decision creating a Maritime Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) as soon as confirmation is received that the Government of Argentina has begun implementation of operative paragraph 1 of this Resolution.

3. Decides that, upon the withdrawal of the Argentine and United Kingdom forces, the Falkland Islands, [South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands] shall be demilitarised and used for peaceful purposes only [but without preventing the continued use of the Islands for the purposes of scientific research].

4. Decides further, in the light of the request of the Government of the United Kingdom, the administering authority, that for an interim period not exceeding two years from (26 April 1982) the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands shall administer their own
under the authority of a United Nations interim administrator who shall be appointed immediately for that purpose and who shall have the additional functions of:

A) confirming the withdrawal of Argentine and United Kingdom armed forces:

B) verifying the demilitarised status of the Islands:

C) administering South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.

5. Urges the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom with the assistance of a special representative to be appointed by the Secretary General to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences during the interim period referred to above and to respect fully the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and bearing in mind relevant General Assembly resolutions.

6. Requests the Secretary General to submit to the Council proposals for the implementation of paragraph within 24 hours.
Willy

Be attached.

On reflection I felt this wasn’t worth passing on to the Prime Minister and that it would perhaps be more appropriate for a Private Secretary to be sent letters to be sent. Agree?

Peter 19/4

P. W. 21/4

Willy - no, simply to pass on to P.M. not having read it through in slow time I felt in present circumstances would be weak.

10 DOWNING STREET

Rever / did you promise Selmi an expenses?
Yehudi Menuhin telephoned this morning to express his grave concern over the Falklands crisis and asked me to pass on to you his sincere feelings, and a number of proposals which he felt might help to rectify the situation. He then read out the following message:

"The invasion of the Falkland Islands has been condemned by all countries of the European Community and by the Security Council. In fact, Great Britain is acting not out of national pride but out of responsibility to:

1. a group of people who are linked with the European Community;
2. to uphold a code of behaviour which prohibits this very kind of arrogance and defiant behaviour.

"It is high time that a permanent active international police force existed. Even if at first it must out of necessity be limited to regions of the European people and the New World countries for American responsibility - cooperation could still exist between the two.

"Afghanistan is of course beyond the power of the Community force to protect, although pressure can be exerted. But the Falklands fall within this sphere (so would in fact the nuclear capabilities of various small nations around the Mediterranean which must eventually be stopped, perhaps in combination with other powers)

Proposals
1. Offer British fleet as part of European Community forces representing the unanimous verdict of the EC. Endorsed and supported, even partly financed, by the European powers.

3. Great Britain in return would be obliged to collaborate - for instance in French action, perhaps in Africa (if and
when the Community animously by an overwhelming majority endorses the moral and legal justification).

"The EC would thus be collectively responsible for Gibraltar, Suez, Dardenelles and all strategic straits and capes affecting world trade. This would cement history with EC and build a world force, already overdue, responsible to everybody which when required could alter boundaries and readjust discrepancies - geographical and cultural.

"Argentina should be offered equal status in local responsibilities, and oil exploration and development etc. Also equality with the EC.

"The Islanders themselves, to endorse their own administratton. Argentin/Spanish to be the second language after English.

"Argentine to have a local High Commission but no troops. Argentine must evacuation Islands prior to any settlement."

END OF MESSAGE

Peter Ewing
Duty Clerk
18 April 1982
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18 April 1982

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear John,

FALKLAND ISLANDS

As you know, the latest message from Mr Haig to Mr Pym concludes by saying: 'If I suspend my mission tomorrow morning I will leave no doubt where lies responsibility for the impasse'. Mr Pym was concerned that such a statement would be seen as a final breakdown of Mr Haig's efforts and provide the starting signal for other less desirable initiatives. Given the sense of the meeting last night that Mr Haig's mission was the most favourable negotiating mechanism from our point of view, and that we would want to stay very close to the Americans in deciding how to play the hand if these efforts were to fail, Mr Pym sent off the enclosed reply which will we hope persuade Mr Haig that, however unsuccessful his current round of talks in Buenos Aires may turn out to be, he should not immediately declare that the process has broken down.

The form of words we have suggested that Mr Haig might use will, however, provide us at best with a short breathing space; and the prospect of the Security Council being called into play, either by Panama acting on behalf of Argentina or by the do-gooders, remains a very real one. It also remains very probable that the result of such an initiative would be to confront us with a resolution which we would have to veto in order to preserve our freedom to use force in self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter if necessary. Mr Pym continues to feel that such an outcome would not only lose us much of our present strong position in the United Nations, but also would have more tangible harmful effects in the world outside. In particular, it would make it much harder for us to maintain the support of countries which are providing assistance to the Royal Navy and those which have taken economic measures against Argentina.

Mr Pym continues to see potential attractions in an alternative approach. This would be to see whether we could devise a draft resolution to put forward ourselves, once there had been an announcement of the failure of Mr Haig's mission. The idea would
be to table a resolution which would either produce an outcome to the present crisis which would be acceptable to the UK or would leave us in a better position politically, and with our Allies and friends, for subsequent military action.

Following discussion last night, we have therefore been giving more thought, on a contingency basis, to the terms of a draft resolution for use if we were faced with the need to pre-empt more damaging action in the Security Council. I enclose a revised text. There might be just a chance that Argentina, in the greater atmosphere of crisis following Mr Haig's failure and faced by American economic measures, could be brought to accept a resolution on these lines. If so, the UK would have secured withdrawal and (if this happened before further hostilities) would have done so without any British or Falkland casualties. We would also have ensured that the wishes of the islanders would be taken into account in the future, since we would of course be guided by those wishes in the negotiations foreseen in paragraph 6 of the resolution. We would also have secured the administration of the Islands in the interim period by the islanders themselves, with very limited UN supervision. Since the islanders are British, this could fairly be presented as the restoration of essentially British administration. Argentina, by contrast, would have secured virtually nothing by means of her aggression and the British policy of military, diplomatic and economic pressure would be seen to have produced results.

If, on the other hand, the British resolution did not pass, for instance because of a Soviet veto, we would be in a much better position to retain the practical support of our friends. We would also be seen by the world at large to have tried everything possible to get a peaceful solution and thus would be able even more easily to justify military action as a last resort.

The main amendments for the text discussed yesterday are:

(a) Operative paragraph 1 brings out the need for Argentina to start withdrawing immediately as well as completing withdrawal by a given date. (Islas Malvinas is the Argentine description for the Falklands, thus not including the dependencies).

(b) Operative paragraph 2 has been extended and divided into two paragraphs. The present paragraph 2 makes clear that the UK would only suspend the enforcement of the Maritime Exclusion Zone to the extent (which we would determine) that this was necessary to enable /Argentina
Argentina to withdraw from the Falklands. The new paragraph 3 makes clear that we would halt our Task Force outside the MEZ only if Argentina were withdrawing; and that the Zone would actually be rescinded only if Argentina withdrew completely.

(c) In operative paragraph 5 the UN official is now described as an 'Interim Commissioner'. His functions have also been changed. He would not now administer the Islands or even supervise administration in any general way. His supervisory function would be confined to ensuring demilitarisation.

(d) Since the success of an operation in the United Nations would depend partly on our ability to resist amendments, there would be advantage in seeking, in our draft resolution, to pre-empt those amendments which others are most likely to propose. We think that an amendment concerning the Falkland Islands dependencies would be extremely likely. We have therefore introduced a mention of the dependencies into operative paragraph 6. It concerns only the scope of future negotiations and not the measures taken to deal with the present crisis. As the Prime Minister is aware, another obvious amendment to expect is a call for future negotiations to be based on past United Nations resolutions, notably those most unacceptable to us. We therefore continue to believe that the best tactic would be to include a reference to 'bearing in mind relevant General Assembly resolutions' at the end of operative paragraph 6.

We have left in the figure of three years for the duration of the interim period. We think, however, that a shorter period would be more likely to attract support in the United Nations. It could open the possibility of restoration of complete British administration sooner than would be possible under the present draft resolution.

I also undertook to confirm the position on amendments to resolutions. It would indeed be open to other members of the Security Council to put forward amendments to any British draft resolution. But we could resist them and would hope to be able to persuade enough members of the Council to vote against or abstain on such amendments to ensure that they failed to get the necessary numbers of positive votes. Even if we were unsuccessful in this, we would use our veto to defeat amendments and thus ensure that the Security Council ended up by voting on
a draft resolution satisfactory to us.

The Prime Minister yesterday evening was concerned that arrangements on these lines would not secure the Falklands from a further Argentine invasion in future. The demilitarisation of the Islands by the United Nations and the presence of a UN Interim Commissioner would make future invasion politically more difficult for Argentina. But we would need much more effective guarantees than that. The arrangement discussed above would be compatible with an American undertaking to ensure that the demilitarisation of the Islands was respected. A separate American declaration to this effect would be a powerful deterrent to Argentine ambitions and would enable British Ministers in Parliament to answer effectively the question of how we could be confident that further invasions would not occur.

I am copying this letter and its enclosures to David Omand (MOD), John Halliday (Home Office), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and the Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Perhaps this matter could be looked at in OD(SA) on 19 April unless circumstances this evening suggest that an earlier meeting is necessary.

We are meanwhile sending the text of the draft resolution to Sir A Parsons in New York on a personal basis, making clear that this is only a tentative draft which Ministers may not wish to take further, but on which his comments would be welcome.

Yours ever

[Signature]

for B J P Fall
Private Secretary
MESSAGE FROM MR PYM TO SECRETARY HAIG : 18 APRIL 1982

Thank you very much for your message this morning about your talks in Buenos Aires. You are clearly making super-human efforts to achieve a reasonable result. We in London are most grateful. Success would be a tremendous achievement and we very much hope that you can bring the Argentines to see reason.

If, most regrettably, you were to conclude that you could not continue your mission for the time being, we should need a little time to consider what to do next. If you announced a decision to suspend your efforts before we had decided with you on next steps, the diplomatic initiative might pass to others. We should therefore be most grateful to know your intentions in good time before any announcement. One way of holding the position might be for you to say on leaving Buenos Aires that the Argentines had not tried seriously to negotiate a reasonable outcome and that you would be reporting on the situation to the President and discussing further steps with him.
POSSIBLE DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

The Security Council

Reaffirming its Resolution 502(1982),
Deeply disturbed about the failure so far to implement
this Resolution,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. Calls on Argentina to begin forthwith the withdrawal of
all Argentine forces and administration from the Falkland Islands
(Islas Malvinas) and to complete it by (0400) Greenwich Mean Time
on (26 April 1982).

2. Takes note of the readiness of the United Kingdom, on the
acceptance of this Resolution by Argentina, temporarily to suspend
the enforcement of the Maritime Exclusion Zone it has declared
around the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), to the extent neces-
sary to permit the implementation by Argentina of operative
paragraph 1 of this Resolution.

3. Further takes note of the readiness of the United Kingdom,
once it has been confirmed that the implementation of operative
paragraph 1 of this Resolution has begun and for as long as the
process of implementation continues, not to permit the task force
it has despatched to the area of the Falkland Islands (Islas
Malvinas) to enter the Maritime Exclusion Zone; and to rescind its
declaration of the Maritime Exclusion Zone as soon as the imple-
mentation of operative paragraph 1 has been completed.

4. Decides that, upon the implementation of the foregoing para-
graphs, the Falkland Islands shall be demilitarised pending the
outcome of the negotiations referred to in operative paragraph 6
below.
5. Decides further that for an interim period not exceeding three years from (26 April 1982) the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands shall administer their own affairs and that a United Nations Interim Commissioner shall be appointed immediately whose functions shall be:
   a. confirming the implementation of operative paragraphs 1-3 above;
   b. ensuring the implementation of operative paragraph 4 above;
   c. supervising the administration of the Falkland Islands to the extent that is required in order to discharge the function in the previous sub-paragraph.

6. Urges the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom, with the assistance of a Special Representative to be appointed by the Secretary General, to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences regarding the Falkland Islands and Dependencies during the interim period referred to above, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations [and bearing in mind relevant General Assembly Resolutions.]

7. Requests the Secretary General to submit to the Council proposals for the implementation of paragraphs 4 and 5 within 24 hours.

8. Decides to remain seized of the question.
PM: ... are you at home or at work?

Sir A. Parsons: I'm at home, Prime Minister.

PM: Oh, I'm sorry to bother you.

Sir A. Parsons: For the moment. I'll be back at work in a few hours.

PM: Yes. I'm not urging you to go back to work, I'm merely sorry if I've caught you at home.

Sir A. Parsons: No, not at all, I'm kind of working at home.

PM: Yes. Look, I don't like, first the idea of a Resolution, I wanted to have a word with you about. And secondly, the terms of it, I think, will put us in acute difficulties at home. First the idea of a resolution. Is it possible to have one that is not in fact amended because it seems to me the moment we go in with one they will have some kind of amendment urging us not to use force.

Sir A. Parsons: Well Prime Minister, my view until a couple of days ago was and I think still is, that unless we go in with something on the lines that I suggested and you obviously don't like very much, whenever it was, yesterday, that we haven't got a hope. Not a hope in hell of taking an initiative which will not immediately bring about an amendment telling us to drop anchor.

PM: Yes, well now look. This can either be passed, in which case I must tell you the paragraphs, some of the paragraphs, would be devastating. Or it can be rejected. In which case it seems to me that we're worst off, worse off than we were before. Or it can be vetoed in which case it seems to me that we're worse off that we were before.

Sir A. Parsons: Well, Prime Minister, this has been my view as I said to you at lunch a week ago. I mean, I produced this as a kind
of desperate last-ditch possibility to retain the initiative. But my view is that, I've been thinking about it all day, I've got a meeting with my staff in a few hours' time, that really we would tactically be better advised not to take the initiative now. Because any move we make will produce precisely that, if we try to involve the Secretary General or a Security Council Commission or anything short of a full solution which we can accept as it were, we will immediately get an amendment which calls on us to drop anchor, to turn round, to hold off as it were which obviously we couldn't accept. Now, my feeling is that if we just go on stalling as I've been doing for the last week, and let somebody else take the initiative, whenever they do, I mean if and when Haig is finished, well then we've still got quite a lot of room for manoeuvre. Because the initiative will be taken essentially by do-gooders and there will be quite a lot of room for negotiating and trying to amend, etc., etc., before anything actually comes to a vote. We may eventually be cornered but we could probably keep the ball rolling for quite a few days before that happened. And I think that could be better than our taking an initiative which might immediately rebound on us.

PM: Well I'm very worried. Because what this does, with its suggestion for the United Nations role, is to preclude us from really carrying out our duty to the Falkland Islanders. What it does is serve notice that we are washing our hands of them in the interim period insofar as looking after them, advising them, being there to be with them. I'm just staggered. For a period of x years we're just going to walk away from them. And just depend on a piece of paper - that's what they had to depend on before. I don't think we're entitled to do that.

Sir A. Parsons: Well, as I said. The only reason why I produced that suggestion was really to illustrate the only conceivable way in which we could take an initiative here.

PM: I think what we've got in that is unacceptable things or things that would prejudice our negotiating hand in the future. Really seriously prejudice them.

Sir A. Parsons: Well, I mean, I don't dissent from that at all. I mean I think all I'm saying is that I think that is the only
kind of initiative we could take ... which is acceptable, then we must do it the other way round as it were. Go on keeping other people out of the Council for as long as we can and fight it off as best we can when somebody else takes the initiative.

PM: Why is it not possible just to bring to the notice of the Security Council that there has been absolutely no attempt to comply with their Resolution?

Sir A. Parsons: Well, we can do that all right. But again, if we try to introduce a Resolution which simply, for example, says reaffirms the previous one, deplores the fact that it hasn't been carried out by Argentina and calls on them to do so, we will immediately get a paragraph introduced which calls on us to drop anchor, which calls for some kind of UN mediation and all that kind of thing.

PM: But aren't we going to get that anyway if we move to introduce one. If I were devil's advocate on the other side that's precisely what I would do and I would be delighted that we, Great Britain, had seized the initiative because it would give me on the other side the chance, the tactical chance, to put something down totally unacceptable to us and then we would be in the position of having to withdraw or. we couldn't veto.

Sir A. Parsons: This is exactly my feeling. If we cannot take an initiative which actually, as it were, produces some kind of system to solve the thing which would be acceptable to us and it's evident from what you say that we can't do that.

PM: Well the idea that we should just opt out for three years seems to me utterly appalling.

Sir A. Parsons: Well in that case then I think we must not take any initiative. I mean we're better off to, as it were, receive the enemy's fire and do the best we can to..

PM: Well, I'm phoning really to get your impressions because I thought I'd - certainly the one we got this morning, today, is different from the one we had yesterday, but it still to me serves / notice to the
notice to the Falkland Islanders that, look for x years we are not going to be there. You're going to have to administer everything yourselves. Leaves aside the very difficult thing about the dependencies which as you know are administered through the Executive Council and the Governor. And that can't be done this way. When it says the Falkland Islands shall administer their own affairs that presumably means through the Legislative Council, what precisely the functions of the Executive Council is with regard to the Falkland Islanders' own affairs and the Governor, I don't know. I don't even know whether it's possible. What I do know is that with the dependencies the Legislative Council has no standing at all, it's purely the Executive Council and the Governor because the dependencies are wholly separate from the Falklands. Well now all of these, it seems to me, have not been worked out in the drafting of this Resolution. I don't want anything come out which compromises us or ties our hands. We're discussing it again tomorrow but the impression which I have, I had yesterday and I have today, is that it serves notice whereas we said in the House of Commons that our objective is to restore British administration as soon as possible. What this does is virtually say for three years I'm going to walk away from it and you must cope with yourselves. And you're going to have some United Nations guy there who will absolutely protect you from anyone landing, although everyone knows he can't possibly, and it just doesn't seem to me to be practicable.

But what it does and obviously it's drafted on the belief that it will be totally and utterly rejected, what it does it seems to me it does exactly what giving notice to withdraw Endurance did. Gives notice that our resolution is not as good, our determination to look after them is not as great as they thought it was. And I assure you it is. However, we'll talk about it tomorrow morning but I just wanted - because you were so strong to me when I last saw you, look for heaven's sake don't get back into there, the United Nations, you will never get such a good Resolution as you've got now and those words I've sort of taken and they've become part of the ten commandments practically. And I believe that they were true.

Sir A. Parsons: I don't go back on any of that. I mean the only reason I sent that telegram was, I wasn't urging a course of action which would mean that we opted out. I was simply trying to
illustrate the only kind of initiative which we could reasonably, and I use the word initiative with great emphasis, the only kind of initiative which we could take in the Council now and get away with.

PM: When you say get away with, what do you mean.

Sir A. Parsons: Well, I mean get away with without immediately tying our hands. Because if we went in with anything else, if we simply went in with a very short Resolution urging the Argentines, or demanding that they immediately fulfil the previous Resolution we would precipitate precisely what we don't want. Which is, they call on us to drop anchor and all the rest of it.

PM: I would have thought an actual Resolution, that any Resolution would precipitate that.

Sir A. Parsons: Well, that is what I feel. I mean I tried to illustrate the only way in which we could keep the initiative here. I mean I don't believe we can. I think that if that is unacceptable to you, which I absolutely understand, then our best course is not to take any initiative here and simply to try to beat off the do-gooders etc for as long as we can.

PM: Yes, well we're discussing it again tomorrow morning but I'm not keen on it.

Sir A. Parsons: Well, I'm going to send another telegram tonight. In which, I've already made up my mind, I made up my mind an hour or so ago what I'm going to say, and I'm simply going to say that if this proposition is unacceptable as I understand it to be, from our point of view, I'm not urging it, then I strongly recommend that we should forget about any question of taking the initiative ourselves in the UN. Because whatever else we do, it's going to bring, it's going to precipitate precisely the call on us which we don't want and can't accept. Therefore, we should sit tight. I should continue to beat people off as I've managed to do for the last week and then we will manoeuvre as skillfully as we can when somebody else does take an initiative. Which I think is not going to be far away.

/ PM:
PM: No, I'm sure it isn't. But I don't want, we have a very strong position now and I do not want us, by our own efforts, to weaken it. And that's my fear. Nor indeed do I want us, by putting forward a Resolution like this to weaken our ultimate negotiating hand. Nor do I really want anything which says to the Falkland Islanders, look you've only got a piece of paper to defend you because I think people would laugh at that here. And absolutely no way in this Resolution are we seeing that no force comes to invade them again. If we have a major peace-keeping force or we were unable to get the United States to guarantee its security, but there's no way, they can come down, they can land in helicopters, in Hercules on the runway and have another major invasion and then we really should look stupid.

Sir A. Parsons: I entirely agree.

PM: So that's the weakness, one of the weaknesses of this thing. I haven't yet discussed it again with Francis but I did say to him that I would like to phone you so he knows that. We'll have another go at it tomorrow but I'm not likely to change my mind I think because I think that there are so many shortcomings ...

Sir A. Parsons: I just want to make clear that, I mean, I'm not as it were urging on you a change of course. No question of that. All I'm trying to do is to illustrate the only conceivable way in which we could ...

PM: Well/I understand it. Last night when we discussed it, I took one look at it and said well I suppose this is Foreign Office. I really can't think Sir Anthony Parsons would have put this forward and they said, oh yes, this is his advice. It's not your advice. What you are saying is if you want us to take an initiative it's only that kind of thing that would succeed. That's a totally different story.

Sir A. Parsons: Exactly, I must admit that makes it sound different. All I'm saying is this is the only way in which we could take an initiative here. If we can't do that, well then anything else that we try to do here off our own bat as it were as an initiative would only invite precisely the situation we don't want.
PM: Some of my opponents are saying all right you must go back to the United Nations, it's their reputation which is in issue. Well, goodness me, it's been an issue for about the last 30-35 years.

Sir A. Parsons: That, from these kind of people is just idle talk. If we go back to the United Nations, I mean there was a suggestion to me from the office, I don't know where it came from, that we might think of some involvement of the Secretary General and the Security Council Commission and so on and I said no this is absolutely out of the question, it will simply tie our hands and bring us all to a standstill as it were and create what I described as dangerous drift.

PM: Well, my view is that if Al Haig can't secure withdrawal of the Argentines then a second Resolution like this won't.

Sir A. Parsons: No, that's quite true. I think one thing, Prime Minister, I should mention while we're on the subject, which I haven't actually brought into my telegrams so far, is that if Haig fails, it's very important that we should stop the Americans taking some initiative in the Security Council. Because the general expectation here in the Council among the other members is that if the Haig mission collapses that the Americans will as it were report to the Security Council. Now if that happens, we're very soon going to get into precisely the situation which we don't want to have, and we'll find ourselves having to vote the opposite way to the Americans.

PM: Yes, he wasn't appointed by the Security Council in any way.

Sir A. Parsons: Oh no, but I think there would be pressures within their own organisation to kind of obviate the issue, you know putting in some kind of report to the Council, calling for a Council meeting describing what happened and then you know urging restraint on everybody.

PM: Yes, they do love keeping people under occupation don't they. If restraint at this stage means to keep people under occupation under a regime that has absolutely no record whatsoever of any / kind of
kind of decency towards their own people. This is the stupidity of urging restraint after an invasion, is to play into the invaders' hands. They'll be killed in the rush with invaders if that is what's going to happen.

Sir A. Parsons: Well, I've just been watching quite a serious talk show on the TV here and I think that generally speaking, you know, everybody's on our side still.

PM: They are because we are showing some courage and resolution trying to stop and invader.

Sir A. Parsons: Prime Minister, I would like to make one point, don't worry about my morale.

PM: Well, I do worry about your morale but I just wondered the precise nature advice because I have no department here and I'm just jolly well realising that I need a department. I have no department and therefore I have to rely on third-hand hearsay and I don't like it.

Sir A. Parsons: Advice is the wrong word - it was simply an illustration of the only type of initiative which I thought that we could actually ... 

PM: Might succeed, only might. All right, I've got it, I've got the message. We'll have a look at it again tomorrow morning but it seems to me ...

Sir A. Parsons: There'll be another telegram from me?

PM: Good, all right, sorry to have bothered you.
FCS: ... heard the latest run from Haig. You've probably seen it.

PM: Yes, I have seen it. It looks as if it is going to go on quite late tonight.

FCS: It does.

PM: But we have not very much information.

FCS: No, not very much information. I don't think it's frightfully hopeful but the good things is that first of all if it all goes badly there will be time to breathe, you go back. And the other is before he decided to come here he will in effect consult us so that we feel, which seems to me quite likely, that it certainly isn't worth it, we don't let him make that journey.

PM: Yes, I have an awful suspicion that compromise is going to be everything to him. I just have that flavour from the latest telegram. I don't know whether there is any truth whatsoever in what Brian Walden was putting out at lunchtime.

FCS: Well I have absolutely no knowledge at all, no more than that. But I tell you what was good about that programme I thought, and that was that they were all those four, including Clinton Davis, were so solid. Wasn't that marvellous.

PM: They were absolutely solid and strengthened our arm enormously. Indeed, made me resolute not to go any further at all.

FCS: Absolutely, I quite agree. And particularly after your call last night so I thought that was all really very good.

PM: Yes, and there's been some kind of meeting at 5 o'clock today, wasn't there?

FCS: Oh, 6 o'clock our time it was going to start over there and it all may take a very long time. But it's the first breather I've / had
had today, which is good.

PM: You got away at lunchtime did you.

FCS: Yes, I went for a walk this afternoon. Did me a power of good.

PM: Do you want to talk about this thing tonight, Francis?

FCS: Well I wouldn't have thought it was necessary really, unless you want to. But it seems to me it will wait till tomorrow.

PM: Yes, I think it will.

FCS: Probably. That is what I had thought. I don't think it's necessary myself.

PM: No, I don't. I'm still unhappy about it but I'll still be unhappy about it tomorrow morning. So unhappiness can persist until tomorrow morning. Because I thought we'd demolished three quarters of that one last night but it's back now.

FCS: Well obviously. But I thought the thing to do was for us all to go to work after that, you see, and see what we could come up with and so that's the purpose of it.

PM: Have you got a devil's advocate over there.

FCS: Oh yes, plenty of them turn themselves into that.

PM: Well I'd better get one I think from the Cabinet Office before tomorrow morning.

FCS: Yes, and we've got to judge it in the light of the situation at the time. But I thought it was helpful, at least I hope it was helpful to put up something in the light of all that discussion and just see what you made of it.

PM: Yes. I hope Haig has some indication from us that we're pretty well near the end of the line that we can go to.

/ FCS:
FCS: Oh, I think without doubt.

PM: Because it looks to me from the earlier telegrams as if he were discussing things that went way beyond what we could agree.

FCS: Absolutely, oh totally. Again, we don't know what he may be up to but it does seem to me to be there in his telegram that when his present round is over, whenever that may be, we'll hear from him as to the nature of it and all the rest of it.

PM: So that we have some warning. What I do not want is for him to think that, and this is what is worrying me slightly, above all we want him to continue negotiations and we want it so much that the negotiations become everything. And the withdrawal nothing. The negotiations aren't the end in themselves. And that's just what worries me just a little bit that he might give the impression oh well some hope and it's all now up to Britain. Which I just don't think would be right at all. And it could be devastating if he gave that impression.

FCS: Oh I quite agree. He's quite clear what our position is. And in the morning also we will have ..

PM: He can't telephone of course from there can he? No, of course not.

FCS: And we'll also have in the morning, Margaret, advice from Tony Parsons.

PM: Yes, he is wholly in the United Nations milieu of course. I'd like to speak to him. I wonder if I can speak to him tonight. I'll see if I can get hold of him later. It's about lunchtime his time. I wonder if we can get him.

FCS: I should think he's probably working.

PM: Probably working, well we'll see. I'd like to just have a talk with him. All right Francis and then we'll have the latest position tomorrow morning. Thank you so much.

FCS: Just to say that either on Tuesday or Wednesday, I don't know / on which
on which, I'm trying to set up an hour followed by lunch in Brussels for the Foreign Ministers who are wanting to know more and I think I ought to respond to that urgently.

PM: I think that's a very good idea because we have to keep them on side.

FCS: Yes, that's right. And I think if I go, the telegrams have gone out now so and I think ...

PM: I think that will be very good. Anyway, I'm doing Questions on Tuesday.

FCS: Yes, I'll do a statement tomorrow.

PM: Yes, Silkin's bound to have a question if we don't volunteer one.

FCS: Oh, we'll volunteer one, there's no question about that in my view.

PM: I agree. Thank you very much for phoning.
TELECON AMBASSADOR/GILLMORE: FALKLAND ISLANDS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. You should take the following line in response to press enquiries about the carriage of nuclear weapons by the Task Force or their possible use in response to the Argentine invasion of the Falklands:

(a) It is our standard policy to confirm nor to deny the specific location of nuclear weapons: and we see no reason to depart from that policy:

(b) However, it is inconceivable that Britain would use nuclear weapons as part of any military response to the Argentine invasion of the Falklands:

(c) (Only if pressed on the implications of the Treaty of Tlatelolco): We are fully aware of our obligations and shall continue to comply with them.

PYM

NNNN

NNNN ends telegram

BLANK

Catchword

File number

Dept EM UNIT

Distribution

FCO

Falkland Islands

Drafted by (Block capitals)

Telephone number

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Time of despatch
CONFIDENTIAL

FM OTTAWA 181634Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 218 OF 18 APRIL
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO AND UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLAND ISLANDS

SIR PHILIP MOORE TOLD ME YESTERDAY AFTERNOON THAT HE HAD SOME OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO MR TRUDEAU DURING THE QUEEN’S VISIT. MR TRUDEAU HAD BEEN ROBUST AND CLEAR THAT WE MUST BE SUPPORTED.

2. MR TRUDEAU HAD EXPRESSED TO SIR PHILIP MOORE GREAT CONCERN ABOUT PRESIDENT REAGAN’S ATTITUDE. IF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION DID NOT SOON COME OFF THE FENCE AND START PUTTING REAL PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINE HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE WIDESPREAD DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER THE AMERICANS COULD BE RELIED ON IN A CRISIS AND SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.

3. YOU WILL BE AWARE FROM MY PREVIOUS REPORTS THAT MR TRUDEAU HAS FOR LONG BEEN PRIVATELY VERY CRITICAL OF THE AMERICANS IN GENERAL AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IN PARTICULAR. I AM SURE THAT HE AND MOST CANADIANS HAVE GRAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF THE REAGAN
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IN PARTICULAR. I AM SURE THAT HE AND MOST CANADIANS HAVE GRAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S LATIN AMERICAN POLICIES. AT THE PRESENT TIME, WITH SUCH THINGS AS REAGAN'S "WE ARE GOOD FRIENDS WITH BOTH SIDES" REMARK, THE NOTORIOUS ARGENTINE DINNER ATTENDED BY SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIALS AND THE EQUIVOCAL AMERICAN ATTITUDE ABOUT INTELLIGENCE HE CAN HARDLY FAIL TO WISH TO POINT OUT PRIVATELY THE CONTRAST BETWEEN CANADA'S WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT FOR US AND AN AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION WHICH APPARENTLY SEEKS TO BE EVEN HANDED AS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE ARGENTINE MILITARY DICTATORSHIP.

MORAN
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 190900Z
FM OTTAWA 181538Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 217 OF 18 APRIL
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO

FALKLAND ISLANDS
THIS WAS ONLY TOUCHED ON BRIEFLY WHEN I TOOK THE LORD CHANCELLOR TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER ON 16 APRIL. LORD HAILSHAM THANKED MR TRUDEAU FOR CANADA’S SUPPORT.


3. LORD HAILSHAM SAID THAT THERE COULD BE NO ARGUING OR MAKING OF CONDITIONS ABOUT OBSERVING A MANDATORY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. THE ARGENTINES HAD TO GET OUT: IF NOT WE SHOULD HAVE TO PUT THEM OUT, QUICKLY OR SLOWLY AS THE CASE MIGHT BE. HE SAID THERE WAS NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR TITLE. THE FACT THAT THE
OUT, QUICKLY OR SLOWLY AS THE CASE MIGHT BE. HE SAID THERE WAS NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR TITLE. THE FACT THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD DECLINED TO AGREE TO REFERENCES TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY KNEW THEIR LEGAL CASE WAS WEAK. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF OUR AGREEING TO THE ARGENTINE SUGGESTION THAT WE HAD TO ACKNOWLEDGE THEIR SOVEREIGNTY AS A CONDITION FOR THEIR COMPLYING WITH THE RESOLUTION.

4. LORD HAILSHAM SAID WE WERE GRATEFUL FOR MR HAIG’S EFFORTS AND DID NOT WISH TO CRITICISE THE AMERICANS. HE ADDED THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UK WAS VERY INFLAMED. THE LEGAL POSITION HAD TO BE RESTORED AND WE COULD NOT SELL 1800 BRITISH SUBJECTS DOWN THE DRAIN WHEN THEY HAD LIVED IN THE ISLANDS FOR 150 YEARS. WHEN HOWEVER MR MACGUIGAN SUGGESTED THAT PROVIDED THE ARGENTINES WITHDRAW WE MIGHT NOT, IN TERMS OF OUR NATIONAL INTEREST, WISH TO REMAIN INDEFINITELY, LORD HAILSHAM SAID THAT IN THE LONG RUN WE MIGHT HAVE TO RECOGNISE GEOGRAPHIC REALITIES. BUT THE WHOLE PROCESS HAD NOW BEEN SET BACK. HE SAID THAT IF HM GOVT SHOWED SIGNS OF GIVING WAY HE DID NOT THINK PUBLIC OPINION WOULD ALLOW THEM TO REMAIN. THE PRESENT CRISIS MIGHT LEAD TO THE END OF THE GALTIERI REGIME. IT WAS A PRICE HE WAS WILLING TO PAY.

5. MR MACGUIGAN SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES MIGHT HAVE TO FEEL STEEL BEFORE BEING PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE. TO THIS END HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY FOR US TO SINK ONE OR TWO ARGENTINE SHIPS. LORD HAILSHAM SAID HE HAD SEEN TOO MUCH OF WAR TO BE ANYTHING BUT UNHAPPY ABOUT LOSS OF LIFE BRITISH OR ARGENTINE; BUT THE BRITISH PEOPLE WOULD, RELUCTANTLY, BACK THE USE OF FORCE IF NECESSARY.

6. LORD HAILSHAM SAID WE WERE DEEPLY GRATEFUL FOR THE SUPPORT OF CANADA AND OUR OTHER COMMONWEALTH AND EUROPEAN PARTNERS. IF THE ARGENTINES WERE ALLOWED TO GET AWAY WITH IT THERE WOULD BE TROUBLE ELSEWHERE, NOTABLY IN THE AMERICAS. MR MACGUIGAN SAID THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN CANADA WAS VERY STRONG ON THE ISSUE.

MORAN

NNNN
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 1900012 APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE F CO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 493 OF 18 APRIL 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR).

YOUR TELNO FALKLANDS AT THE UN

1. BEFORE COMMENTING SPECIFICALLY ON YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE MY OWN POSITION CLEAR, EVEN THOUGH THIS MEANS REPEATING SOME OF WHAT I HAVE SAID IN EARLIER TELEGRAMS, PARTICULARLY IN MY TELNO 488.

2. SINCE I RETURNED FROM LONDON LAST MONDAY, I HAVE BEEN RACKING MY BRAINS TO SEE IF, IN THE EVENT OF HAIG FAILING, THERE IS ANY WAY IN WHICH WE COULD RETAIN THE INITIATIVE HERE WITHOUT PRECIPITATING CALLS ON US TO HALT OUR MILITARY PREPARATIONS, WHICH WE WOULD HAVE TO VETO. THIS WOULD PROBABLY LEAD TO AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN WHICH WE WOULD BE DANGEROUSLY ISOLATED EVEN FROM OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES, HOWEVER ROBUST SOME OF THEM MAY BE NOW.
3. I AM STILL WHOLLY CONVINced THAT, IF WE INITIATED A STRAIGHT
FORWARD CALL IN THE COUNCIL FOR ARGENTINA TO IMPLEMENT SCR 502
WITH OR WITHOUT SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO
ANTE, OR IF WE INVOKED THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OR A SECURITY COUNCIL COMMISSION OR ANY UN MECHANISM OF THAT KIND,
EVEN IF ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE WERE EG "TO BRING ABOUT THE
IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502", WE WOULD PRECIPITATE
PRECISELY THE SITUATION IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE IE A CALL ON US TO
HALT THE FLEET AND SUSPEND THE MEZ, PENDING WHATEVER ACTION THE
SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS ASKED TO TAKE. WE
COULD OF COURSE WITHDRAW OUR RESOLUTION OR REFUSE TO ACCEPT
AMENDMENTS BUT THERE WOULD BE NO AVOIDING A COUNTER-DRAFT WHICH
WOULD PUT US ON THE SPOT. TO PUT IT IN A NUTSHELL, I AM STILL VERY
MUCH OF THE VIEW WHICH I PUT TO YOU IN LONDON AND TO THE PRIME
MINISTER AT CHEQUERS IE THAT WE PEAKED WITH SCR 502 AND THAT IT
IS VERY HARD TO ENVISAGE ANY FURTHER POSITIVE ACTION WHICH WE
COULD TAKE IN THE UN WITHOUT COURTING TROUBLE.

4. IT WAS WITH THE ABOVE THOUGHTS IN MIND THAT I ADVANCED THE
IDEAS IN MY TELNOS 480 AND 481. I INTENDED THEM TO ILLUSTRATE,
WITH THE PROS AND CONS, THE ONLY KIND OF INITIATIVE WHICH WE
COULD TAKE WITH ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND WITHOUT TYING OUR HANDS
MILITARILY FOR MORE THAN A STRICtLY LIMITED PERIOD. I WAS NOT
ADVOCATING THE IDEAS AS SUCH, SO MUCH AS POINTING OUT THAT IF
WE WANTED TO KEEP THE INITIATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE ONLY
WAY WE COULD DO SO WOULD BE TO PUT FORWARD A SUBSTANTIVE PACKAGE.
THE DRAFT IN MY TELNO 481 SEEMED TO ME TO BE THE MAXIMUM THAT WE
MIGHT BE ABLE TO GET AWAY WITH WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE AMENDMENT.
IF A DRAFT ON THESE LINES IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO MINISTERS, THE
BEST WAY FOR US TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
WILL BE TO CONTINUE TO WAIT UNTIL SOMEONE ELSE CALLS FOR RESUMED
PROCEEDINGS THERE. I WOULD CONTINUE TO DO MY BEST TO POSTPONE
THIS MOMENT AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND, ONCE BACK IN THE COUNCIL,
WOULD USE EVERY MANOEUVRE AT MY DISPOSAL TO PROLONG DISCUSSION
AND DELAY THE MOMENT WHEN WE WERE DRIVEN INTO A CORNER AND OBLIGED
TO VETO. I COULD PROBABLY HOLD OUT FOR SEVERAL DAYS. THERE ARE
PLENTY OF POSSIBILITIES.
5. Even if Ministers could accept something on the lines of my TELNO 481, it would be extremely difficult to get such a resolution adopted, much more so than SCR 502, which we achieved essentially because of widespread anti-pathy to the use of force. In the present case it would be we who would be seen to be on the point of using force. We could exploit this as a means of pressure on the faint-hearted to accept our resolution, but there would be a risk that someone would table an interim resolution calling on us not to use force while our proposals were under consideration.

6. I would not in any case have a hope of getting a resolution through in less than three or four days from scratch. The Council would not let me bulldoze them a second time. First, unless I invited defeat in a procedural vote, I would have to allow 24 hours for Costa Mendez to get here (an inevitable demand). Then the Council would want to hear his views in public debate (the Russians/Panamanians would see to that). If he objected to the package, weak sisters might abstain in the vote if I refused to accept amendments, on the ground that no good would come of a substantive resolution which was not acceptable to both parties. There would be many other problems (some mentioned in my TELNO 480) which I need not spell out again. But, all in all, there would be an outside sporting chance of pulling it off and, if we failed through lack of votes or a veto, we would be in a better position to justify the subsequent use of force if and when the storm breaks here.

7. This would not be true of the text in your telegram under reference which would precipitate the situation we are trying to avoid. It leaves the future of our task force ambiguous and the absence of reference to South Georgia etc would arouse suspicion that our intention was to seize South Georgia as a base and negotiate from strength with our fleet hovering round the Falklands. Fair enough to reasonable people, but this is not a reasonable place. We would get amendments designed to "clarify" these situations which I would probably have to veto, or withdraw the resolution, leaving the field open to a counter-draft with the obvious consequences.
ONE OR TWO FINAL POINTS. FIRST, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE "DO GOODERS" OR OTHERS ARE LIKELY TO CALL THE COUNCIL WHILE HAIG IS STILL IN ACTION. IF THEY DO, WE SHOULD BRING MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON THE AMERICANS AND FRENCH TO JOIN US IN A TRIPLE VETO OF ANYTHING UNACCEPTABLE TO US ON THE GROUND THAT IT CUT ACROSS HAIG'S EFFORTS.

9. SECONDLY, IF HAIG FAILS AND IF IT IS DECIDED THAT THERE IS NO VALID INITIATIVE WHICH WE CAN TAKE IN THE COUNCIL, WE MUST ENSURE THAT THE AMERICANS COOPERATE WITH US TO THE FULL HERE (NOT EASY WITH MRS. KIRKPATRICK IN THE SADDLE). THERE IS AN EXPECTATION HERE THAT, WIN OR LOSE, THE AMERICANS WILL AT SOME STAGE REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON HAIG'S MISSION EVEN THOUGH IT IS OUTSIDE THE UN FRAMEWORK - THE ARGUMENT BEING THAT IT IS BASED ON SCR 502. IF HAIG FAILED AND THE AMERICANS DECIDED THAT THEY MUST TAKE SOME ACTION OF THIS KIND, THE EFFECT ON OUR CAUSE COULD BE SERIOUS UNLESS WE HAD WORKED OUT WITH THEM IN ADVANCE A LINE TO TAKE WHICH WOULD ENABLE BOTH OF US (THIS MIGHT JUST ENCOURAGE THE FRENCH TO FOLLOW SUIT) TO VETO ANYTHING UNDESIRABLE. SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD MAKE LIFE A GREAT DEAL EASIER FOR US, PARTICULARLY WITH A GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION IN MIND. HENCE I STRONGLY ENDORSE THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF YOUR MESSAGE TO HAIG (PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELNO 749 TO WASHINGTON).

PARSONS
SECRET

ZZ WASHINGTON
GRS 717
SECRET
PM FCO 180930Z APRIL 82
TO FLASH WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 749 OF 18 APRIL
FALKLANDS: CORRESPONDENCE WITH HAIG

1. I HAVE THIS MORNING RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING FURTHER MESSAGE FROM HAIG IN BUENOS AIRES.

BEGIN. BASED ON THE UNACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE WHICH I RECEIVED AND SENT TO YOU LAST NIGHT (FRIDAY), I THREATENED TO BREAK OFF THIS PROCESS. AS A RESULT, I WAS INVITED TO MEET WITH THE JUNTA, AND SPENT TWO HOURS WITH THEM THIS MORNING (SATURDAY). THE CHARACTER OF THE GROUP IS ESSENTIALLY AS I IMAGINED: GALTIERI IS THE LEAST BRIGHT AND GIVEN TO BLUSTER; THE ADMIRAL IS ULTRA HARD-LINE; THE AIR FORCE GENERAL IS BRIGHT. POLITICALLY REASONABLE - RELATIVELY SPEAKING - BUT CLEARLY THIRD IN INFLUENCE.

I IMPRESSED ON THESE MEN IN THE STRONGEST TERMS THAT BRITISH RESOLVE WAS BEYOND DOUBT, AND THAT THEY WERE ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH MILITARY HUMILIATION AND ECONOMICruIN. WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE ADMIRAL - WHOSE DEFINITION OF GLORY HAS LITTLE TO DO WITH THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY SUCCESS - I WOULD SAY THESE MEN ARE WORRIED. THEY ARE FEELING THE PRESSURE OF YOUR FLEET, THOUGH IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE FOR YOU TO ASSUME THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO FIGHT.

THE JUNTA URGED ME TO STAY AND TRY TO 'SOLVE THE PROBLEM' WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER. IN HOPES THAT THEY WOULD IMPART FLEXIBILITY TO THEIR NEGOTIATORS I AGreed TO DO SO. THE TEN-HOUR SESSION THAT ENDED WAS EXCRUTIATINGLY DIFFICULT. WE SPENT MOST OF THAT TIME ON THE LANGUAGE DEALING WITH THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE DEFINITIVE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS. YOUR LANGUAGE WAS REJECTED OUT OF HAND. I PRESSED UPON THEM LANGUAGE THAT AVOIDS REJUDGING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE WHILE PRESERVING WHAT YOU MUST HAVE WITH REGARD TO THE RIGHTS OF THE ISLANDERS. THE ARGENTINES ARE NOW DEVELOPING A NEW FORMULATION BUT I EXPECT IT WILL BE PREGNANT WITH THE CONCEPT

/OF ASSURED

1
SECRET
OF ASSURED ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY.

THE ISSUE OF TRAVEL, TRADE, ETC, IN THE INTERIM PERIOD WAS ALSO HOTLY CONTESTED. THERE WILL BE NO AGREEMENT UNLESS IT INVOLVES A CLEAR PROSPECT OF GENUINE PROMOTION OF VARIOUS FORMS OF INTER ACTION, WITH THE NECESSARY SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER FEARS COULD OCCUR.

WE ARE ALSO ENCOUNTERING DIFFICULTY ON THE QUESTION OF INTERIM ADMINISTRATION, THOUGH THE INTEGRITY OF THE IDEA WE DISCUSSED IN LONDON HAS BEEN MAINTAINED.

FINALLY, THOUGH WE DID NOT DISCUSS IT AT LENGTH THERE WAS A DEFINITE FORESHADOWING OF SERIOUS PROBLEMS ON THE QUESTION OF MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT - IE STOPPING THE FLEET AND REMOVING THE SUBMARINES. I THINK THIS MATTER CAN BE SETTLED IN TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO THE UK. THOUGH NOT WITHOUT MORE FLEXIBILITY THAN I ENCOUNTERED IN LONDON. ALL IN ALL, AS OF NOW THE SITUATION IS GRIM. I WILL RECEIVE A NEW ARGENTINE TEXT DURING THE NIGHT AND THEN DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO BREAK OFF.

I WILL ONLY CONSIDER COMING TO LONDON IF THE ARGENTINES GIVE ME A TEXT THAT GOES WELL BEYOND THEIR POSITION TODAY. I DO NOT WANT TO SHIFT THE SPOTLIGHT ON TO YOU IF IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ARGENTINE PROPOSAL IS UNACCEPTABLE. EVEN IF I DO NOT COME TO LONDON, I WILL OF COURSE SEND YOU THE ARGENTINE TEXT.

IF I SUSPEND MY MISSION TOMORROW MORNING I WILL LEAVE NO DOUBT WHERE LIES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE IMPASSE. ENDS.

2. PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM ME. BEGINS. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR MESSAGE THIS MORNING ABOUT YOUR TALKS IN BUENOS AIRES. YOU ARE CLEARLY MAKING SUPER-HUMAN EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A REASONABLE RESULT. WE IN LONDON ARE MOST GRATEFUL. SUCCESS WOULD BE A TREMENDOUS ACHIEVEMENT AND WE VERY MUCH HOPE THAT YOU CAN BRING THE ARGENTINES TO SEE REASON.

IF, MOST REGRETTABLY, YOU WERE TO CONCLUDE THAT YOU COULD NOT CONTINUE YOUR MISSION FOR THE TIME BEING, WE SHOULD NEED A LITTLE TIME TO CONSIDER WHAT TO DO NEXT. IF YOU ANNOUNCED A DECISION TO SUSPEND YOUR EFFORTS BEFORE WE HAD DECIDED WITH YOU ON NEXT STEPS, THE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE MIGHT PASS TO OTHERS. WE SHOULD THEREFORE BE MOST GRATEFUL TO KNOW YOUR INTENTIONS IN

/GOOD TIME

SECRET

SECRET
SECRET

GOOD TIME BEFORE ANY ANNOUNCEMENT. ONE WAY OF HOLDING THE POSITION MIGHT BE FOR YOU TO SAY ON LEAVING BUENOS AIRES THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD NOT TRIED SERIOUSLY TO NEGOTIATE A REASONABLE OUTCOME AND THAT YOU WOULD BE REPORTING ON THE SITUATION TO THE PRESIDENT AND DISCUSSING FURTHER STEPS WITH HIM. ENDS.

3. TEXT IN PARAGRAPH 2 ALSO PASSED TO U.S. EMBASSY.

PYM

[COPY SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

NNNN

STANDARD
S A M D
EMERGENCY UNIT

COPIES TO:

PS/HOME SECRETARY
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
PS/SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG CABINET OFFICE
MR S FULLER DIO CABINET OFFICE

SECRET

3
CIVILIANS.

STEPHEN JOHN MARTIN OF THE BAS HAS INFORMED US THAT AS AT 3 APRIL THE WHEREABOUTS OF MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH ANTARCTIC SURVEY AND OTHER CIVILIANS WAS AS FOLLOWS:

BIRD ISLAND 4 BAS
PAUL COPESTAKE
PAUL HUMPHRIES
JULIAN HECTOR
BARRY WHEELER

SCHLIEPER BAY 2 BAS
PAUL MARTIN
WILLIAM DOIGE (CANADIAN NATIONAL)

ST ANDREWS BAY 3 BAS 2 ANGLIA TV
ANNE PRICE, ANGLIA TV
LUCINDA BUXTON ANGLIA TV
LYELL HUT 3 BAS 1 NERC STUDENT
CAMPBELL GEMMEL NERC STUDENT
IAN BARKER
TREFOR EDWARDS
DAMIEN SANDERS
(ABOVE NAMES NOW PROBABLY IN GRYTVIKEN)

15 PERSONS IN TOTAL.

THOSE AT SCHLIEPER BAY AND LYELL HUT COULD BE SHORT OF FOOD.
HOWEVER THOSE AT LYELL ARE WITHIN WALKING DISTANCE OF MAIN
BASE AT GRYTVIKEN, WHERE THEY PROBABLY NOW ARE. THOSE AT
BIRD ISLAND AND ST ANDREWS BAY SHOULD BE OK FOR FOOD.

HUTCHINSON

SENT/RCVD AT 181658Z  TWW/RH
Immediate
Advance Copy

00 FCO DESKBY 181800Z

GRS 300
SECRET
DESKBY 181800Z

FM WASHINGTON 181646Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1339 OF 18 APRIL

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 749: FALKLANDS

1. IF THE TALKS IN BUENOS AIRES BREAK DOWN, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO US TO GET A CLEAR STATEMENT FROM THE AMERICANS OF WHERE THE RESPONSIBILITY LIES AND OF SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION. SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD BE IMPORTANT INTER ALIA TO HELP COUNTER THE MOVES THE ARGENTINIANS CAN THEN BE EXPECTED TO MAKE IN THE OAS TO INVOKE THE RIO TREATY.

2. AS OF LAST NIGHT BOTH THE WHITE HOUSE (MY TELNO 1332) AND HAIG HAD GOTTEN TO THE POINT OF PREPARING TO MAKE A STATEMENT OF WHERE THE RESPONSIBILITY LAY.

3. AS WILL BE CLEAR FROM MY EARLIER TELEGRAMS, HOWEVER, THERE WILL STILL BE SOME, INCLUDING SOME OF THOSE ACCOMPANYING HAIG, WHO WILL SEEK TO DISSUADE HIM FROM MAKING SUCH A STATEMENT, ARGUING THAT THIS WOULD UNDERCUT HIS ABILITY SUBSEQUENTLY TO RESUME HIS MEDIATING EFFORTS AND THAT, AS ONE OFFICIAL HERE Sought TO ARGUE TO US, YESTERDAY, IT WOULD THEREFORE BE BEST TO AVOID QUOTE FINGER POINTING UNQUOTE.

4. IF HAIG MAKES SOME PROGRESS WITH THE JUNTA TODAY, THE PROBLEM WILL NOT ARISE OR AT ANY RATE WILL BE DEFERRED. IF THEY REMAIN INTRANSIGENT, HOWEVER, WHILE MAKING SOME PROGRESS, THEY HAVE APPEARED TO WAGE A PROGRESSIVE DEER IN THE WILDERNESS.
4. If Haig makes some progress with the junta today, the problem will not arise or at any rate will be deferred. If they remain intransigent, however, while giving ourselves time to coordinate, we shall need to watch very carefully for signs of the American going off the boil.

5. We shall also need to consider urgently whether, in the event of a breakdown, we can agree to the Americans revealing where they had got to in their dealings with us. I made clear last night to Clark that it would be crucial to clear anything about this with us, and he has telegraphed to Haig. But I think it inevitable that much of this will come out anyway. Elements of Haig’s negotiating position in Buenos Aires are already surfacing in the press here.

Henderson

NNNN
PS No. 10 DOWNING ST.
PS/CHANCELLOR
SIR K COUZENS
MR LITTLER
MR HAWTIN
MR PERETZ
MR ILETT
MR McINTYRE

HD/S IMMEDIATE
H.M. TSY

Miss DICKSON (EIP DIV) D/EN
DIO CABINET OFFICE
MR WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE
MR FULLER SADU CABINET OFFICE

SIR R. ARMSTRONG CAB. OFFICE

(Copies passed to Emergency Staff, MOD Sitcen and Cinc Fleet)

OO FCO DESKBY 181800Z

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

PP BIS NEW YORK

GRS 500
RESTRICTED
DESKBY 181800Z
FM WASHINGTON 181641Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 1338 OF 18 APRIL 82
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK BIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS : US PRESS

1. THE WASHINGTON POST REPORTS THAT WHILE AT VARIOUS STAGES YESTERDAY IT LOOKED AS IF THE TALKS WOULD BREAK DOWN COMPLETELY BECAUSE OF ARGENTINE INTRANSIGENCE, HAIG WAS IN THE END ABLE TO ACHIEVE ENOUGH PROGRESS TO JUSTIFY CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS. THE POST SUGGESTS THAT HAIG PROPOSED A TRIPARTITE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS AND THAT THIS WAS REJECTED BY THE ARGENTINES BECAUSE IT LEFT THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE UNRESOLVED. THE TALKS WERE CONDUCTED "UNDER PRESSURE OF AN ABRUPT US DEPARTURE".
2. The post notes growing tension in Buenos Aires with no signs of last week's fervent patriotism. In place of the 100,000 demonstrators outside the presidential palace on Haig's last visit, groups of spectators waited anxiously to learn whether a solution had been reached. Despite national support for Galtieri over the Falklands, the post notes the regime's continuing difficulties with opposition political and Labour leaders.

3. The New York Times writes of a "transitional plan" calling for withdrawal of the Argentinian troops on the islands and the diversion of the approaching British naval force, with a tripartite provisional administration. Negotiations would begin over the final status of the islands and the wishes of the islanders would be taken into account. Argentine officials are quoted as rejecting this proposal.

4. The post carries a report from its Buenos Aires correspondent questioning whether the British naval force is carrying sufficient troops to undertake an assault on the islands. Drew Middleton, reporting from London, draws attention to the efforts which will be needed to sustain a blockade over a considerable period of time.

5. The post, while strongly approving Haig's efforts to achieve an agreement, notes the confusion which has accompanied these, with leaks to the press here about US assistance to Britain and contradictory briefings by administration officials.

6. The New York Times suggests that the issues at stake are as high for the United States as for Britain. If American diplomatic efforts fail, public opinion in Britain could react against the United States. The US appearance of neutrality has been contrasted unfavourably with the support from the European Community. This could aggravate the difficulties over nuclear weapons deployments in Europe. A failure would also open up major opportunities for the Soviet Union in Latin America.

Henderson
DEAR FRANCIS,

1. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR MESSAGE AND YOUR KIND WORDS OF SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT.

2. THE ARGENTINES DELIVERED TO ME AT THE HOTEL AT 2 A.M. THIS MORNING A REVISED TEXT RESULTING FROM YESTERDAY'S MARATHON SESSION. ALTHOUGH THEIR REVISIONS ARE STILL UNSATISFACTORY, I BELIEVE WE NOW HAVE -- FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE WE BEGAN THIS MISSION -- SOME MOVEMENT TOWARD A WORKABLE SOLUTION FOR YOU AND ARGENTINES.

3. BASED ON THIS ASSESSMENT, WE WILL RENEW OUR DELIBERATIONS AT THE CASA ROSADA AT 2 P.M. LOCAL -- THIS GAP IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE THE WEARY PARTICIPANTS SOME BREAK IN THE PACE -- BUT NOT TOO MUCH.

4. IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT WE MIGHT HAVE A WORKABLE DRAFT BY THE END OF THE DAY (THE DAY NEVER ENDS IN BUENOS AIRES UNTIL THE STROKE OF MIDNIGHT) OR SOMETIME TOMORROW. IN THIS EVENT, A RETURN TO LONDON MIGHT BE JUSTIFIED. IF WE RETURN, I KNOW YOU RECOGNIZE THAT EXPECTATIONS WILL BE RAISED AND THE SPOTLIGHT WOULD SHIFT FROM THE CASA ROSADA TO NUMBER 10. YOU HAVE MY ASSURANCES THAT I WOULD UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES MOVE PRECIPITOUSLY EITHER TO LONDON OR WASHINGTON WITHOUT GIVING YOU AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT WITH US. I SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE VOID WHICH WOULD RESULT IF THE U.S. MISSION IS SUSPENDED. IT WOULD BE FILLED BY UNPREDICTABLE FORCES.

MY WARM REGARDS TO YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER.

AL.

END TEXT. HAIG
CONFIDENTIAL

DESKY 196222Z
FM OTTAWA 181634Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 218 OF 18 APRIL
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO AND UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLAND ISLANDS

SIR PHILIP MOORE TOLD ME YESTERDAY AFTERNOON THAT HE HAD SOME OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO MR TRUDEAU DURING THE QUEEN'S VISIT. MR TRUDEAU HAD BEEN ROBUST AND CLEAR THAT WE MUST BE SUPPORTED.

2. MR TRUDEAU HAD EXPRESSED TO SIR PHILIP MOORE GREAT CONCERN ABOUT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ATTITUDE. IF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION DID NOT SOON COME OFF THE FENCE AND START PUTTING REAL PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINE HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE WIDESPREAD DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER THE AMERICANS COULD BE RELIED ON IN A CRISIS AND SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.


MORAN

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FM JEDDA 180929Z APR 82
TO PRIORITY FC0
TEL NO 171 OF 18 APR

YOUR TEL NO 53 TO BERNE AND NOS GUIDANCE 51 AND 61: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. I CALLED AGAIN ON THE HEAD OF WESTERN DEPARTMENT IN THE MFA TO-DAY. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION AMBASSADOR QABBANI SAID THAT HE HAD REPORTED MY EARLIER DEMARCHE TO PRINCE SAUD BUT HAD NOT

YET HAD ANY REACTION FROM HIM. SAUD WAS STILL IN RIYADH PREPARING FOR THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL.

2. I WENT ON TO MAKE THE POINTS IN YOUR TEL GUIDANCE NO 51 AND I HANDED OVER A BOUT DE PAIPER. I ALSO SPOKE ABOUT SELF-

DETERMINATION (YOUR TEL NO GUIDANCE 61) AND ASKED FOR SAUDI SUPPORT OVER ARGENTINE EXPORTS AND OVER LOANS AND EXPORT CREDITS (YOUR TEL NO 53 TO BERNE). I HANDED QABBANI A PAPER SETTING OUT THE FIGURES FOR SAUDI/ARGENTINE TRADE. HE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY SAUDI LOANS OR EXPORT CREDITS TO ARGENTINA. NOR ARE WE, BUT WE ARE ENQUIRING IN FINANCIAL CIRCLES.

3. QABBANI WAS AS USUAL SYMPATHETIC BUT NON-COMMITTAL. HE SAID HE WOULD REPORT TO PRINCE SAUD AND LET ME KNOW THE REACTION. IF THERE IS TIME, I SHALL RAISE THE MATTER WITH PRINCE NAIF, THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, WHEN I SEE HIM ON 21 APRIL.

CRAIG

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THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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Desks/FCO 1813002
Desks/Lisbon 1813002
FM Madrid, 180932Z Apr 82
To Immediate FCO
Telegram number 203 of 18 April
and to immediate Lisbon
Info priority Washington Bonn UKDEL NATO Governor Gibraltar
(Personal) UKDEL Strasbourg

Anglo-Spanish relations
The Spanish foreign minister asked me to call at his flat
at short notice on the evening of Saturday, 17 April. He had
just returned from the King’s state visit to Norway.

2. Perez-Llorca said that the Spanish prime minister’s visit
to Athens earlier in the week, which he had also attended, had
gone well. Ratification of Spanish entry into NATO would not
(not) be impeded by the Greeks. Calvo Sotelo certainly hoped
to attend the June meeting of NATO and he himself still hoped
to be present at the foreign ministers' meeting next month.
The Dutch parliament should present no (no) problem. But now
a new snag had arisen in Lisbon. The necessary legislative
action had been introduced in the Portuguese assembly where it
was now with the defence committee. The socialists there were
arguing that Portugal should seek assurances about the new
command structure and Portugal’s own position within the alliance
before ratifying the protocol. This had struck a responsive
chord within the ruling coalition whose caucus was apparently
meeting this Monday. Such pre-conditions would set a dangerous
precedent and were not reasonable, given the assurances which
Spain had already conveyed to Portugal both publicly and privately.
In an attempt to help, Perez-Llorca had cancelled his own visit
to Portugal due for April 21 and 22, when the final vote in the
Portuguese parliament should be taken.

3. Perez-Llorca said he would be grateful for anything our
ambassador in Lisbon could do urgently to stiffen the Portuguese
government’s resolution to get the protocol ratified without
pre-conditions. It would be helpful if he would work with his
American and German colleagues, who were also in the picture
as Spain’s other best allies. I undertook to convey an
immediate message.

4. Perez-Llorca added that he welcomed this opportunity to be in
touch with me again. (Owing to his absence in Athens and Oslo,
I had not seen him since the Spanish abstention on our security
council resolution over the Falklands). He said ruefully that
he did not have a guilty conscience about that decision. (I
formed the conclusion that the opposite was in fact the case). /The
SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 181646Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1339 OF 16 APRIL

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 749: FALKLANDS

1. IF THE TALKS IN BUENOS AIRES BREAK DOWN, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO US TO GET A CLEAR STATEMENT FROM THE AMERICANS OF WHERE THE RESPONSIBILITY LIES AND OF SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION. SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD BE IMPORTANT INTER ALIA TO HELP COUNTER THE MOVES THE ARGENTINIANS CAN THEN BE EXPECTED TO MAKE IN THE OAS TO INVOKE THE RIO TREATY.

2. AS OF LAST NIGHT BOTH THE WHITE HOUSE (MY TELNO 1332) AND HAIG HAD GOTTEN TO THE POINT OF PREPARING TO MAKE A STATEMENT OF WHERE THE RESPONSIBILITY LAY.

3. AS WILL BE CLEAR FROM MY EARLIER TELEGRAMS, HOWEVER, THERE WILL STILL BE SOME, INCLUDING SOME OF THOSE ACCOMPANYING HAIG, WHO WILL SEEK TO DISSUADE HIM FROM MAKING SUCH A STATEMENT, ARGUING THAT THIS WOULD UNDERCUT HIS ABILITY SUBSEQUENTLY TO RESUME HIS MEDIATING EFFORTS AND THAT, AS ONE OFFICIAL HERE SOUGHT TO ARGUE TO US YESTERDAY, IT WOULD THEREFORE BE BEST TO AVOID QUOTE FINGER POINTING UNQUOTE.

4. IF HAIG MAKES SOME PROGRESS WITH THE JUNTA TODAY, THE PROBLEM WILL NOT ARISE OR AT ANY RATE WILL BE DEFERRED. IF THEY REMAIN INTRANSIGENT, HOWEVER, WHILE GIVING OURSELVES TIME TO COORDINATE, WE SHALL NEED TO WATCH VERY CAREFULLY FOR SIGNS OF THE AMERICANS GOING OFF THE BOIL.

5. WE SHALL ALSO NEED TO CONSIDER URGENTLY WHETHER, IN THE EVENT OF A BREAKDOWN, WE CAN AGREE TO THE AMERICANS REVEALING WHERE THEY HAD GOTTEN IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH US. I MADE CLEAR LAST NIGHT TO CLARK THAT IT WOULD BE CRUCIAL TO CLEAR ANYTHING ABOUT THIS WITH US, AND HE HAS TELEGRAPHED TO HAIG, BUT I THINK IT INEVITABLE THAT MUCH OF THIS WILL COME OUT ANYWAY. ELEMENTS OF HAIG’S NEGOTIATING POSITION IN BUENOS AIRES ARE ALREADY SURFACING IN THE PRESS HERE.

HENDERSON [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]
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CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 160102Z APR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1336 OF 18 APRIL

FALKLANDS

1. KISSINGER HAS PHONED REFERRING TO BRITISH OPINION ABOUT THE USA ON THIS ISSUE. HE DOES NOT THINK ANYONE IN LONDON IS WAITING WITH BAITED BREATH TO KNOW HIS VIEW BUT IT IS AS FOLLOWS IN CASE THERE SHOULD BE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING.

1) THE USA SHOULD PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO HMG.
FROM WHAT HE HAS HEARD HE DOES NOT THINK HMG SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO GO ANY FURTHER.
2) IF THERE IS A SHOW-DOWN THE USA SHOULD GO FOR BROKE ON THE BRITISH SIDE.
3) IN THE MEANTIME HE RECOGNIZES THAT SOME DELICACY IS NEEDED IN EXPRESSING USA VIEWS IF A SETTLEMENT WITH ARGENTINA IS TO BE REACHED.
I SAID THAT UNTIL THE US GOVERNMENT REVEALS 2 TO THE ARGENTINIANS THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO GET 1. KISSINGER SAID THAT FROM HIS CONTACTS WITH THE WHITE HOUSE HE BELIEVED THAT THAT WAS WHAT HAIG WAS NOW DOING. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE FOUR-SQUARE BEHIND US AND WOULD NOT TRY TO PUSH US FURTHER. IF HE HAD BEEN DOING THE SHUTTLE HE WOULD HAVE LET THE ARGENTINIANS STEW A BIT LONGER WHILE THE BRITISH FLEET GOT NEARER.

3. KISSINGER THOUGHT THAT THE OUTCOME WOULD BE GOOD FOR BRITAIN. AS REGARDS THE ARGENTINIANS, HE WAS NOT SURE THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO EXECUTE ANY SETTLEMENT. HE THOUGHT THAT A COMBINATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS AND PERONISTAS WOULD TAKE OVER THERE.

HENDERSON

NNNN
Muscat Palace

18th April, 1982.

PERSONAL.

Dear Friend,

It is with sorrow we have noted the events in the British Falkland Islands in recent days. Such an unfortunate problem occurring at a time when you felt your Government was on the way to success, particularly with regard to its financial strategy, must be a great blow to you. We are sending you, therefore, this personal note to convey our sympathy, best wishes and support.

We are particularly concerned for your well-being, whilst the memory of our most enjoyable visit to the United Kingdom is still very fresh. We are aware of how much you personally did in order to achieve the success of that Visit. We feel, therefore, that you richly deserve a satisfactory outcome to this disturbing and uncalled for incident. We pray that you and your Government, the British people and particularly any of those in the Armed Forces who may be called upon to fight, will have God's blessing and strength of purpose.

We wish also to be remembered to your family, who, we know, must be of great help to you at this time during these difficulties. We send you every good wish and assurances that our thoughts are with you.

Qaboos

The Rt. Honourable Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP.,
Prime Minister.
FALKLAND ISLANDS
SITREP BY FCO 0730 18 APRIL

Haig Initiative

1. Mr Haig began his second day of talks in Buenos Aires pessimistic following 'totally unacceptable' Argentine proposals (his message of 17 April to Mr Pym, see FCO telno. 747 to Washington). Clark at the White House told Sir N Henderson that Haig's instructions would be to make clear the US view of Argentine intransigence and which side they would be on if talks broke down.

2. However Haig held a further meeting with Costa Mendez from 1600 to 2155 local and will be resuming later today (Washington telno. 1337). Galtieri was not present. Meanwhile agencies reported that the Argentine generals met until 1830 (local time) under the chairmanship of the Army Chief of Staff to discuss Haig's proposals, and would also resume today.

US

3. Yesterday's American press stressed British 'resentment' at US impartiality, prompting Dr Kissinger to phone Sir N Henderson to make clear his view that in a showdown the US would be entirely on the British side. He believed Haig would be using this argument to pressure Argentina to an acceptable settlement.

Latin America

4. Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia have announced that they will increase their trade with Argentina to compensate for European and other economic measures.

Royal Marines and BAS Personnel

5. The party of 29 marines and 13 BAS personnel notified through Swiss Embassy Buenos Aires and through Uruguayan MFA as flying to Montevideo last night (Montevideo telno. 147), arrived at 0420 GMT today (telno. 148), none injured. RAF VC10 departed 2230 GMT last night to collect them all: ETA Brize Norton 0330 on 20 April.

Journalists

6. Argentine MFA have confirmed reports that the three missing British journalists have been arrested in Ushuaia and charged with espionage. The Sunday Times believe the case is coming up tomorrow and are sending Isobel Hilton to attend (Montevideo telno. 1 to Berne). The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation have now said that three of their reporters and their interpreter have been arrested at Comodoro Rivadavia.

C M J Segar
Emergency Unit

SECRET
FALKLAND ISLANDS

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