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INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

Points to Make (Defensive)

1. [We should not raise this question and it is most unlikely that the Argentines will. If they do ask whether we would consider taking the dispute to an international tribunal, Mr Ridley should say that he will need time to consult his Ministerial colleagues before giving HMG's answer].
Essential Facts

1. The question of British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies has not been submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or to any other international arbitration. Since Argentina has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, any reference to the Court could only be made with the agreement of the Argentine Government.

2. In 1947 and subsequently HMG offered to submit the dispute over Argentine claims in the Dependencies to the ICJ. In 1955 HMG applied unilaterally to the Court against encroachments on British sovereignty in the Dependencies by Argentina and Chile. However, the matter could not be pursued since both Argentina and Chile declined to submit to the Court's jurisdiction in the matter.

3. In 1966 the question arose as to whether in the course of negotiations with the Argentines the UK should offer to refer the dispute over the Falkland Islands to the ICJ.

4. The question was not, however, pursued further. This was partly because reference to the Court would have had no attraction for Argentina, but more because the composition of the Court had by then become less favourable for the UK on what is seen by many other members of the UN as a colonial problem.

5. Legal Advisers do not dissent from the views expressed by the Law Officers in 1966, nor do they consider the composition of the ICJ as any more favourable to the UK position than in 1966. If for political reasons it seemed advisable to offer international arbitration...
arbitration (either the ICJ or an Ad hoc Arbitration Tribunal) to
the Argentines again as a method of resolving the dispute, the
Law Officers would need to be consulted before taking such a step.
They also advise that reference to an ad hoc arbitration tribunal
might be preferable to reference to the ICJ since the composition
of the former would have to be agreed between us and the Argentines.
But, given the Argentines' repudiation of the British award in
the Beagle Channel case (see Brief no 26), the Argentine
Government might think we were being offensive if we suggested
arbitration again as a means of solving the dispute.
FALKLAND ISLANDS: ANGLO-ARGENTINE TALKS (NEW YORK, 28-30 APRIL 1980)

THE LEGAL POSITION

Points to make (if raised)

1. We have no doubts about British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies.

2. The UK have exercised sovereignty continuously over the Islands for 147 years. Argentina's claim is without legal foundation.
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Series: FCO 7

Piece: 3801

Folio(s): ANNEX A

Document(s) temporarily retained in Department of origin

REVIEW NOT COMPLETED
THE ARGENTINE CLAIM

1. Since Britain took possession in 1833, Argentina has protested that she is entitled to sovereignty over the Islands. Her claims are primarily based on the grounds that:
   a) she has inherited Spain's previous titles to the Islands (Spain in fact appears not to have formally renounced her title or to have explicitly ceded it to Argentina);
   b) she effectively occupied the Islands from 1820 to 1833 when they reverted to a status ofterra nullius(in 1829 an Argentine political and military governor was appointed);
   c) the Islands belong to Argentina by right of geographical contiguity, since they are on the Argentine continental shelf;
   d) the Islands' present colonial status is anachronistic;
   e) the Islands' economy has been neglected and would benefit from close association with Argentina.

2. Argentina also argues that the initial forceful occupation and settlement of the Islands and the expulsion of Argentine nationals in 1833 vitiates the whole period of British possession thereafter, and cannot form a good basis for title.

The Dependencies

3. Argentina has from time to time put forward claims to the Dependencies and continues to do so. These claims have at different times been based on proximity to Argentina and alleged inheritance of title from Spain. Argentina first claimed South Georgia in 1927 and the South Sandwich Islands in 1948. Her Majesty's Government rejects all these claims, as without legal or historic foundation.
FALKLAND ISLANDS: ANGLO-ARGENTINE TALKS (NEW YORK, 28-30 APRIL 1980)

SOVEREIGNTY OPTIONS

Points to Make (only if raised by Argentines)

1. Ready to listen to Argentine views and to comment where we can (see Essential Facts).

2. But this exploratory round is not the place to undertake any substantive discussion of sovereignty proposals.

3. All these have to be seen in the context of the paramountcy of Islanders' wishes.
Essential Facts

1. We have no wish to raise sovereignty options. But Argentines will want to discuss sovereignty. This paper summarises the range of possible scenarios for a political solution and comments briefly on their feasibility.

Leaseback

2. Concession to the Argentines of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, the Dependencies and their Maritime Zones. Argentina would simultaneously lease them back to HMG and agree on the co-administration of the economic resources of the maritime zones and seabed. A perpetual lease would be ideal (but the Argentines could not agree to this). The term would have to be negotiated: we should try for, say, 99 years but would inevitably have to settle for something shorter. Comment: it would be a formidable task to negotiate an agreement of this kind acceptable to Britain, Argentina and the Islanders. It would require Argentine agreement to leave the administration and way of life of the Islanders unchanged throughout the period of the lease. It would probably also require outside guarantees.

3. A further extension of a "leaseback" solution, involving more far-reaching concessions to the Argentines, would be to grant effective Argentine sovereignty over the Dependencies and their Maritime Zones, with leaseback operating only for the Falkland Islands and their Maritime Zone. Comment: this might be of more interest to the Argentines. But it could only be carried through against fierce opposition from the Islanders and the lobby.

Mixed Approach

4. Differentiation between territory (in which the Argentines are primarily interested) and people, which is the burden of our concern. It would involve conceding sovereignty over the uninhabited Dependencies (e.g. South Sandwich Islands; but possibly not South Georgia for Antarctic, fish reasons) and their Maritime Zones to
Argentina who would as a *quid pro quo* abandon her sovereignty claim over the inhabited Falkland Islands. **Comment:** unacceptable to Argentina because it would not involve the concession of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands which they are seeking.

**Joint Sovereignty or Condominium**

5. An example is the Anglo-French condominium of the New Hebrides. Co-sovereignty would have to lead eventually to co-administration. It would be extremely complicated. **Comment:** the Islanders would find it unacceptable because it would involve Argentine intervention in their way of life. It would probably be unacceptable to the Argentines in that it would involve their admitting the UK to a share of sovereignty which they claim exclusively.

**Joint Administration**

6. Favoured by the Argentines. Short period of joint administration, followed by phasing out of British presence and full Argentine sovereignty. **Comment:** unacceptable to the Islanders.

**Symbolic Gestures**

7. These would be designed to recognise the existence of a special Argentine interest in the Islands without allowing Argentina to exercise the more substantive attributes of sovereignty, which would remain exclusively with Britain. An example could be the flying of Argentine flags from certain public buildings. Although we would request such a gesture to be covered by the sovereignty umbrella, it would be difficult to maintain that there was not at least some erosion of our position on sovereignty. **Comment:** the Argentines would be unlikely to be satisfied unless the gesture was clearly a first step to more substantial concessions on sovereignty. Symbolic gestures would probably be of most use as part of a package of practical measures designed to reduce the Falkland Islands' isolation from the Argentine mainland.

**Sovereignty "freeze"**

8. This would require Argentine agreement to leave the sovereignty dispute in abeyance for a given period, say 30 years, at the end of which we would both review the sovereignty claim. **Comment:**
nothing in this that would appeal to the Argentines, who want early progress on the sovereignty front.

Other Models

9. Two existing examples of shared sovereignty are:

(a) Spitzbergen where Norway has sovereignty but other powers have the right of "economic access".

(b) The Aaland Islands where Finland has sovereignty but the Islanders enjoy certain special rights reflecting their relationship with Sweden.

Neither would be acceptable to the Islanders, because they would involve an Argentine presence and intervention in their way of life.

Arbitration

10. See Brief no. 6.

"Fortress Falklands"

11. We should firmly refuse to consider any concessions to the Argentines. They will either give way or mount direct or indirect attacks on the Islands and their economy. We should then have to defend them. Comment: The Argentines are not going to give up a sovereignty claim they have maintained for decades. There would be substantial economic and military costs in attempting to maintain such a position in the Islands. We could expect no support internationally, certainly not from Uruguay or Brazil, to whom we would have to look for alternative transit facilities. We are in a minority of one in the United Nations on this issue. The fortress concept would effectively prevent all development in the Islands without the continued injection of substantial capital and other aid; and it would also prevent any exploitation of the Maritime Zones generated by the Islands and Dependencies.
ARGENTINA'S ATTITUDE TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

Essential Facts

1. All Argentine regimes, whether civilian or military, subscribe to the sovereignty claim over the Falkland Islands and Dependencies. The claim is based on alleged inheritance of title from Spain and Argentine occupation of the Islands between 1820 and 1832. But it is not just a matter of law, but one of national honour and machismo. It fits in with military and nationalist pre-occupation with "sovereignty", inspired partly by fear (about national security) and partly by ambition (the historical rivalry with Brazil). Every child learns at school that the Islands are Argentine and illegally occupied by Britain. If the Islands ever became Argentine, it is unlikely that many Argentines would wish to settle there; the main significance of the Islands would be their strategic position in the South Atlantic and the resources in and under the sea.

2. The Argentines' ability to focus on the Falkland Islands issue is conditioned by internal and external factors. There are few current distractions. Internal subversion, the military's first target after the March 1976 coup, has been largely contained. The Government's economic policies have steadily reduced inflation and increased the country's wealth. Other foreign policy issues are less pressing. Two years ago, Argentine attention was focused primarily on the dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channel. This came close to open war, prevented at the last minute only by the intervention of the Vatican with its offer of mediation (see Brief no. 26). Differences with Paraguay over the exploitation of the hydro-electric potential of the Parana river, whose waters they share, have been overcome. There are signs of a growing cordiality between Argentina and Brazil, the area's traditional rivals.

3. The present Argentine Junta is relatively moderate, but it has constantly to defend its position against hard-liners in the Armed Forces. If some major internal quarrel arose (on foreign

/or domestic
or domestic e.g. economic policy) the possibility remains of the Junta turning to the Falklands issue to provide a suitable distraction. The closest Argentina has yet come to military action against the Falklands was in the months before the 1976 coup, i.e. at a time when the Government of the day were anxious to divert attention from internal problems.

4. The heat was only taken out of the Falklands dispute in 1976 when HMG showed a willingness to negotiate. The talks which followed between 1977 and 1979 were based on the prospect of some deal on sovereignty being possible. We kept the Argentines in play only with difficulty and there was continuing suspicion among the Argentine officials about the genuineness of our intentions. The Argentines became increasingly impatient about British delaying tactics.

5. The Argentines have been relatively patient since the last round of talks in March 1979. They accepted that the Government needed time to formulate policy and have limited themselves to occasional reminders of their wish to hold talks. In New York, they are likely to insist again on an agreement to transfer sovereignty as a prerequisite for any economic cooperation or joint development of the area's resources. But it is probably true that (despite the effects of inter-Service rivalries) the present military Government in Argentina will wish to avoid raising the temperature on the Falklands dispute. In this respect (and if we decide actively to pursue a political solution), they are likely to be easier to deal with than any civilian Government, more open to domestic pressures.
¿Qué pasa con las Malvinas?

La diplomacia argentina ha demostrado que tiene buenos reflejos al contestar de inmediato las manifestaciones del embajador brasileño acerca de la inclusión del tema de las Malvinas en el comunicado conjunto presidencial dado a conocer en Buenos Aires con motivo de la reciente visita del general Joao Baptista Figueiredo. Las manifestaciones diplomáticas inglesas se enderezaban a influir en la opinión pública del país vecino y a mostrar como un paso inconveniente lo que no es sino un gesto de solidaridad clásico, como reiteración de una postura histórica.

Pero el caso tiene otros extremos. La intemperante actitud del embajador George Hall al decir que no reconoce un archipiélago llamado Malvinas y sí otro (que es el mismo) llamado Falkland, dificilmente pueda ser considerada como un gesto personal. Mucho menos si se tiene en cuenta que el diplomático conoce perfectamente el problema, por haber intervenido en su elucidación durante anteriores destinos. Que las autoridades británicas hayan cambiado el nombre de las islas cuando las ocuparon ilegalmente y por la fuerza en 1833, es una cosa, y que sus funcionarios ignoren la identidad de las mismas es otra muy diferente. Cuando alegan no saberlo, cometen el mismo tipo de escamoteo que al reclamar por la autodeterminación de los poblabores actuales (unos mil ochocientos), puesto que los habitantes autóctonos fueron retirados; de ese fragmento de su patria para hacer lugar a otros habitantes, procedentes del hemisferio Norte, que responden, desde luego, a una lealtad distinta. Y la distorsión prosegue si se tiene en cuenta que la economía de las Malvinas está virtualmente monopolizada por una sola compañía, que determina las reacciones en el ámbito insular como dadora de empleos y hace trabajo de "lobbying" en el Parlamento británico.

Es posible suponer, entonces, que cuando el embajador Hall afirma en Brasil que "los Falkland es esto es, los malvinenses" son ejemplo de un pueblo que quiere seguir siendo británico y el gobierno de S.M. jamás abandonaría a un pueblo que desea preservar su identidad británica", y cuando agrega que "las islas son parte de la posesión de Su Majestad británica y no tenemos dudas sobre la soberanía de ese archipiélago", está desmintiendo en la práctica todo progreso en la improba labor negocialora, emprendida a mediados de la década del 60 por la Argentina y el Reino Unido a instancias de las Naciones Unidas y para concluir de una vez con el colonialismo y otras formas afines, consideradas como propias del siglo decimonono y reñidas con la civilización contemporánea. El dilema es de hierro: o bien el embajador inglés en Brasilía contradice expresamente la actitud de su cancillería, o bien el Foreign Office ha disuelto su voluntad de tratar simultáneamente los temas de cooperación y de soberanía con Buenos Aires. Pero esto último, si fuera exacto, equivaldría a contradecir la voluntad de la comunidad internacional, que incitó réttilmente a resolver el problema en forma pacífica, dentro del referido marco de la descolonización, que es inequívoco, aunque se trate específicamente de un caso de preservación de la integridad territorial.

Junto con la satisfacción por la rápida y elocuente respuesta de nuestra diplomacia al exabrupto del representante británico, en Brasilía (el cual adicionalmente se arroga la potestad de aprobar o desaprobabar lo que dos países soberanos incluyen en sus instrumentos internacionales), surge, entonces, la preocupación por conocer el estado real de las ya excesivamente extensas gestiones entabladas para obtener el reintegro del archipiélago. Es comprensible que para ellas rija una prudente reserva. Pero esta última no podría extenderse al sentido general de lo actuado, como es saber si existe o no una propuesta consistente del Reino Unido a mantener la negociación sobre cañones que le permitan prosperar. En este último sentido, la ciudadanía tiene derecho a saber qué es lo que verdaderamente ocurre.
Las islas en cuestión

EL pequeño archipiélago del Atlántico Sur conocido en los países de habla inglesa como Falkland y en el mundo hispano como Islas Malvinas constituyó un factor irritativo que perturbo las relaciones entre este país y Gran Bretaña durante los últimos ciento cincuenta años. La importancia de la mención menciona de la política exterior en su totalidad. Puede ser que las islas no merezcan la atención que reciben. Pero es indiscutible que suscitan un gran interés, que de seguro continuará hasta que se halle una solución definitiva al problema.

Existen pocas dudas en cuanto a qué deberá ser la solución definitiva: el reconocimiento universal de la plena soberanía argentina sobre todo el archipiélago. Lo pensamos así no porque los argumentos argentinos, basados en derechos históricos, sean en sí mismos mejores que los británicos, basados en una prolongada ocupación de hecho y el manifiesto deseo de la pequeña población de vivir bajo la Corona Británica, sino porque esa solución reflejará, como hay que hacer, la realidad de la plena dominación británica sobre las islas, que no se da nunca de postura. En este país las Malvinas constituyen una realidad que todo el mundo reconoce.

En Gran Bretaña son una realidad poco conocida de una importancia considerable. Mientras declina el poder británico, junto con la determinación de emplearlo en lugares aliciados, y crece el poderio argentino en el Atlántico Sur, una transferencia de soberanía debe ser parte del orden natural de las cosas. Es poco realista apuntar que la mayor parte de la historia de las Islas Malvinas es una historia de lucha y de lucha...
Wines from Argentina

The world's fifth largest wine producer, Argentina today offers a range of wines of excellent quality and is rapidly developing as one of the leading wine exporting countries.

The reasons are clear: Argentina's growers offer wines which compare well with the best from other countries - at prices which are decidedly competitive.

Quality is controlled and origin guaranteed by the Government of Argentina through the Wine Board.

The Argentine Wine Board warmly welcomes visitors to the WORLD WINE FAIR (Bristol 16th - 26th July) where they will be able to discuss the wines of Argentina and taste them on Stand No 74.

Further information can also be obtained from the Economic Counsellor, Argentine Embassy, 111 Cadogan Gardens, London SW3. Telephone: 01-730 4388

Instituto Nacional de Vitivinicultura
Argentine Wine Board

Daily Telegraph
16/7

An uncle called at the office to ask me what was up to. I said it was up to the attention of the Daily Telegraph to decide whether to accept the Argentine version of the map of the S. W. Atlantic, although I agreed that it was odd that the United States could show up with the Argentine view on Falklands sovereignty.
FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM LORD CARRINGTON'S INTERVIEW WITH HAROLD BRILEY OF THE BBC, RECORDED IN BRASILIA ON 31 JULY.

HAROLD BRILEY: NOW YOU HAVE WON WORLD ACCLAIM FOR SKILL AND DIPLOMACY IN ZIMBABWE, IS THERE ANY CHANCE OF YOUR TURNING YOUR ATTENTION TO TWO LONGER LASTING PROBLEMS IN THIS REGION WHICH BRITAIN IS DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH, THAT IS TWO COLONIES HERE, BELIZE CLAIMED BY GUATAMALA AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, CLAIMED BY ARGENTINA?

LORD CARRINGTON: WELL THERE IS OF COURSE NO QUESTION OF GUATAMALA CLAIMING THE WHOLE OF BELIZE. THIS IS NOT A MATTER OF NEGOTIATION. BELIZE IS A BRITISH COLONY AND GUATAMALA SAYS THEY HAVE SOME CLAIM OVER SOME OF THE TERRITORY OF BELIZE. WE ARE HAVING SOME CONVERSATIONS WITH THE BELIZIANS AND WITH THE GUATAMALANS, AND I HOPE VERY MUCH IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO GIVE INDEPENDENCE TO BELIZE IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE. WITH REGARD TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, THERE IS NO DOUBT ABOUT THE BRITISH LEGAL RIGHT TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, AND WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR ALL THE WAY ALONG THAT IT'S THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WHICH WILL BE THE DETERMINING FACTOR IN BRITISH POLICY. BUT, GIVEN THAT, WE ARE OF COURSE QUITE READY TO TALK TO THE ARGENTINIANS.

HAROLD BRILEY: WE WOULD LIKE TO GET RID OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS THOUGH, IS THAT NOT SO? IT WOULD BE MORE VIABLE AS AN ECONOMIC PARTNER, FOR EXAMPLE, OF ARGENTINA?


HAROLD BRILEY: NO QUESTION OF HANDING THE FALKLAND ISLANDS OVER TO ARGENTINA?

LORD CARRINGTON: NO.

INSTABILITY IN THE CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA.

/HAROLD BRILEY
HAROLD BRILEY: Do you share the feelings of people in the United States for example that in an unstable area like the Caribbean and Central America, where there is near anarchy in San Salvador on the brink of civil war, Nicaragua going Marxist perhaps, and Guatemala itself having internal unrest, that a whole important area strategically and economically between the Panama Canal and the Mexican oil fields can be Communist?

LORD CARRINGTON: Well, quote go Communist unquote is a phrase that people use rather imprecisely. I think that the instability which is being created by what has happened in Central America is thoroughly bad, and we must all of us, insofar as it is in our power to do so, try and return some kind of stable government to that part of the world. Insofar as it affects British Interests, it affects the problem of Belize and it also affects the stability of the Caribbean where we still have considerable interests. There is no doubt about it that there has been an instability in the Caribbean. We have seen it in the revolution in Grenada by Mr. Bishop, we see it in the unrest in Jamaica. And so all this is of enormous importance to the West, and of particular importance to Britain, and I shall be discussing these things during this trip with the three Foreign Ministers I meet, and with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Barbados.

TOUGHS IN BELIZE.

HAROLD BRILEY: Will we keep our 2000 troops and our Hawker Harrier jets in Belize indefinitely?

LORD CARRINGTON: No, not indefinitely. What we are seeking to do is to grant Belize independence on a basis on which none of that is necessary.

HAROLD BRILEY: So they would be withdrawn if we could get a guarantee that Guatemala would not invade?

LORD CARRINGTON: That's right. If there is security for the Belizeans and there is no need for it, then of course we wouldn't be there.

FALKLANDS.

Q: You said that you dealt with all important international questions in your discussions with the Chancellor and the President. Do you not think the question of the Falkland Islands is an important international question?

A: I think that this is a matter between the Argentine Government and the British Government.

BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY.

Q: Brazil did not participate in the boycott of the Olympics, nor in the grain boycott. To what extent does the UK feel that Brazil might have a bigger role to play in international affairs in this way?

A: I don't think that my country would presume to suggest to other countries how they should behave or what they should do. These are matters for countries themselves to decide. We took one view about the Olympics and your Government took another. There we are, as for a greater part to be played by the Brazilian Government, in world affairs - that again is a matter for the Brazilians to decide. Certainly I think that the Brazilians are playing "A part in..."
A part in world affairs and we welcome the part that they have been playing, notably for example in the trip that the Foreign Minister made to southern Africa the other day.

Q: In your speech today you said that defence and security were the first priorities of any country in its foreign policy. In relation to defence and security does the UK consider Brazil to be a natural ally?

A: I think that all countries which have the same basic interests in the defence of freedom are natural allies.

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Commonwealth Parliamentary Association

26th Annual Conference: Zambia 1980

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. The Falkland Islands have been settled by the British uninterrupted since 1833. Britain has no doubts about its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies and totally rejects Argentina's claim to sovereignty.

2. Britain is concerned to ensure a viable and secure future for the Islands both politically and economically. An economic survey of the Islands (commissioned by the British Government and carried out by Lord Shackleton in 1976) showed that the population was declining and the economy stagnating. No new investment was likely nor any development of economic resources in the area practical in a climate of continued political uncertainty.

3. For that reason, successive British Governments have, with the agreement of Island Councillors, held talks with the Argentines, specifically without prejudice to either side's position on sovereignty. The aim has been to seek a way of working together to develop the economy of the Islands and the resources of the South West Atlantic area, in which all concerned have an interest. The Islanders have been assured that no decisions will be taken against their wishes and that no proposals for a settlement will be put to Parliament which do not have their support.

4. The Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr Ridley), led the British delegation at a round of exploratory talks in April this year. The delegation included for the first time a Falkland Islands Councillor. Although no decisions were taken, each side was able to reach a better understanding of the other's position and it was agreed that contacts on day-to-day matters between the Islands and Argentina should be expanded. Both Britain and Argentina are now considering the position reached. No dates have been set but it is hoped that further exchanges will be held.

5. Some Commonwealth countries do not support Britain's determination to take account of Islander wishes. In 1976 a UNGA
pro-Argentine Resolution on Falklands was adopted by 102 - 1 (UK) with 36 abstentions. (Commonwealth countries voting with Argentina: Bangladesh, Cyprus, Ghana, India, Lesotho, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia).
ANNEX B

BACKGROUND NOTE

FALKLAND ISLANDS: THE DISPUTE

1. The Falkland Islands have been settled by the British since 1833. We have no doubt of our sovereignty over them. They are also claimed by Argentina.

2. We reject this claim. The Islanders wish to remain British and retain their British way of life. But we have to accept the economic and physical implications of the geographical realities. The Islands are over 7,000 miles from the UK but less than 400 from Argentina. It would be difficult to develop them satisfactorily in the absence of some form of agreement with Argentina.

3. The dispute is not only about land but also about maritime zones. As long as no political solution is reached, we can in practice neither control, nor raise revenue from, third country fishing in Falklands waters, nor can we establish a regime for the exploitation of the resources (if any) of the continental shelf. We have refrained from declaring a 200 mile fishery zone to avoid antagonising the Argentines.

4. Successive British Governments have held talks with the Argentines to try to resolve the dispute and obtain for the Islanders the conditions for a secure and prosperous future. But the Argentine have insisted on nothing less than complete transfer of sovereignty and progress has been difficult. We have stated publicly that no agreement will be accepted by HMG unless it is also acceptable to the Islanders. Ministers are committed to keeping Parliament and the
Islanders fully informed of any developments which may affect their future.

TALKS IN NEW YORK 28-29 APRIL

5. The Government authorised the Minister of State at the FCO, Mr Ridley, to hold exploratory talks with the Argentines in New York on 28 and 29 April. An Island Councillor attended as a member of the UK Delegation. The talks were cordial and positive and went rather better than we might have expected. But they were purely exploratory and neither side was empowered to reach any decisions. The Argentines, as expected, put forward their formal claim to sovereignty over the Falklands, but they did not allow this to inhibit the exchanges, which were conducted with considerable frankness. We explored the possibilities for co-operation in development and protection of the economic resources in and under the waters around the Falkland Islands. The Argentines appeared to be interested in wooing the Islanders and a proposal for more direct contacts between the Falkland Islanders and the Argentine mainland was agreed. But it is clear that overall progress still depends on progress on the sovereignty issue.

6. Each side now has to report back. While the intention was expressed to have further rounds of talks, the Argentines will want future exchanges to be more formal (i.e. negotiations rather than talks) and they will want to discuss sovereignty.
From Pax Britannica to Burnley

Mark Arnold-Forster introduces a fortnightly column on perceptions of British foreign policy

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, British foreign policy depended for its success on commercial prowess, the Bank of England, and the Royal Navy. British goods were needed. The British fleet was everywhere. Lord Palmerston could always count on a plentiful supply of gunboats which frightened almost everyone. So could Lord Curzon.

In the end, the navy even started building special gunboats for special rivers. Those who have served on HMS Locust in the English Channel will remember with dismay that she was originally designed for the Yangtze Kiang.

Now that British gunboats are in short supply, the Guardian intends to start a fortnightly series dealing with British foreign policy in the twentieth century's declining years. Can Britain influence foreign events, and if so, how? Has Britain exercised an influence in favour of good, evil, or chaos? By what means does Britain exercise an influence at all?

I have also stopped asking neutrals about the reasons for Soviet shipbuilding, which really go back to the Cuban missile crisis, when the Russians felt humiliated. When I put the same question about Russian ships to Chancellor Kreisky of Austria that I had put to Synnegren, he said that was an "islanders' question" (Insularenfrage), implying, rightly, that I was overbittered about ships at a time when aeroplanes, missiles, and nuclear weapons mattered more.

Which leaves the Foreign Office playing a straight bat and not much else to the major problems which affect the world--like the revival of hostage-taking--and to four problems which are peculiar to Britain. They are the remaining colonies--Hong Kong, Belize, Gibraltar, and the Falkland Islands.

Hong Kong is the worst. Hundreds of refugees from China arrive every night. But there is less room for 100 or more Chinese refugees a night.

The problem that Belize, Gibraltar, and the Falkland Islands have in common is that each is being threatened by a menacing or odious neighbour. Anyone who considers the Government of Guatemala to be benevolent needs his head examined. The same could be said in the case of Argentina. The Spanish Government, though not odious, is still imposing the elements of Franco's blockade of Gibraltar.

There are also the accounts of British influence on the UN in New York and on the numerous international committees in Geneva and Vienna. We hope to explain as many of them as we can. Watch this space. On a forefront on Thursday.

Grain harvest falls far short of this year's predictions.
VISIT BY MR RIDLEY TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS: 22-29 NOVEMBER 1980

Sovereignty Options

Points to make

1. No doubt about British sovereignty. Reject Argentine claim outright.

2. But have to be realistic. Dispute frightens away private investment: economy stagnating and population decreasing. Argentines in position to prevent any exploitation of marine resources not sanctioned by them: potential source of income untapped. Trade with Argentina makes even better commercial sense than trade with UK.

3. Therefore, have to look at possible ways of satisfying Argentine sovereignty claim while preserving British way of life. Details not discussed in New York in April but Councillor Monk will have reported to you Argentines' readiness to explore possibilities.

Freeze

4. Since April, we have looked at all the various options that we can think of. Know that you favoured a freeze or moratorium when I was last here. I can see the advantage in that for you. But I can see nothing in it for the Argentines. They have rejected such a proposal in the past and are unlikely to find any more acceptable now.

Joint sovereignty

5. Another possibility is some sort of shared sovereignty or condominium. Has its theoretical attractions. But falls between 2 stools. It would be extremely difficult to work (c.f. New Hebrides). Would be faced with undesirable level of Argentine involvement in your daily lives and the Argentines would always be pushing to be given overall sovereignty.

Leaseback

6. There are other technical options. But only one seems to me to have even a chance of success: leaseback. We discussed it on my last visit. Under no illusions about difficulty of achieving settlement on this basis. All sides will have to make concessions. But I believe it presents best way of making progress towards solution of problem, while preserving British administration and way of life. (See Brief no. 3: Implications of Leaseback).

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Sovereignty options

Essential facts

1. Possible scenarios for a political solution are set out below. The list is not exhaustive but covers the options most likely to be regarded as feasible.

Sovereignty Freeze

2. This has been put forward by the Islanders in the past. It would require Argentine agreement to leave the sovereignty dispute in abeyance for a fixed period, say 25-50 years, after which both sides would review the sovereignty position. Comment: easy to see why it would appeal to the Islanders but nothing in it for the Argentines who want early progress.

Joint sovereignty or condominium

3. An example is the recently ended Anglo-French condominium of the New Hebrides. Co-sovereignty would inevitably lead to co-administration. It would be extremely complicated. Comment: the Islanders would find it unacceptable because it would involve Argentine intervention in their way of life. It would probably be unacceptable to the Argentines in that it would involve their admitting the UK to a share of sovereignty which they claim exclusively. They might accept it as an interim measure pending full transfer of sovereignty.

Joint administration


Mixed approach

5. Differentiation between territory (in which we judge the Argentines to be primarily interested) and people, which is the burden of our concern. It would involve conceding sovereignty over the uninhabited Dependencies (e.g., South Sandwich Islands; but possibly not South Georgia for Antarctic, fish reasons) and their Maritime Zones to Argentina who would as a quid pro quo abandon her sovereignty claim over the inhabited Falkland Islands. Comment: already discussed at length in previous exchanges; unacceptable to Argentina because it would not involve the concession of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands which they are seeking.
6. A more complicated version would be the cession of all territory to the Argentines, but retention for the UK of full sovereign rights over the people and their way of life. **Comment**: hard to see how it would work. Argentines will not be satisfied with perpetual technical sovereignty over territory alone.

**Leaseback** (see brief no. 3)

7. Concession to the Argentines of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, the Dependencies, their Maritime Zones and Continental Shelves. Argentina would simultaneously lease them back to HMG and agree on cooperation to develop the internal economy of the Islands. A perpetual lease would be ideal (but Argentines are unlikely to agree to this). The term would have to be negotiated: we should try for, say, 99 years but might have to settle for something shorter. **Comment**: it will not be easy to negotiate an agreement of this kind acceptable to Britain, Argentina and the Islanders. The term of the lease would be vital. It would also require Argentine agreement to leave the administration and way of life of the Islanders unchanged throughout the period of the lease. We would certainly want outside guarantees perhaps from the UN to ensure that the Argentines in years to come did not go back on any arrangement. But it would preserve the Islanders' way of life for the foreseeable future and it might satisfy the Argentine wish for titular sovereignty, in the knowledge that they would gain full control in due course.

8. There are several permutations of the basic concept, eg refusal to include South Georgia, agreement to cede the South Sandwich Islands outright etc etc. **Comment**: if the idea of leaseback proved acceptable, we should try to secure an agreement which gave as little away as possible. We cannot know now how far we might have to go.

**Symbolic gestures**

9. These would be designed to recognise the existence of a special Argentine interest in the Islands without allowing Argentina to exercise the more substantive attributes of sovereignty, which would remain exclusively with Britain. An example could be the flying of Argentine flags from certain public buildings, or even the presence of a senior Argentine liaison official. Although we would request such developments to be covered by the sovereignty umbrella, it would be difficult to maintain that there was not at least some erosion of our position on sovereignty. **Comment**: the Argentines would be unlikely to be satisfied unless the gesture was clearly a first step to more substantial concessions on sovereignty. Symbolic gestures would probably be of most use as part of a package of practical measures designed to reduce the Falkland Islands' isolation from the Argentine mainland. They would clearly have a role to play in any final agreement on sovereignty.
Other models

10. Two existing examples of shared sovereignty are:

   a) Spitzbergen where Norway has sovereignty but other powers have the right of "economic access"

   b) The Aaland Islands where Finland has sovereignty but the Islanders enjoy certain special rights reflecting their relationship with Sweden

Neither would be acceptable to the Islanders, because they would involve considerable Argentine presence and intervention in their way of life.

International arbitration (see also Brief no. 25)

11. An international court or arbitration committee would give a binding ruling on the sovereignty position. Comment: unlikely to produce acceptable result for either side. Argentines do not accept jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and they have rejected the findings of an arbitration committee on the Beagle Channel which gave the disputed Islands to Chile. For us, there is the usual danger that a court will find against the "colonial power".

"Fortress Falklands"

12. We could firmly refuse to consider now or in the future any concessions to the Argentines. They would either give way or mount direct or indirect attacks on the Islands and their economy. We should then have to defend them. Comment: the Argentines are not going to give up a sovereignty claim they have maintained for decades. There would be substantial economic and military costs in attempting to maintain such a position in the Islands. We could expect no support internationally, certainly not from Uruguay or Brazil, to whom we would have to look for alternative transit facilities. We are in a minority of one in the United Nations on this issue. The fortress concept would effectively prevent all development in the Islands without the continued injection of substantial capital aid; and it would also prevent any exploitation of the Maritime Zones and the sealed off Islands and Dependencies. It is in no-one's interests, least of all the Islanders'.

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THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Series: FCO 7

Piece: 3801

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REVIEW NOT COMPLETED
THE ARGENTINE CLAIM

1. Since Britain took possession in 1833, Argentina has protested that she is entitled to sovereignty over the Islands. Her claims are primarily based on the grounds that:

   a) she has inherited Spain's previous titles to the Islands (Spain in fact appears not to have formally renounced her title or to have explicitly ceded it to Argentina);

   b) she effectively occupied the Islands from 1820 to 1833 when they reverted to a status of terra nullius (in 1829 an Argentine political and military governor was appointed);

   c) the Islands belong to Argentina by right of geographical contiguity, since they are on the Argentine continental shelf;

   d) the Islands' present colonial status is anachronistic;

   e) the Islands' economy has been neglected and would benefit from close association with Argentina.

2. Argentina also argues that the initial forceful occupation and settlement of the Islands and the expulsion of Argentine nationals in 1833 vitiates the whole period of British possession thereafter, and cannot form a good basis for title.
FAKLAND ISLANDS DEPENDENCIES

Legal Position

1. The Dependencies comprise South Georgia (annexed by Captain Cook in 1775), together with some very small archipelagos (notably the Shag Rocks and the Clerke Rocks) and the South Sandwich Islands (discovered by Cook but not annexed until 1908). There has been a British Government station on South Georgia since 1909; an all year round British presence is now provided by the scientifically important British Antarctic Survey station.

Administration

2. For convenience, the Governor of the Falkland Islands administers the Dependencies. Legally and constitutionally, the Islands and Dependencies could be separated; politically this would be difficult to achieve (see attached minute from Legal Adviser).

Resources

3. The Land of the Dependencies is not thought to offer any exploitable minerals, although centuries of occupation by penguins have covered some of the smaller islands in huge quantities of guano. The Continental Shelf around the Dependencies is not thought to contain hydrocarbons; the waters are too deep for present-day technology. There are, however, considerable quantities of fish, particularly round South Georgia, which Japanese, German, Russian and Polish vessels regularly exploit in the absence of any fishing regime (South Georgia was for many years a whaling base). The South Sandwich Islands are particularly inhospitable, virtually inaccessible and uninhabited.

The Argentine Position

4. The Argentines claim both (South Georgia since 1927 and South Sandwich Islands since 1948). They maintain what we regard as
an illegal scientific station on Southern Thule (one of the South Sandwich Islands: see Brief no. 8). They are unhappy about third country fishing around the Dependencies but rejected a scheme put to them by Mr Rowlands in December 1978 for cooperation and co-administration of the Dependencies' maritime zones because it did not involve acceptance of Argentine sovereignty over the land area of the Dependencies.

As the same Tugendhat, the Falkland Island Dependencies are different from the Falkland Islands. The latter are of the same area, size and character as the Dependencies and the Dependencies are part of the same colony, but they are subject in an important and different way to our legal claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The Dependencies were never part of the Falkland Islands, and the Falkland Islands Dependencies Act of 1967 defines the Dependencies as having a territory which comprises the present islands and some surrounding territory which now comprises the British Antarctic Territory.

In practical terms, the British Antarctic Territory now comprised nearly all of the Falkland Island Dependencies. However, the Dependencies Act which now controls the Dependencies and the separate colony of the Falkland Islands was not created. There is no reason why this Act should be and should never have been a

While another purpose for this letter.

I have no other comment to make than that the Dependencies are an important factor in the legal questions by the Governments of the Dependencies and the Falkland Islands. I wrote this letter to make sure that our legal arguments were not weakened in part whether these were valuable assistance to the
FALKLAND ISLAND DEPENDENCIES

1. I refer to Mr Temple's minute of 25 September to you concerning an enquiry by Mr Ridley about the constitutional link between the Falkland Islands, their Dependencies and the British Antarctic Territory.

2. As the name implies, the Falkland Island Dependencies are "dependencies" of the Falkland Islands, i.e., they are administered from the Falkland Islands. The Governor of the Falkland Islands is also Governor of the Dependencies and the Executive Council of the Dependencies is composed of the same persons who make up the Executive Council for the Falkland Islands and the Council has the same power in relation to the Dependencies as it does for the Falkland Islands. The Dependencies are, however, legally distinct from the Falkland Islands. Thus, the Legislative Council for the Falkland Islands has power to enact legislation only in respect of the Falkland Islands. The power to legislate for the Dependencies is vested in the Governor. Historically, the Dependencies were never part of the Falkland Islands and the root of our legal claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands is different from that of our claim to sovereignty over the Dependencies. The Dependencies were made dependencies of the Falkland Islands only in 1908 by Letters Patent and by Letters Patent in 1917 the area of the Dependencies was defined so as to include not only the territory which comprises the present Dependencies but also the territory which now comprises the British Antarctic Territory.

3. As mentioned, the British Antarctic Territory was originally part of the Falkland Island Dependencies. However, in 1962, the territory which now comprises the BAT was carved off from the Dependencies and the separate colony of the British Antarctic Territory was created. There is no constitutional link between either the Falkland Islands or their Dependencies and BAT. The High Commissioner for the BAT is at present the Governor of the Falkland Islands. However, this is for convenience and there is no legal reason why this should be so and it would be open to HMG to appoint another person for this post.

4. If HMG were to decide to separate the Dependencies from the Falkland Islands, the Falkland Islanders would have no legal grounds for objection. The Dependencies were made dependencies of the Falkland Islands by the UK Government and it is open to the UK Government to make them a separate and distinct colony. Indeed, there is a precedent for this in the creation of the BAT. I do not consider myself competent to advise on whether there would be political objections by the Islanders. I would imagine that this would depend on in part whether there were valuable mineral on
living resources around the Dependencies (I understand that Antarctic krill are particularly abundant around the area of the Dependencies) and whether the Islanders felt that the action of the UK Government would in practice deprive them of the benefit of these resources.

26 September 1980

K J Chamberlain
Legal Counsellor
VISIT BY MR RILDELEY TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS: 22-29 NOVEMBER 1980

Steering Brief

Presentation of the Visit

1. The visit (undertaken at short notice to fit in with the Minister's parliamentary obligations) will be presented to Islanders as a logical step in a series of developments which followed Mr Ridley's first visit in July 1979. After the exploratory exchanges with the Argentines in New York in April (attended by Councillor Monk), the British Government have been considering what might be the next steps towards a solution. Lord Carrington discussed matters generally with Foreign Minister Pastor in New York in September. We have since been looking at the position. Mr Ridley now wishes to inform himself of Islander views. When passing through Buenos Aires, he paid a brief courtesy call at the Argentine Foreign Ministry.

Objectives

2. Our objectives are:

(i) to persuade Councillors (and through them Islanders) that the prolongation of the dispute is not in their interests or those of HMG: and that we must work towards a negotiated settlement with the Argentines;

(ii) therefore to obtain their agreement that we should enter into negotiations with Argentina to explore the scope for a settlement based on leaseback;

(iii) to impress upon them our respect for their wishes to remain British, our interest in their welfare and our concern for their future.
The Islanders' Aims

3. We can expect these to be:

(i) to preserve the status quo, with a continuing and, if possible, increased British commitment to the defence and economy of the Islands;

(ii) to argue that the Islands' offshore resources should be developed without the need for a political solution;

(iii) to drag their feet on the need to negotiate on sovereignty with the Argentines: and to avoid taking any firm position on the merits of leaseback.

Tactics for Talks

4. Mr Ridley will first have to convince Councillors that it is necessary to talk about sovereignty at all. Islanders have frequently demonstrated that where there is choice between stagnation and increased involvement with Argentina, they prefer the former. They were quick to spot that the 1977 Terms of Reference (which governed the 1977/79 talks and specifically mentioned sovereignty) did not apply to the April 1980 talks in New York. The relative quiet on the Argentine front may have lulled the Islanders into a false belief that nothing need be done and all is well.

5. Councillors must be made to recognise that:

(i) the Argentine claim has not gone away, nor will it ever do so;

(ii) the Argentines will soon become impatient at the lack of progress, with potentially difficult consequences for the Islands (e.g. communications, fuel and other harassment);

(iii) only by working out through negotiation a solution acceptable to all parties can the Islands be assured of a viable and secure economic and political future.
6. It may be necessary to paint a grim picture of the alternatives. The British Government have had to cut aid across the board and it will be increasingly difficult for the Islands to maintain the generous per capita allocation of previous years. Neither Islands nor Dependencies could be defended against Argentine intrusion; at the very least the Argentine stranglehold will tighten to the Islanders' increasing discomfort. It makes sense to work with the Argentines to use their wealth for the Islands' benefit. Otherwise the prospect must be one of continued population drift and economic stagnation. It is also best to look for a negotiated solution now: rather than under duress at the mercy of any future political changes in Argentina.

7. We should highlight the narrow range of negotiating options (Brief no. 2) and the potential benefits of a leaseback solution to the Islands (Brief no. 3). But essentially the ending of the dispute would remove international politics from the future economic development of the Islands, open up the Islands to investment, enable the resources (fish and any oil - Briefs nos. 4 and 5) of the area to be exploited for the benefit of the Islanders, lead to the Islands' internal economy being put on a more substantial footing; and most importantly, remove the shadow of the dispute from Islanders' everyday lives, and ensure continued British administration for a substantial period.

8. Councillors will want to know the likely terms (especially the length) of any leaseback and what it will mean in particular for Argentine involvement in their everyday affairs. We should resist going into details: they would in any case be guesswork as they remain to be negotiated. Our proposal at this stage is simply that we should talk to the Argentines about the concept and implications of leaseback of all the territories, continental shelves and maritime zones. We would look for the longest term possible. The Islanders would throughout remain under British administration, they would still own their land and would be able to run their affairs in the way they do now as they want.

/Meetings with Councillors
Meetings With Councillors

9. Three sessions of talks with the Councillors are planned (Monday 24, Tuesday 25 and Saturday 29 November). Councillors nevertheless may attempt either to delay a response until Mr Ridley has left. When it will be easier for them to say no, or to claim that they cannot speak for their constituents, who must be consulted. It will be important to get them to give the Minister some reply before his departure; any consulting they need to do will have to be done by then. They are the elected representatives of the Islanders and enfranchised to speak on their behalf. We are not asking Councillors to sanction at short notice a fully-fledged proposal for a settlement; we are merely seeking their endorsement for the opening of negotiations based on leaseback. Councillors will be invited to be represented at all talks with the Argentines and if and when a proposal is finally worked out it will have to be put to all the Islanders (and to the British Parliament) before it can be accepted. Councillors should be made to realise quite clearly that they are not being asked to commit themselves to a cession of sovereignty, only to sanction our efforts to find with them a workable solution to the problem.

Other Argentine Matters

10. Mr Ridley will want to speak as reassuringly as possible on other subjects to avoid any red herrings. He will wish to remind Islanders of his hope that contacts with the Argentines on everyday matters can be increased (Brief no. 6) and that minor problems like the house for the LADE representative (Brief no. 7), should not be blown up out of all proportion. Islanders will also want to be reassured that we are opposed to Argentine policing of waters near the Falklands (Brief no. 4), their presence on Southern Thule (Brief no. 8) and that the Argentine-financed oil jetty (Brief no. 9) will not mean an increased level of Argentine involvement in their lives.

Bilateral Questions

11. Islanders may raise the perennial problem of extending the airfield (Brief no. 10) and the more recent one of the school hostel (Brief no. 11) and will certainly wish to vent their feelings about the Falkland Islands Government Air Service (Brief no. 12), which
has had many problems of late. Other possible subjects are UK aid (Brief no. 13) and the Royal Marine Detachment (Brief no. 14). Depending on the climate of his discussions, the Minister may wish to discuss with Councillors their unfulfilled promise to accept some Vietnamese refugees (Brief no. 15), and the difficulties in the way of imported labour from St Helena (Brief no. 16). Islanders are concerned about the effect of the proposed new nationality legislation (Brief no. 17) on their status and will need to be convinced that no material change is involved.

Exchanges with Islander General Public

12. Mr Ridley's discussions with Councillors will be in confidence. But Councillors will want to consult their families, friends and constituents and in the narrow Falklands community it is likely that the general context of the exchanges will become fairly widely known before Mr Ridley's departure. He may well therefore begin to receive questions about leaseback and its details. These can best be played by ear at the time depending on the circumstances. But, broadly, Mr Ridley will want to maintain that his exchange of ideas with Councillors was in confidence and general and that no-one is committed to anything other than further negotiations with the Argentines.

Press Line if Leaseback Proposals Leak

13. The fact that negotiations with Argentina on a leaseback arrangement have been put to the Islanders is likely to leak during Mr Ridley's visit, or shortly thereafter. When it does (and we know the nature and extent of the leak) our general line should be that Mr Ridley has been reviewing with the Councillors the way in which progress might be made towards a settlement of the dispute with Argentina, and that one idea that is being considered is a leaseback arrangement which would secure British administration on the Islands for a significant period. We should, of course, reaffirm that HMG would continue to be guided in these matters by the wishes of the Islanders as a whole.
Falklands protest rejected

By Patrick Keatley,
Diplomatic Correspondent

The British Government has registered protest with Argentina over publication of an advert in leading newspapers in Buenos Aires inviting applications from oil companies to drill in an area of the South Atlantic which infringes upon the 200-mile economic zone of the Falkland Islands.

The Argentine Foreign Ministry has rejected the protest, declaring that Britain has never gone through the process of issuing a formal declaration defining such a zone.

Pending the final outcome of the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Britain and other countries have proceeded to issue such proclamations, and the British Government insists upon sovereignty over the island of Rockall in the North Atlantic, west of Scotland, reflecting concern to secure future oil and fishing rights.

The quadrilateral zone now announced by Argentina as a drilling block involves intrusion into the 200-mile zone surrounding the Falkland Islands colony for about one-third of the total distance from the outer to the high-tide mark. It is possible that Britain could exercise leverage upon many oil companies by warning those who bid for exploration and production rights in British areas of the North Sea that they will forfeit such rights if they choose to proceed with operations in Falkland waters under an Argentine licensing system.

One obvious option seems now to be ruled out by the unresolved quarrel between Britain and Argentina over the sovereignty of the Falklands. Because there has been a series of contacts between London and Buenos Aires which is still continuing, an abrupt proclamation now of sovereignty over an economic zone would be taken as a hostile act by Argentina, and might well lead to overt intrusion by its navy or commercial fishing fleet, or both.
Dear Department,

WORLD TOURISM ORGANISATION

1. The enclosed list of present members of the WTO has been received from the Spanish MFA under cover of a Note (No. 25) which is also enclosed. Attached to the list are two annexes, one noting inter alia the reservations/observations made by various Member States at the time of their joining the WTO, and the other the names of the countries which so far have approved the introduction of certain changes to the Statutes of the organisation.

2. While not mentioned specifically by name, it seems reasonable to conclude that the reservations of Argentina and Spain in Notes 1 and 6 in the first annex were made at the time with both the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar in mind. You may, however, be already aware of this.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

cc: W P Hartshorne Esq, Gibraltar

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Mr. Bums,

You might discover some line about this after a ... it is quite meaningless without the enclosed. But as long...
NOTA VERBAL

El Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores saluda atentamente a la Embajada de Su Majestad Británica en esta capital y en su calidad de Depositario de los Estatutos de la Organización Mundial del Turismo, tiene la honra de remitirle adjunto relación de los Estados Miembros de dicha Organización, con las observaciones correspondientes.

Asimismo le envía relación de Estados que han aprobado las modificaciones al Artículo 38 de los Estatutos de la Organización Mundial del Turismo y al párrafo 12 de las Reglas de Financiación anejas a los mismos.

El Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores aprovecha esta oportunidad para reiterar a esa Embajada el testimonio de su más alta consideración.

Madrid, 17 de noviembre de 1980.

A la Embajada de Su Majestad Británica en Madrid.
ESTATUTOS DE LA ORGANIZACION MUNDIAL DEL TURISMO (O.M.T.)

México, 27 de septiembre de 1970
En vigor: 2 de enero de 1975

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(a) Conforme al artículo 5 (2) de los Estatutos.
(b) Conforme a las disposiciones transitorias del artículo 41
(c) En aplicación del artículo 5 (3) de los Estatutos.
(d) Conforme a las disposiciones del artículo 6 (4).
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1.- "La aplicación de los presentes estatutos a territorios cuya soberanía fuera discutida entre dos o más estados, firmantes o no del mismo, no podrá ser interpretada como alteración, renuncia o abandono de la posición que cada uno ha tenido hasta el presente."

2.- El Gobierno de la Commonwealth de las Bahamas hizo llegar al Gobierno suizo una declaración fechada el 29 de noviembre, recibida el 14 de diciembre, por la que la Commonwealth de las Bahamas se retiraba de la OMT. Conforme al art. 35(1) de los estatutos, la retirada tuvo efecto el 14 de diciembre de 1978.

3.- "Tout en adoptant les Statuts, le Gouvernement de la République Socialiste Tchécoslovaque déclare que les dispositions de l'article 6 concernant la responsabilité des Etats pour les relations extérieures de certains territoires sont en contradiction avec le contenu et l'objectif de la Déclaration de l'Assemblée Générale de l'ONU en date du 14 décembre 1960 de l'octroi de l'indépendance aux pays et nations coloniales."

(Traducción: Al adoptar los Estatutos, el Gobierno de la República Socialista Checoslovaca declara que las disposiciones del artículo 6 relativas a la responsabilidad de los Estados en las relaciones exteriores de ciertos territorios están en contradicción con el contenido y objetivo de la Declaración de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas nº 1514 de 14 de diciembre de 1960 de conceder la independencia a los países y naciones colonizadas.)

4.- Conforme al art. 31(1) de los estatutos, la República China por declaración de 11 de diciembre de 1971, recibida el 28 de enero, completada por declaración de 25 de febrero de 1972, recibida el 12 de marzo, aceptó los estatutos.

La Primera Asamblea General de la OMT, reunida en Madrid del 12 al 22 de mayo de 1975, declaró nula dicha aceptación.

5.- El Gobierno de El Salvador ha hecho llegar al Gobierno español una declaración fechada el 28 de enero de 1980, por la que El Salvador se retira de la OMT. Conforme al art. 35(1) de los estatutos, la retirada surtirá efecto a partir del 28 de enero de 1981.

6.- "España, al aprobar los Estatutos de la Organización Mundial del Turismo, hace constar que la aplicación de los artículos 6 y 43 a territorios no autónomos, cuya soberanía sea discutida por dos o más Estados, no puede ser interpretada en ningún caso como reconocimiento de nuevas situaciones jurídicas ni modificación de las existentes."
En el instrumento de 21 de febrero de 1975 confirmando la aprobación de los estatutos, el Presidente de la República de Irak hizo la siguiente declaración:

"Entry into the above statutes by the Republic of Iraq shall, however, in no way signify recognition of Israel or be conducive to entry therewith into such dealings as may be provided for in the said statutes."

(Traducción: La participación de la República de Irak en los estatutos no significa en ningún caso el reconocimiento de Israel ni conduce con ello a tales relaciones como podría deducirse de los estatutos.)

En relación con esta notificación, el Gobierno de Israel, en una nota de 11 de mayo de 1975 de su Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, hizo una declaración en los siguientes términos:

"The instrument deposited by the Government of Iraq contains a statement of a political character in respect to Israel. In the view of the Government of Israel, this is not the proper place for making such political pronouncements, which are moreover, in flagrant contradiction to the principles, objects and purposes of the Organization. That pronouncement by the Republic of Iraq cannot in any way affect whatever obligations are binding upon Iraq, under general international law or under particular treaties. The Government of Israel will, in so far as concerns the substance of the matter, adopt towards the Republic of Iraq an attitude of complete reciprocity."

(Traducción: El instrumento depositado por el Gobierno de Irak contiene una declaración de carácter político con respecto a Israel. Al parecer del Gobierno de Israel, este no es el lugar apropiado para hacer tal clase de pronunciamientos políticos, los cuales están además en flagrante contradicción con los principios, objetivos y propósitos de la Organización. Tal pronunciamiento por la República de Irak no puede en ningún caso afectar cualesquiera obligaciones que recaigan sobre Irak en virtud del derecho internacional general o de tratados particulares. El Gobierno de Israel, en lo que concierne al fondo de esta cuestión, adoptará frente a la República de Irak una actitud de completa reciprocidad.)

8.- El Gobierno de la República de Nicaragua hizo llegar al Gobierno suizo una declaración fechada el 10 de abril de 1973, recibida el 19 de abril, por la que la República de Nicaragua se retiraba de la OIT. Conforme al art. 35(1) de los estatutos, la retirada tuvo efecto el 19 de abril de 1979.
9.- Por el Reino en Europa y por las Antillas holandesas.

10.- "Toutefois, l'approbation de la République Arabe Syrienne desdits statuts et son acceptation des obligations qui en découlent ne doivent être interprétées dans aucun sens comme une reconnaissance de ce qui est appelé l'"Etat d'Israel". De plus, elles ne sauraient lier la République arabe Syrienne à entrer en relations, de quelque nature que ce soit, avec le précité."

(Traducción: No obstante, la aprobación de la República Arabe Siria de dichos estatutos y la aceptación de las obligaciones de ellos derivadas no deben ser interpretadas en el sentido del reconocimiento del "Estado de Israel. Además éstas no conducirán a la "república Arabe Siria a establecer relaciones de dicha naturaleza con el Estado de Israel.)

Esta puntualización dio lugar a una comunicación por parte del Estado de Israel de fecha 17 de octubre de 1971, en los siguientes términos:

"Le Ministère a noté le caractère politique de la déclaration faite à cette occasion par le Gouvernement de la République Arabe Syrienne. De l'avis du Gouvernement israélien, les Statuts ne sauraient se prêter à des déclarations politiques de cette nature. De plus, la déclaration en question ne saurait aucunement modifier les obligations dont la République Arabe Syrienne est déjà tenue en vertu du droit international général ou en vertu des traités particuliers. En ce qui concerne le fond de la question, le Gouvernement de l'Etat d'Israel adoptera à l'égard de la République Arabe Syrienne une attitude d'entière réciprocité."

(Traducción: El Ministerio ha tomado nota del carácter político de la declaración hecha en esta ocasión por el Gobierno de la República Arabe Siria. Al parecer del Gobierno de Israel, los Estatutos no dan ocasión a declaraciones políticas de esta naturaleza. Además, la declaración en cuestión no podrá en modo alguno modificar las obligaciones que recaigan sobre la República Arabe Siria en virtud del derecho internacional General o de tratados particulares. En lo que concierne al fondo de la cuestión, el Gobierno de Israel adoptará frente a la República Arabe Siria una actitud de completa reciprocidad.)

11.- "The Approval by the Government of the Republic of Korea of the present Statutes does not in any way mean or imply the recognition of any territory or regime which has not been recognized by the Government of the Republic of Korea as a State or Government."

(Traducción: En lo que se refiere a las disposiciones del Estatuto en cuanto a la aplicación del mismo sobre los territorios coloniales y otros territorios dependientes, la República Democrática Alemana se guiará por las disposiciones de la Declaración de las Naciones Unidas respecto a la garantía de independencia a los países y pueblos colonizados (Res. No 1514 (XV) de 14 de diciembre de 1960) que proclama la necesidad de acabar rápida e incondicionalmente con el colonialismo en todas sus formas y expresiones.)

13.- "Die Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland beehrt sich, dem Eidgenössischen politischen Departement in Zusammenhang mit der heutigen Hinterlegung der Beitrittserklärung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zur Welt-Tourismus-Organisation (WTO) im Namen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu erklären, dass die Erklärung über den Beitritt der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zur WTO durch Annahme der Satzung der WTO und die Übernahme der sich aus der Mitgliedschaft ergebenden Verpflichtungen mit Wirkung von dem Tag, an dem die Satzung der WTO für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland gültig sein wird, auch für Berlin (West) gilt.

(Traducción: En nombre de la República Federal de Alemania, la Embajada de la República Federal alemana tiene el honor de comunicar al Departamento Político Federal en relación con el depósito efectuado en el día de hoy de la declaración de ingreso de la República Federal en la Organización Mundial del Turismo, que la declaración de ingreso de la República Federal en la OMT es también de aplicación a Berlin Occidental, por aceptación de los estatutos de la OMT y el reconocimiento de las obligaciones de miembro, con efectos desde el día en que el estatuto de la OMT se aplique a la República Federal.)
En relación con esta notificación el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de la R.F.A. en una nota de 3 de mayo de 1976 a la Embajada de Suiza en Moscú, hizo la siguiente declaración:


(Traducción: La notificación de la República Federal de Alemania de 29 de enero de 1976, relativa a la extensión a Berlín Occidental de los Estatutos de la Organización Mundial del Turismo, no puede ser tomada en consideración por la Unión Soviética a no ser que ésta extensión sea conforme al acuerdo cuatripartito de 3 de septiembre de 1971 y a los procedimientos establecidos y que no afecte a las cuestiones relativas al estatuto y a la seguridad.)

14.- Los datos consignados son relativos a la República de Vietnam; la condición de miembro no ha sido confirmada al depositario por la República Socialista de Vietnam.

15.-

a) "Le Conseil d'Etat de la République Socialiste de Roumanie considère que les provisions de l'article 5, paragraphe 3 et de l'article 41 du Statut de l'Organisation mondiale du tourisme ne sont pas en concordance avec le principe selon lequel les traités internationaux multilatéraux dont l'objet et le but intéressent la communauté internationale dans son ensemble doivent être ouverts à la participation universelle".

b) "Le Conseil d'Etat de la République Socialiste de Roumanie considère que le maintien de l'état de dépendance de certains territoires auxquels se réfère les réglementations des articles 6, paragraphes 1, 2 et 3; 39 paragraphe 2; et 43 du Statut de l'Organisation mondiale du tourisme n'est pas en concordance avec la Charte de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et les documents adoptés par l'ONU sur l'octroi de l'indépendance aux peuples et aux peuples coloniaux, y compris la Déclaration relative aux principes du droit international touchant les relations unilatérales et la coopération entre les États conformément à la Charte de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, adoptée à l'unanimité par la
Resolución 2625 (XXV) de 1970, que proclama solemnemente el deber de los Estados de favorecer la realización del principio de igualdad de derechos de los pueblos y de su derecho a disponer de sí mismos con el objetivo de poner fin al colonialismo.

(Traducción: a) El Consejo de Estado de la República Socialista de Rumanía considera que las previsiones del artículo 5, párrafo 3 y del artículo 41 del Estatuto de la Organización Mundial del Turismo no están de acuerdo con el principio según el cual los tratados internacionales multilaterales cuyo objeto y finalidad interesan a la comunidad internacional en su conjunto deberían estar abiertos a la participación universal.

b) El Consejo de Estado de la "República Socialista de Rumanía considera que el mantenimiento del estado de dependencia de ciertos territorios a los que se refieren las reglamentaciones de los artículos: 6, párrafos 1, 2 y 3; 33 párrafo 2; y 43 del Estatuto de la Organización Mundial del Turismo no están de acuerdo con la Carta de las Naciones Unidas y los documentos adoptados por la ONU sobre el otorgamiento de independencia a los países y pueblos colonizados, incluida la declaración relativa a los principios de derecho internacional en lo tocante a las relaciones análogas de cooperación entre Estados conforme a la Carta de las Naciones Unidas adoptado unánimemente por la resolución 2625 (XXV) de 1970, que proclama solemnemente el deber de los Estados de favorecer la realización del principio de igualdad de derechos de los pueblos y de su derecho a disponer de sí mismos con el objetivo de poner fin al colonialismo.

16. - La Asamblea General en su 33 reunión, celebrada en Torremolinos del 17 al 27 de septiembre de 1979, en la resolución 49 (III) reconoció a la Santa Sede un estatuto especial de observador permanente ante la Organización, con voz pero sin voto.

17. - El Gobierno de la República de Singapur hizo llegar al Gobierno suizo una declaración fechada el 9 de noviembre de 1976, recibida el 10 de noviembre, por la que Singapur se retiraba de la OMT. Conforme al art. 35 (1) de los estatutos, la retirada tuvo efecto el 10 de noviembre de 1977.

18. - "The Government of the Kingdom of Thailand hereby notifies the Federal Political Department of Switzerland, in accordance with Article 37, paragraph 1, of its approval of the Statutes of the World Tourism Organization and the acceptance of the obligations of membership, on the understanding that Articles 31 and 32
and other provisions of the Statutes for which legislative measures for their implementation are necessary will not be regarded as binding on the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand until the completion of such measures, upon which notification will duly be made to the Federal Political Department of Switzerland."

(Traducción: El Gobierno del Reino de Tailandia por la presente notifica al Departamento Político Federal de Suiza, de acuerdo con el artículo 37, parágrafo 1, su aprobación de los Estatutos de la Organización Mundial del Turismo y la aceptación de las obligaciones de miembro, en el entendimiento de que los artículos 31 y 32 y otras estipulaciones de los Estatutos para cuya ejecución son necesarias medidas legislativas, no obligarán al Gobierno del Reino de Tailandia hasta la conclusión de tales medidas, que deberán ser notificadas oportunamente al Departamento Político Federal de Suiza.)

19.- El Gobierno de la República de Trinidad y Tobago hizo llegar al Gobierno suiza una declaración fechada el 24 de diciembre de 1976, recibida el 31 de diciembre, por la que Trinidad y Tobago se retiraba de la OMT. Conforme al art. 55 (1), la retirada tuvo efecto el 31 de diciembre de 1977.
RELACIÓN DE ESTADOS QUE HAN APROBADO LAS MODIFICACIONES AL ARTÍCULO 38 DE LOS ESTATUTOS DE LA O.M.T. Y AL PARRAFO 12 DE LAS REGLAS DE FINANCIACION ANEJAS A LOS MISMOS.

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**FILE NUMBER:** ALW 040/325/1  
**TITLE:** UK/ARGENTINE DISPUTE OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS' POLICY

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<td>15</td>
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<td>MOD Harding/Fearn</td>
<td>Falkland Islands - priority in eyes of Argentines</td>
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<td></td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>Falkland Islands Hunt/Fearn</td>
<td>Rex Hunt's first impressions</td>
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<td>From Buenos Aires to SAMD FCO</td>
<td>Argentine claims of sovereignty</td>
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1. I attach a Committee Paper covering policy issues arising from the above Conference. Para 3 of the Paper draws attention to the Argentine attitude towards our delegation.

2. For your further information while the Argentinians refused our hospitality, they did not exclude the Home Office team from their invitations. Our team were not aware of any specific lobbying on this occasion. However, the next meeting scheduled to be held in Rio de Janiero in November 1981 for six weeks is likely to be much more politicised.

17 December 1980

D T Healy
Energy, Science and Space
Department
E012
Note for the Record

1. In the opinion of the UK delegation, the BA meeting started off on the wrong foot using as a framework the CITEL standards based largely on American propagation data which is dated, unlike CCIR whose data is constantly revised.

2. CCIR became equated with a "Region I Club". Despite these constraints, our delegation did not try to press for CCIR standards, but attempted to guide the meeting into their use on technical grounds. They had a measure of success in limiting the damage. However, there was no final remit to go either for 10 km spacing on frequencies or 9 km which we would prefer.

3. The spectre was raised of a technical failure of the Second Session next year. It was agreed that the UK should still attend in order to be seen to be protecting the interests of the Associated States. Although this is the primary reason and we did not wish to be regarded as a "Regional I Observer", clearly we do have Region I (and BBC) interests to look after.

4. The final outlook was not so pessimistic. Once the US had got themselves sorted out and it was seen that Region I would not take interference avoidance action the balance would tilt in favour of 9 km.

5. Mr Cameron of RI and the BBC will licene to produce for FCC transmission to the States that have not yet given us their frequency requirements a telegram "unless we hear to the contrary!"

17 December 1980

D T Healy
Energy, Science and Space
Department
EO/12
REGIONAL MF ADMINISTRATIVE BROADCASTING CONFERENCE
(REGION 2)

POLICY WORKING GROUP

POLICY ISSUES ARISING FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE
REGION 2 ADMINISTRATIVE MF CONFERENCE BUENOS AIRES
MARCH 1980

1. The attitude of the Argentine delegation towards the UK was very
unhelpful and it transpired that this came more from the UK's mistaken
idea than a reflection of the Falkland Islands problem. No specific
mention was made of the Falkland Islands; the UK indicated the frequency
requirements without difficulty. It was noted, however, that information
by the Argentinean delegation showed the Falkland Islands were not
being part of Argentina territory. This led to speculation in an attempt
to present a picture in Argentina and was not significant in respect of the Conference.
The purpose for the Second Session held in London will enable the UK to take a
even more positive line, if necessary, towards the Argentinean delegation and
into the problem of the Falkland Islands. The UK scientists did not
participate in the discussion on the matter.

Home Office
Radio Regulatory Department (DRT)
Waterloo Bridge House
Waterloo Road
London SE1 8UA

December 1980
1. The UK position at the Conference was clearly established at an early stage as that of a Region 1 country representing the legitimate interests of some 20 dependent territories for which the UK has responsibility within the ITU and that the UK had full voting rights on matters relating to the Conference. Nevertheless, the attitude of many Region 2 countries, mainly from South America, to Region 1 countries present at the Conference was distinctly cool. There was evidence of an attitude which suggested that only Region 2 countries should be attending the Conference and that the presence of Region 1 countries was undue interference in their affairs. The fact that the UK was paying for a major part of the costs of the Conference did not seem to influence their attitude at all. It was only towards the end of the First Session that attitudes began to soften and the UK was able to play a more significant role in the Conference work.

2. The Conference opened with a clear attitude expressed by the majority of the administrations that the Inter-American Telecommunications Conference (CITEL) had already decided the major issues and that the Conference would be concluded well within two weeks. It soon transpired, however, that many of the administrations of Region 2 had little knowledge of the problems facing them in preparing for the Second Session.

3. The attitude of the Argentine delegation towards the UK was very unhelpful and it transpired that this came more from the UK being a Region 1 country rather than a reflection of the Falkland Isles problem. No specific mention was made of the Falkland Isles; the UK indicated the frequency requirements without difficulty. It was noted, however, that maps distributed by the Argentines all showed the Falkland Isles and the UK Antarctic region as being part of Argentine territory. This we understood to be standard practice in Argentina and was not significant in respect of the Conference. The venue for the Second Session being in Brazil will enable the UK to take a slightly stronger line, if necessary, towards the Argentine without running into the problem of offending the host country for the Conference as existed in Buenos Aires.

4. The situation with respect to Guatemala is likely to be more difficult. At the First Session, efforts were made by Guatemala and the UK to avoid a confrontation in the preparation of the report of the First Session by the choice of words in the text which avoided reference directly to Belize.
The publication of a map which accidently did not show Belize enabled the Guatemalan delegation to accept the draft documents without difficulty. It is to be expected, however, that they will be distinctly unhappy with the final report of the First Session which shows Belize in the published map.

5. Another issue which involved the UK and other European countries was the question of channel spacing. As Region 1 has opted for a 9 kHz channel spacing and Region 2 currently uses 10 kHz it was clearly in the interests of Region 1 to persuade Region 2 of the advantages of moving to 9 kHz. The chances of success were distinctly limited until the USA announced its support for 9 kHz at the last moment. This situation led to a clear split between Region 2 countries on the choice of channel spacing with the Canadians leading those in favour of 10 kHz and the USA those in favour of 9 kHz. No decision was taken and the matter was left for further study by a panel of experts and the IFRB who will be reporting to the Second Session where an early decision will need to be made. The Canadians used this situation to enhance their prestige and position as leader of the developing countries, whilst the USA's position was distinctly eroded, resulting in U.S. proposals on many issues being rejected. It is clear that the U.S. will have to work extremely hard before the Second Session if their credibility is to be restored.

6. The IFRB were asked to undertake, in collaboration with the Panel of Experts, a very considerable amount of work before the second session including an analysis of the relative advantages of 9 and 10 kHz channel spacing, inter-Regional interference studies, determination of the incompatibilities between stations in order to suggest appropriate alterations to the individual administrations, and in the case of 9 kHz spacing, to ensure that the rearrangement optimizes the use of frequency spectrum. In order to carry out this work they are first required to develop numerous computer programmes to provide the necessary antenna data, propagation information, intra-Regional and inter-Regional interference calculations, service area calculations and such supporting sub-programmes as digitized maps etc. As the IFRB is already months behind with the implementation of the Regions 1 and 3 plans resulting from the 1975 Conference, it is a matter for concern as to whether they will be able to cope with the increased work load brought about by the Region 2 Conference.
7. The frequency and power requirements of all the territories represented by the UK have been submitted to the ITU in a preliminary exercise designed to assess the scale of the problem and no particular problems are anticipated in respect of those territories when final submissions are made to the Second Session. Clearly the UK will need to ensure that the frequencies used by dependent territories are fully protected at the Second Session, particularly if the channel spacing remains on 10 kHz and there is excessive demand for additional usage of channels on the lines followed at the 1975 Conference.
FALKLANDS DISPUTE: ARGENTINE MILITARY

1. In great haste for the bag I enclose our translation of a quarter page advertisement which appeared out of the blue in "La Nacion" yesterday.

2. Cesar Saravia is a wealthy man who joined the banker Capozzole in efforts to buy the Falkland Island Company a few years back. (The group was thought at the time to be linked with James Goldsmith.) We shall obviously try and find out more about him and the background to his renewed attempts to catch the headlines.

Yours,

Richard

R H T Gozney

cc: M W Growcott Esq
    PORT STANLEY
ENOUGH:

Confirming my decision to fight for unity, action, recovery and the Malvinas

To the relevant authorities:

This outrage has been taking place for many years; it has not been the action of the British people but of selfish and mean interests with no consideration for peoples, irrespective of their nationality or religion, but who use it for their own benefit.

Why have the Malvinas, which are a part of our territory, still not been returned to us (4,700 sq km).

Diplomatic talks, protocol air meetings and negotiations have meant nothing but a delay, and the authorities of the two countries and not their peoples are responsible for this.

On one occasion I tried to reach an agreement with the Falkland (Islands Company) for the sale (of land) not out of material interest but solely and exclusively for the sake of justice, so much so that I was planning to hand over part of that land to the population. No population is unfair nor do they speculate with interests to derive a benefit at the expense of other peoples.

I am addressing the authorities of both Britain and Argentina because we have to put an end to, and set a deadline for, these endless negotiations. BECAUSE TOMORROW NEVER COMES.

Our deadline is 25 May 1981, our country's national day. This will help us to be united and not to oppose each other or be divided.

For several years our countries have been closely attached to each other through shared interests and work, and this unity must be reaffirmed every day; this shall not be achieved, however, if the Malvinas are not returned, since they are part of our FLAG and MOTHERLAND, and I have no doubt that the British people and authorities will understand this to be so.
I must give a warning that if there is no concrete reply to this we shall start public action:

Therefore, in 90 day's time I will propose to the Government that they should:

(1) Interrupt the communications that add to the welfare and safety of the Malvinas population, and prevent those we consider our brethren being cut off from their more urgent needs.

(2) Announce that the import action and use of British goods shall be stopped as will be the export of our products to Britain; (these factors have formed a link for a long time and should be reinforced and not weakened).

(3) Break off diplomatic relations, which have so far led to no solution but have been a diversion and a waste of time.

TO CLAIM ONES RIGHTS IS AN OBLIGATION. NOT TO CLAIM IS COMPLICITY.

César Alberto Cao Saravia
FALKLAND ISLANDS: UNATTRIBUTABLE PRESS BRIEFING

1. Mr Ridley will be giving an unattributable press briefing to selected journalists (list attached) at 5.00 p.m. on 17 December. I submit a brief. See below.

P R Fearn
South America Dept.

16 December 1980
FALKLAND ISLANDS: UNATTRIBUTABLE PRESS BRIEFING

Speaking Notes

1. No doubts about British sovereignty; but Argentine claim exists and will not go away.

2. Dispute overshadows Islanders' everyday lives: blights economy, prevents development and causes population decline.

3. Could simply ignore Argentine claim, but at best status quo would not improve; at worst could be faced with more tangible action. (If Pressed: Argentines could obviously make life very difficult for the Islanders, e.g. by stopping flights).

4. Thus our concern for the Island's future makes us want to look at possible bases for solution. But Islanders' wishes paramount. It is their future and they must decide. Therefore it was essential for me to go and consult Islanders fully on how best to proceed.

5. Islanders are understandably apprehensive about change. But they recognise need to remove dead hand of dispute. Active and serious debate now going on. We hope to have their response in New Year, but no time limit and no pressures.

6. Only the beginning of a long road. Talking only of possible bases and cannot predict Argentine reactions. Any eventual solution would have to be endorsed by Islanders and Parliament.

7. If Islanders decide against further exploration of possibilities with Argentines, we shall of course continue to support them as before, as best we can.

/Points to Make (if asked)
Points to Make (if asked)

8. Details of leaseback proposal would be for negotiation. But minimum requirements would have to be:

   Long lease (several generations)
   Unchanged British administration throughout
   FIG rights to license fishing and oil exploration

9. Recognise necessity of assisting economic development of Islands. Solution to dispute would help on this.

10. Fish. Have not declared 200 mile fishery zone:

    (i) so as not to exacerbate situation; and
    (ii) because we cannot effectively enforce or police it. Actual fishing unlikely to be profitable to Islands or UK, but licensing could produce useful revenue.

11. Oil. No-one knows whether there is any oil. We have not been able to agree on continental shelf delimitation with the Argentines, who claim the whole area. In the absence of agreement, we hold the median line between Argentina and the Islands to mark the boundary of the Islands' continental shelf. But no reputable commercial company is going to explore in disputed waters: solution of dispute must come first. (If asked: we have protested to the Argentines about their offering blocks for oil exploration which appear to extend on to our side of the median line.)

12. Home Secretary looking into nationality problems.
UNATTRIBUTABLE BRIEFING ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. I attach a list of journalists who have accepted Mr Ridley's invitation to an unattributable briefing on the Falklands tomorrow afternoon at 5 pm.

2. Mr Adams will attend from News Department.

Roger Westbrook
News Department

15 December 1980
MR RIDLEY'S UNATTRIBUTABLE BRIEFING ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS:
WEDNESDAY 17 DECEMBER : 5 pm

John Humphrys
Andrew Walker
Michael Frenchman
Patrick Keatley
Charles Douglas-Home
Hugh O'Shaunessy

BBC TV News
BBC External Services
The Times
The Guardian
The Times
Financial Times
Mr Fearn

FALKLAND ISLANDS: UNATTRIBUTABLE PRESS BRIEFING

1. Mr Ridley has seen Mr Westbrook’s minute of 11 December and agrees he should see the journalists suggested, plus Mr C Douglas-Home.

2. Mr Westbrook is arranging for them to call on the Minister on Wednesday 17 December at 5.00 p.m. I would be grateful if you would provide a brief by close of play on Tuesday 16 December.

P L Bean
APS/Mr Ridley

12 December 1980

cc: PS Mr Day
    PS/LPS Mr Harding
    PS/PUS Mr Westbrook
FALKLAND ISLANDS: UNATTRIBUTABLE PRESS BRIEFING

1. In his minute of 9 December, Mr Fearn records Mr Ridley's willingness to give an unattributable press briefing on the Falklands. News Department would welcome such a briefing. The issue is, for the moment, not attracting press attention but it will be news throughout the coming months and to have some key journalists in full possession of the facts of the situation as we see it will be an undoubted advantage.

2. I recommend that Mr Ridley should invite the following journalists to such a briefing:

   + Charlie D'Home
   John Humphrys, BBC TV News
   Andrew Walker, BBC External Services
   Michael Frenchman, The Times
   David Adamson, Daily Telegraph
   Patrick Keatley, The Guardian
   Robert Harvey, The Economist

Once a date and time has been agreed, News Department will contact the journalists.

10 December 1980

Roger Westbrook
News Department
FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. In much of the correspondence from the public and MPs following Mr Ridley's parliamentary statement, emphasis has been laid on the Islands' strategic significance, particularly in view of the Americans' planned withdrawal from the Panama Canal.

2. We have tended to take the view that the Islands have little strategic significance nowadays, particularly with a much reduced Royal Navy. But as far as I am aware, no-one has ever looked at the problem with an expert eye and let us know whether we are right. I think it might be valuable to commission such an assessment (perhaps from MOD or the Cabinet Assessments Staff); even if we could not refer to it publicly, it would put us on firmer ground when formulating replies. If you agree, I shall find out who might do this and ask for an assessment.

Colin Bright

CC Bright
South America Department

11 December 1980

1. As a former member of Planning Staff, I am always pleased to see the conventional wisdom challenged. But in this particular case, I am sufficiently convinced of the correctness of the conventional wisdom to doubt the need for an assessment. The argument may be set out thus:

a) Demonstrably the Royal Navy do not value the islands very highly, or they would be using facilities there at present, or at least would have put them in a manner that on no account should they be surrendered to Argentina because of their potential strategic value;

b) Therefore it must be in strategic interest to maintain the use of the islands to a potential enemy (this was some years the case for retaining a military presence in Malta);

c) But there is no possibility of our ever ceding sovereignty over the islands to any country
Mr Morrice (HK&GD)

EVACUATION OF PATRIALS FROM DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

1. Your minute of 28 November refers. There have never been any plans to cater for service assisted evacuation of UK patriars from any of our dependencies. In our view the principle remains that it is the first duty of the Government of the Dependent Territory to restore law and order, with the help if necessary of UK Police and/or military forces and that UK patriars should be treated no differently from other residents in their entitlement to protection. We do not foresee any development which would cause a change in this assessment.

2. There is no external threat to any of the WIAD territories which might lead to a requirement to rescue or evacuate any inhabitants. The need for internal security reinforcements could arise in the Caribbean dependencies (including, from the date of its separation, Anguilla) but there is the Joint Theatre Plan No. 61, which provides for any necessary assistance from the services if internal disorder develops. Before such an operation need be mounted, the Governor would have recourse to other help eg the services of the Regional Police Adviser and possibly Police reinforcements from other dependent territories in the area (though he could not rely on these being supplied). He might also request Police reinforcements from the UK. As long as the Caribbean guardship is available, it could also be used with effect to defuse a potentially dangerous internal security situation. In our South Atlantic territories, there are no convetible internal threats which could not be dealt with adequately by local resources.

3. Our view is that this question should not be raised at the Caribbean Governors’ Conference in January. We are not aware that any of the Governors wish to raise the issue. Previous references in minutes from the Inspectorsate about local plans refer only to the internal security plans which every Governor has in case of emergency. None of these foresee any evacuation.

4. However, for the record, I attach a note on the spread of UK patriars around the Caribbean dependencies. The figures for DS Aid and technical staff will not be too far out, but the businessmen and others are rough guesses only. Posts would have to be consulted for anything more accurate. As to evacuation destinations, I would be guided by JTP No. 89. Caribbean territories would look to Trinidad or Barbados and the Western Caribbean to Bermuda/UK.

8 December 1980

M L H Hope
West Indian and Atlantic Department

Assistants; MCD, SAMD, SAD.
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<td>a) DS</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3 + foreign spouses</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Aid and Technical Staff</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Business Community</td>
<td>1000*</td>
<td>3000*</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50 to 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Teachers, etc</td>
<td>(incl. in b)</td>
<td>300*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (VSO)</td>
<td>' '</td>
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**Total**

|                | 1018    | 3302    | 65               | 85  | 100?       |

* Complete guess

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**British Virgin Islands**

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<td>a)</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>b)</td>
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<td>c) 100 - 200</td>
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<td>d) 100 - 200</td>
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**Total** 200?
EVACUATION OF UK PATRIALS FROM DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

1. So far as I am aware contingency planning relating to Belize does not include provision for the evacuation of UK beloners. It is very much on the cards that a need could arise if the Guatemalans should take it into their heads to abandon negotiation with us and opt for an attempt to occupy Belize, or part of it, militarily. However, the objection that was raised in the case of Hong Kong is certainly valid for Belize. Very little can be kept confidential in Belize and any effort eg to set up a network of wardens or emergency communications would, especially in present circumstances when everyone is particularly jumpy, be interpreted as active preparation for an invasion and would create great alarm. That is not to say that one could not conduct a purely intellectual exercise on paper which might mean that some of the groundwork had already been done if the balloon did go up, but it should certainly remain within a very restricted circle.

2. I agree that the subject should be on the agenda for the Caribbean Governors' Conference in January.
EVACUATION OF UK PATRIALS FROM DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

1. Your minute of 29 November.

2. In the case of the Falkland Islands, there are two principal eventualities which might necessitate evacuation:
   
   (i) natural disaster; and
   
   (ii) attack by Argentina.

   In the unlikely case of (i), evacuation could be to the nearest land, Comodoro Rivadavia in Argentina. In the case of (ii), it is unlikely that any South American country would be prepared to accept evacuees and thus become involved in the conflict. Evacuation would probably have to be much further afield.

3. As for numbers involved, it is difficult to be specific (though we have asked the Governor to ensure that the imminent census establishes how many UK patrials there are). But in practice it would not be possible to distinguish between patrials and non-patrials. The 1700 or so Islanders are almost all CUKC's under the present legislation and there is continuing pressure in Parliament to extend full British citizenship to all of them under the new legislation. It would be invidious to evacuate some and not others. The numbers are in any case so low that there should be no problem. In addition to the population, there are approximately 10 DS staff, 10 ODA personnel and 60 UK nationals serving on OSAS terms. There are also 40 Royal Marines.

4. That said, I do not think there is any point in establishing an evacuation plan. The Islanders live isolated lives in scattered settlements; it would be difficult for a plan to be comprehensive. It would also be very embarrassing if it became known that we were considering contingency plans; there would be bound to be accusations that we were preparing to abandon the Islands to Argentina. I should have thought it would be sufficient for the MOD to be aware (as they are) of the potential need for swift action and for the Governor to be instructed to keep under review the best means of assembling the Islanders in an emergency.

R H Smith

R H Smith
South America Department

3 December 1980
EVACUATION OF UK PATRIALS FROM DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

1. Following their visit to various Caribbean dependencies, the Inspectors recommended that consideration be given to preparing plans for the evacuation of UK citizens from dependent territories.

2. Such plans do not exist in dependent territories, as the Inspectors noted; it has long been a generally accepted principle that it is the first duty of the Government to restore law and order, and that all residents, whether UK patrials or dependent territory nationals, are entitled to the same protection.

3. The only attempt at such a plan, of which this department is aware, was made for Hong Kong in 1967. It was abandoned on the grounds that preparations for such a plan were likely to become known and seriously impair public confidence. It was decided to rely on mounting a crash operation if the need arose. These arguments could likewise apply to other sensitive territories such as Belize, Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands.

4. I should welcome your views on the feasibility and general principle of preparing plans to evacuate UK patrials and sensitive locals for the dependent territories for which you are responsible. It would also be helpful if you would give approximate numbers and classes of personnel (DS, aid personnel, technical staff, business community, teachers, religious orders) and families, and the nearest point to which they could be evacuated.

5. This subject, as it affects the Caribbean territories, may be touched on at the Conference of Caribbean Governors in January; I should welcome a fairly early response.

P. Morrice
Hong Kong and General Department

28 November 1980

K247 233 4381
LUNCH FOR MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS INTERESTED IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

Tuesday 2 December, 1.00 Warwick Square

The Lord Buxton of Alsa
The Earl of Lauderdale
Baroness Elles
Lord Trefgarne
The Lord Shackleton
The Lord Morris
GIBRALTAR

1. THE MADRID NEWSPAPER "ABC" TODAY CARRIES AN INTERVIEW WITH THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR IN LONDON IN WHICH HE SAYS QUOTE WE ARE MILLIMETRES AWAY FROM STARTING UP THE PROCESS WHICH WOULD LEAD US TO A SOLUTION OF THE GIBRALTAR PROBLEM UNQUOTE. HE SAYS QUOTE IF WE AGREE ON CERTAIN QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE STATUS OF THE POPULATION, WHICH STILL REMAIN TO BE FIXED, THE FRONTIER WILL OPEN AND WE WILL START THE NEGOTIATIONS AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL CONCERNING THE CENTRAL PROBLEM UNQUOTE. HE EXPLAINED THAT THERE COULD BE A DIFFERENCE OF INTERPRETATION ON THE TEXT OF THE LISBON AGREEMENT AND THAT WORK WAS GOING ON TO CLARIFY THIS. HE SAID THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO AVOID FUTURE DISCRIMINATION. QUOTE WHAT WE ARE ASKING IS THAT SPANIARDS IN GIBRALTAR SHOULD BE GIVEN STATUS NOT INFERIOR TO THAT ENJOYED BY MEMBERS OF THE EC. IT WOULD BE ABSURD THAT A SPANIARD IN GIBRALTAR SHOULD RECEIVE INFERIOR TREATMENT TO A DUTCHMAN OR ITALIAN, AND I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE IS ANY BRITISH OBJECTION ON THIS QUESTION: THERE ARE PRESSURES FROM SOME GROUP OF GIBRALTARIANS WHO DO NOT WISH US TO REACH SUCH AN AGREEMENT UNQUOTE.

2. ASKED ABOUT THE WISHES OF THE GIBRALTARIANS HE SAID THAT THESE COULD NOT BE IGNORED BUT THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO CONVINCE THEM THAT IN ORDER TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM, DISCRIMINATION MUST BE ELIMINATED. HE THEN WENT ON TO LIST THE VARIOUS ADVANTAGES FOR THE GIBRALTARIANS OF AN EARLY OPENING OF THE BORDER: FREE COMMUNICATION AND A GREATER CHANCE OF PROSPERITY, WATER, ELECTRICITY AND OTHER KINDS OF SUPPLIES FROM SPAIN AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A GREAT EUROPEAN PORT IN THE AREA.

3. HE MENTIONS THAT LITTLE ATTENTION WAS GIVEN IN SPAIN TO THE FACT THAT IN THE LISBON AGREEMENT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AGREED FOR THE FIRST TIME TO NEGOTIATE WITH SPAIN ON ALL MATTERS INCLUDING SOVEREIGNTY. THE LATTER POINT WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED BUT WAS IMPLICIT IN THE REFERENCE TO UN RESOLUTIONS.

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]
1. In much of the correspondence from the public and MPs following Mr Ridley's parliamentary statement, emphasis has been laid on the Islands' strategic significance, particularly in view of the Americans' planned withdrawal from the Panama Canal.

2. We have tended to take the view that the Islands have little strategic significance nowadays, particularly with a much reduced Royal Navy. But as far as I am aware, no-one has ever looked at the problem with an expert eye and let us know whether we are right. I think it might be valuable to commission such an assessment (perhaps from MOD or the Cabinet Assessments Staff); even if we could not refer to it publicly, it would put us on firmer ground when formulating replies. If you agree, I shall find out who might do this and ask for an assessment.

Colin Bright
South America Department

11 December 1980
FALKLAND ISLANDS: UNATTRIBUTABLE PRESS BRIEFING

1. We spoke this morning about ways of getting more balanced and accurate press treatment of the Falkland Islands issue. The letter from Mrs Tremayne in The Times of 8 December and the recent "Now!" article illustrated this need; and it would also seem helpful in dealing with Parliamentary opinion. Mr Ridley would be ready to give an unattributable press briefing if this could be suitably arranged.

2. You thought that this might best be done by an off-the-record briefing of up to half a dozen journalists rather than going for single targets; and you agreed to suggest suitable names.

P R Fearn
South America Dept.

9 December 1980

THE ARGENTINE POST OFFICE (ENTE) ANNOUNCED ON 26 NOVEMBER THAT THEY WERE SETTING UP A BRANCH AT THE SCIENTIFIC STATION UDALE. THIS STATION WAS DESCRIBED AS LYING IN THE ANCLING SECTOR OF THE ANTARCTIC. AS WE KNOW THE ARGENTINE NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT ON SOUTHERN THULE, AS PART OF THEIR EFFORTS TO SUPPORT OUR CLAIM TO THE ANTARCTIC SECTOR THE ARGENTINES HAVE FOR MANY YEARS BEEN RUNNING POST OFFICES THERE AND THIS NEW ONE, ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, IS THE THIRTEENTH TO BE ESTABLISHED, BUT SINCE SOUTHERN THULE LIES WITHIN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS' DEPENDENCIES RATHER THAN THE BRITISH ANTARCTIC TERRITORY, THE LEGAL ADVISERS MAY, I IMAGINE, WISH US TO COVER OUR SOVEREIGNTY POSTION.

THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY THAT THEY HAS APPROVED ARGENTINE ADHERENCE TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDEMDANGERED SPECIES, A CONVENTION INTALLED IN WASHINGTON IN MARCH 1973 (WITH APPENDICES AGREED AT SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS IN NOVEMBER 1976 AND MARCH 1979), IN ANNOUNCING THEIR APPROVAL, THROUGH DEGREE NUMBER 33/34 OF 1 DECEMBER 1980, SIGNED BY PRESIDENT VIOLETA, THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE MINISTER OF ECONOMY, THE GOVERNMENT ADDED THE FOLLOWING DECLARATION:


THAT THESE THREE MINOR MOVES TO BUTTRESS THE ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY CLAIM HAVE COME IN QUICK SUCCESSION IS PROBABLY A COINCIDENCE, THE ARGENTINE BUREAUCRACY DEICTATES THAT EACH TAKES WEEKS OR MONTHS OF PREPARATION. BUT FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HERE IT IS A FORTUNATE COINCIDENCE - WHILE THEY ARE RESTRAINING THEMSELVES FROM MAKING ANY SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT ON MR RILEY'S VISIT TO THE FALKLANDS THEY CAN AT LEAST POINT TO THESE MOVES, ALBEIT MINOR, IN PURSUIT OF THEIR CLAIM.
RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED
FROM LIMA 031500Z DEC 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 170 OF 03 DECEMBER 80

YOUR GUIDANCE TELNO 123 BELIZE

1. I HOPE TO SEE THE FOREIGN MINISTER SOON TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER, AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNGA VOTE, INCLUDING A LIST OF CO-SPONSORS AND DETAILS OF THE LATIN AMERICANS.

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY GUIDANCE ON THE FALKLANDS? LOCAL PRESS ARE SPECULATING ABOUT THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.

WALLACE

LIMITED
INFORMATION

GB MD
UND
SIR L. ALLINSON

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED
PP BUENOS AIRES
GHS 412
UNCLASSIFIED
FM POCO 031600Z DEC 80
TO PRIORITY CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 125 OF 3 DECEMBER 1980

FAKELAND ISLANDS

1. A STATEMENT (TEXT IN YS/148/80) WAS MADE IN PARLIAMENT ON
2 DECEMBER ON THE RECENT VISIT BY THE MINISTER OF STATE,
MR RIDLEY, TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THE FOLLOWING MAY BE DRAWN
ON FREELY IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS.

LINE TO TAKE

2. (I) EFFECTS OF THE DISPUTE.
THE CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY WHICH THE DISPUTE CREATES OVERSHADOWS
THE LIVES AND FUTURE OF THE ISLANDERS. IT PREVENTS THE EXPANSION
OF THE ECONOMY AND EXPLOITATION OF RESOURCES. THE POPULATION IS
DECLINING.

(II) UK AIDS.
WE WANT TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR A SOLUTION TO THE DISPUTE
ACCEPTABLE TO ALL THE PARTIES. BUT WE SHALL DO NOTHING WHICH IS
NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS. MR RIDLEY'S
VISIT TO THE ISLANDS WAS IN ORDER TO CONSULT ISLANDERS ON POSSIBLE
BASES FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE DIALOGUE WITH ARGENTINA.

(III) WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS?
WE HAVE NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR SOVEREIGNTY. BUT THE DISPUTE WILL NOT
JUST GO AWAY. THE AIM OF ANY SOLUTION MUST BE TO MAINTAIN BRITISH
ADMINISTRATION AND WAY OF LIFE WHILE ALLOWING THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE ECONOMY AND RESOURCES. ONE IDEA ON WHICH ISLANDER VIEWS ARE
BEING SOUGHT IS A LEASEBACK ARRANGEMENT (THE CESSION OF THE TITLE
OF SOVEREIGNTY TO THE ISLANDS AGAINST A LONG LEASE BACK TO THE UK
OF ALL THE TERRITORIES AND MARITIME ZONES AND CONTINENTAL SHELVES
CONCERNED).

1
(IV) WHAT DO ISLANDERS THINK?
WE Await THEIR VIEWS. NO PRESSURES ARE BEING PUT ON THEM. IT IS
THEIR FUTURE: THEY MUST DECIDE.
(V) WHAT WOULD LEASEBACK INVOLVE?
HYPOTHETICAL AT THIS STAGE. DETAILS WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED.
A LEASE WOULD NEED TO BE FOR A LONG PERIOD, COVERING SEVERAL
GENERATIONS, IF IT IS TO BE ACCEPTABLE.
(VI) ARGENTINE VIEWS?
PREMATURE TO SPECULATE ON THE ARGENTINE POSITION. BUT WE ARE
AWARE THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT DO WANT TO SEE SUBSTANTIVE
NEGOTIATING UNDERTAKEN.
(VII) DATE FOR FUTURE TALKS?
NONE HAS BEEN SET.

BACKGROUND

3. GUIDANCE TELNO 37 GIVES BACKGROUND TO DISPUTE. THE TALKS
REFERRED TO IN THAT GUIDANCE WERE EXPLORATORY ONLY BUT SERVED TO
ESTABLISH AGAIN THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS OF THE UK AND ARGENTINA.
THERE HAVE BEEN NO TALKS SINCE,ALTHOUGH THE SECRETARY OF STATE
DISCUSSED THE DISPUTE BRIEFLY WITH THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN
MINISTER AT THE UNGA IN SEPTEMBER. WE DO NOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE
ISLANDERS’ CONSIDERED REACTION TO THE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES FOR
PROGRESS BEFORE THE NEW YEAR.

CARRINGTON

BY TELEGRAPH:
BUENOS AIRES      BRASILIA      MONTEVIDEO
SANTIAGO          PORT STANLEY
[ALL PRIORITY]

AND SAVING TO CERTAIN OTHER POSTS

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION       ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
INFORMATION D                   GUIDANCE
Chancery
British Legation to the Holy See
ROME

Your reference

ALW 040/325/1
Date 22 October 1980

Dear Chancery,

1. Thank you for your letter of 20 October drawing attention to page 34 of the publication "Argentina" which was sent to you by the Argentine Embassy in Rome.

2. We are in no doubt that the Falkland Islands are British. They are shown as such on British maps and, of course, in official publications issued by HMG. While we reject the Argentine claim and protest when necessary to protect our claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, we cannot in practice prevent an Argentine official publication marking the Islands as Argentine territory.

3. We are grateful to you for spotting the entry but we do not consider it necessary to lodge a formal protest on this occasion.

D G Davies
South America Department
Mr Wallace, WIAD  
Mr Noss, WIAD  
Mr Keith, SED  
Mr Kydd, MCD  
Mr Davies, SAMD  
Mr Forbes-Meyler, SPD  
(Separate copies to each)

1. I attach a draft brief on Constitutional Development of the Remaining Dependencies which is required for the Commonwealth Senior Officials meeting in Nicosia from 5 to 7 November 1980.

2. As the final brief should be with CCD by noon on Wednesday 22 October, I should be grateful if you could let me have your comments by telephone this afternoon.

E K Maxwell (Miss)  
Hong Kong and General Department  
K245  233 4784

21 October 1980

Phoned Miss Maxwell  
21/10  with  
was avoiding  
[Handwritten note: Opened in case it was urgent.]

[Handwritten note: Included F1 data need (OBAT?) was missing.]

[Handwritten note: CPA, 21/10]
COMMONWEALTH SENIOR OFFICIALS MEETING, NICOSIA:
5-7 NOVEMBER 1980
VI. BACKGROUND BRIEFS
BRIEF NO. 34
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE REMAINING DEPENDENCIES
POINTS TO MAKE
POLICY TOWARDS THE DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
1. HMG's policy since 1945 has been to encourage dependent territories towards independence by seeking to create the conditions which make it feasible. There are, however, certain exceptional cases where external political considerations make independence impossible. HMG does not force independence on unwilling territories and seeks to be guided by the wishes of the local people.
TERRITORIES WHICH REACHED INDEPENDENCE IN 1980
2. The Condominium of the New Hebrides became the Republic of Vanuatu on 30 June.
BRIEF NO 34
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE REMAINING DEPENDENCIES

BACKGROUND

ANGUILLA (Population 6,500)
1. Part of the Associated State of St Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla since 1967, it will be formally separated at the end of 1980 and will revert to dependent territory status. The Government is administered by Her Majesty's Commissioner assisted by an Executive Council. The Commissioner is required to act in accordance with ExCo advice but retains responsibility for external affairs, defence and internal security. Anguilla is relatively backward economically and institutionally; HMG is concentrating on educating Ministers and populace to self-sufficiency. But independence plays no part is islanders' view of future. An election was held in May this year; some modest constitutional advance expected later this year.

BELIZE (Population 140,000)
2. Belize, formerly British Honduras, was recognised as a British Colony in 1862. Belize has internal self-government although the Governor retains responsibility over external defence, internal security, external relations and the Civil Service. There is a House of Representatives with 18 elected members and a Senate of 8 appointed members. General elections are held at least every 5 years. Independence in Belize is hampered by dispute with Guatemala over sovereignty which is now 17 years old. Negotiations are in train; the content is confidential. HMG is actively seeking agreement as offering the most secure future for Belize. But it must be with consent of the Belizeans.

BERMUDA (Population 57,300)
3. Bermuda has been a UK dependency since 1612. The
constitution is very advanced although falls short of internal self-government. There is an elected House of Assembly, and a Cabinet selected by the Premier. A Council, chaired by the Governor and consisting of the Premier and 2 or 3 other Ministers, advises on matters of external affairs, defence, internal security and the police, although the Governor retains ultimate responsibility in all four subjects. Both local parties agree that independence is logical and may come about within the next five years. As yet no timetable has been put forward.

BRITISH ANTARCTIC TERRITORY (No indigenous population)

4. BAT is administered by a High Commissioner resident in the Falkland Islands. He is empowered to make regulations for and the territory, to establish Courts of Justice. The High Commissioner appoints the Station Commander at each research station as a Magistrate.

BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY (No permanent population)

5. The territory is administered by Her Majesty's Commissioner for BIOT who is Head of the East African Department in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS (Population 11,000)

6. The BVI has been a dependency since 1632. The Constitution provides for a Ministerial system of Government with Governor retaining usual reserve powers. There are no present indications of a wish to move to independence. The islanders possibly consider that they would not be so well placed to continue giving a home to great number of foreign investors if they emerged from their dependent status.
CAYMAN ISLANDS (Population 17,340)

7. A British dependency since 1670. Constitutionally the least advanced of the West Indian territories, it operates a membership system, or embryo Ministerial system. There is a Legislative Assembly comprising official and elected members. The Cayman islanders believe their present constitution is well suited to their circumstances and are determined that there should be no move towards independence.

FALKLAND ISLANDS (Population 1,930)

8. The Falkland Islands have been a UK dependency since approximately 1833. It is very backward constitutionally, and the Governor retains full powers, although he is advised by the Executive and Legislative Councils. The Islands are, moreover, the subject of a dispute between the UK and the Argentine which would make independence a problem. But the islanders do not want independence.

GIBRALTAR (Population 31,760)

9. A British colony since 1713. Gibraltar has a Ministerial system of government with the Governor retaining the usual reserve powers. Independence is, however, blocked for political reasons: Article 10 of the Treaty of Utrecht states that if Gibraltar ceases to be a UK dependency, Spain has first claim on the territory. The people of Gibraltar, by a referendum in 1967, voted overwhelmingly to retain their connections with the UK.

HONG KONG (Population 5,017,000)

10. Hong Kong and Kowloon have been British dependencies since 1860 and 1898 respectively. Constitutional advance is hampered by the fact that in 1997 the lease ceding the New Territories to the UK expires. There are, however, Executive and Legislative Councils comprising appointed members which advise the Governor.
11. A British colony since 1668. Constitutionally, the most advanced of the West Indian territories with very few powers remaining to the Governor. It has a Ministerial system of Government. There are no indications of any wish to proceed to independence but this could change at any time.

THE ISLANDS OF PITCAIRN, DUCIE AND OENO (Population 70)

12. The Pitcairn Islands Group have been UK dependencies since the early 1800s. Pitcairn is the only inhabited island. The islanders elected their own representative, the Island Magistrate, but power resides with the Governor, who resides in Wellington, New Zealand. Independence is not feasible.

ST HELENA AND DEPENDENCIES (Population 6,450)
(Ascension Island and Tristan da Cunha)

13. St Helena came under direct government of the Crown in 1833. The Governor retains full powers for the administration of the group; he is advised on St Helena by a Legislative Council (with a majority of elected members) and an Executive Council. There are Administrators in both Tristan da Cunha and Ascension, with equally full powers, who are responsible to the Governor of St Helena. Independence would be impractical for St Helena although attempts are being made to stimulate the economy and encourage self-sufficiency. The same applies to Tristan da Cunha, which is however relatively prosperous. Ascension has no indigenous population.

TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS (Population 6,500)

14. The Turks and Caicos Islands have been a British dependency since 1874. It has a Ministerial system of Government. The Governor retains the usual reserve powers. Of the two local parties, the Government party favours
independence in 1982; the opposition party opposes it. There is an election on 4 November after which a referendum may be held to discover whether or not the electorate want independence.

Hong Kong and General Department.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
21 October 1980
South American Dept

Dear Department,

1. We enclose a publication issued by the Ministry of External and Cultural Relations of the Argentine Republic, which has been sent to us by the Embassy of the Argentine Republic to the Holy See.

2. We would draw your attention to page 34 of the publications, and should be grateful if you would let us know whether representations should be made regarding it and, if so, how.

Yours ever,

M. Davies

Encl.
Prefazione

Desideriamo presentarvi un paese americano, il quarto del continente, dopo il Canadà, gli Stati Uniti e il Brasile. È la Repubblica Argentina, che copre oltre 3.760.000 Km2 dalla zona subtropicale fino al Polo Sud.

Il territorio continentale ha un'area equivalente alla somma di quelle di dodici paesi europei: Spagna, Portogallo, Francia, Italia, Gran Bretagna, Repubblica Federale Tedesca, Austria, Belgio, Olanda, Norvegia, Finlandia e Svizzera.

La gran diversità del clima favorisce una svariata produzione agro-zootecnica. Il paese ha pure una gran ricchezza forestale, mineraria e peschiera, nonché importanti giacimenti di petrolio e di uranio.

Numerose industrie alimentari risultanti dalla sua grande produzione di granaglie e di carni, centrali idroelettriche ed atomiche, acciaierie e manifatture varie, sono la testimonianza del suo ascendente cammino verso l'avvenire.

La Repubblica Argentina occupa un posto di prim'ordine nell'America Latina per il suo Prodotto Lordo Interno pro capite. Ventisette milioni di abitanti capitalizzano lo sforzo delle generazioni anteriori e vi aggiungono il proprio con senso di grandezza nazionale.

L'Argentina è cresciuta e si è sviluppata in virtù dell'apporto migratorio europeo; presenta un chiaro profilo occidentale e cristiano. Sul piano internazionale difende permanentemente l'eguaglianza giuridica degli stati, il non intervento nelle questioni interne di altri paesi, l'infondatezza dell'applicazione di sanzioni economiche fra le nazioni e la libera determinazione dei popoli.

Questa è l'autentica realtà argentina, chiara, visibile, tangibile. Questa è la nostra verità, che offriamo a coloro che vogliono conoscerla senza riserve mentali, a cuore aperto, affinché si sappia come siamo e come viviamo.

Fra i ventisette milioni di esseri umani che fanno la grandezza della Repubblica, l'Argentina ha l'orgoglio di annoverare tre premi Nobel, di mostrare al mondo l'alto
Most of booklet *not* filmed
[editorial note, 16 December 2012]
INSTRUCTION TO MILITARY ATTACHES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES

I attach for information, copies of a signal sent to attaches in the above-mentioned countries. This is the result of a personal approach by the Head of DIA, Lt. General Tighe, to DGI. DGI's answer to Gen. Tighe formed the background of the message to our attaches and was discussed with PUSD.

Mrs. Watlings
Defence Dept. 7st 13/8

Covering SECRET
UK/US EYES ONLY

SECRET
U.S./U.K. EYES ONLY
SECRET

CYF66 11/1555:224A2632
FOR CYP
ROUTINE 111559Z AUG 84
FROM MODUK
TO BRITDEFAT BUENOS AIRES

SECRET
SIG ACA/UDM
FOR DEFAT FROM CHSI. MY AAA/ACA/UDM 111559Z AUG 84.
NOTWITHSTANDING INSTRUCTIONS IN THE REFERENCE WE
WOULD NOT (NOT) EXPECT YOU TO DISCUSS FALKLAND
ISLANDS DISPUTE WITH YOUR US COLLEAGUES.

DISTRIBUTION UDM

CYF 1 DIC ACTION (CYF 1 DISCO)
SECRET

FOR

SECRET
PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED
UK/U.S. EYES ONLY

ROUTINE: 111500Z AUG 80

FROM MODUK
TO BRITDEFAT ASUNCION
BRITDEFAT BANGKOK
BRITDEFAT BOGOTA
BRITDEFAT BUENOS AIRES
BRITDEFAT BRASILIA
BRITDEFAT CARACAS
BRITDEFAT HAVANA
BRITDEFAT ISLAMABAD
BRITDEFAT JAKARTA
BRITDEFAT LA PAZ
BRITDEFAT LIMA
BRITDEFAT MANILA
BRITDEFAT MANAGUA
BRITDEFAT MEXICO CITY
BRITDEFAT MONTEVIDEO
BRITDEFAT PANAMA CITY
BRITDEFAT QUITO
BRITDEFAT RANGOON
BRITDEFAT SAN SALVADOR
BRITDEFAT SANTO DOMINGO
BRITDEFAT TEUCUCIALPA
BRITDEFAT COLUDEO
BRITDEFAT DACCA
BRITDEFAT GEORGE TOWN

original has gone by bag to post where DAS reside only

4/8
SECRET UK/US EYES ONLY

SIC AAA/ACA/UDM

FOR DEFATS, DEFADS AND HD BDILS(W) FROM DMSI.


2. THIS DIRECTIVE IN NO WAY ALTERS YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES TO YOUR HEAD OF MISSION OR THE MOD. THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE IN THE SYSTEM OF TASKING AND REPORTING, AND WHILE YOU ARE ENJOINED TO

SECRET
DISCUSS MILITARY INTELLIGENCE MATTERS FRANKLY AND INFORMALLY WITH YOUR US COLLEAGUES IN POST THE TRANSMISSION OF YOUR WRITTEN AND SIGNALLLED REPORTS TO WASHINGTON AS APPROPRIATE WILL BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE DSC.

3. DIRECTOR DIA WILL BE SENDING A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO YOUR US COLLEAGUES.

4. HD BDILS IS REQUESTED TO SHOW THIS MESSAGE TO LT GEN TIGHE

ORIG- ICO HAZELTON BRANCH - DMS Tel - 6119

UK/U.S. EYES ONLY

SECRET
As suggested in your minute of 20 August to Mr Duggan, I attach an unclassified line for the UK representatives to take at their discretion in support of any initiative by the Falkland Islands representative to expound the Islands' case at the conference. The background brief you already have requires no up-dating.

Colin Bright
CC Bright
South America Dept

1 September 1980

RESTRICTED

CODE 18-78
POINTS TO MAKE (AS APPROPRIATE)

1. We have no doubt as to British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and Dependencies. The Falkland Islands have been settled by the British uninterruptedly for nearly 150 years. Prior to settlement, there were no indigenous Islanders. Nearly all the 1800 Islanders are of British extraction and have British passports. Their language, way of life, and system of Government are British.

2. The Islanders do not want independence. They have made it clear that they wish to remain British. We recognise and respect that wish. The issue is not one of de-colonization, but of self-determination. Islanders are fully consulted on all developments affecting their interests. HMG have made it clear that no proposals about the future of the Islands will be brought before Parliament unless they are acceptable to the Islanders.

3. We are concerned that the Islands should have a viable economic and political future. HMG and the Islanders recognise that the development of offshore resources (oil and fish) is only possible in cooperation with Argentina. We hope to work together with the Argentines to this end.
COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATION ANNUAL CONFERENCE: THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. Mr Bartrop's minute of 14 August to Mr Fearn and your own reply of 18 August refer.

2. Perhaps the needs identified in this exchange might be met by your provision of a page or so of unclassified 'Points to Make' (along the lines - but longer - of para 5 of your minute) which the Minister and Mr Paterson (Assistant Head in this department and FCO adviser to Mr Marten at the Conference) might have by them and which could be made available to members of the delegation - and perhaps to the Falkland Islands' representative.

3. If you agree could I perhaps have this by 10 September, along with any updating you then think necessary to the short defensive brief you have already provided.

20 August 1980

T J David
Commonwealth Coordination Dept

cc: Mr Harding
Mr Barltrop, CCD

cc
Mr Harding

COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATION ANNUAL CONFERENCE:
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. Your minute of 14 August asked whether we might take more vigorous action at the CPA conference in support of our position on the Falkland Islands.

2. We are, as you know, now talking to the Argentines again about this issue. As in previous years, we expect the fact that such discussions are taking place to mean that there will be no international discussion of the dispute, not least at the United Nations, where we expect as in previous years that we and the Argentines will confine ourselves to short ritual statements of our positions. We do not at the moment wish to raise the international temperature.

3. That being said, however, I agree that it is useful for the Falklands representatives at these meetings to make known to fellow Commonwealth delegates the facts of the situation in the Falklands. There seems to be quite widespread ignorance about these, not least in Latin America. In the Commonwealth context, we would have expected more understanding from Commonwealth countries.

4. It would, therefore, be helpful to ensure that we do give the Falklands representatives whatever discreet assistance they may require. It would be sensible for them to take the lead, particularly in public speeches but we could reinforce as necessary in corridor discussions.

5. The sort of thing which is not widely known is that e.g. the population is wholly British (there are no Argentines or other Europeans in the Islands); that their language, way of life and system of government are British; that our tenure and administration has continued uninterrupted for nearly 150 years; that the Islanders have no wish to be anything other than British.

6. We have already supplied as requested a short defensive brief. We will be updating this in mid-September as necessary. We could let you have any further supportive material which you think you might require then.

G A Duggan
South America Dept.

18 August 1980
Mr. Duggan

3

[Handwritten note:]

Mr. Duggan, we have also received a brief attached. We need to provide additional information to our confidential brief in mid-1995.
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. As you may know, the Annual Conference of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association is to be held in Lusaka from 27 September to 4 October; and Mr Marten will be leading the UK delegation.

2. These conferences are customarily attended by representatives from the Falkland Islands; and on both the last 2 occasions (at which I was myself present) they made good use of the platform to put over the Falkland Islands' case and to urge that, in acknowledgment of the principle of self-determination, Commonwealth countries should support their case at, eg, the United Nations. The Islands' representative at last year's conference was particularly effective and was warmly applauded at the end of his speech.

3. This year the Falklands' representative is to be the Hon Timothy Miller, Member of the Legislative Council, and he will no doubt seek to follow in the footsteps of his fellow islanders and promote the Islands' case. You may wish to consider whether there is any way in which the UK delegation could lend support, either in the course of a speech or alternatively behind the scenes. If so, this might entail some special briefing (ie over the brief already commissioned from your department). You no doubt let me know if you feel there is any scope for pursuing this idea.

4. CPA conferences do not, incidentally, pass resolutions, nor are communiqués issued at their conclusion. They do, however, present an opportunity for 'spreading bread on the waters'.

R A R Bartrop
Commonwealth Co-ordination Department

14 August 1980

cc: PS/Mr Marten

CONFIDENTIAL
8 August 1980

Dear Colin,

FCO TELNO. 154 (NOT TO RIO DE JANEIRO OR PORT STANLEY):
SUGGESTION OF BRAZILIAN MEDIATION FOR THE FALKLANDS

1. The press report suggesting that the Secretary of State had requested Brazilian mediation between the UK and Argentina on the Falklands dispute was carried originally not by the Argentine press but by "O Globo" of Rio de Janeiro. The O Globo story appeared on 3 August and the following day various Argentine newspapers ran it, attributing the story to O Globo.

2. The Argentine Foreign Ministry have not issued an official denial from here but once the story appeared in the Argentine newspapers, public denials from both the Itamary and the Argentine Ambassador in Brazil were reported in Argentine newspapers within a day or two. We had been questioned by journalists from "Noticias Argentina" and "Clarín" and had said that there was no truth in the idea. The combination of all these denials was enough to kill the story without it ever having reached front pages.

Yours ever,

Richard

R H T Gozney

CCS: THE CONSULATE GENERAL
RIO DE JANEIRO

CHANCERY BRAZILIA

M W Growcott Esq
PORT STANLEY
CPA ANNUAL CONFERENCE: BRIEFS

1. As requested in your minute of 31 July, I attach an unclassified brief on the Falkland Islands. We may, however, need to provide a classified brief in mid-September. But this will depend on events and I cannot confirm at this stage. I shall contact you again in September if a further brief is necessary.

D G Davies
South America Department
233 3386
LORD CARRINGTON'S VISIT TO BRAZIL: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. Your minute of 5 August refers. I submit a self-explanatory draft telegram.

2. I have not been able to speak to the Argentine Ambassador about this as he has been out of his office since he rang you yesterday. But I have spoken to Sr Iglesias, the Counsellor at the Embassy, who seemed happy enough with this response.

P R Fearn
South America Dept.

6 August 1980
FM FCO 061100Z AUG 80
TO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES
TELEGRAM NUMBER
INFO ROUTINE BRASILIA
Secretary of State's Visit to Brazil: Falkland Islands.

1. Argentine Ambassador has sought clarification of reports
   in the Argentine press that the Secretary of State had requested
   Brazilian mediation between UK and Argentina on the Falklands
   dispute. Ortiz de Rozas asked whether we could issue an official
   denial.

2. We have confirmed to the Argentine Embassy that the story
   is quite inaccurate and drawn their attention to the Secretary of
   State's comment on the Falklands issue at his press conference in
   Brasilia (Brasilia telno. 228). We see no need to take the
   initiative in issuing an official denial but have said that we
   would have no objection if the Argentine MFA wished to put on
   record their understanding of the press reports' inaccuracy.

CARRINGTON

Catchword

Distribution
Limited
SAMD
News Dept
Mr Harding
PS/Mr Ridley
PS

Authorised for despatch

Comcen reference Time of despatch
Mr Fearn
cc: PS
News Department

LORD CARRINGTON'S VISIT TO BRAZIL: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. The Argentine Ambassador telephoned me this morning, to say that he had been asked by his Ministry to seek clarification on reports appearing in the Argentine press to the effect that the Secretary of State, while in Brazil on his current tour, had asked the Brazilians to "mediate" between Britain and Argentina on the Falkland Islands question.

2. I told the Ambassador that I had seen reports of the Secretary of State's meetings in Brasilia and that he had made no such request. The Ambassador was reassured, but nevertheless asked if we could make an official denial of the reports, either in London, or through the Secretary of State's party, or through the Embassy in Buenos Aires. I undertook to look into this, and would be grateful for advice.

5 August 1980

K D Temple
PS/Mr Ridley
INTERFERENCE WITH Falklands MAIL

1. Many thanks for your letters of 17 and 24 July holding me to my promise to take up with the Foreign Ministry cases of letters with "Islas Malvinas" written on them by the Argentine Post Office if they became a regular event.

2. I am inclined to agree that the postcard to Velma Malcolm from Norway, the letter to the Office of the Governor from the States, and the envelope from Agfacolor here in Buenos Aires all had the offending phrase added by ENTEL here so I shall take the matter up and let you know the outcome. So please go ahead and tell the likes of Velma that the Embassy are trying to get this silly business stopped.

R H T Cozney

cc: D G Davies Esq
SAMd, FC0

RESTRICTED
Government House
FORT STANLEY
Falkland Islands
17 July 1980

R H T Gozney Esq
British Embassy
BUENOS AIRES

Dear Richard,

INTERFERENCE WITH FALKLANDS MAIL

1. I have been approached by Mrs Malcolm, Secretary to the local branch of the Committee, who complains that Argentine interference with Falkland Islanders' mail is a fairly frequent occurrence. In support of this she produced a postcard of which I enclose a copy. The words 'Islas Malvinas' have been added in a different coloured ink. (She had no other examples to show me but insisted it was happening all the time).

2. Mrs Malcolm was intending raising this subject direct with you and I could only dissuade her from this by promising to relay her complaint. I said that there was little that we could do and pointed out that the card bore the Joint Declaration cachet and did not therefore constitute any threat to our sovereignty. Mrs Malcolm's opinion of me has not been enhanced by my saying this. Is there anything you can do to help me redeem myself?

Yours ever,

Michael

cc: D G Davies Esq
SAMD ICO

L W Grewcott

McEchii

This may be nothing in this. So may simply be too half the contact.
Dear William & George,

A little second from our mother most point is our first disappointment we came to see the Mid Night Sun & got cold with cloud's小狗 the first time in 62 weeks we have any rain. At was quite warm in Sweden & Denmark and mid 22°C.

Germany & Austria were colder. 2 our feet of the country, so far, it efficient & clean fire. Looking young people few days.

Tomorrow we go down to Bahia may use the run there we both.

We fly back London next Sat w. have today there than a month from Broad in 9 compartment. Working to see a lot of old friends at the London Welker Room in May.

All the Very Best Pat, Your & Gang.
INTER-PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE, EAST BERLIN, 1980

Brief No  : FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. The Falkland Islands have been settled by the British uninterrupted since 1833. Britain has no doubts about its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies and totally rejects Argentina's claim to sovereignty.

2. Britain is concerned to ensure a viable and secure future for the Islands both politically and economically. An economic survey of the Islands (commissioned by the British Government and carried out by Lord Shackleton in 1976) showed that the population was declining and the economy stagnating. No new investment was likely nor any development of economic resources in the area practical in a climate of continued political uncertainty.

3. For that reason, successive British Governments have, with the agreement of Island Councillors, held talks with the Argentines, specifically without prejudice to either side's position on sovereignty. The aim has been to seek a way of working together to develop the economy of the Islands and the resources of the South West Atlantic area, in which all concerned have an interest. The Islanders have been assured that no decisions will be taken against their wishes and that no proposals for a settlement will be put to Parliament which do not have their support.

4. The Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr Ridley), led the British delegation at a round of exploratory talks in April this year. The delegation included for the first time a Falkland Islands Councillor. Although no decisions were taken, each side was able to reach a better understanding of the other's position and it was agreed that contacts on day-to-day matters between the Islands and Argentina should be expanded. Each delegation is now reporting back. No dates have been set but it is hoped that further exchanges will be held.
Separate copies to:

Miss Barker-Harland (ACDD)
Mr Robinson (CSCE Unit)
Mr Janvrin/Mr Pearce (Defence Dept)
Mr Haswell/Mr Rampton (EAD)
Mr Broucher (EESD)
Mr Kydd/Mr Connor (MCD)
Mr Passmore/Mr Lamport (MED)
Mr Holmes/Mr Lander (NENAD)
Mr Tyrer (OID)
Mr Lavers (SAD)
Mr Barnett (SEAD)
Mr Dalton/Mr Sprake (SAfD)
Mr Bright (SAMd)
Mr Keith (SED)
Mr Ralph/Mrs Anderson (UND)
Mr Carter (WED)

INTER-PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE, EAST BERLIN, 15-24 SEPTEMBER 1980

1. The annual Inter-Parliamentary Conference will be held in East Berlin in September to debate resolutions either drafted at the IPU's Spring Meeting in Oslo or to be drawn up on the spot. The British delegation will include Messrs John Page (C) - Chairman of the British Group of the IPU - Gordon Bagier (L), Tom Cox (L), John Hunt (C), John Osborn (C) and Albert Roberts (L), plus two other MPs and one Peer to be selected in mid-July.

2. As usual, the delegation has asked the FCO for a series of briefs, to be ready in time for a briefing meeting at the end of July (ie before the recess). These fall into three categories:

   (a) Briefs, plus a full or partial draft resolution, on those subjects on which a draft resolution was not prepared in Oslo;

   (b) Briefs, including suggested additions or amendments, covering the already existing draft resolutions;

   (c) Contingency briefs on individual subjects likely to arise during the conference.

3. I should be grateful if addressees of this minute (one copy only to each Department) would treat it as a request for this material, as listed at Annex A, to reach me not later than Thursday, 24 July (some up-dating may be necessary later, but the delegation has requested a complete set of briefs by that date). Where more than one Department is listed, would the first-named please lead and co-ordinate.
4. Briefs should be unclassified, undated and without FCO attribution. They should be typed in final form on plain white paper, with the following heading:

INTER-PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE, EAST BERLIN, 1980

Brief No (blank): (SUBJECT)

Please use "Britain" and "British policy" rather than "HM Government" or "the Government's/our policy", etc, when giving our views.

M Hickson
Overseas Information Department

3 July 1980
Separate copies to:

- M & CD (Belize)
- WED (Berlin)
- SAND (Antarctica, Chile and Falkland Islands)
- FED (China, Hong Kong, Korea)
- CSCE Unit (CSCE)
- SED (Cyprus, Gibraltar)
- SEAD (Democratic Kampuchea, Vietnam)
- ACD (Disarmament)
- EAD (Horn of Africa)
- RID (Irish Republic and Northern Ireland)
- Defence Dept (Mercenaries)
- NENAD (Middle East, Zionism and input on National Liberation Movements)
- SAFD (Namibia, South Africa (including apartheid and sanctions) and input on National Liberation Movements)
- FBD (Aid Target, North/South Dialogue, New International Economic Order, [Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources])
- CAD (Zimbabwe)
- NKGGD (Right of Self-Determination)
- MCD (Iran)
- SAD (Afghanistan)
- OID (New International Information Order)
- UND (Mrs Wiseman) (Credentials and Diplomatic Relations and Recognition, Non-Aligned Movement, Threats to the Peace and Chapter VII of the UN Charter)
- UND (Mr Davey) (National Liberation Movements)
- UND (Mr Davey and Mrs Tucker) (Calls for the Expulsion of members of the United Nations and the Specialised Agencies)
- UND (Mr Kahl) (Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources)

POLITICAL BACKGROUND BRIEF

1. In his minute of 3 January (copy attached) Mr French explained the purpose of this brief for use at international meetings and requested departments to provide material on subjects covered by them.

2. Participants at a major UN Conference in July will need an up-to-date version of the brief; may I please ask you to assist in its production?

3. I attach a copy of what your department produced in January. If there are no changes required, a phone call or short minute to me saying so will suffice; if changes are needed

CONFIDENTIAL
needed would you kindly provide two copies in final form on plain white A4 paper typed on one side only?

4. May I ask for contributions to reach me as soon as possible and in any case no later than close-of-play on Wednesday, 2 July.

S J Davey
United Nations Department
K.144
233 5024

cc Mrs Morphet, Research Dept.
Planning Staff.

26 June 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

Political Guidelines

1. UN Department compiles periodically a Compendium of briefing comprising general political and economic background briefs for use primarily by those, including non-UN officials, attending technical UN meetings. It is designed to alert them to sensitive issues, to provide sufficient background to make the subject intelligible and provide guidance on what to do if the subject should come up at short notice.

2. I should be grateful if recipients of this minute could update as necessary those sections of the last edition of the Political Background Brief (July 1979) relevant to their interests, covering the following points where appropriate:

a) references to UNGA resolutions of the previous one or two sessions, and how the UK/Nine/West voted:

b) a steer on key words or phrases which may arise (eg 'peaceful coexistence', 'the NIEO', 'apartheid is genocide', etc).

c) the importance we attach to solidarity of the Nine.

3. For SAmD and MACD I attach a copy of a letter from UKMission Geneva on the subject of the World Administrative Radio Conference, calling for something in the Political Background Brief on Antarctica, and

/S. J. DAVIE
for expansion of existing sections on the Falkland Islands and Belize. For SAFD, NENAD and Mrs Tucker, I attach a suggested draft on calls for the expulsion of members of the United Nations and the Specialised Agencies on which I would welcome comments, and from NENAD, a contribution on Israel. Could SEAD please expand their section to cover the seating of Democratic Kampuchea at UN and other international meetings. For OID, I should be grateful for a section on the New International Information Order, though not linked with a/the New International Economic Order (minutes of 14 and 17 September 1979 respectively, from Mr Escritt (FRD) and Mr Stegmann (UND(A)/ODA) to Mr Allison (IPD) refer.) I should also be grateful if MED and SAD could provide new sections covering Iran and Afghanistan; if NENAD could expand the Middle East section to cover the Western Sahara; if ACDI could cover the diversion of resources from the arms race to development, particularly industrial development; and if Rhodesia Department could cover compensation to Frontline States for Rhodesian attacks.

4. It would be most helpful if I could receive amended or new sections in final form, on plain white paper with no classification, by close of play on Monday 14 January. (The whole paper will be classified confidential.) I should also welcome any suggestions for additional briefs which recipients may consider necessary.

3 January 1980

cfi: Mrs Morphet, Research Dept
Planning Staff

R French
United Nations Department

KL44 233 5024
1. Argentina claims sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies (South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands). The British Government reject this claim and have stated consistently that they are in no doubt of their sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies. Argentina loses few opportunities at international fora to reassert and thereby seek to strengthen its claim to sovereignty.

2. In the event of an Argentine declaration challenging British sovereignty, the UK delegate should issue a declaration on the following lines (the exact wording should be cleared with South America Department, FCO (233 4077)):

"With reference to the declaration by the Republic of Argentina, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have no doubt as to United Kingdom sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and the Falkland Islands Dependencies. The United Kingdom therefore do not accept the declaration of the Argentine Republic claiming to contest United Kingdom sovereignty over the above mentioned territories."

3. Problems may also arise over nomenclature: eg in the United Nations Argentina has proposed successfully that the words "Islas Malvinas" should appear on official documents printed in English where the words "Falkland Islands" are mentioned. The UK representative should resist any attempt to secure the adoption of the words "Islas Malvinas" in place of the words "Falkland Islands" in an English text or any attempt to secure the addition of the words "Islas Malvinas" after the name of the Falkland Islands. The nomenclature to be used in any discussion is the "Falkland Islands".

4. If the Argentines interpret UNGA Resolutions on the Falklands as condemning the "illegality" of the British position there, the UK delegate should issue a counter-statement on the following lines (exact wording to be cleared with South America Department, FCO):
"The United Kingdom does not accept the assertion by Argentina that the 'open quote' illegality of the occupation of the Falkland, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands by the United Kingdom has been 'close quote' recognised by the United Nations. UN Resolutions have simply called for the settlement of the dispute by negotiation between the two Governments."

Background (not for use)

5. Without political and economic co-operation with Argentina, the Falkland Islands face a bleak future. Recognising this, successive British Governments have developed a dialogue to seek a new framework and resolve the dispute. But Argentina's refusal to negotiate on any basis other than a complete transfer of sovereignty has meant that no effective progress has been possible. The Government have held one round of talks with the Argentines and hope to continue the dialogue. But no solution will be agreed unless it is acceptable to the Islanders. They want to retain their British way of life; they do not want independence.

6. The last UNGeneral Assembly Resolution on the Falklands in 1976 was pro-Argentine and was passed by 102 votes to 1 (the UK) with 36 abstentions (including other EEC countries). We can expect little support at international meetings from other countries. The UK could not vote for any resolution at a UN meeting which questioned British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.
COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATION: CARIBBEAN REGIONAL CONFERENCE, BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS, 12-21 JULY

1. Mr Victor Goodhew (Cons) and Mr Kenneth Marks (Lab) have been chosen by the Speaker's Selection Committee to represent the UK Branch of the CPA at the forthcoming Caribbean Regional Conference in Tortola. A representative from the Falkland Islands will attend the meeting.

2. I should be grateful if you would arrange to provide an unclassified brief on the Falkland Islands for the CPA delegation. I attach a copy of a last year's brief and should be grateful if yours is prepared in the same format.

3. Will you please arrange for five sets of the brief to reach me by 2 July.

24 June 1980

D Higgins
Commonwealth Coordination Dept

Encl

My Davies of
Attachment very useful!
Be keen to have draft by
1 July.

25/7 CEC
COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATION
CARIBBEAN REGIONAL CONFERENCE, BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS (12-21 JULY)

FALKLAND ISLANDS

Constitutional Status

1. The Falkland Islands (population about 1,800, nearly all of British stock) are a British Crown Colony. The Islands are administered by a Governor (Mr R M Hunt C.M.G) aided by an Executive Council of six and a Legislative Council of 8 (6 elected by universal adult suffrage). The next general election is due in 1982. The present constitution dates from 21 November 1977.

Political

2. There are no political parties as such. The overriding political issue is the dispute with Argentina and the people are united in their wish to remain British and resist Argentina's claim to sovereignty. There is no pressure for independence.

Economic

3. The economy is based almost entirely upon sheep farming (approximately 700,000 sheep) which employs over half the work-force. The Falkland Islands Company dominate the economy, especially the wool trade, and own nearly half the land area. Exports consist almost entirely of wool; principal imports are foodstuffs, manufactured goods, timber and machinery. There is a small annual trade surplus. Estimated per capita income (1977) was £1,700.

4. Prospects for diversification are limited. The Islands are too remote, the climate too inhospitable and the population too low. Studies are in hand to improve pastures and methods of sheep-farming and it is hoped to develop a specialized tourist industry centred around the abundant wild life. Lord Shackleton produced an Economic Survey of the Islands for the British Government in 1976 and many of his recommendations have been implemented. However, some were too expensive and others, such as development of marine resources, cannot in practice be undertaken in the absence of some form of agreement with Argentina.

Dispute

5. The British have exercised sovereignty over the Islands uninterrupted since 1833. The Argentines claim that their seizure was unlawful and that the
Islands are Argentine. While rejecting that claim, British Governments have recognised the advantages of bringing the Islanders closer together with their nearest neighbours. (The Islands are 8,000 miles from the UK, but only 400 from Argentina). The Argentines now provide the only air-communications with the mainland and most of the Islands' fuel (at a lower price than the UK pays). But they have not abandoned their claim, and they are not prepared to cooperate in the economic development of the area without concessions on sovereignty.

6. In recent years, successive British Governments have held talks with the Argentine Government to try to seek a way forward. The Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr Ridley, held a round of talks with his Argentine counterpart in April. An Island Councillor attended. The talks were wide-ranging and conducted in a cordial atmosphere. Both sides are currently considering the next steps and hope to continue the dialogue soon. But no decisions will be taken without the Islanders' agreement and they will be consulted at every stage.

Commonwealth interest

7. There is little Commonwealth interest in the Falklands, though this may be due to lack of knowledge about the problem. The Falkland Islands representative is always welcomed warmly at Commonwealth meetings, and he may be able to interest his colleagues. The last UN vote on the dispute was in the 1976 General Assembly. 102 countries supported the pro-Argentine resolution (including 13 Commonwealth countries), 36 abstained and one (the UK) voted against.

South America Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
June 1980
Mrs A Applegate  
South America Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

20 June 1980

Dear Angela,

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. I am enclosing a rough translation of an article that appeared in El Comercio on 10 June about the Argentinian claim to the Falkland Islands. There has been no follow up to this report either from the newspaper to whom we gave our side of the story or from other members of the public.

2. We would like to be kept informed on the Falkland's issue and I should be grateful if you could let us have a copy of the record of the talks Mr Ridley held in New York at the end of April. If there has been any progress towards a solution which we could announce in a press release, would you please send us details.

Yours ever,

A White
THE MALVINAS ISLANDS (FALFLAND ISLANDS)

The 10th of June, by Law 20561, the Republic of Argentine established the day of NATIONAL VINDICATION, as an assertion of its sovereignty over the insular territory, of unquestionable ownership, to the Argentinian territory.

During the year 1833, Great Britain, while being at peace with the Argentinian Government, with whom it had signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, by means of the Corvette "Clio" laid hands on the port of Soledad making altogether impossible any resistance by the small national ship "Sarandi" to defend the islands, maintaining by this means and since then its occupation through an act of force and usurpation of the Argentinian sovereignty.

In spite of Great Britain's allegation of former rights over the aforementioned maritime territories, the Argentinian sovereignty is also based on historic and geographic reasons, proceeding from the natural right of succession from Spain after its independence. Furthermore, it exists the acknowledgment of the Argentinian continental shelf which lengthens out through the underwater ground and emerges again where the Malvinas are exactly located geographically, being by consequence, an extension of the national territory, as established by the Geneva Convention of 1958.

Notwithstanding the renewed claims and exceptions which were made in several congresses, assemblies, conferences and replying actions, which did not find any response on the part of Great Britain, the United Nations through the General Assembly, on 16 December 1965, by 94 votes in favour, 14 abstentions and none against, approved Resolution 2065 (XX). This Resolution invites both Governments to continue without delay the negotiations recommended towards a peaceful solution of the controversy; whereas Resolution 1511 (XV) considers it as a territory which should be decolonised.

Considering the possibility of peaceful negotiations, the terms of rightful claims were clearly established in accordance with history and jurisprudence, for the plain and smooth restitution of the Argentinian patrimonial territory.
By means of this system, the negotiations between the two Governments, and in order that the legal sovereignty exercised by Argentine turns into a true fact, there are supporting documents in this sense, always within the correct relationship which prevail between both Governments to solve the phase of this secular litigation in a level of evenness, in favour of which my country contributes with its most legitimate titles of territorial sovereignty.
1. You asked for a summary of the press cuttings from Brasilia dealing with HMA's statements on the Falklands.

2. The articles include most of the same points. My Portuguese is not good enough for me to understand every nuance, but I get the impression that the attitude of the Brazilian press was not particularly hostile and a fairly balanced coverage is given to HMA's views. Hambro's response and the statement issued by the Argentine Embassy in Brasilia, I have translated most of the cutting from the Correio Braziliense as it contains most of the points in the other papers, as well as the whole of the Argentine statement.

3. 'Correio Braziliense' 22 May. Brazilian support for the Argentine's claim to the Malvinas Islands annoys the English. British Ambassador, George Hall, regretted the inclusion of a statement of support for Argentina's claim in the joint communique signed by the Brazilian president in Buenos Aires. Brazil's position on this is not new. A Foreign Ministry spokesman told journalists that this had not changed since 1843 (357), i.e. the date of the English occupation. The British Ambassador denied any legal basis to Argentine claims and said he did not know of the Malvinas "I know of the Falkland Islands" (Nearly all the papers made some reference to the English use of the name Falklands. Britain has been negotiating with Argentina since 1976, in agreement with a UN resolution yet, according to George Hall, there should be no doubts about British sovereignty of the islands. The Ambassador participated as a representative of the British Foreign Office in the Malvinas negotiations 1977-79, and he said that these discussions were cordial and that both sides hoped that they would continue. He added that the UK is supported by the right of possession (direito de ocupação) and the principle of self-determination. The 1,800 inhabitants are English or of English descent, and they wish to remain British. The Ambassador said that the two countries had also agreed to begin joint exploration of the maritime area. He asserted that the Brazilian statement would not affect Anglo-Brazilian relations. According to an Hambro spokesman, Sr. Pericas, Brazil has voted at the UN on the Malvinas question in support of Argentina. It was first raised in 1964/5. The vote was 96-7 (UK) in support of Argentina's claim and led to a resolution that Argentina and the UK should resolve the problem through diplomatic negotiation. In reference to the communique Pericas explained that the Argentines wished the statement to be included, nevertheless it was not the only international subject mentioned.

The Argentine Embassy distributed a statement:

"The Embassy of the Republic of Argentina does not wish to comment on her country's position on the Malvinas question, as she is at present involved in negotiations with HMG. Nevertheless, it is thought necessary to recall certain
points, not under discussion, with regard to known historical, geographical and juridical facts which form the basis of Argentine rights

(i) The Malvinas have been part of the national territory of Argentina since independence; they were populated and governed by Argentinians

(ii) The Islands border on the nation's territory, lie within the continental shelf, and have the geographical and physical characteristics of Patagonia

(iii) The Malvinas were occupied in 1835 by an English military force who ousted the population and installed settlers who came from Britain

(iv) From a British point of view, the Malvinas today enjoy colonial status

(v) There is no Argentinian population on the Islands because Argentinians have been denied access

(vi) Most of the present population are employees of a British company on the Islands, part of a traditional colonial arrangement

(vii) The Argentine government has never accepted this situation, based on an act of aggression and the current negotiations are a continuation of one of the oldest debates in international relations

(viii) The Argentines are confident that these negotiations will eliminate one of the last remaining colonial situations in Latin America and the world

4. 'Jornal de Brasilia.' Britain's Ambassador regrets the inclusion of the statement in the joint communiqué. But he said that President Figueiredo had expressed his confidence in the current negotiations. The Ambassador guaranteed that bilateral relations between Britain and Brazil would not change, as Brazil was entitled to her own sovereign responses to any subject. Even so he asked why no other international problem [concerning Argentina] had been mentioned in the communiqué. Sr Hall interprets the Brazilian gesture more as a reaffirmation of Argentine-Brazilian friendship than as a declaration of force which, according to him, could have been made without including the statement

Edmund Hall made it clear that his government had nothing to discuss on the matter; there are no doubts about sovereignty. There are no connections between the people who live on the Malvinas and Argentina - none of the Argentines who live on the islands were born there. Nor are there any cultural ties.

/Hall
Hall said that the negotiations were progressing well, in a cordial atmosphere. It was a difficult problem and he believed in a diplomatic solution, but this would take time, and should only involve the governments of Great Britain and Argentina. The discovery of oil did not change the nature of the negotiations. The Humaraty spokesman said that the Brazilians did not see it as a colonial problem but as a dispute over sovereignty. The article concludes with points taken from the Argentine statement with reference to lack of Argentine inhabitants. Our Ambassador is quoted as saying that there was "only one Spanish teacher (she was my pupil, poor girl ("coitada")) and a representative of the Argentinian Oil Company." According to London the only Argentines present on the islands at the time of the occupation were soldiers who mutinised.

5. 'O Estado de São Paulo' makes the same points as 'Correio Braziliense' and the 'Jornal de Brasilia'. HMA found the inclusion of an isolated statement (no other dispute was mentioned) strange, but he emphasised that it would not have any negative effects, and he referred to Figueiredo's expressions of confidence in the negotiations. This is followed by the Humaraty position, (i.e. it was new, was a response to Argentina's interest, and that the Malvinas question was a problem of sovereignty). The article then goes on to say that HMA had stressed that the people of Britain were never going to abandon a people who wished to preserve their English identity and he denied that interest in the islands was a result of the discovery of potential oil reserves in the region. He refuted the accusation that the UK had expelled the inhabitants of the archipelago in 1833.

6. D C I (Diário de Comércio e Indústria?) quotes HMA as asking "with characteristic English sense of fair play" why no other international problems were mentioned, and infers that he was referring indirectly to the dispute between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel, which had almost brought the two countries to war.

7. 'Folha de São Paulo' again includes the same points as the other papers. It also says however that the Humaraty spokesman said that the Brazilian government had not at the time received any form of representation on the Malvinas from the British government. On the contrary, the question was merely dealt with in the Press, in much the same way as Brazil had made public her support for the Argentine government.

8. 'Jornal do Brasil' says that the delay of 5 days between HMA's statements to the press and the publication of the joint declaration make evident the need for consultations with London. HMA said that he found it "curious" that the Malvinas question was one of the few statements on foreign policy (the others dealt with Zimbabwe and Namibia). He repeated his government's point of view - that it was a difficult matter, but it would be resolved in a peaceful way and there was no question of the use of force. Mr Hall emphasised that London upholds the need to consult the inhabitants which is in accordance with UN principles and is an indispensable element in the search for a solution to the problem.

/9. O Globo
ARGENTINE CLAIM TO THE FALKLANDS

1. Would you please refer to my predecessor's letter of 11 June 1979 to Hugh Caplin. This year the Argentine Ambassador once again repeated the Argentine claim to the Falkland Islands and I am enclosing a copy of the relevant press cutting. For some reason or another the day chosen this year was 10 June rather than 8 June. I also think that the last paragraph referring to Uruguay is worth noting.

2. When talking to the Director of External Political Affairs about a quite different matter, I took the opportunity to enquire whether any Uruguayan officials had been present. The answer was "No", but I was reminded that Uruguay does support the Argentine claim.

Miss Patricia M. Hutchinson

23 June 1980
Evocan la reafirmación de los derechos argentinos en Malvinas

Se llevó a cabo en horas del mediodía de ayer, en los salones del Departamento Cultural de la Embajada de la República Argentina, el acto alusivo al día de la afirmación de los derechos soberanos de la República Argentina sobre las islas Malvinas.

En él, el Embajador Guillermo de la Plaza se refirió al tema expresando que el acto, lejos de significar solamente una muestra de cumplimiento reglamentario más, obedecía a la necesidad profunda que sientan todos los argentinos de expresar, cada vez con mayor firmeza, nacida de la convicción absoluta en la razón que les asiste, el sentimiento de defensa que les urge al contemplar ese sitio de patria, temporalmente sustraído al pleno goce de sentirse integrado a la Argentina.

Más adelante el Embajador señaló que tenía la seguridad de que esta próxiimo ya, el momento en que la Justicia se impondrá sobre los hechos de fuerza, herencia de épocas perjudicadas que el concierto de las naciones ya no puede tolerar, indicando que Argentina se ha empeñado en mejorar las condiciones de vida de los ocupantes de las islas, mediante el establecimiento de comunicaciones modernas y eficientes, apoyo en los sistemas de salud y educación, documentación de identidad y facilidad de ingreso y egreso del territorio continental y extensión de impuestos.

Expresó su reconocimiento al Uruguay, que a través de las múltiples instancias que los dos países hermanos del Plata han debido superar, materializó su apoyo ya sea gubernamental o privado, en el plano diplomático, o desde la cátedra. Finalmente de la Plaza señaló: "Cuando llegue el día, no lejano, en que este 10 de junio se convierta de fecha de afirmación de derechos en celebración por la restitución de las Malvinas, seguramente los uruguayos estarán a la derecha del anfitrión."
Dear David,

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. We have received the attached Note from the Argentinian Embassy, proclaiming 10 June "Day of the Affirmation of Argentinian Rights to the Malvina Islands". Unless you instruct otherwise, we do not intend to reply.

Yours ever,

Anne Irwin

---

Mr. Duggan

Every Argentine mission except the one in London is expected to send its note to each MFA and its other missions. Few of our embassies have opened the receipt. Do we need guidance on how to handle any such material?
L'Ambassade de la République Argentine en URSS présente ses compliments aux Missions Diplomatiques et a l'honneur de leur communiquer ce qui suit:

La République Argentine a institué le 10 juin comme "Le jour de l'affirmation des Droits Argentins sur les îles Malvinas", en commémoration de la création de l'Arrondissement Politique et Militaire des îles Malvinas" décrétée par le Gouverneur Provisoire des Provinces Unies du Rio de la Plata, M.Martín Rodríguez. Sont ainsi réaffirmés les inaliénables droits dont notre pays est titulaire sur les îles Malvinas, archipel qui au moment de la Révolution liberatrice du 25 Mai 1810 était soumis à Espagne, étant resté par conséquence depuis sous souveranité argentine.

En 1833 - par la force - un détachement naval anglais évinca la garnaison argentine qui y était postée. Depuis dure une occupation que la République Argentine n'a pas reconnu légitime et contre laquelle elle n'a jamais cessé ni cessera de réclamer jusqu'au moment où la plénitude de l'exercice de sa souveraineté sur les îles lui sera rendue.

L'Ambassade de la République Argentine saisit cette occasion pour renouveler aux Missions Diplomatiques les assurances de sa haute considération.

Moscou, le 10 juin 1980

AUX MISSIONS DIPLOMATIQUES
ACCREDITEES A MOSCOW
Mr French, UN Department, K144

BRIEFING FOR MR WALDHEIM'S VISIT

1. As agreed on the 'phone, I suggest a short defensive background note should be included in the briefing on the recent talks in New York with the Argentines on the Falkland Islands.

2. I now attach

   (a) a blue crested copy

   (b) a white copy, with 12 additional copies.

3. I do not think that you would want to include any mention of this in your steering brief.

   G A Duggan
   South America Department

9 May 1980
VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO : FALKLAND ISLANDS (DEFENSIVE)
ESSENTIAL FACTS

Talks with the Argentines

1. Mr Ridley met the Argentine Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Comodoro Cavandoli, on 28/29 April in New York.

2. First exchanges under the Conservative Government. Exploratory. Both now reporting to own Governments. Hope to continue exchanges.

Informing the United Nations Secretary-General

3. The UK and Argentine missions in New York will separately send copy of Communiqué (attached) to Mr Waldheim, under short covering letters to notify him of the meeting. This is standard practice.
JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED IN NEW YORK AFTER ANGLO/ARGENTINE TALKS

In accordance with separate announcements in London and Buenos Aires on April 15th 1980 by the Argentine and UK Governments, a Ministerial meeting was held in New York on 28 and 29 April to discuss the Falkland Islands question and related issues in the South Atlantic within the negotiating framework referred to in relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.

The British and Argentine delegations were led respectively by Mr Nicholas Ridley, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, and Comodoro Carlos R Cavandoli, Under Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Buenos Aires.

The discussions were of a comprehensive and wide-ranging nature and were conducted in a cordial and positive spirit.

The two Governments intend to hold future meetings in order to continue these exchanges.
VISIT OF UN SECRETARY-GENERAL TO LONDON: BRIEFING

1. Mr Waldheim will pay an official visit to the UK from 20-23 May. Briefing is needed for his calls on the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington on 20 and 21 May. Mr Waldheim will also attend a dinner given by the Prime Minister on 20 May and a working lunch with Lord Carrington on 21 May. The Department of Energy and ODA are briefing separately on Mr Waldheim’s calls on Mr Howell and Mr Marten.

2. I attach a draft list of briefs, all of which will go both to the Prime Minister and Secretary of State. The general idea is that the Prime Minister should focus on a tour d’horizon of the international political and economic scene and leave more detailed discussion of individual issues to Lord Carrington. The Steering Brief will include a broad survey of the international political and economic scene in the UN context and a summary of individual subject briefs; it should indicate in particular what we want from Mr Waldheim and what Mr Waldheim is likely to want from us.

3. I should be grateful if recipients at list A above would provide:

(a) Short notes for use in the Steering Brief on the lines indicated in paragraph 2.
above, in draft form by close of play, Friday, 9 May.

(b) Briefs as listed at Annex A, focusing on the UN angle in each case, by lunchtime, Thursday, 15 May. A model is at Annex B. The subject briefs should comprise points to make and essential facts, on separate sheets. Points to make should have subheadings in capitals underlined. Defensive material or material not for use should be clearly identified. There should be two separate top copies, one all on blue crested, and one with the points to make on pink and essential facts on white, plus twelve copies.

For both (a) and (b), please see also Mr Cartledge's letter of 8 June 1979, attached at Annex C.

4. I should also be grateful if copy recipients would advise by close of play, Friday, 9 May if reference to their subjects should be made in the Steering Brief or if additional briefs are necessary - i.e. if their subjects should be raised with Mr Waldheim or if he is likely to raise them with Ministers. Contributions to the Steering Brief by close of play, Friday, 9 May and additional briefs by lunchtime, Thursday, 15 May.

5. I should be grateful if all concerned would note that the Secretary General prefers to be addressed as Mr rather than Dr Waldheim, and "Mr" should be used throughout the briefs.

6. All contributions and any enquiries to Mr French, K144 on 233 5024 please.

7 May 1980

Mrs S Wiseman
United Nations Department

cc. Planning Staff
News Dept
UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S VISIT TO LONDON: MAY 1980

List of Briefs

1. Steering Brief (including personality note and essential facts). (UND, with contributions from departments)

2. UN Issues:
   (a) Role of Secretary General. (UND)
   (b) UN Secretariat. (UND)
   (c) Finance:
       (i) UN Budget (UND)
       (ii) UK aid to UN bodies (UND(B), UND(A)/ODA with UND)
   (d) Institutional Questions. (UND)

3. Afghanistan. (SAD)

4. Iran. (MED)

5. Middle East (NENAD):
   (a) Arab/Israel
   (b) Lebanon

6. Southern Africa (SAfD):
   (a) Namibia
   (b) South Africa
7. Cyprus. (SED)

8. IndoChina. (SEAD)

9. North/South (including energy and Brandt Commission report). (FRD to lead, with ESSD and UND)
VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 2: ROLE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
POINTS TO MAKE

MR WALDHEIM'S ACHIEVEMENTS

1. We appreciate initiatives taken by the Secretary-General, notably . . . .

FUTURE ROLE

2. Any scope for an initiative over Ruritania?

3. What are the principle limitations on the Secretary-General's freedom of action?

ELECTIONS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERALSHIP? [if raised]

4. Grateful for the information on Mr Waldheim's intentions.
VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 2: ROLE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. See biographical note (Annex A to Steering Brief) for career and personality details.

2. Under Article 99 of the UN Charter, 'the Secretary-General may . . .'. In practice, the Secretary-General tends to rely on exercise of his 'good officers' a unique third party mechanism for conciliation, mediation or transmission of views. He has been most active in . . .

3. Waldheim's turn as Secretary-General expires in December 1981. He is likely to face competition from . . .

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
7 MAY 1980
From the Private Secretary

Cc

8 June 1979

De Martin,

Briefs for the Prime Minister on Overseas Affairs

In the light of the briefs prepared for her for the visit to London of Chancellor Schmidt on 10/11 May and for her own visit to Paris for talks with President Giscard on 5 June, the Prime Minister has considered the style and layout which she wishes to be adopted in the briefs for future inward and outward visits and for calls on her by overseas visitors.

The Prime Minister would like the "Objectives" for any visit to be much more concisely expressed than in recent briefs: each objective should be stated in no more than half-a-dozen words or so. The steering brief for a visit should contain a short section on the tactical handling of the talks; the remainder of the steering brief should consist of a summary of all the individual subject briefs, very much on the lines of the draft steering brief prepared for the European Council in Strasbourg on 21/22 June (EQ(S)(79)10) dated 7 June. The individual subject briefs should be divided into two parts: a concise list of points to make, shorter than the present 'Line to Take', but a little fuller than the present 'Summary of Points to Make', followed by a reasonably full factual background section which should distinguish clearly between information which can be freely used and information which should not be disclosed. Any set of briefs must in future be accompanied by a sheet of vital statistics on the country concerned: this could perhaps best appear at the end of the steering brief. The Prime Minister has asked that briefing should at all times avoid woolly generalisations and have a high factual content.

I should be grateful if any briefs prepared for the Prime Minister on overseas matters could in future follow the above pattern. The Prime Minister may, of course, wish further changes to be made in the light of experience.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of the Cabinet.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]
Mr Bright (SAD)

CPA ANNUAL CONFERENCE 1979

1. Thank you for sending me a copy of Mr Growcott’s letter of 2 April enclosing a copy of the Falkland Islands representative’s belated report on last November’s CPA Annual Conference. I have read it with much interest.

2. I can confirm that Mr Wallace’s contribution to the debate on the security of the smaller countries of the Commonwealth was well received – see para 10 of my report on the conference (attached for ease of reference). From my experience of the 1978 and 1979 conferences, I would endorse Mr Wallace’s conclusion that these present useful opportunities for educating Commonwealth colleagues on the subject of the Falkland Islands. His suggestion for a special information pamphlet which can be distributed on such occasions would seem sensible.

R A R Barltrop
Commonwealth Co-ordination Department

29 April 1980
being once again in the midst of parliamentarians. Mr Muldoon concentrated on the world's economic problems and "the need to help the helpless".

7. The conference agenda (see Annex B) provided the customary mix of politico-economic and parliamentary subjects. Pride of place was given to "The Energy Crisis". Parliamentarians from the 'new' Commonwealth naturally laid great stress on the damage done to developing countries by the spiral in oil prices; and, while they argued from this for improved aid terms from the developed countries, there was at least some criticism directed at OPEC members for what they had done and were still doing to the world economy. On the more positive side, much emphasis was placed on the need to develop alternative sources of energy, preferably renewable sources. A rather dull debate was enlivened at one stage by a vigorous exchange between two British MPs (Mr Leo Abse, Labour; and Mr Ronald Brown, Labour) on the pros and cons of developing nuclear energy.

8. "The Refugee Problem", originally envisaged as a subject for panel discussion, had been promoted to the plenary agenda because of the developments earlier in the year in SE Asia; and, appropriately, the lead speaker was from Malaysia - their Minister of Energy and delegation leader. He called on the Commonwealth to galvanise world opinion over the plight of the refugees in SE Asia, and listed various measures which he believed would help bring about a solution of the problem, including an acceleration of the international programme for permanent resettlement of the 'boat people'. Mr Blaker, making the first of his two prepared speeches, spoke of the aid given by Britain, both financially and through the resettlement of some thousands of refugees from Hong Kong. Peaceful solutions to the problems of SE Asia were, he said, essential. A speech by the delegate from Hong Kong, describing the nature and scale of the problems created for the territory by the 'boat people', was listened to with great attention. Mr Pavitt, one of 5 members of the UK delegation who had visited the colony on their way to New Zealand, supplemented this usefully.

9. While the emphasis in this debate was inevitably on SE Asia, representatives from Cyprus, Sri Lanka, India and Botswana used the opportunity to speak of their own countries' particular problems in the 'refugee' field, with the Sri Lankan dwelling on his country's intercommunal difficulties and the Cypriot attacking the Turks and Turkish Cypriots along familiar lines.

10. On the second afternoon, the conference turned to consider "The security of the smaller countries of the Commonwealth" - a subject which had been discussed in a useful panel discussion at the 1978 annual conference and which the CPA Executive Council had since concluded was worthy of debate in a plenary session. It certainly attracted a long list of speakers, a good proportion of whom came from "the smaller countries"; and the representatives from the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar made good use of the opportunity to explain their respective cases and urge Commonwealth support. The Falkland representative spoke particularly effectively, and was warmly applauded when he sat down - as was also the Gibraltar delegate. The Turks & Caicos delegate (a Minister) used his speech to criticise the British Government for, allegedly,
agreeing to discuss further devolution of powers only on the condition that the Islands were prepared to contemplate moving to independence within 12 months. Most speakers reflected their particular national concerns, taking security in the broadest sense and including economic well-being. The Cypriot leader again took his chance to argue the Greek-Cypriot case, and appealed for "brotherly help" within the Commonwealth and for pressure to be applied to "the aggressors" with a view to achieving a just and peaceful settlement. One of the UK delegates, Mr Shaw (Cons) spoke of the need for Britain to continue giving assistance in training and equipment to, especially, the smaller members of the Commonwealth; the latter should at the same time seek broader support through regional co-operation, eg in relation to their territorial seas.

11. On the Wednesday morning 28 November the conference reached the one agenda item which we had always recognised could be difficult for us — depending on the progress (or otherwise) in the Lancaster House conference on Rhodesia. The subject was "Africa South of the Sahara"; and the main focus was inevitably Southern Africa, particularly Rhodesia. But two factors undoubtedly ran in our favour: there was evidently a widespread, if unspoken, recognition of the delicacy of the negotiations and of the importance of not 'rocking the boat', and coupled with this was the fact that the great majority of delegates were not well informed about the state of play in the negotiations. They were thus ready to listen with attention to Mr Blaker's careful account of the position and (generally) to respond by expressing the hope that the conference would soon reach a successful conclusion. Even the Tanzanian delegation leader, Mr Kaduma (the former Foreign Minister), who opened the debate, adopted a low-key approach — although he did not allow this to inhibit him from criticising western "co-operation" with South Africa or the British handling of the Rhodesia conference. Only a Gambian woman delegate built up any head of steam on the subject. The Zambians maintained a helpful silence (though one of them had delivered a diatribe against the West in the debate on the Security of Small Countries). With no more than 12 delegates having taken the microphone, the debate ran out of speakers in a mere 2½ hours — which is probably without precedent in CPA annual conferences since the Rhodesian UDI. It was all very satisfactory.

12. With the end of the debate on "Africa South of the Sahara", there remained little of direct interest on the agenda so far as international affairs were concerned. For the Wednesday afternoon and Thursday morning the conference was converted into a series of panel sessions on various topics (see Annex B), with these running concurrently on each occasion. Several members of the UK delegation played an active part in these, with Mr Abse chairing the panel on "Terrorism" and Mrs Knight and Mr Baker being members of the panels on "The Year of the Child" and "Population Growth & Economic Assistance to Developing Countries" respectively. However (and with no reflection on the UK participants) the CPA Headquarters view is that overall this year's panel discussions were less successful than usual.
Dear Gerald

CPA CONFERENCE

1. I attach for your information a copy of Councillor Stuart Wallace's report of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference held last November in New Zealand.

Yours ever
Michael

cc: (with enc) R H T Gozney Esq British Embassy BUENOS AIRES

Mr Davies
CCD might be interested (especially remittances isn't)
28/4

Copy to CCD YW
25TH CONVENTIONAL PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND

I would first like to express my gratitude to members of Council who made it possible for me to represent the Falklands in Wellington. It was an honour and an experience which I shall long remember.

I would also like to tender my apologies for the lateness of this report.

I arrived in Auckland on 17th November, having flown with some fifty other delegates from Los Angeles. On our arrival we were met at Auckland International by the then President of the Association, the Hon. J. R. Harrison, Speaker of the New Zealand Parliament.

The following day delegates and others involved in the Conference met for a briefing session in the Hotel Continental, after which we visited a nearby winery and enjoyed a magnificent lunch. In the evening delegates attended the President’s reception, which took the form of a dinner.

The pre-conference tours began next day, we were divided into ten groups for these, some groups on shorter tours left a day later, 20th November. I had elected to join one of these as I had hoped to meet some Falkland Islanders in Auckland. In the event, however, my ‘free’ day was fully occupied visiting a forest products complex and later at a mayoral reception. I managed to meet only a few Falkland Islanders.

We were on tour from 20th until 25th November, traveling by coach from Auckland to Rotorua, by air (F28) from Rotorua to Blenheim, by coach again to Nelson and then by ferry to ‘windy’ Wellington, where we settled in for the Conference proper.

Touring was immensely enjoyable, but also exhausting, we were almost continually on the move, whenever we stopped we were overwhelmed with hospitality, at each town we were guests of honour at various functions hosted by town councils and other local bodies. Among other things we visited a youth camp, a cement works, an old gold mine and enjoyed several Maori concerts, generally we had not a moment to spare. I was surprised by the New Zealand climate, I had not somehow appreciated how hot it would be, and when travelling on the coach I kept well to the rear, in the cool area close to the air conditioning unit, much to the merriment of the others.

I thought this touring a valuable preliminary to the conference itself, it gave us all an opportunity to meet and get to know each other. I was interviewed by reporters on three occasions, and made the front page on two local newspapers. Everyone seemed intrigued by the Falklands, and found it astonishing that I (or anyone else for that matter) had actually been born here. New Zealanders, and most delegates I talked with, expressed surprise when told that we have long established families in the Falklands.
While we were in Wellington the DC10 accident occurred in Antarctica. I, with other delegates, attended an ecumenical service for those who died.

The Conference venue was the Parliament building in Wellington, a circular structure, aptly called the 'Beehive', it housed the main conference hall where the plenary sessions were held. I attended all plenary sessions, and was able to sit in on three panel sessions, which were held with three running concurrently.

The Plenary sessions were:

1st The energy crisis
2nd The refugee problem
3rd The security of the smaller countries of the Commonwealth
4th Africa south of the Sahara
5th Parliament, the Executive and the Civil Service
6th Freedom of the individual, human rights and the authority of Government in a parliamentary democracy

I spoke at the 3rd Plenary, a copy of my effort is attached. It was fortunate that I had been registered well in advance as this session was a busy one, which had many in attendance. I also had the advantage of being only third to speak, which meant that those listening were still reasonably receptive. The address seemed well received, afterwards numerous delegates approached me and asked for copies, expressed interest and asked questions. I felt the lack of an information leaflet. I feel we should quickly prepare a suitable pamphlet for such occasions. It was apparent that few delegates had any understanding of our situation, often believing that we were first generation colonialists from the United Kingdom. Again the fact that I was born here was an advantage, as I was frequently asked of my birthplace. It is worth noting that several African delegates asked for information.

The energy crisis brought predictable speeches, some delegates urging greater conservation of known resources (noticeable the more industrialised nations) others emphasised the disastrous effect which spiralling fuel prices have on the economies of their countries. Many delegates spoke of the need for a radical change in the levels and manner of distribution of the earth's resources. The United Kingdom delegation provided some entertainment here with a fiery exchange between Mr. Ronald Brown and Mr. Leo Abse, pro and anti nuclear energy. Both were very able and eloquent speakers. Mr. Brown accused Mr. Abse of 'intellectual dishonesty' and of 'living in cloud cuckoo land'.

/The refugee.......

The refugee problem - a difficult and sad subject. Delegates generally enumerated the various things which their countries had done to help. As we had just toured the relatively sparsely populated New Zealand countryside there were one or two remarks about the New Zealand record on accepting refugees. The most moving contribution came from the delegate from Hong Kong, Mr. Charles Young, who, without notes gave a graphic account of the appalling suffering of the boat people.

I had thought that 'Africa South of the Sahara' would provoke fireworks, but as the Lancaster House talks were underway at the time, most delegates exercised restraint, in fact there were not over many speakers.

I found it interesting to listen to delegates speaking at the 5th Plenary bemoaning the lack of time for MPs to consider proposed legislation, and of the undue influence of the civil service, it was evident that our concern in this regard does not stem solely from our peculiar system.

The panel sessions were:-

A. The year of the child
B. Pollution and protection of the environment
C. The drug traffic
D. Population growth and economic assistance to developing countries
E. International terrorism
F. The MP - his functions and responsibilities

Panel B - I was not at all impressed with this session, far too many delegates spoke entirely from notes, doing no more than stating their national positions. The chair did not guide the meeting at all well and many left the room. It was generally agreed that there is a need to collate existing knowledge of pollution control and make it more available to every country.

Panel C - I managed to sit on this for a short while. The delegate from the Turks and Caicos, Mr. Mackuire, spoke of the problem of drug traffic transiting his country. It was felt that more international funds were needed to combat the illicit drug trade. I was interested to learn that in the United Kingdom there are apparently only 5,000 addicts, compared with 150,000 in New York City alone.

Panel D - I thought this was the most successful Panel. Mr. Kenneth Baker (U.K.) was a panelist and had a comprehensive knowledge of the subject. During the discussion the point was made that economic assistance for its own sake was not necessarily a good thing, there had to be adequate planning and a careful assessment made of the long term effects of any aid. The difficulty of

/politicians.....
politicians making aid available when their own constituents saw their standards of living reducing was considered. There was also some comment on the dangers of the population explosion.

I spoke briefly and entirely 'off the cuff' as I had not intended to take an active part. I pointed out that some countries had deliberate policies of increasing their populations, for reasons of nation development. I was, it seemed, the youngest delegate, and was expected to respond when a Canadian delegate alleged that young people had no idea of where they were going. In my reply I said that this was an over generalisation, and that indeed many older people appeared to have no idea where they were or how they had got there. This light hearted exchange brought much laughter and applause.

I found the Conference valuable in two major respects; obviously it is our only opportunity to make people aware of our desires, in addition, and perhaps of equal importance, the Conference gave me the chance to meet and talk with politicians from all over the Commonwealth, which made me aware that they too have often 'feet of clay'! The experience allowed me to better appreciate the attitudes of others and helped put our problems in some sort of perspective.

The informal chats were I thought almost more worthwhile than the formal sessions. I spent much time with African and Indian delegates, most of whom had no idea of how their countries voted at the United Nations on our issue. My list was most useful. The Africans were, I thought, sensitive to the criticism of adopting a double standard regarding self determination etc. Dr. Tabua of Fiji was particularly helpful, and did considerable informal lobbying for us during the Conference and also channelled likely converts to me! As an Island community our problems were more readily understood by delegates from other Islands, particularly Pacific Islands.

In my opinion the United Kingdom delegation were by far the most impressive, able and eloquent their 'professionalism' was evident. However I gained the impression that it counted little in the eyes of many delegates from their ex colonies! I felt then that if we are to enlist any support then we ourselves must do more. We should aim at projecting an image of a community with an identity of its own, not simply British!

I hope that in New Zealand I managed to build on the work of previous Falkland Island delegates and create a better understanding of, and support for, our position. I certainly feel that C.I.P. Conferences are invaluable opportunities for us to make friends and hopefully, influence people.

S. B. Wallace
In common with other countries we in the Falkland Islands have our share of domestic, economic and social problems to overcome. In our particular case, however, almost all the internal affairs which cause us headaches stem from, or are related to, the threat presented to our home by Argentina. This threat causes great anxiety and concern to the people of the Islands, I would therefore like to use this opportunity to talk of our special circumstances, in doing so I hope that I am able to add your understanding of the wishes and aspirations of the 2,000 people of the Falkland Islands.

As you are aware Argentina lays claim to our homeland, a claim which we emphatically reject. Were we not a Colony I feel sure that she would find no support in the councils of the world for her claim, and would soon realise that it damages her credibility as a responsible and mature member of the world community. However, we are a British Colony, we wish to remain so simply because this form of association meets the real needs of our community at this time. Without it we would be unable to provide many essential social services and in addition would be unable to defend ourselves even by diplomatic means against the ever present threat to our homes. This threat is not a matter of academics, its affect on every aspect of life in the Islands is very real, the small degree of security we have is provided by the knowledge that a metropolitan power is responsible for our well being, and, if need be, our physical defence.

We Falkland Islanders are descendents of pioneers from Britain who, some five generations ago, settled in the Falklands. Before their arrival the Falklands were uninhabited - that fact alone makes us virtually unique in the western hemisphere. Over the years we have built a small, close knit community, our people are hardy and hardworking, with customs, culture and traditions derived from our forefathers which are entirely different from those of our large neighbour. We wish only to be allowed to progress in our own fashion, to determine our own future and not be pressured into any form of association with Argentina which would destroy those things which we value most. Surely this is in keeping with the fundamental principles of self determination and human dignity to which this Association and the United Nations subscribe.

Yet when our situation is discussed at the United Nations and other international organisations, countries which are rightly loud in their support for the rights of people who live under wholly objectionable regimes in other parts of the world, particularly Africa, are strangely reluctant to give us their support. It appears to be acceptable to apply a double standard when such fundamental issues are discussed, for, at the recent summit conference of Non Aligned States in Havana, Governments, some represented here today, supported a
declaration which gave no weight at all to the wishes of the people of the Falkland Islands. I can only believe that such declarations are acceptable because our circumstances have not been sufficiently appreciated, and that those involved did not look beyond the dirty label 'Colony' when casting their votes. To believe otherwise is to admit that no more than a convenient lip service is paid to the principles which govern international affairs in other areas.

The resources of our area of the South West Atlantic are largely untapped, indeed their potential has not been fully explored, yet unless we are able to resolve our differences any development is paralysed. We believe that the security of our homes and the prosperity of the region generally can best be achieved by the evolving of an harmonious and mutually rewarding relationship with Argentina, we are not, however, prepared to become pawns in anyones game.

In an effort to find common ground, and at the request of the United Nations, the United Kingdom and Argentine Governments have entered into negotiation. Although this is without prejudice to our sovereignty, and the United Kingdom Government has made clear that no agreement can be reached without the approval of the people of the Falkland Islands, each new round of talks bring fresh tension and concern to our people. Despite this we have done everything possible to ensure that the talks can proceed in an atmosphere conducive to finding solutions acceptable to all parties, Argentina has made no similar effort. There have been a series of unwarranted and illegal intrusions, on land, sea and air during the course of the discussions, such actions are not those of a government genuinely interested in seeking lasting agreements. Argentina is encouraged in such actions by the support she enjoys in the United Nations. Were members of this Association, and through them their respective governments, to use their considerable influence both individually and collectively on our behalf they would make a significant contribution to our security and increase the chances of achieving a settlement acceptable to all.

In conclusion I would like to say that I believe that although our security is, in the first instance, the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government, like other small countries we must ultimately depend upon the integrity of the other members of the world community and on their recognition of the fact that we too are entitled to the fundamental right of self determination.
Folios 28 & 29

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ARW 376/325/1

as folios 2 & 3
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON SW1A 2AH

ALW 040/325/1

28 March 1980

R M Hunt Esq CMG
PORT STANLEY

Dear Rex,

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. Thank you for your letter of 19 March. I am glad you are settling in well and have been able to see so much of your kingdom.

2. What you say about the labour shortage was echoed in Colin Bright's report on his visit to the Islands, which you should by now have received. It is difficult to know what to suggest as a remedy; larger scale advertisement in the UK might help but I fear that there are not many people who would be willing to commit themselves to the Islands under present circumstances. Would the young OSAS people stay without the OSAS topping-up? Some, perhaps; but I suspect most would leave.

3. What we and the Islanders need of course is a solution to the dispute. You will now know that we have firm dates for talks with the Argentines. There is perhaps not much hope for real progress at this first round, but at least we shall all know more about our respective positions afterwards. In welcoming Islander participation, I hope you will be able to convince the Councillors of the need for absolute confidentiality about the date of the talks (until it is announced by Parliament and the Islands) and, later, about the talks themselves. It would be very damaging if details were to leak.

4. I hope, too, that you will be able to use your powers of persuasion to get Council agreement for the LADE house (providing, of course, that the new clause creates no problems). Irritants like this make our dealings with the Argentines unnecessarily awkward. We shall also need to watch the Chilean commercial deal closely; there may be considerable political implications in some of their proposals.

5. I look forward to meeting Ferguson when he is here and to reading Benbow's report (not yet received). And I trust that the next three years will be as enjoyable for you as the first three weeks.

Yours ever,

Robin

CC
R Gozney Esq., BUENOS AIRES
P R Fearn
South America Dept.
19 March 1980

PR Pearn Esq
South America Dept
FCO

Dear Robin,

1. It is three weeks to the day since I arrived in Port Stanley and, although I know that we are now discouraged from writing first impressions (and a good thing too), I thought that you might like to know that I am still in the land of the living.

2. Despite our unfortunate mishaps with the Islander, I have been able to see a bit of the Camp. After one day here Mavis and I were able to get to Hill Cove in West Falklands and Darwin to catch the tail-end of their sports meetings. This gave us the opportunity to meet most of the farm managers who had congregated in these two places for the annual beano. Last week we seized the opportunity of HMS Endurance's visit to sail around the north of the Island and, with the help of her Wasp helicopter, were able to pay an overnight visit to Adrian Monk in San Carlos and spend a morning with Alan Miller in Port San Carlos before returning here. I intend to continue to get out to the Camp whenever I can but the ships are about to leave us for the winter and FIGAS have only one Beaver currently flying, so my opportunities of travelling (except by Landrover) are now somewhat curtailed.

3. In the light of the Flight Safety Report about the recent accident, I have had no alternative but to ground the Islander until certain recommendations about landing strips and flight

/safety

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safety have been implemented.

4. There have been no repercussions following the death of a Falkland Islander after a drunken brawl with a Chilean, but I have no doubt that the Islanders will wish to see justice done.

5. I shall be holding my first Executive Council meeting towards the end of this month or early next, followed by a joint Council meeting to select two members to represent the Falkland Islands at Mr Ridley's proposed talks with the Argentines. I have no idea at present whom they will select but I gather that they do want to be represented.

6. Despite some silly agitation locally about the LADE house, the majority of Councillors seem prepared to go ahead with the lease. I understand that an Argentine Air Force Lawyer is due in today to discuss the terms with the Chief Secretary. According to their resident representative, he will be proposing an additional clause to the lease, which we shall obviously need to look at carefully.

7. As to whether the Councillors accurately represent the views of the Islanders, and what the Argentines really think about the Falkland Islands, these are early days yet and I do not venture an opinion. The Councillors I have met seem to know the way their constituents think even if their own views are not always in sympathy. Argentine tourists come over in increasing numbers and seem to be struck by the difference and "Britishness" of Port Stanley (they rarely seem to go much beyond the town). The new Vice-Commodoro here said he volunteered for the post because it is so quiet and peaceful...
and his children have much more freedom here than on the mainland.

8. I have been around most of the Government Departments and inspected the ODA's development projects. The point that strikes one immediately, whether in town or in Camp, is the shortage of people, and not only working men but men, women and children of all ages. The biggest crowd I have seen was at a Stanley v Endurance football match, when half the spectators were RN or Marines and the total was less than one would normally see at a village cricket match in England. When it comes to the working force, the shortage is even more striking. The Chief Secretary runs the "Secretariat" with one secretary whom he shares with the Deputy Chief Secretary, one girl in the registry and a part-time messenger. The construction gang on the Darwin road consists of 7 men, including the foreman. The only private building contractor has three men and one of those must be getting on for 70. Two of the crew of the "Forrest" are Cape Horners laying up in Port Stanley awaiting spare parts for their yachts. Virtually anybody can walk in here and get a job on the same day. It is the same story wherever one goes: Government Departments, commercial firms and farms are all understaffed. Government Departments would collapse completely without OSAS officers. Of significance is that many of these OSAS officers, and particularly the younger ones, have extended their contracts and some seem happy to stay indefinitely. I am sure that there must be others in the UK who would settle happily here if they knew more about the Falkland Islands and if there was accommodation here for them. I realise that what I am saying is not new and that the twin problem of accommodation and population has been and will certainly be with us for a long time, but I mention it because
it is the most prominent fact that strikes the newcomer - that and the sunshine, clarity and purity of the air. I can understand now why a Bradford wool-dealer can pick out Falkland Islands wool blindfold from the rest.

9. Which brings me to the Grasslands Trials Unit and the Green Patch Scheme. I am impressed with Dr Ferguson, the new head of the GTU and I commend him to you when he comes to the UK in June to report to the Advisory Committee. Like my predecessor, I attach great importance to the work of the GTU, even though the benefits are essentially long-term. I award the leases to the 6 lucky farmers in the Green Patch Scheme next week. This again is a most promising development although we shall have to give it several years before we can pronounce on its success.

10. In the meantime, my immediate worry is the budget and how we are to balance it when the recurrent costs of the projects that we have been given by ODA are likely to amount to at least 8% of recurrent revenue. Robin Benbow's idea of using the considerable funds in the Government Savings Bank to invest in worthwhile development in the Islands has a lot of merit and we await your and the Bank of England's comments on his report with interest.

Yours ever,

R M Hunt

cc: R Gozney
BUENOS AIRES
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Mr Flower, SEAD

EAST TIMOR: CONSEQUENCES OF RECOGNITION

1. My minutes of 14 August and 16 November 1979 set out some factors from SAmD's point of view, pertaining to the Falkland Islands, which are still relevant. I agree therefore with the recommendation in your proposed submission.

2. I would suggest, however, that the following points might be brought out a little more in the submission and the teleletter. There can be little doubt that Indonesia has crushed any opposition in East Timor but the question which concerns us is the manner in which this control has been achieved and what precedent we would be setting by accepting this violation of international law by recognising, in whatever manner. Our continuing colonial responsibilities require us to take no action which might prejudice our position at the United Nations. It is not clear to me what need there might be for someone from our Embassy in Jakarta to visit East Timor.

3. Might I therefore suggest the following changes:

a) in paragraph 4 of submission amend as follows ".... from our Embassy in Jakarta to visit East Timor, if need to do so were to arise, without embarrassment";

b) in paragraph 5 of draft submission redraft final sentence to read ".... set an adverse precedent which might raise problems in dealing with our continuing colonial responsibilities ....";

c) paragraph 6 of submission delete last sentence and a half, ending paragraph with "present stance";

d) paragraph 2 of teleletter amend to read "shows signs of life and there is some possibility of a legal transfer, which would be better .....";

e) paragraph 2 of teleletter insert new sentence at bottom of first page as follows ".... irritate the Portuguese. Third, our continuing colonial responsibilities in Belize, Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands require us to take no action which might prejudice our position at the United Nations. As far as voting at the UN on East Timor is concerned ....";
f) paragraph 3 of the teleletter, add after the first sentence "we do not see any requirement for such visits e.g. there are no obvious consular or commercial reasons; we have adequate sources of information in the Australians and Americans. However, if there seemed to be some good reason for a visit, one ought to be possible even in present circumstances. As long as ....".

19 March 1980

G A Duggan
South America Department

cc: Assistant, UND
    ECDE
    SED
    M&CD
    Planning Staff
    Research Department
    Miss Wilmshurst, Legal Adviser
BRITAIN'S ATTITUDE TO EAST TIMOR

PROBLEM
1. Should we follow the suggestion of our Embassy in Jakarta and accord de facto recognition to Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor?

RECOMMENDATION
2. I recommend that we should not take this step at present, and submit a draft reply to Jakarta. UND, SED, SAmD, MCD, ECD(E), Planning Staff and Legal Advisers concur.

ARGUMENT/BACKGROUND

A. In his teleletter of 30 October 1973, Mr Furness in Jakarta suggested that the time was ripe for us to re-consider our attitude to East Timor. We replied that we could not accord de jure recognition to the Indonesians' sovereignty over East Timor as their annexation of the territory in 1975 was clearly illegal under international law, but asked whether Jakarta believed that the criteria for de facto recognition had now been met. In his teleletter of 14 February Mr Furness said that the evidence indeed indicated that Indonesia enjoyed, with a reasonable prospect of permanence, the obedience of the mass of the population and the effective control of the greater part of the territory it annexed in 1975. Resistance on the ground to Indonesian control is now slight and relief work is finally proceeding successfully.

B. The strongest argument in favour of according de facto recognition to Indonesian sovereignty (a step which would not imply our approval of their annexation) is simply that the criteria for doing so have been met; it would be unsatisfactory to toy with our doctrines of recognition, which in this respect remain unchanged by decisions over the recognition of government, when little appears to be at stake. In addition, the Indonesians would probably be pleased if
we made even this small step towards accepting their position and it would enable personnel from our Embassy in Jakarta to visit East Timor without embarrassment if the need to do so arose. De facto recognition of Indonesian sovereignty would not in itself require us to switch from abstaining to supporting Indonesia in the annual UNGA vote, but it would need to be raised when the question of the Nine's vote is next discussed.

5. Against these arguments can be set our wish to avoid offending the Portuguese, who are under domestic pressure to keep the issue alive. (The Portuguese Foreign Minister in a personal letter recently asked the Secretary of State if he would be prepared to use his good offices to help open a Portugal-Indonesia dialogue on East Timor; a positive response was given but the Portuguese are not yet able to follow the matter up). Moreover, our present attitude is useful in deflecting criticism here of our relations with Indonesia and, even though the cases are legally distinguishable, there is a risk that our stance on aggression in Cambodia and Afghanistan might be compromised if we were believed (albeit erroneously) to be condoning Indonesia's illegal seizure of East Timor. We should also avoid (especially at the UN) any move that might set an adverse precedent and raise problems in dealing with our continuing colonial responsibilities in Belize, Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands.

6. The Indonesians are sensitive to international criticism in this matter but understand the position we have hitherto adopted and are not pressing us to change it. Thus although we would be consistent with our legal doctrine if we were to accord de facto recognition now, there is little political benefit in doing so and the balance of advantage seems to lie with maintaining our present stance at least until it becomes apparent that there is something to be gained by altering it. In any case, before announcing a change in policy we should consult our Community partners about our proposed step.

28 March 1980

R P Flower
South East Asian Department
CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: (Redacted)

FROM: R P Flower

DEPARTMENT: SEAD

TO: E R M Davies
A E Purvis Esq

JAKARTA

SUBJECT: BRITAIN'S ATTITUDE TO EAST TIMOR

1. Thank you for your teleletter of 14 February, and the documents on American attitudes which you sent on by bag. We have given careful thought to the recognition problem, bearing in mind the suggestions in paragraph 9 and the valuable comments in Goulding's letter to Burns of 6 March and Shakespeare's teleletter to me of 10 March (both copied to you).

2. It may be hard to deny the facts on the ground could justify our according de facto recognition to Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, but there are reasons for not taking this step now. First, as long as the recent Portuguese initiative still shows signs of life and there is some possibility of a legal settlement, it would be better not to change our present stance. Second, while it would no doubt please the Indonesians if we were to give some form of recognition to their position in East Timor, there is no pressure on us to concede the point at present; it would be useful to keep any concession in reserve, especially since our attitude helps us to deflect periodic criticism here of our policy towards Indonesia. Moreover the change might both fall well...
short of what the Indonesians would like and irritate the Portuguese. Third, as we have already said, our colonial responsibilities in Belize, Gibraltar and the Falklands require us to take no action which would prejudice our position at the United Nations. As far as voting at the UN is concerned, it is still too early to predict whether the Nine's common vote can be repeated, although Goulding's letter gives useful guidance on possible UN reaction to any attempt by Portugal and Indonesia to tidy the matter up.

3. You asked about visits to East Timor by Embassy personnel. (Diplomatic staff of the Embassy could go there even in present circumstances, if a real need for a visit arose, provided that it was made clear that they were not acknowledging expressly or by implication Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor in their dealings with the authorities without prejudicing our position. It could be explained to the Indonesians that we would be interested to observe at first-hand the facts on the ground and could if necessary be admitted that one purpose would be to help us consider whether or not a change in our attitude would now be possible. If the Indonesians insisted that any visit by British Embassy personnel would necessarily be taken as implying at least de facto recognition we would, of course, have to think again.

4. The most encouraging aspect of the American papers...
ATTITUDE TO EAST TIMOR

With reference to paragraph 2 of Mr Duggan's minute to you of 19 March, recognition of the de facto incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia would not involve us in "accepting this violation of international law". It is precisely to enable a State to avoid accepting the unlawful acquisition of territory by force that the concept of de facto as opposed to de jure recognition exists in this context.

2. I do not see any objection however to the proposed amendments, except that the word "transfer" suggested for paragraph 2 of the teleletter should perhaps be replaced by "settlement", since it is unlikely that Portugal will formally transfer East Timor.

19 March 1980

E S Wilmshurst
Legal Advisers

cc Mr Duggan SAMD
Planning Staff
BRITAIN'S ATTITUDE TO EAST TIMOR

1. Our Embassy in Jakarta have suggested (Mr Furness' tele-letter of 14 February, copied to you) that HMG should now accord de facto recognition to Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, since the legal criteria for doing so appear to have been met.

2. I should be grateful for any comments that you and the other addressees might have on the attached draft submission, which recommends that we should not immediately change our present position.

3. I enclose a copy of Mr Goulding's letter to Mr Burns (without encls.) and of Mr Shakespeare's teleletter to me of 10 March for ease of reference.

11 March 1980

R P Flower
South East Asian Department
1. We have followed with interest the correspondence about East Timor resting with Alan Furness' teleletter of 14 February and Lisbon telegram no 17 Saving of 23 February. Here in New York, we have two specifically UN preoccupations. First, we must protect our own position on the decolonisation of Belize, Gibraltar and our other remaining colonial possessions. This requires us to insist on the primacy of the principle of self-determination. Secondly, we would be wary of promoting any initiative which seemed to defy previous UN resolutions endorsing that principle in relation to East Timor, unless we were sure that most of the Third World was on board and that the initiative would not be seriously challenged.

2. It nevertheless seems to us possible to devise within these constraints a solution which would square the circle between the Indonesians, who claim that an act of self-determination has already taken place, and the Portuguese (and the UN generally), who claim that the people of East Timor have yet to be given the opportunity to determine their own future. I enclose a copy of an interesting minute by our Legal Adviser, David Anderson, analysing the legal position and suggesting the form which such an initiative might take. As you will see, the idea is that the UN should be involved, probably through a personal representative of the Secretary-General, in a procedure which the Indonesians could claim simply endorsed the decision taken in May 1976, but which the Portuguese would claim represented a new act of self-determination.

3. Such a procedure would of course presuppose a fair amount of co-operation and goodwill between the Indonesians and the Portuguese. It would be resisted by Fretilin and the core of their supporters here. But if both Indonesia and Portugal were fully behind it and mobilised the support of their respective friends, it would probably command a majority in the General Assembly. The Russians might be tempted to
take the matter to the Security Council and try to get a resolution reaffirming the Council's resolutions of 1975 and 1976. But on this hypothesis, the Indonesians and Portuguese ought to be able to ensure that such a resolution did not command nine positive votes. Such an outcome would be compatible with the constraints under which we have to operate (paragraph 1 above), though our advice here would be that we should not take the lead in promoting it, lest it be argued that we were actively condoning the use of force by Indonesia.

Enc

Copies & Enc:

A E Furness Esq
JAKARTA

J W R Shakespeare Esq
LISBON

Mrs S Wiseman, UND, FCO
CONFIDENTIAL

TELELETTER

FROM J W R SHAKESPEARE, LISBON

020/9 10 MARCH 1980

FOLLOWING FOR R P FLOWER ESQ Chief FCQ

A E FURNESS ESQ JAKARTA

M I GOULDING ESQ UKMIS NEW YORK

K G MACINNES ESQ UKMIS GENEVA

EAST TIMOR.

1. WE HAVE SEEN A COPY OF FURNESS’S INTERESTING TELELETTER OF 14 FEBRUARY ABOUT EAST TIMOR ADDRESSED TO YOU. SINCE THEN YOU WILL HAVE SEEN LISBON TELEGRAM NUMBER SAVING 17 OF 23 FEBRUARY IN WHICH THE AMBASSADOR REPORTED HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER, FREITAS DO AMARAL. FROM WHAT WE HAVE HEARD BOTH FROM FREITAS AND THE PRIME MINISTER, SA CARNEIRO, IT SEEMS THAT FREITAS’S ORIGINAL IDEA, WHEN HE WROTE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN JANUARY (FCO TELEGRAM NUMBER 12 OF 15 JANUARY), WAS TO PRESS AHEAD WITH A PURELY GOVERNMENTAL INITIATIVE ON EAST TIMOR, ONLY BRINGING THE PRESIDENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE REVOLUTION INTO THE PICTURE AFTERWARDS. SA CARNEIRO, WHO IS MORE ANXIOUS TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT, HAS, WE JUDGE, COUNSELLED RESTRAINT AND DECIDED TO TRY TO WORK WITH PRESIDENT EANES ON THE PROBLEM.

2. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS SINCE WRITTEN TO THE AMBASSADOR TO SAY THAT IT WILL BE SOME TIME BEFORE HE WILL BE ABLE TO PROCEED WITH HIS REQUEST FOR HELP. I AM SENDING A TRANSLATION IN THE NEXT BAG WHICH YOU MAY WISH TO SHOW TO THE PRIVATE OFFICE. HE ADDED THAT A STUDY WAS TO BE MADE OF THE PROBLEM. AT THE SAME TIME WE KNOW THAT SA CARNEIRO AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC ARE DISCUSSING EAST TIMOR AND THAT SOME SORT OF JOINT ACTION IS PLANNED. FROM WHAT WE CAN GATHER FROM CONTACTS WITHIN THE PRESIDENCY (DAVID ROYCROFT’S MINUTE OF 28 FEBRUARY COPIES TO YOU BUT NOT TO ALL) AND THE GOVERNMENT, ANY SUBSEQUENT ACTION IS UNLIKELY TO BE AS DRAMATIC AS THAT ENVISAGED BY FREITAS. TALKS WITH THE
Indonesians have not been ruled out but we have been told that the
Indonesians are insisting on Portuguese recognition of
Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor as a pre-condition for
solutions. For constitutional and political reasons this is
out of the question for the Portuguese. The government, and
especially the Centre Democrats, are under pressure from party
members to take some action to relieve the suffering of the
population of East Timor and it is the humanitarian rather than
the purely political aspects of the problem which are worrying
both the government and the President.

3. The Portuguese press have given prominence over the past
days to a report on Timor prepared by quote a Jesuit priest
unquote which, it is claimed, has shown that the population of
East Timor has fallen from 688,661 in 1975 to 329,271 in 1979.
A new pressure group linked to the Centre Democrat party calling
itself the Quote Office for Timorese Affairs unquote gave a press
conference on 3 March at which the figures were published, the
organisers said that since it was known that only 5,000 Timorese
had emigrated to Australia and 2,000 to Portugal it had to be
asked what had happened to all the rest? The group called on the
government to establish contact with the Indonesians and to
tackle the problem of East Timor with quote courage and
realism unquote.

4. Both the government and the President seem to realise that
there is no easy way out of the problem for Portugal. The
Portuguese dilemma is that the constitution makes it impossible
for them to accept Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. There
would not, therefore, be any question of a solution along the
lines of that adopted in 1975 over Goa where the Portuguese simply
signed the territory over to the Indians. Apart from the constitu-
tional point it would be politically unacceptable for the govern-
ment to be seen to be abrogating its responsibility for the
population (especially those of Portuguese origin). At the moment
it seems most likely that the Portuguese will concentrate on working
within the UN to put further pressure on Indonesia to alleviate
the suffering of the population and to allow out at least the
50 Portuguese former colonial civil servants which they believe
to be still in the territory.

J M R Shakespeare
CONFIDENTIAL

UKMIS NEW YORK
LISBON
CONFIDENTIAL
TELELETTER
FROM A E FURNESS JAKARTA
FILE REF: 014/4 DATED 14 FEBRUARY 1980
FOLLOWING FOR R P FLOWER SEAD
COPIED TO M I GOULDING ESQ, UKMIS NEW YORK
J W R SHAKESPEARE ESQ, MVO, LISBON
K G MACINNES ESQ, UKMIS GENEVA.

EAST TIMOR.

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER FAJ 6222/2 OF 24 JANUARY, WHICH GOES SO FULLY INTO THE COMPLICATED SUBJECT OF THE INDONESIAN INCORPORATION OF EAST TIMOR. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING THE FURTHER LETTER YOU PROMISE IN PARAGRAPH 7 ON THE GOA PRECEDENT. MAY I CONCENTRATE IN THIS REPLY ON THE POSSIBILITY OF OUR ACCORDING "DE FACTO" RECOGNITION OF INDONESIAN'S INCORPORATION OF EAST TIMOR? AS WE SEE IT HERE (AND OF COURSE ALL OUR IMPRESSIONS ARE SECOND-HAND SINCE NO-ONE FROM THE EMBASSY HAS VISITED EAST TIMOR), THE INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE INDEED ESTABLISHED PERMANENT CONTROL OVER THE WHOLE OF EAST TIMOR AND NOW ENJOY THE OBEDIENCE OF THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF ITS POPULATION.

2. YOU WILL ALREADY BE AWARE THAT INDONESIAN TROOP STRENGTHS IN EAST TIMOR HAVE BEEN GREATLY REDUCED IN RECENT MONTHS. OUR BEST PRESENT ESTIMATE IS THAT THERE ARE NOW ABOUT 5,000 REGULAR COMBAT TROOPS IN THE TERRITORY, COMPARED WITH FOUR TO FIVE TIMES THAT NUMBER NUMBER A YEAR AGO (ALTHOUGH THE INDONESIANS WERE RELUCTANT TO ADMIT THAT THEY FOUND IT NECESSARY TO HAVE SO MANY THERE). THE DEATH OF ROGER LOBATO ON THE LAST DAY OF 1978 SYMBOLIZED THE END OF COORDINATED FRETILIN RESISTANCE AND OF ANYTHING THAT COULD REALISTICALLY BE DESCRIBED AS A CIVIL WAR. VIRTUALLY NOTHING HAS BEEN HEARD OF THE ORGANIZATION IN EAST TIMOR SINCE THEN. THE SELF-STYLED FRETILIN "MINISTERS" WHO HAVE OCCASIONALLY APPEARED IN MOZAMBIQUE, LISBON OR NEW YORK, HAVE NO CONNECTION WITH ANYTHING THAT IS NOW HAPPENING IN EAST TIMOR, AND IT IS NOT CLEAR WHO, IF ANYONE, IS NOW LEADING THE FEW FRETILIN REMNANTS IN EAST TIMOR.

3. SUCH FIGHTING AS NOW CONTINUES IS CONFINED TO THE EXTREME EASTERN TIP OF THE ISLAND, WHERE INDONESIAN FORCES ARE NONETHELESS ABLE TO CIRCULATE AT WILL. INDONESIAN TROOPS ARE STILL OCCASIONALLY AMBUSHED THERE, BUT THE ARMY SEEMS JUSTIFIABLY CONFIDENT THAT BANDITRY IN THE AREA WILL SOON BE REDUCED TO AN "ACCEPTABLE" LEVEL. A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF PROTRACTED BUT UNCOORDINATED ARMED RESISTANCE TO CENTRAL AUTHORITY IS AFTER ALL STILL TO BE FOUND IN OTHER PARTS OF INDONESIA, SUCH AS ACEH AND IRIAN JAYA, AND INDEED IN THE OUTLYING PARTS OF MOST ASIAN COUNTRIES.

5. BARRING THE COLLAPSE OF THE INDONESIAN REPUBLIC (OF WHICH THERE IS NO SIGN), IT SEEMS INCONCEivable HERE THAT EAST TIMOR'S INTEGRATION INTO INDONESIA WILL NOT CONTINUE OR THAT INDONESIA COULD STILL BE BROUGHT TO ADMIT THE NEED FOR AN "ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION" WHICH IMPLIED THE POSSIBILITY OF ANYTHING OTHER THAN MAINTAINING THE PRESENT SITUATION. MOST OBSERVERS SAY THAT AS FAR AS THEY CAN TELL, THE POPULATION OF EAST TIMOR ACCEPTS ITS INTEGRATION INTO INDONESIA, IF WITHOUT MUCH OBVIOUS ENTHUSIASM. THIS IS HARDLY SURPRISING, EVEN IF THEY SHOWED LITTLE INCLINATION TO JOIN INDONESIA WHEN THE PORTUGUESE ABANDONED THEM IN 1975, THE LAST THING THAT THEY COULD BE EXPECTED TO WANT NOW, AFTER THE END OF A CIVIL WAR, IS ANY FURTHER QUESTIONING OF THEIR PRESENT TRANQUILITY.

6. ALTHOUGH THIS IS PERHAPS NOT STRICTLY RELEVANT TO OUR CRITERIA FOR RECOGNITION, THE ECONOMIC CONDITION OF EAST TIMOR HAS IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY SINCE DAVID ROBERT'S LETTER OF 19 NOVEMBER TO CHARLES CRAWFORD (NOT COPIED TO ALL RECIPIENTS OF THIS TELELETTER) ABOUT THE FAMINE THERE. THANKS TO THIS SEASON'S (CURRENT) RAINS AND TO THE WORK OF ICRC AND CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES (CRS), THE FAMINE NOW APPEARS TO BE OVER: CROPS HAVE BEEN PLANTED AND ICRC HAVE ENDED THEIR FOOD PROGRAMME IN TWO OF THEIR ORIGINAL EIGHT PROJECT AREAS. MALNUTRITION IS STILL RIFE, BUT FOREIGN VISITORS TO THE TERRITORY SAY THE STANDARDS OF HEALTH HAVE VISIBLEY IMPROVED OVER THE LAST THREE MONTHS. SO LONG AS FOREIGN RELIEF EFFORTS CONTINUE, THERE IS UNLIKELY TO BE A REPETITION THIS YEAR OF LAST YEAR'S FAMINE. CRS, STRONGLY BACKED BY USAID, ARE IN FACT DIGGING IN FOR A LONG-TERM PROGRAMME OF RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT AID, WHILE ICRC (FOLLOWING THE VISIT TO EAST TIMOR LAST WEEK OF JAEKLI, A COMMITTEE MEMBER, AND DE COURTEN, DELEGATE-GENERAL RESPONSIBLE FOR ASIA) HAVE JUST AGREED WITH THE INDONESIANS THAT THEIR PRESENT SIX-MONTH AID PROGRAMME SHOULD BE RENEWED WHEN IT COMES TO AN END IN APRIL.

7. ICRC HAVE IDENTIFIED THREE ADDITIONAL AREAS FOR RECEIVING AID UNDER THIS SECOND PHASE. THE TOTAL POPULATION OF THE NINE AREAS THEY WILL THEN BE WORKING IN WILL BE 63,000, OF WHOM SOME 50,000 WILL RECEIVE INTENSIVE FOOD AND MEDICAL AID. ICRC REPRESENTATIVES IN JAKARTA CONTINUE TO EXPRESS SATISFACTION TO US ABOUT THE COOPERATION THEY ARE RECEIVING FROM THE INDONESIAN RED CROSS AND THE AUTHORITIES. ONE REPRESENTATIVE CONFIDED (PLEASE PROTECT HIS CONFIDENCE) THAT OVERALL LOSSES THROUGH CORRUPTION AND INEFFECTIVENESS HAD BEEN LESS THAN 2 PERCENT OF TOTAL AID SHIPMENTS, THE LOWEST HE HAD KNOWN IN ANY RELIEF PROGRAMME HE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN. DESPITE TEETHING TROUBLES, THE ICRC PROGRAMME IS NOW BEING WELL RUN AND THEY EXPECT TO MAKE A LARGE SAVING (PERHAPS US DOLLARS 2 MILLION) ON THE BUDGET ALLOCATED TO THEM FOR THE FIRST SIX-MONTH PHASE. THIS WILL MEAN A CORRESPONDING REDUCTION IN THE AMOUNT ICRC WILL HAVE TO COLLECT FOR THE SECOND PHASE: AN APPEAL WILL BE LAUNCHED IN MARCH FOR PROBABLY NOT MUCH MORE THAN US DOLLARS 2 MILLION.
8. In the next bag I shall be sending you (but not copy recipients of this teleletter), evidence which the US Ambassador the US Assistant Secretary of State (Holbrooke) and the US Deputy Director for Foreign Disaster Assistance (Holmes) gave before the Congressional Sub-committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs on 4 December 1979. Their praise of the relief effort and Indonesian support for it was evidently endorsed by Congressmen Wolff, Hyde and Myers, who on 12-23 January made a tour of East Timor that even included an unscheduled visit made at their request to the troubled extreme eastern end of the island (where they found no military activity of any significance). The congressmen have not yet produced a report of their visit, but I shall let you have a copy if they do and we receive it. I shall also send you (but not copy recipients) copies of articles (provided by the US embassy here) that appeared in the New York Times on 28 and 30 January written by Hentry Kamm, who appears to have approached the same evidence as the congressmen saw from a more negative angle. Even Kamm, however, is forced to admit the effectiveness of the present relief programme and fails to uncover any specific abuses. I think that all this American material bears out what I have been saying in this teleletter.

9. If you accept that the facts on the ground would now justify at least de facto recognition, where do we go from here? I agree that there would be no need to announce this, and presumably it need not necessarily be accompanied by an alteration in our vote in the UN General Assembly (ie from abstention on Fretilin resolutions to voting against them). This would of course be the step that would most clearly demonstrate our sympathy to the Indonesians and distinguish us from the communist supporters of Fretilin at the UN and the East European equivocators. You will see that the US position, as described in Holbrooke's testimony of 4 December 1979 is:

(1) The US accepts the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia:

(2) The US does not recognise that the people of East Timor have exercised their right of self-determination:

(3) US contributions to humanitarian and developmental aid for East Timor.

On the basis of this, the US manages to vote against the Fretilin resolutions. Is the American formulation any help to us? One step that we might take, although this would clearly call for previous consultation with our European Community partners, is for a visit to East Timor to be paid by a member of this embassy (other than perhaps by the ambassador himself?). If you will forgive a historic
REMINISCENCE, I MYSELF, AS A JUNIOR MEMBER OF THE HIGH COMMISSION IN NEW DELHI, VISITED GOA IN 1965, WITHOUT ANY ILL CONSEQUENCES THAT I AM AWARE OF. IF, AS SEEMED POSSIBLE AT ONE STAGE LAST YEAR, SOME OF OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS ARE MORE LIKELY THAN WE TO SWITCH VOTE AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THEN DISCUSSING POSSIBLE VISITS BY REPRESENTATIVES FROM COMMUNITY EMBASSIES IN JAKARTA AS A PRELIMINARY TO CONSIDERING ANY POSSIBLE CHANCE OF VOTE AT THE UN MIGHT BE ONE WAY OF MAINTAINING A COMMUNITY CONSENSUS ON THIS MATTER AT LEAST A LITTLE LONGER. (PRESUMABLY THE PROSPECT OF PORTUGUESE ACCESSION MAKES ITS MORE DESIRABLE FOR SUCH A CONSENSUS ON EAST TIMOR TO BE MAINTAINED?)

AND IF THERE WERE ANY PROSPECT OF AN OFFICIAL PORTUGUESE VISIT TO EAST TIMOR, AS PART OF ANY DISCUSSION BETWEEN INDONESIA AND PORTUGAL (OR EVEN IF WE WERE MERELY TO SUGGEST SUCH A VISIT), IT WOULD NOT BE VERY CONSISTENT FOR US TO CONTINUE TO AVOID IT GOING TO EAST TIMOR OURSELVES.

I AM COPYING THIS LETTER TO CHANCERIES AT LISBON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND UKMIS GENEVA.

SEAD REGISTRY PLEASE COPY TO UKMIS GENEVA, UND, SED, M AND CD, SAMD, RESEARCH DEPT. AND PLANNING STAFF.

A E FURNESS

COPY HAS BEEN PASSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK.
IPU SPRING MEETING, OSLO, 1980

Brief No. : FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. Britain has no doubts about its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies and totally rejects Argentina's claim to sovereignty.

2. Britain is concerned to ensure the Islands' political and economic future. An economic survey of the Islands (commissioned by the British Government and drawn up by Lord Shackleton in 1976) showed that the population was declining and the economy stagnating. No new investment was likely nor any development of economic resources in the area practical in a climate of continued political uncertainty.

3. For that reason, successive British Governments have, with the agreement of Island Councillors, held talks with the Argentines, specifically without prejudice to either side's sovereignty claims. The aim has been to seek a way of working together to develop the resources of the South West Atlantic area, in which all concerned have an interest. The Islanders have been assured that no decisions will be taken against their wishes and that no proposals for a settlement will be put to Parliament which did not have their support.

4. The previous British Government conducted four rounds of negotiations (two at Ministerial level) and one meeting of expert working groups. These were exploratory in nature and no decisions were taken. Councillors were kept informed and consulted at every stage but did not take up the invitation to participate.

5. Mr Nicholas Ridley MP, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, visited the Islands in July 1979 to gain first-hand knowledge of the Islands and of the views of Islanders. He emphasised again the Government's concern for the Islanders' welfare and future. He assured them that their wish to remain British was recognised and accepted. No date has yet been agreed for further exchanges with the Argentine Government but the British Government have undertaken to continue the dialogue in a constructive spirit.
IPU SPRING MEETING, OSLO: BRIEFING

1. This year's Spring Meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), at which draft resolutions for the Annual Conference will be formulated, will be held in Oslo from 7-13 April. The British delegation of MPs will comprise Messrs John Page (C), Gordon Bagier (L), Tom Cox (L), John Hunt (C), John Osborn (C) and Albert Roberts (L), with Lord Goronyw Roberts as reserve. As usual, they will require briefs. Those relating directly to agenda topics have already been supplied by relevant departments, but I should be grateful if you would treat this minute as a request for a contingency brief on the subject(s) indicated below. Where more than one department is listed, would the first-named please lead and co-ordinate.

2. These briefs will be for the exclusive use of the delegation, who will need them in time for a briefing meeting in mid-March. I should be grateful if they could reach me as soon as possible, and in any case not later than Friday 14 March. (I realise that on certain subjects - eg. Rhodesia - some up-dating may be needed at the end of March, but it would still be helpful to have a preliminary brief where this is feasible). Where briefs were provided for the last IPU Conference in September 1979, a copy is attached (for the lead department only) for ease of reference: if no or only minor changes are needed, please return the copy to me.

3. Briefs should be unclassified, undated and without FCO attribution. They should be typed in final form on plain paper with the following heading:

   IPU SPRING MEETING, OSLO, 1980

   Brief No. [Blank]: [SUBJECT]

   Please use "Britain" and "British policy" rather than "HMG" and "the Government's policy", etc, when giving our views.

4. The following briefs are required:

   **Subject**

   (a) Norway [short background brief]

   (b) Rhodesia [including defensive briefing on contentious issues such as alleged British bias, South Africans in the security forces, use of the auxiliaries, return of refugees, etc]

   (c) Afghanistan

   (d) The Olympic Games

   (e) CSCE

   (f) SALT

   **Department**

   WED

   Rhodesia Dept

   S.Af.D

   UND

   SAD/EESD

   CRD

   EESD

   CSCE Unit

   Defence Dept.
Subject

(g) MBFR
(h) Namibia
(i) South Africa (UK relations)
(j) Iran
(k) Arab/Israel (including PLO)
(l) Western Sahara
(m) East Timor
(n) Belize
(o) Falkland Islands

Department

Defence Dept.
S.Af.D
S.Af.D
MED
NENAD
NENAD
SEAD
M&CD
SAmD

20 February 1980

M Hickson
OID
233-3048

cc: Mr Morris, CRD
Mr Robinson, CSCE Unit
Mr Millington Defence Dept
Mr Broucher, EESD
Mr Kydd, M&CD
Mr Lamport, MED
Mr Holmes, NENAD
Mr Layden, Rhodesia Dept.
Mr Lavers, SAD
Mr Morrise, SAfD
Mr Bright, SAmD
Mr Crawford, SEAD
Mr Nash, WED
Contingency Brief

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. In mid-1976 an Economic Survey of the Islands, commissioned by the Government and conducted by Lord Shackleton, showed that the Falklands were in decline, and that no new investment was likely, nor any development of economic resources in the area practical in a climate of continued political uncertainty. This led Britain to consider the desirability of opening a dialogue with Argentina with a view to establishing a new framework of economic and political co-operation; without this the future of the Islands appeared bleak. The then Minister of State, Mr Rowlans, accordingly visited the Falklands in February 1977 and, after full and wide-ranging discussions, obtained Islander agreement that the Government should try to establish formal Anglo-Argentine negotiations. The Islanders accepted that these would have to include the sovereignty question. They were given full assurances that they would be closely consulted throughout any talks; that proposals for a settlement - if indeed any emerged - would have to be acceptable to them before being brought to Parliament; and that the talks themselves would be conducted without prejudice to Britain's sovereignty position.

2. Terms of reference for negotiations were subsequently agreed with the Argentines. These cover the twin themes of political and economic co-operation with regard not only to the Falkland Islands, the Dependencies of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, ...
Islands, but to the South West Atlantic in general. They also state that a major objective of the negotiations is to achieve a stable, prosperous and politically durable future for the Islands.

3. There have been four rounds of negotiations so far and one meeting of working groups. The negotiations which the previous Government conducted with the Argentines were exploratory in nature and no decisions were taken. Mr Ridley, the new Minister of State, paid a six day visit to the Falkland Islands (between 20-26 July 1979). During his stay he emphasised the Government's concern for the Islanders' welfare and future and our recognition and acceptance of their wish to remain British. No date has yet been agreed for a further round of negotiations but the new Government has undertaken to continue the dialogue in a constructive spirit.
Falkland Islands

Points to make (only if raised)

1. We intend to continue our exchanges with the Argentines. No date yet set - perhaps after Easter. The Islanders, whom we have promised to consult at every stage, have recently reaffirmed their support and may participate in future talks.

2. We reject Argentina's claim to sovereignty. But we have no wish to continue a sterile dispute that benefits no-one, least of all the Islanders. We shall continue to work for a regime of economic co-operation with Argentina to develop the resources of the Islands and their Dependencies.
Security Dept
FCO

Dear Department,

DR STEPHEN FRANCIS SZANTO

1. I have been approached by the second in command of the Royal Marines detachment, Lt David Boyd, who was slightly worried by the behaviour of Dr Szanto who has recently arrived in the Colony. Apparently Lt Boyd was at a party which Dr Szanto also attended and was surprised to hear the doctor engaging in heated political discussions about the future of the Islands and generally stirring things up a bit. It may be that Dr Szanto does not realise that his opinions, which Lt Boyd described as being radically British, are not welcome among Falkland Islanders. I understand he was telling Islanders that they are lucky to have had it so good for so long and must now face up to the inevitable Argentine take-over.

2. Dr Szanto is here as a locum tenens whilst the usual doctor is on maternity leave. I believe that he may have paid part or all of his passage money to get here but is paid his salary under OSAS terms. He is, I understand, a Hungarian refugee who left Hungary in 1956 and subsequently studied medicine in Dublin. I regret that I do not have his personal details but he would appear to be a naturalised British citizen.

3. Dr Szanto would appear to be perfectly straightforward but his strongly expressed patriotic fervour on behalf of his adopted country, whilst perhaps understandable is unusual. I am passing on Lt Boyd's observations for what they are worth and should be interested to know if we should be cautious in our dealings with Dr Szanto. I hope I am not causing you too much trouble.

Yours ever,

Michael Cowdery
D A Greencoat

cc: D G Davies Esq
SAMD FCO
VISIT BY MR RIDLEY TO ANDEAN FACT COUNTRIES, FEBRUARY/MARCH 1980

General: Falkland Islands

Points to Make (as appropriate)

1. The Falkland Islands have been under British control and peopled by Britishers without interruption since 1833. There were no indigenous islanders. Nearly all present islanders are of British extraction and have British passports.

2. The Islands are a self-governing colony. The islanders do not want independence. They wish to retain their British way of life (language, institutions), and their close links with Britain. The Falklands problem is not one of decolonization, but of self-determination; the islanders have the right to choose.

3. We have no doubts about our sovereignty. We reject Argentina's claim. It is unlikely that the Argentines would ever actually want to live in the Islands: they have enough empty spaces of their own.

4. But we have no wish to continue a sterile dispute that benefits no-one. We have sought in previous exchanges to see whether we can resolve our differences and move jointly to develop the economic resources of the South West Atlantic area.

5. We intend to continue such exchanges with the Argentines. But the wishes of the islanders cannot be ignored.
Essential Facts

1. Britain has exercised sovereignty over the Falkland Islands without interruption since 1833. Earlier settlements, by British, French, Spanish and Argentines, had previously been disbanded. Britain also exercises sovereignty over South Georgia (annexed in 1775) and South Sandwich (discovered 1775 but not annexed until 1908), the Falkland Islands Dependencies. The UK has been willing to put the matter to arbitration, but Argentina has always refused.

2. Argentina claims sovereignty as inheritor to Spain's title, as occupant of the Islands between 1820 and 1832 and because of the geographical contiguity. In recent years she has pressed her case with increasing vigour and has won the support of the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations. The most recent UN resolution (31/49) was passed by the General Assembly in 1976. 102 countries supported it (including all South American countries) and 36 abstained. Only the UK voted against. The resolution commends Argentina for assisting the process of decolonization and calls on both the Argentinians and the UK Governments to expedite negotiations and to refrain from taking any unilateral decisions which would affect the status quo. The UK view is that the Falklands problem is not one of decolonization but rather one of self-determination, as enshrined in the UN Charter. (The islanders do not want independence.) Argentina refuses to accept this view.

3. Many South American countries appear to have endorsed Argentina's case without much knowledge of the circumstances. It is likely that they are in some cases not aware of the British origins of the population.

4. The previous government held 4 rounds of talks with the Argentines (2 at Ministerial level) between 1977 and 1979. They were conducted expressly without prejudice to the sovereignty
claims of either side, but little progress was made in the face of Argentine refusal to accept anything less than a full transfer of sovereignty. We pinned our hopes on making clear the mutual advantages of economic co-operation (e.g. on fish or oil) in advance of a sovereignty settlement, but the Argentines remained intransigent. The talks ended in March 1979. We hope to hold a round of exploratory discussions soon.

5. The economic viability of the Falklands is declining. Efforts to improve it have usually foundered on the rock of the dispute. Commercial companies are not willing to prospect for oil until the question of sovereignty over the Falklands waters and the subjacent continental shelf is settled to the satisfaction of both the UK and Argentina. The small size of the population (1850) and the isolation of the Islands are further factors contributing to the decline. Emigration has slowed down but still continues.
MR BLAKER'S TALK TO CONSERVATIVE PARLIAMENTARY COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE: 6 PM, 20 FEBRUARY

1. Mr Blaker is speaking to this Committee about the Commonwealth as a whole, and about those parts for which he is responsible – Asia and the Pacific. Briefing for this is in hand.

2. Mr Blaker's office have also asked for very short and purely defensive briefing on any other Commonwealth topics currently of interest about which MPs may question him. He will be taking questions for possibly 30 minutes.

3. May I therefore please have contributions, in the form of 'Essential Facts' (white paper, one side only, 1 1/2 spacing, example attached) as follows:

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<th>Topic</th>
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<td>Belize - state of play</td>
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<td>Caribbean dependencies (problem areas only)</td>
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<td>Falkland Islands - state of play</td>
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4. The above list is not exclusive. Departments may wish to brief on other topics which they think MPs could raise in the context of Mr Blaker's talk.

5.
5. The classification of the talk will be 'Restricted'. If there are specific points from confidential or even secret sources which Mr Blaker should not reveal this should be indicated.

6. May I please have contributions, in final form, not later than 1800 hours Tuesday 19 February - earlier if possible.

Now by 1400 on 19 Feb.

James Paterson
Commonwealth Co-ordination Department
(233 4493   E301)

15 February 1980

cc:

PS/Mr Blaker
HKGD
GREEK ACCESSION: ESSENTIAL FACTS


2. Treaty provides for Greek acceptance of Community acquis, subject only to certain agreed derogations and transitional measures. Main points are:
   i) basic 5-year transitional period;
   ii) 7-year transitional period for free movement of labour and some sensitive agricultural products;
   iii) transitional arrangements for contributions to Community Budget to ensure Greece benefits from outset.

3. In negotiations main problems arose over agriculture (opposition from France and Italy), free movement of labour (Germany) and Budget (UK).

4. No negotiations on Political Cooperation, since harmonisation of foreign policies is voluntary. Potential problem over Israel (only partially recognised by Greece) and Turkey.

5. Accession generally popular in Greece. Benefits expected from CAP and Budget. But PASOK, main opposition party, hostile to entry and expected to boycott ceremonies.
FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. Many thanks for your letter of 11 February. These were very useful contributions on the Argentine attitude and I am grateful to you for passing them on to us.
For what it is worth I thought you might like to know of two conversations I had during a three day visit to the Argentine last week in which the topic of the Falkland Islands cropped up.

The first occasion was at a dinner with Admiral Bessola who is an electronics expert but currently Director of Naval Welfare. He is an old friend and certainly not a political creature. Over dinner he made the point to me that in Argentine eyes the Falkland Islands were becoming of less immediate importance and that the feeling was increasingly becoming one of "time will resolve the problem". I think this perhaps worth reporting to you because Bessola, who I have known for 4 years, raised the topic with me and it is a topic which I cannot recall our having discussed before.

The second occasion on which the Falkland Islands was mentioned was at dinner with a retired Admiral, Edgardo Segura, who was at one time Head of the Argentine Naval Mission to Europe. He is a shrewd and clever man and very much a political creature. We have often discussed the Falkland Islands and other matters informally and on this occasion his attitude was much more relaxed. In answer to my question about the importance of the Falkland Islands to the Argentine Government at this stage he said that it was now very much a second priority and that as long as talks went on it would not become a major issue.

I did mention these two conversations to John Chick at the Embassy but I thought you might also wish to be aware of them.
1. Please see Mr Berman's minute below.

2. There seems to be some confusion about this. As I said to you on the phone, I am happy for the wording you suggest in para 2 of your manuscript minute of 31 January to be used in place of the final sentence of para 3 of the brief ("The nomenclature ..... is as described"). But this form of words was originally given to us by our Legal Adviser, it is essential that any amendment should be cleared with him.

3. On closer examination I think there is no need for any additional wording in para 4 of the brief. The wording in quotes, from the bottom line of the first page of the brief ("The United Kingdom") to the end of line 5 of page 2 of the brief ("the two Governments") is all designed to form part of a UK counter-statement to any statements the Argentines might make on this issue. The wording was cleared with Mr Chamberlain; any changes you propose to make will again need to be cleared with him. If you would still like to expand in the brief on the reasons for the UK's votes at the UN on the Falklands issue, you might add as a new second sentence in para 6 of the background: "The UK could not vote for any resolution at the UN which questioned British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands." If you wish to include such a sentence, then it too will need to be cleared with the Legal Advisers.

4 February 1980

C C Bright
South America Department
To Chamberlain
Legal Controller

Falkland Islands

1. May I suggest that I consult you about the attached contribution to our General Political Background Brief.

2. There is some ambiguity over terminology, covered in paragraph 3. Could one say in the last sentence of this paragraph: "The terminology to be used in any discussion is the Falkland Islands."? Grateful your advice.

3. I have also added a phrase at the end of paragraph 4, which may make it clearer.

[Signature]
31.1.80

Mr. Ford

1. [Am. Qtd. Jnt. (In 3rd LV) - Minute]

This is potentially quite wrong. If you have a Departmental problem, then I assume you will consult me in your usual efficient way.
1. However, you put it up to A. Mr. Yet, who has a problem, this is for them to consult their legal advice, explaining what the problem is and what advice is sought. They cannot evade their Departmental responsibilities by dumping the matter in your lap.

2. I am not prepared to deal with this matter (in Mr. Shaw's absence) until the points raised in your note are met, and it is explained to me what purpose this paper is to serve and how it relates to what we have said and done on previous occasions.

J. D. Brown
Legal Counsellor
31st March 80.
FAKLAND ISLANDS (See also Antarctica)

1. Argentina claims sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies (South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands). The British Government reject this claim and have stated consistently that they are in no doubt of their sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies. Argentina loses few opportunities at international fora to reassert and thereby seek to strengthen its claim to sovereignty.

2. In the event of an Argentine declaration challenging British sovereignty, the UK delegate should issue a declaration on the following lines: (The exact wording should be cleared with South America Department, FCO, (233 4077))

"With reference to the declaration by the Republic of Argentina, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have no doubt as to United Kingdom sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and the Falkland Islands Dependencies. The United Kingdom therefore do not accept the declaration of the Argentine Republic claiming to contest United Kingdom sovereignty over the above mentioned territories."

3. Problems may also arise over nomenclature: eg, in the United Nations, Argentina has proposed successfully that the words "Islas Malvinas" should appear on official documents printed in English where the words "Falkland Islands" are mentioned. The UK representative should resist any attempt to secure the adoption of the words "Islas Malvinas" in place of the words "Falkland Islands" in an English text or any attempt to secure the addition of the words "Islas Malvinas" after the name of the Falkland Islands. The nomenclature to be used in any discussion of the Falkland Islands is as described.

4. If the Argentines interpret UNGA Resolutions on the Falklands as condemning the "illegality" of the British position there, the UK delegate should issue a counter-statement on the following lines (exact wording to be cleared with South America Department FCO):

"The United Kingdom does not accept the assertion by

/Argentina
Argentina that the "illegality of the occupation of the Falkland, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands by the United Kingdom has been recognised by the United Nations Organisation." UN Resolutions have simply called for the settlement of the dispute by negotiation between the two Governments.  

5. Without political and economic co-operation with Argentina, the Falkland Islands face a bleak future. Recognising this, we have developed a dialogue to seek a new framework. Under the last Government, 4 rounds of talks were held. But Argentina's refusal to negotiate on any basis other than a complete transfer of sovereignty has meant that no effective progress has been possible. Successive British Governments have pledged that no solution will be agreed that does not conform with the Islanders' wishes. The Islanders want to retain their British way of life. They do not want independence.

6. The last UN General Assembly Resolution on the Falklands in 1976 was pro-Argentine and was passed by 102 votes to 1 (the UK) with 36 abstentions (including other EEC countries). We can expect little support at international meetings from other countries.
With the compliments of

R J STRATTON

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

LONDON, SW1A 2AH
MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

POLICY TOWARDS THE DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

General Policy

1. The present British Government are fully committed to the policy followed by successive Governments since 1945 of giving every help and encouragement to those Dependent Territories which wish to become independent, while not forcing independence on those which do not want it. Wherever independence is feasible, we will seek to create the conditions which will make it a realistic and desirable objective. Where local governments have made it clear that they do not wish their territories to become independent, we are content to retain sovereignty for the time being. But we must also retain the legal powers necessary to ensure that we are able to fulfil the responsibilities that sovereignty entails. In those territories where international political considerations rule out the possibility of independence, or rule it out for the present, we will seek the most suitable arrangements for the territories' administration. Each case will be considered on its merits, bearing in mind the constraints imposed by external political circumstances and the wishes of the local population.

Powers to be retained by the British Government

2. Responsibility and power must go together. Political development must therefore stop some way short of full internal self-government where territories choose to remain dependent. In such cases the British Government, through the Governor, will retain overall responsibility for:

(i) external affairs;
(ii) defence;
(iii) internal security, including administration of the police;
(iv) the administration of the public service;
(v) the judiciary.
3. In certain territories, limited powers in some of these areas have already been delegated to local governments. It is not the intention to reverse those decisions, but no further delegations will be agreed in respect of these particular responsibilities. We will, however, be prepared to consider sympathetically any proposals that Governors may care to put forward for increasing the powers of local governments in other areas.

4. Where a territory's government have announced their intention to move to independence, a programme will be agreed for the various stages of constitutional change. There can be no standard timetable for this: the pace will largely be dictated by local circumstances. In all cases, the Governor will retain until the last moment formal responsibility for at least the first three of the matters listed in paragraph 2 above, though it will undoubtedly be appropriate for him to consult the local Premier increasingly about the way he exercises these responsibilities as independence approaches.

5. Any constitutional changes introduced as a result of a decision to move towards independence will, of course, need to be reviewed if that decision is subsequently reversed (for example as a result of a change of government in the territory concerned). This could entail the resumption by Governors of powers that had already been delegated in anticipation of independence.

The Role of British Aid

6. The reasonable needs of the Dependent Territories will continue to be a first call on our aid programme. In deciding how aid resources should be used in the Dependent Territories, our principal objective will be to create a political and economic climate that will make independence a realistic and attractive
attractive alternative to continuing colonial status. We recognise, however, that in some territories the possibility of genuine economic independence is remote. In the past, a generous allocation of development aid (and in certain cases also budgetary aid) has often formed a vital ingredient in achieving a final independence agreement. The possibility of similar action will be borne in mind in future cases, subject to the overall constraints placed on the aid programme by the Government's general economic policies.

Alternatives to Independence

7. The Government's preference will remain a straight choice between continued dependence or full independence. We will nevertheless be prepared to consider on their merits any proposals for alternative arrangements that may be thought appropriate for particular territories. These could include association or integration with another country where this is locally acceptable, but will certainly not again include the relationship provided for under the 1967 West Indies Act which led to the creation of the West Indies Associated States. British experience since 1967 has clearly demonstrated the drawbacks of an arrangement which left the Government answerable for the consequences of policies over which they had no control.
### THE DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area (sq miles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>137,000</td>
<td>8,866</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bermuda</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>20½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Antarctic Territory</td>
<td>Transient</td>
<td>666,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Indian Ocean Territory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cayman Islands</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falkland Islands and Dependencies</td>
<td>1,930 ?</td>
<td>6,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>21½</td>
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<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>4,900,000</td>
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<td>New Hebrides</td>
<td>100,000</td>
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<td>Pitcairn Islands Group</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1 ½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Helena and Dependencies</td>
<td>6,500</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks and Caicos Islands</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
POLICY TOWARDS THE DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

1. I enclose a memorandum setting out the basic policy of Her Majesty's Government towards the United Kingdom's remaining dependent overseas territories. It has been approved by the Secretary of State as the basis for guidance to Officers Administering Governments.

2. For the most part the memorandum restates the broad lines of policy that have been followed by successive Governments since 1945. But it lays down a somewhat tougher line than has sometimes been adopted in the past about what powers can be delegated to local governments in territories that opt to remain dependent.

3. The views of those Governors principally concerned were of course taken into account in preparing the memorandum. But it would still help us to know if any of the policy as stated is likely to cause problems in your territory. I should stress that the memorandum does not apply to those "political" territories — ie Hong Kong, the Falkland Islands, Belize and Gibraltar — whose relations with a neighbouring foreign power inhibit in any case an 'orderly' move to independence; to the New Hebrides, which is soon to be independent; to Pitcairn, which with its 60-odd inhabitants will thereafter be our only remaining dependency in the Pacific; or in large measure, because of its advanced stage of self-government and its capacity to attain independence, to Bermuda.

4. At present the memorandum is a United Kingdom classified paper. But we should like to down grade it so that copies can at least be made available to Local Ministers or Legislatures. There may be advantage in giving it even wider circulation, both in the Dependent Territories themselves and in Britain. I should value your advice about this. Are there any changes which you would like made before the memorandum is more widely disseminated (without prejudice of course to the policy which Ministers have approved). On the face of it, it is a perfectly straightforward statement of policy; and I see no reason why it should not be made generally known. We would of course ensure that, if this were done, the special position of Hong Kong and the other "political" territories was made clear.

/5.
5. Wider dissemination of the memorandum could be accelerated if Ministers were to decide that it should be given to the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, which will almost certainly be considering the future of our Dependent Territories during the course of this year. Since the Committee's activities are normally public, this would amount to publication in the United Kingdom. We shall naturally keep you informed about this.

6. I am sending a similar letter to all other Officers Administering Governments.

R J Stratton

ANGUILLA
C H Godden Esq
H M Commissioner

BELIZE
J P I Hennessy Esq CMG OBE (wef 1.3.80)
Governor and Commander-in-Chief (designate)

BERMUDA
The Hon Sir Peter Ramsbotham GCMG GCVO
Governor and Commander-in-Chief

BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS
J A Davidson Esq OBE
Governor

CAYMAN ISLANDS
T Russell Esq CBE
Governor

Falkland Islands
R M Hunt Esq CMG (wef 20.2.1980)
Governor and Commander-in-Chief

and British Antarctic Territory
High Commissioner (designate)

GIBRALTAR
General Sir William Jackson GBE KCB MC
Governor and Commander-in-Chief

HONG KONG
Sir Murray MacLehose GBE KCMG KCVO
Governor and Commander-in-Chief

MONTSERRAT
G W Jones Esq CBE
Governor

NEW HEBRIDES
A C Stuart Esq CMG CPM
British Resident Commissioner

PITCAIRN
Sir Harold Smedley KCMG MBE
Governor
British High Commission, WELLINGTON

ST HELENA
G C Guy Esq CMG CVO OBE
Governor and Commander-in-Chief

TURKS & CAICOS
J C Strong, Esq CBE
EAST TIMOR AT THE UN

1. In your teleletter of 30 October to Murray Simons, you put a case for changing Britain’s attitude to the Indonesian annexation of East Timor. We had prepared the following summary of the current British position before the Portuguese Foreign Minister made his recent approach to the Secretary of State asking that Britain use its good offices to help open an Indonesian-Portuguese dialogue on East Timor. While this development has introduced an intriguing new element into the issue, it seems unlikely that anything substantial will emerge for some time yet so our analysis is perhaps still worth sending. I would like to comment first on the interesting political questions you raised, then on the legal principles involved.

2. You recognised in your paragraph 2 that acceptance of Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor could be an embarrassing precedent for Belize, the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar. The FCO departments concerned agree and their views can be summarised thus:

(i) Belize: a policy switch on East Timor would expose us to accusations that our position on Belize is insincere and would reduce the effectiveness of our earlier strategy designed to induce the Guatemalans to negotiate;

(ii) Falkland Islands: there is a residual danger of an Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands and should this take place, Britain’s UN case would be seriously flawed were we to accord full legal recognition to the Indonesian seizure;

(iii) Gibraltar: unlike (i) and (ii) there is no danger that force will be used to settle the dispute, but it is still important in this context to oppose the unlawful seizure of territory.
3. You moved on to suggest that our policy in these cases was based on the principle that the wishes of the local inhabitants should be respected, rather than on our opposition to annexation per se. I agree that our argument rests primarily on our support for the principle of self-determination, as in the absence of any attempted takeover we have not had need to appeal to the further principle that states cannot legitimately acquire territory by force. Nonetheless, we should of course maintain the latter principle if necessary, as we do whenever it is challenged; for instance, we still have not recognised the Baltic States de jure as part of the Soviet Union and we did not recognise Goa de jure as part of India until 1975, when Portugal and India reached agreement. There are, moreover, parallels with Cambodia and Afghanistan.

4. The Indonesian annexation of East Timor offended against both principles: it constituted an illegal acquisition of territory by force, and frustrated the legitimate aspirations of the East Timorese to self-determination. (Gordon Duggan recalls that by late 1975 it was clear that the East Timorese had little inclination to join Indonesia.) Thus there is in present circumstances no basis on which we could recognise Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor.

5. You argued in paragraph 3 that it would be unwise for us to get out of step with our major allies over East Timor, but there is no evidence that our policy is causing difficulties in this respect. In any case, the considerations we face are not identical to those faced by our allies: they are not tied by residual colonial responsibilities and do not, therefore, need to avoid setting a precedent which might adversely affect them; moreover, we wish to pay due regard to the views of Portugal as an old ally, a fellow member of NATO and a future EEC colleague. Conversely, Australia and New Zealand are quite properly influenced by regional concerns which weigh less strongly with us.

6. In paragraph 4 you mentioned the possibility of a Portugal-Indonesia reconciliation. There is now at last some prospect of movement in this direction following the Portuguese Foreign Minister's letter to the Secretary of State, though as the telegrams from Lisbon and Jakarta on the matter make clear, both sides will have to make concessions if an agreement is to be reached; the Portuguese will probably have to reconcile themselves to effective permanent Indonesian control over the territory while the Indonesians might need to withdraw from their hitherto resolute position that a legitimate act of self-determination in East Timor has already taken place. Moreover, as UKMIS New York helpfully pointed out in their telegram of 17 January (copied to you), there remain the UN Security Council Resolutions of 1975 and 1976 to complicate the picture.

7. Nonetheless, perhaps the time is ripe for moves towards a settlement. The Portuguese have good domestic reasons for wanting
the East Timor problem solved and the Indonesians continue to be embarrassed by international pressure against them over the matter, especially since their human rights record has recently improved; in addition, UN interest seems to be flagging somewhat. (On 25 January I mentioned the possibility of a reconciliation to Saleh Basarah, the Indonesian Ambassador in London, and he said that the Indonesians would welcome an approach from Portugal, but he thought that the Portuguese should be prepared to go to East Timor to see for themselves what progress the Indonesians had made.) Perhaps the Goa precedent (on which I shall be writing more fully) suggests that a formula can be found which will both prove acceptable to the principal parties involved and satisfy those others (including ourselves) who are concerned about the self-determination issue.

8. As far as aid is concerned (your paragraph 5) we are happy that the ICRC is mounting a relief operation to which British charities can contribute. Since no public funds are available at present for aid to East Timor, our official attitude is not compromised.

9. Our voting at the UN is, of course, influenced by our legal stance on the issue concerned but tactical political considerations also weigh strongly. It is as yet too early to say whether the Nine's common front on East Timor will be maintained, though it is worth noting that our UN policy so far has been successful in alienating no-one and in giving us some ammunition to use in answering periodic criticism in Britain about human rights in East Timor. Although some 35 countries have up to now accepted Indonesia's point of view, including Australia, New Zealand and the United States, the majority are still holding back and it will, we expect, be some time before a UN majority builds up in Indonesia's favour. We should be grateful for anything UKMIS New York may wish to add.

10. Those are the political considerations. The legal position is based on the long-held British doctrine by which we give full ('de jure') recognition to a State's annexation of territory if (i) the Government of the annexing State enjoys, with a reasonable prospect of permanence, the obedience of the mass of the population and the effective control of the greater part of the territory acquired; and (ii) the annexation was not 'illegal' under international law. The Indonesian use of force to seize East Timor was clearly illegal (see, for example, the 'Declaration on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States' adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1970: 'The territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use of force. No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognised as legal'). It would, therefore, be inappropriate for us to recognise it 'de jure'.

11. Nevertheless, in the case of an illegal annexation where all the conditions in 10(i) were met, we could accord 'de facto'
recognition to signify our acceptance of the facts on the ground. In the present case this would, for example, make it easier for us to discuss the political and economic future of East Timor with the Indonesian authorities. There is no need to announce such a step formally. Nor is there, on the other hand, any pressure on us to take it at present — on the contrary, the prospect of negotiations creates good reasons for us not to take any step that might be perceived as disruptive. In any case, we have hitherto considered the military situation sufficiently equivocal to justify our postponing a decision; in view of the fact that resistance to the Indonesian occupation is now apparently slight, perhaps you could comment on the overall facts of Indonesian control in East Timor as seen in Jakarta, with a view to helping us decide if the conditions in 10(i) have now been met.

R P Flower  
South East Asian Department

cc: M I Goulding Esq, New York  
J W R Shakespeare Esq MVO, Lisbon  
UND  
SED  
M&CD  
SAMD  
Research Department  
Planning Staff
Sir D Maitland

cc
Mr Harding o.r. (without encs.)

Friday 25

FALKLAND ISLANDS: DISCUSSION ON 23 JANUARY AT 11.30 A.M.

1. Mr Harding is to call on you on 23 January to discuss the Falkland Islands. Although this involves a considerable amount of material, you may find it useful to look through some recent papers as background.

2. I attach:

Flag A
(i) a copy of the COI fact sheet on the Falkland Islands and Dependencies;

Flag B
(ii) a personal copy of the policy paper which OD will be taking on 29 January;

Flag C
(iii) the latest comments from the Governor in Port Stanley and the Charge in Buenos Aires on a possible lease-back solution to the dispute;

Flag D
(iv) a summary of the negotiations with the Argentines between 1977 and 1979;

Flag E
(v) the records of Mr Ridley's meetings with Falkland Islands Councillors in Port Stanley in July 1979;

Flag F
(vi) a copy of the summary volume of the 1976 Shackleton Report;

Flag G
(vii) a note on the Lobby i.e. the Falkland Islands Committee and associated bodies.

3. You may also like to see a copy of the latest JIC assessment of the Argentine threat: this is being sent to you separately.

22 January 1980

P R Fearn
South America Dept.
FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. Sir Donald Maitland's office rang 17 January about the briefing Mr Harding is to give Sir Donald on the Falklands at 11.30 am 23 January.

2. The office wanted to know if someone from the Department would be accompanying Mr Harding. They would also be grateful for copies of any telegrams or correspondence which it would be useful for Sir Donald to see before the meeting.

17 January 1980

D G Davies
South America Department

Yes. I will keep an handwritten copy for his return. I agree to Mr. Dugger's suggestion re briefing papers (but perhaps re factor?)

It is up to Mr Harding whether he wants someone to back up; we don't know until his return on 23 January but we should note the requirement.

2. On briefing papers, I suggest the 2nd paper / 3rd paper / our papers prepared for 16 Jan brainstorm; incl. "posts" input to Bradley's visit recons / GI Committee note / Shackleton. Mr Davies should put together with covering draft minutes from his team."
STATEMENT ON THE DEFENCE ESTIMATES: 1980

1. I attach relevant extracts from the 1980 Defence White Paper which will be circulated to OD for discussion on 22 January.

2. I should be grateful for any comments you may have by noon Thursday 17 January. These should if possible be confined to any matters of major significance. We would not wish to burden MOD with minor drafting comments.

D W Fall
Defence Department

16 January 1980
Guatemala recognised the existing border. The main elements of the Belize garrison are five infantry companies, Harrier, Puma and Gazelle aircraft and an RAF Regiment Rapier detachment to defend the airfield. There are also armoured reconnaissance, artillery, air defence, engineer and communications units. A Royal Navy warship, supported by a Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessel, is deployed to the Caribbean and Western Atlantic as the Belize guardship. It can take up station in Belizean waters at short notice.

The Falkland Islands

418. The Falkland Islands, which are a dependent territory, are claimed by Argentina. A solution to this dispute acceptable to the inhabitants of the Islands has yet to be found. A detachment of Royal Marines is permanently stationed there. The ice patrol ship, HMS Endurance, supports the garrison and other Royal Navy vessels visit the Islands from time to time.

Hong Kong

419. Units of all three Services are stationed in Hong Kong. The garrison demonstrates Britain's commitment to preserve the colony's territorial integrity and security. The resident forces consist of:

- four infantry battalions (three of them Gurkha units);
- a Gurkha engineer field squadron;

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CONFIDENTIAL
25TH COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATION (CFA) CONFERENCE, WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND 1979

1. I enclose for your information a copy of my report on the recent CPA Annual Conference. Also attached is a copy of the Summary Report of the Conference issued by the CPA.

2. I should like to use this opportunity to thank those departments that supplied briefs. These were in general much appreciated by the Delegation.

R A R Barltrop
Commonwealth Co-ordination Department

15 January 1980
25TH COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE, NEW ZEALAND, NOVEMBER 1979

1. The 25th Annual Conference of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association took place in Wellington, New Zealand, from 26 November to 1 December 1979. It was preceded by a series of tours arranged, as is customary, to enable delegates to see something of their host country.

Attendance

2. The UK delegation was originally to have been led by the Lord Privy Seal; but the prolongation of the Lancaster House conference on Rhodesia prevented this, and his place was taken by Mr Peter Blaker, Minister of State, FCO. A list of the UK delegation is attached at Annex A. Mr Neil Marten, Minister of State, FCO, and Minister for Overseas Development, was also present in Wellington for the conference, in his capacity as Hon Treasurer of the Association.

3. There were also, as is usual, delegates from the parliaments of Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of Man; while, from the dependent territories, there were representatives from Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Montserrat and the Turks and Caicos Islands. Because of the elections, Belize was not represented.

4. The great majority of Commonwealth national parliaments were represented. As with Belize, however, the timing of elections prevented Kenyan attendance; while domestic/political tension was presumably responsible for Guyana and Mauritius being absent. Cyprus, newly-joined, made its CPA debut (and, as was to be expected, made full use of this additional platform). With parliamentary government re-established in Bangladesh and Ghana, their applications to join/rejoin were promptly approved (although they could not participate on this occasion); and the Executive Committee was given delegated authority to accept an application from Nigeria as and when received. The conference was attended by a total of 163 delegates and observers. Nineteen delegations were led by ministers.

5. The Commonwealth Secretary-General normally puts in an appearance at the annual conference, at the invitation of the CPA, and delivers an address. On this occasion, however, Mr Ramphal felt it was more important for him to be on hand in London, the Lancaster House talks being at a critical stage.

The Debates

6. The conference followed the customary pattern. The formal opening on the first morning was addressed by the Governor-General, Sir Keith Holyoake, and the Prime Minister, Mr Muldoon. The former's contribution, reminiscing on his own long career in politics, was as entertaining as it was informal, and prompted a standing ovation at the end. Both here and at his own reception at Government House later in the day, he showed his pleasure at
agreeing to discuss further devolution of powers only on the condition that the islands were prepared to proceed to independence within 12 months. Most speakers reflected their particular national concerns, taking security in the broadest sense and including economic well-being. The Cypriot leader, for his part, appealed for "brotherly help" within the Commonwealth and for assistance to "the aggressors" with a view to ending the spiral of war and peace. One of the UK delegates, Mr Shaw (Coke's) spoke of the need for Britain to continue giving assistance in training and equipment, especially, the smaller members of the Commonwealth; the latter should at the same time seek broader support through regional cooperation, eg in relation to their territorial seas.

11. On the Wednesday morning, 20 November the conference reached the one agenda item in which we had already recognized could be difficult for us - depending on the progress (or otherwise) in the Lancaster House conference on Rhodesia. The subject was "Africa South of the Sahara", and the main focus was inevitably Southern Africa, particularly Rhodesia. But two factors undoubtedly ran in our favour: there was evidently a widespread, if unspoken, recognition of the delicacy of the negotiations and the importance of not "rocking the boat", and coupled with this was the fact that the great majority of delegates were not well informed about the state of play in the negotiations. They were therefore ready to listen with attention to Mr Blaker's careful account of the position and (generally) to respond by expressing the hope that the talks would soon reach a successful conclusion. Delegates from some of the smaller states, such as Zambia, the then Foreign Minister, who opened the debate, adopted a more low-key approach although he did not allow this to inhibit him from criticizing South Africa and the British handling of the Rhodesian conference. Only a Zambian woman delegate built any head of steam on the subject. The Zimbabwean maintained a helpful silence (though one of them had delivered a strong protest against the west's involvement in the Security of Small Countries). With no more than 12 delegates having taken the microphone, the debate ran out of speakers in a mere 1 hour - which is probably without precedent in CPA annual conferences since the Rhodesian WH. It was all very unsatisfactory.

12. With the end of the debate on "Africa South of the Sahara", there remained little of direct interest on the agenda so far as international affairs were concerned. For the Wednesday afternoon and Thursday morning, the conference convened into a series of panel sessions on various topics (see Annex B), with these running concurrently on each occasion. Several members of the UK delegation played an active part in these, with Mr Abse chairing the panel on "Terrorism" and Mr Knight and Mr Baker being members of the panels on "The Year of the Child" and "Population Growth & Economic Assistance to Developing Countries" respectively. The session was held with and without the participation of the CPA Headquarters view in that overall this year's panel discussions were less successful than usual.

- 2 -
13. The remaining plenary sessions were on parliamentary subjects: Parliament, the Executive and the Civil Service and 'Freedom of the Individual, Human Rights and the Authority of Government in a Parliamentary Democracy'. The lead speaker for the latter was Dr Dickson Mabon, deputy leader of the UK delegation. He chose to include in his speech a reference to Gambia's proposal for a Commonwealth Human Rights Commission, suggesting that delegates might take advantage of the debate to comment on it. He added that whether such a commission would be the proper way to proceed or whether it might be better to have regional charters (as in Europe) was a matter for debate. Several of the subsequent speakers picked up the point. The Jamaican Minister of Justice, Senator Rattray, said he personally would welcome the establishment of a Commonwealth Human Rights Commission. Support for the idea was also voiced by Trinidad's Leader of the Opposition (Mr Faday), an Australian Opposition MP and by implication a Barbados delegate. The absence of comment from other delegates probably reflected the fact that the delegations at CPA conferences are parliamentary rather than governmental; and it is likely that many delegates were quite unaware of Gambia's proposal.

14. Dr Mabon also referred to the enforced abandonment by the Canadian Government of their proposal at the UN for the establishment of an Under-Secretary with special responsibility in the human rights field. His invitation to fellow delegates to comment on this was not picked up - which in the case of the Indian speakers was not perhaps surprising, since he mentioned India's role in undermining the proposal.

15. Although delegates from the sub-continent tended to be audacious or unintelligible, none of them appeared to comment on the British Government's new immigration proposals; and the only criticism actually voiced (which was explicit rather than implicit) was from an Australian opposition member, alluding to the restriction on women bringing non-British fiancées or husbands into the UK.


General

17. For better and for worse, this was a dull conference. From our point of view, South Rhodesia, it was good that it was so. In other respects, it was a pity that it was not a little livelier. I believe that several factors contributed to its rather prosaic character. Above all, there was the extraordinary shape of the hall. The New Zealanders had, curiously, decided to hold the conference proper in their new Parliamentary annexe, delegates found themselves sitting in an area where some were wholly invisible to others. One consequence of this was that all delegates spoke from a central microphone; and this in turn encouraged an existing tendency to speak from prepared texts - in fact something like 75% of delegates did so. Thus the ebb and flow of real debate was almost wholly absent, and we were treated to one prepared speech after another - something that from parliamentarians was not a little surprising.

18. It is difficult for an observer to assess the value of these annual parliametary gatherings; but it probably lies less in the quality of the actual debates than in the personal contact that they provide between members of parliaments through the length and breadth of the Commonwealth and the wider understanding of one another's problems that this engenders - in other words, as so often with the Commonwealth, it is the intangible benefits that matter.

19. It clearly remains right that the UK delegation should be led by a minister. It was unfortunate that this year, because of the late change in the leadership and a flight delay, Mr Blaker missed both the opening day of the conference and the final day. On the other hand, he was able to devote much of the Friday (when the CPA were dealing with domestic business) to a series of useful bilateral calls - on the Prime Minister, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Leader of the Opposition - and, earlier in the week, gave a luncheon address to the Wellington Press Club. On the Thursday he was able to make some visits out of Wellington.

20. Moving at the end of the conference what was very much more than a formal vote of thanks, Sir Arnott Cato, President of the Barbados Senate, paid tribute to our New Zealand hosts, commenting particularly on the warmth with which the delegations had been received by New Zealanders, official and private, both in Wellington and in the admirably-organised tours preceding the conference. His sentiments would have been strongly endorsed by everyone. The friendships made, moreover, had been reflected in the sorrow which delegates had shared with all New Zealanders at the tragedy of the DC-10 crash in Antarctica which had taken place at the middle of the conference and had cast a shadow over everything.

21. The 1980 conference is to be hosted (in late September/early October) by Zambia - who, after the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, seem glutons for punishment. Commenting on this in the opening session, the Zambian Deputy Speaker remarked that Zambia would hope to make CPA delegates' stay there "exciting and enjoyable". We should perhaps hope that the latter description will be more appropriate than the former.

R A R BARLOW

Commonwealth Co-ordination Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

December 1979
UK DELEGATION

Leader: Mr Peter Blaker, MP
Minister of State, FCO

Deputy Leader: Rt Hon Dr J Dickson Mabon, MP
(Labour)

Members: Mr Leo Abse, MP
(Labour)

Mr Kenneth Baker, MP
(Conservative)

Mr Ron W Brown, JP, MP
(Labour)

Lord Chelwood, MC, DL
(Conservative)

Mr Paul Dean, MP
(Conservative)

Mrs Jill Knight, MBE, MP
(Conservative)

Mr Laurie Pavitt, MP
(Labour)

Mr Michael Shaw, MP
(Conservative)

Secretary: Mr Peter Cobb
Secretary, UK Branch, CPA

FCO Adviser to Leader: Mr R A R Bartrop
Head of Commonwealth Co-ordination Department
FCO

Private Secretary to Leader: Mr C A Munro
25TH COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE
NEW ZEALAND 1973

Conference Agenda

Monday 26 November
a.m. Formal Opening
p.m. 1st Plenary - The Energy Crisis

Tuesday 27 November
a.m. 2nd Plenary - The Refugee Problem
p.m. 3rd Plenary - The Security of the Smaller Countries of the Commonwealth

Wednesday 28 November
a.m. 4th Plenary - Africa South of the Sahara
p.m. Panel A - The Year of the Child
     Panel B - Pollution and Protection of the Environment
     Panel C - The Drug Traffic

Thursday 29 November
a.m. Panel D - Population Growth and Economic Assistance to Developing Countries
     Panel E - International Terrorism
     Panel F - The MP - His Functions and Responsibilities
p.m. Free

Friday 30 November
a.m. General Assembly
p.m. General Assembly

Saturday 1 December
a.m. 5th Plenary - Parliament, the Executive and the Civil Service
p.m. 6th Plenary - Freedom of the Individual, Human Rights and the Authority of Government in a Parliamentary Democracy
     Closure of the Conference
SUMMARY REPORT OF THE

25TH
COMMONWEALTH
PARLIAMENTARY
CONFERENCE

NEW ZEALAND
26 NOVEMBER – 1 DECEMBER, 1979

ISSUED BY THE HEADQUARTERS SECRETARIAT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATION
PALACE OF WESTMINSTER, 7 OLD PALACE YARD, LONDON S. W. 1
SUMMARY REPORT OF
CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS

The following is a summary report of the discussions in the Plenary and Panel Sessions of the Conference. The summary notes the many views expressed and the consensus where this clearly emerged. It was prepared by the parliamentary reporting staff of the New Zealand House of Representatives.

1ST PLENARY SESSION

THE ENERGY CRISIS

Shri Ram Nivas Mirdha, MP, Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, India, began the debate by referring to the likelihood of further increases in the price of oil, brought about by the determination of the OPEC countries to use their near monopoly for political ends.

Although India supported the right of the OPEC countries to obtain just and remunerative prices for their raw materials, and to dispose of their national wealth as they saw fit, those countries had to be made aware that their present policies might have a harmful effect on the future prosperity of developing countries.

The per capita consumption of energy in the developing countries was negligible when compared with that of the industrialised countries, which were attempting to pre-empt the bulk of the world’s natural resources in order to maintain their present patterns of consumption.

The less developed countries had suffered heavily since 1973 through having to compete with more affluent countries in securing minimum requirements of petroleum products from the world market. Oil imports now accounted for half of India’s total import bill; and the less developed countries were having to pay higher prices, not only for oil, but also for imports of plant, machinery, and fertiliser, etc.

The energy crisis was without doubt a global one that called for urgent measures and cooperation between the countries of the world. Demand and waste should be controlled, and indigenous and alternative sources of energy developed. In view of their consumption, the advanced countries had a special responsibility for energy conservation.

Some steps had been taken, but much more needed to be done. Various countries, including New Zealand, were developing alternative sources of energy, and India itself was taking measures to control and review oil consumption.

TWENTY-FIFTH
COMMONWEALTH
PARLIAMENTARY
CONFERENCE

The Twenty-fifth Conference of the CPA met in New Zealand Parliament Buildings from 26 November to 1st December, 1979, when the New Zealand Branch of the Association was host.

The Speaker of the New Zealand House of Representatives, Hon. J. R. Harrison, ED, MP, President of the Association, was Chairman of the Conference, which was attended by 163 Delegates and Observers and 32 Secretaries to Delegations.

The preparation for press of the Verbatim Report of the Conference is in hand and will be distributed to Delegations and Branches as soon as it has been published.
Most of booklet \textit{not} filmed
[editorial note, 16 December 2012]
3RD PLENARY SESSION

THE SECURITY OF THE SMALLER COUNTRIES
OF THE COMMONWEALTH

Hon. P. I. Wilkinson, MP, New Zealand, began the debate by observing that while the smaller States enjoyed certain advantages such as security, equal voting rights in international forums, and access to international aid organisations, these advantages were balanced by the ultimate dependence of smaller States on the decisions of the larger powers, and the vulnerability of smaller States to protectionism, international inflation, and the vagaries of the international money market.

Although, despite these disadvantages, some smaller States had been able to raise their aspirations, the fact remained that the existing trade structure had not been evolved with the security of smaller States in mind. To be small in today's world was to be inherently insecure.

The security of smaller States should be seen not only in strategic terms, but also in political, social, and economic terms. The countries of the South Pacific provided classic examples of micro-State insecurity, inasmuch as their isolation imposed critical problems of communication, as well as social and psychological barriers to economic development.

New Zealand had sought to assist in a strategy for the greater economic security of the South Pacific countries by establishing trade links and encouraging exports and development. In addition, the evolution of the economic zone concept associated with the Law of the Sea was of profound economic importance to the region. However, it was important that consideration should be given to the susceptibility of Pacific Island countries to the internal dislocation attendant upon the over-hasty conversion to a market economy, and the introduction of foreign technology and ideas.

The physical security of the South Pacific countries should also be kept in mind, particularly in view of the need to police the economic zones, and the enormous cost of modern defence.

A delegate from Zambia said that although the smaller countries could develop only in a climate of complete security and freedom, such a climate did not exist because of the failure of the super powers to restrain military expansion and find solutions to the various conflicts throughout the world. In addition, the larger nations tended to destabilise the smaller nations by promoting internal unrest, financing hostile propaganda campaigns, encouraging multinational companies, and multiplying markets. The future of the smaller Commonwealth States rested on the co-operation of the Commonwealth as a whole.

The delegate from the Falkland Islands spoke of the threat posed by Argentina, and of the desire of the Falkland Islands to remain a British colony. It was hoped that the right of self-determination for the Falkland Islands would be preserved, and that a harmonious relationship with Argentina could be evolved.

The delegate from Haryana noted the pivotal role that the Commonwealth could play in achieving peace and prosperity for future generations. India, although a republic, had chosen to remain within the Commonwealth while adopting a policy of non-alignment. He praised the considerable co-operation within the Commonwealth on matters of defence.

The delegate from Gibraltar asked why his country should not enjoy the same privileges enjoyed by other Commonwealth countries. Most Commonwealth countries faced no real threat to their security, but for years Gibraltar had had to suffer restrictions imposed on it by its near neighbour, Spain. He appealed to the Commonwealth for support.

Canada was a huge country poised between Soviet Russia and the United States, said a Canadian delegate, yet its 23,000,000 people could not protect it if ever those super powers used their huge atomic arsenals. He thought the security of the smaller countries of the Commonwealth and their future were tied entirely to economic stability. Democratic systems had to be kept in good condition; they had to live by the rule of law, but most important, in his opinion, was the need for a strong economic base.

The Turks and Caicos Islands' security problems were financial and constitutional, said one of their delegates. They had just balanced their budget for the first time in a century, after 12 years' work on tourism. The islands were a pilots' paradise; 42 percent of tourists
Barbados had extended its territorial waters from 3 to 12 miles, said a delegate from that country, and subscribed to the view that the sea was jointly owned by the peoples of the world and its resources should be shared fairly. Problems arising had to be solved by compromise at the international level. Another aspect of the security was that all Caribbean and the Caribbean had been described as one of the world's worst trouble spots. Its people did not want any great power to dominate or interfere, nor did they want a cool, much less a hot, war. All they wanted was to pursue their own destiny in peace.

Commonwealth countries were no longer completely as one, but, through being equal and independent, were less strong as individuals and only strong if working together, said a United Kingdom delegate. The need to work together had never been greater. The British Kingdom could not defend itself alone but was putting its main strength into NATO as well as helping friends in other parts of the world as much as possible. It had to honour its direct and indirect defence obligations as well as contribute to United Nations peacekeeping forces. He disagreed with the suggestion that the United Kingdom should withdraw from the European Economic Community; the best hope for peace and economic strength in Europe lay in developing this bond.

The unity of the inhabitants of a country was the best safeguard against aggression, said a delegate from Trinidad and Tobago. Many Caribbean governments endangered their internal security by failing to unite their own citizens. Half the people of Trinidad and Tobago were of African descent and the other half of Indian descent. Their Government exploited this difference for its own political ends. It was encouraged in doing so by the irrelevant Westminster political system, inherited from the United Kingdom. In his opinion such a system was totally unsuited to a highly pluralistic society such as existed in Trinidad and Tobago. He noted that no other Caribbean country had condemned this racism in Trinidad and Tobago or this racism in Guyana. It seemed to him that racism was only objectionable when it was white racism against black; when it was black racism against others, people ignored it.

The security of a small or a large nation depended largely on its constitutional makeup, a Western Samoa delegate said. In his part of the South Pacific there had never been a military coup or a gun fired in anger. Differences would be settled, not by using firearms, but at a round-table conference.

The leader of the Cyprus delegation said that the sense of security enjoyed by any small Commonwealth country in colonial times had vanished. Cyprus had a troubled history because it was strategically located. The bitterness and disillusionment of its people caused by the Turkish invasion and conquest did not originate from an anti-British feeling, but he appealed for help to re-establish Cyprus as a truly independent country. The people of Cyprus, who had fought beside Great Britain in two world wars, had a special right to ask for this help.

Vietnamese imperialism, with the impetus of strong assistance from the Soviet Union, was the threat to the security of Commonwealth States and others in South-east Asia, said a Singapore delegate. Commonwealth and other States should take concrete action to stop the Vietnamese from further pursuit of imperialism. Their policies should demand that Vietnamese troops withdraw from Kampuchea.

A plea for support for Gibraltar in enabling it to survive as a country in the free world was made by a Gibraltar delegate. Its security was in jeopardy because of continuous attempts by Spain to swallow it. The people of Gibraltar wanted to remain what they were. It was difficult to understand why the new Spanish Administration should want to perpetuate the present shameful position of separating peoples and families. If Spain claimed to be a Western democracy it had to act and behave as one.

In supporting the plea of the delegate from Gibraltar, a delegate from The Gambia said no country should be denied its freedom and inalienable rights. Smaller Commonwealth territories should not be abandoned, and he felt that the United Kingdom had greater responsibility for their security, although its association with Europe was also vital for them. He asked what security arrangements were being contemplated by the Commonwealth, not
Mr Bright  
South America Department  

FALKLAND ISLANDS: POLITICAL BRIEF  

1. I am in general agreement with your draft brief on the Falkland Islands which I assume will replace the existing brief in its entirety. I would propose, however, some slight restructuring of the first three paragraphs of the brief. In the first place, I think paragraph 1 and paragraph 3 of your brief should go together since they both deal with countering explicit Argentine claims to sovereignty. The question of nomenclature is a more subtle claim and ought perhaps to be dealt with separately in the brief. I also think it would be useful if some examples could be given of the way in which Argentine claims to sovereignty commonly arise. In my experience these usually take the form of an Argentine objection to the UK applying the provisions of a particular treaty to the Falkland Islands or a claim by Argentina to apply the provisions of the treaty herself to the Falkland Islands. Finally, for the benefit of those who may not know exactly what comprises the Falkland Island Dependencies, I would propose that South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands appear in parenthesis.  

2. I therefore would suggest the following re-draft for paragraph 1:  

"Problems might arise because of Argentine's claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies (South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands). The British Government have stated consistently that they have no doubt of their sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies. Argentina constantly seeks to strengthen its claim to sovereignty. For example, Argentina may object to the application by the UK of a particular treaty to the Falkland Islands or claim the right to apply the treaty herself to the Falkland Islands".  

Paragraph 3 of your draft would then become paragraph 2, but with the word "declaration" replacing "reservation" in the second and third lines.  

3. With regard to the question of nomenclature, (your paragraph 2), I should be grateful if you could check that this is up to date and accurate. I had the impression that the UK does not object to the words "Islas Malvinas" appearing in documents in the Spanish language and that we only object to these words appearing in documents in English whether as original documents or documents translated from Spanish. (I do not know what the position is with regard to documents in French, Russian, Chinese or Arabic). If what I have said is accurate, perhaps this should be mentioned in the brief. In any event, I would suggest the opening sentence of this paragraph (which now becomes paragraph 3) read as follows:  

"Problems may also arise over nomenclature. In the UN, Argentina has proposed etc ... "  

/4/  

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4. Finally, I note that the title of the brief refers to Antarctica, but that the existing political brief contains no brief on Antarctica. I assume that a brief on Antarctica will be drafted, but I cannot see what relevance this has to the Falkland Islands except that Argentina’s statement claiming sovereignty over the Falkland Islands is frequently combined with a statement on Antarctica.

3 January 1980
K J Chamberlain
Legal Counselor

Mr. R. French
UN Department (K 144)

POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR USE AT INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS

1. As requested in your minute of 5 January, I attach revised, up-dated sections on:
   (1) Chile
   (2) The Falkland Islands.

2. I also attach a new contribution on Antarctica, as suggested in paragraph 3 of your minute.

G A Duggan
South America Dept

14 January 1980
233 4970 K 276(b)

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

CODE 23-73
FAKILANDS ISLANDS (See also Antarctica)

1. Argentina claims sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies (South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands). The British Government reject this claim and have stated consistently that they are in no doubt of their sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies. Argentina loses few opportunities at international fora to reassert and thereby seek to strengthen its claim to sovereignty.

2. In the event of an Argentine declaration challenging British sovereignty, the UK delegate should issue a declaration on the following lines: (The exact wording should be cleared with South America Department, FCO, (233 4077).

"With reference to the declaration by the Republic of Argentina, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have no doubt as to United Kingdom sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and the Falkland Islands Dependencies. The United Kingdom therefore do not accept the declaration of the Argentine Republic claiming to contest United Kingdom sovereignty over the above mentioned territories".

3. Problems may also arise over nomenclature: eg, in the United Nations, Argentina has proposed successfully that the words "Islas Malvinas" should appear on official documents printed in English where the words "Falkland Islands" are mentioned. The UK representative should resist any attempt to secure the adoption of the words "Islas Malvinas" in place of the words "Falkland Islands" in an English text or any attempt to secure the addition of the words "Islas Malvinas" after the name of the Falkland Islands. The nomenclature to be used in any discussion of the Falkland Islands is as described.

4. If the Argentines interpret UNGA Resolutions on the Falklands as condemning the "illegality" of the British position there, the UK delegate should issue a counter-statement on the following lines (exact wording to be cleared with South America Department FCO):

"The United Kingdom does not accept the assertion by
/Argentina

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Argentina that the "illegality of the occupation of the Falkland, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands by the United Kingdom has been recognised by the United Nations Organisation." UN Resolutions have simply called for the settlement of the dispute by negotiation between the two Governments.

Background (not for use)

5. Without political and economic co-operation with Argentina, the Falkland Islands face a bleak future. Recognising this, we have developed a dialogue to seek a new framework. Under the last Government, 4 rounds of talks were held. But Argentina's refusal to negotiate on any basis other than a complete transfer of sovereignty has meant that no effective progress has been possible. Successive British Governments have pledged that no solution will be agreed that does not conform with the Islanders' wishes. The Islanders want to retain their British way of life. They do not want independence.

6. The last UN General Assembly Resolution on the Falklands in 1976 was pro-Argentine and was passed by 102 votes to 1 (the UK) with 36 abstentions (including other EEC countries). We can expect little support at international meetings from other countries.
ANTARCTICA

1. Challenges to UK sovereignty in the British Antarctic Territory may arise from four main sources:
   A Challenge from states party to the Antarctic Treaty
      (i) Argentina and Chile
   The claims of these two countries constitute the most direct challenge to British sovereignty and are the ones likely to occur most frequently in international fora. The claims overlap both each other and the British Antarctic Territory, and were pursued vigorously until the conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959. Article IV of the Treaty (text attached) freezes national claims in the area south of 60° South. In spite of this, Argentina in particular, misses few opportunities to state her claim.
      (ii) The "non-claimant" Parties to the Antarctic Treaty
   Of the 13 Antarctic Treaty Consultative parties, 7 claim sovereignty over territory in Antarctica (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the UK) but 5 have specifically denied that any valid national claims can be made to the area (Belgium, Japan, Poland, USA and USSR). One, the Republic of South Africa, is in a special position: South Africa has not made a territorial claim in the Antarctic and has not repudiated the Union's recognition of British, French, Norwegian, Australian and New Zealand claims. The 5 so-called 'non-claimant' states are unlikely to challenge British sovereignty in the British Antarctic Territory as vigorously as are Argentina and Chile; but while some of the non-claimant states are countries usually regarded as friendly, they cannot, in the Antarctic context, be relied upon to support the British position, and will indeed be bound to challenge it in circumstances where failure to do so could be taken as amounting to recognition of our claim.
   B Challenge from states not party to the Antarctic Treaty
      (iii) Challenge to UK sovereignty in the British Antarctic Territory
   UK sovereignty in the British Antarctic Territory may also be disputed or wilfully ignored by other countries not parties to the Antarctic Treaty on lines similar to (ii) above.
      /(iv)
(iv) The "Common Heritage" challenge to territorial claims in Antarctica

Representatives of some group of 77 countries may advance the view that Antarctica is part of the "common heritage of mankind" (like the deep sea bed, the Moon etc). They deny the validity of all national claims to the area and are suspicious of the Antarctic Treaty 'club's' special interest in the area. This group is divided between those who wish to exploit the area for the benefit of 'all mankind' (eg who would wish the authority of the proposed International Seabed Authority to extend to the shoreline of Antarctica) and those who wish the area to remain a huge nature reserve.

2. The difficulties presented by these challenges to British sovereignty require different responses: the Annex sets out standard language which may be used to counter them but the Polar Regions Section of South America Department in the FCO should be consulted wherever possible (telephone 233 3054 or 233 3481).

3. Challenges to UK sovereignty over the British Antarctic Territory from representatives of bodies other than states (eg international organisations) should be reported to Polar Regions Section without delay.
ANNEX

1. Argentine/Chilean statements contesting the sovereignty of HMG over the British Antarctic Territory
   (If the Argentine/Chilean delegation do not mention Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty).
   "With reference to the Statement of the Argentine/Chilean Delegation, I am bound to state that HMG have no doubts as to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom over the British Antarctic Territory and I wish to bring to the attention of the Argentine/Chilean Delegation Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty to which both the Argentine/Chilean Governments and HMG are parties. Article IV freezes claims to Antarctic territory south of 60 degrees South Latitude. If the statement of the Argentine/Chilean Delegation is recorded in the minute I request that my present statement shall also be so recorded".
   (If the Argentine/Chilean Delegation mention Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty).
   As above, but after "Territory" substitute: 'and I note the reference to Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. If the statement etc..."

2. Challenges to UK sovereignty over the British Antarctic Territory by 'non-claimant' parties to the Antarctic Treaty
   As above, (inserting appropriate delegation name) but after 'parties' substitute: 'Article IV ensures inter alia that no acts or activities taking place while the Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for denying claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. If the statement etc..."

3. Challenges to UK sovereignty over the British Antarctic Territory by states not party to the Antarctic Treaty
   "As representative of the United Kingdom I do not accept the statement of the ..... delegate insofar as it disputes/ignores the sovereignty of the United Kingdom over the British Antarctic Territory. HMG have no doubt as to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom over the British Antarctic Territory and I wish formally to reserve its rights in this matter. If the statement etc..."

4. The challenge of the "common heritage" position
   As in 3 above but after the second reference to the British Antarctic Territory insert "HMG are alive to the interests
of all mankind in the Antarctic, as recognised by the Antarctic Treaty, and they remain convinced that the best method of ensuring the peaceful, orderly and conscientious development of the area is through adherence to the principles and methods of the Antarctic Treaty system. If the statement etc ...".
CONFIDENTIAL

FM PORT STANLEY 1020052 JAN 80
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 008 OF 10 JANUARY
INFO BUENOS AIRES

FOR SAMD

YOUR TELNO 4: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. RECEIPT OF THIS TELEGRAM WAS DELAYED YESTERDAY BY COMMUNICATIONS FAULTS. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT WARRENTS A LONGER REPLY THAN I CAN GET INTO A BRIEF TELEGRAM OR HAVE TIME TO WRITE UP IN A LETTER FOR TOMORROW'S BAG. DESPATCH OF THIS BAG IS ANYWAY IN DOUBT BECAUSE OF A DIFFICULTY IN SECURING AIRLINE BOOKINGS FOR THE COURIERS.

2. I PROPOSE TO SEND GROWCOTT TO BUENOS AIRES NEXT WEDNESDAY 10 JANUARY TO SEND A CONSIDERED REPLY BY THE EMBASSY'S TELELETTER SERVICE. A LETTER REPLY TO DUGGAN'S TELELETTER OF 27 NOVEMBER IS ALSO IN THE BAG: IF NECESSARY, GROWCOTT WILL TRANSMIT THIS FROM BA BY TELELETTER. I HOPE THIS WILL FIT IN WITH YOUR SUBMISSION TIMETABLE. IF NOT I WILL SUMMARISE REPLIES FOR TRANSMISSION BY TELEGRAPH.

PARKER

FILE:
PARKER

CONFIDENTIAL

Reply drafted: 7/11/80
1. I attach a letter I have just received from Dr Maureen Williams, enclosing a copy of an article on the Falkland Islands by Mr Gooding. I do not know Dr Williams personally, but she is a fairly eminent international lawyer and a member of the International Law Association.

2. Although Dr Williams' letter calls for no reply, I think it might be courteous to send a brief acknowledgement, especially as Mr Gooding's article is sympathetic to the UK's position. If you agree, I would propose writing to Dr Williams on the following lines.

"Thank you for your letter of 17 December 1979 enclosing a copy of an article by Mr Gooding on the Falkland Islands.

I have read Mr Gooding's article with interest and have passed it on to South America Department in the FCO for their information".

9 January 1980

K J Chamberlain
Legal Counsellor

Mr Chamberlain

I agree entirely. As far as I have been able to discover in a quick search, we have not seen this article before and it does, I think, as you say, some sympathy for our position (if not always for the right reason). If you do not want to keep the papers, please return them, with a copy of your letter, to me.

[Signature]
To the Legal Department of the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Downing Street,
London SW1

Dear Sirs,

As an Anglo-Argentine and graduate of University College London (LL.M.), I have pleasure in sending you an article written in the Buenos Aires Herald by Mr. Roy H. Gooding on the "Islands" (Falkland-Malvinas) two years ago.

The author, who is a friend of mine—and who last week confirmed his interesting approach to the matter—has closely studied the historical background of this issue.

As a matter of interest may I add that Mr. Gooding was born in Argentina—his parents were Britishers on contract here—and at a very early age returned to the U.K. where he completed his Junior School education. His senior studies were concluded at Belgrano Day School, Buenos Aires, and he settled in Argentina ever since. He was born in 1927.

I trust these views may be of interest to you.

Prof. Dr. Maureen Williams
Member of the Executive Council of the International Law Association and of the Air and Space Law Committees—Associate of the Royal Aeronautical Society.
Dear Professor Williams,

Thank you for your letter of 17 December 1979 enclosing a copy of an article by Mr. Gooding on the Falkland Islands.

I have read Mr. Gooding's article with interest and have passed it on to the South America Department in the FCO for their information.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

K.J. Chamberlain
Legal Counselor
SELECT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. Your minute of 31 December.

2. The projected timing of an oral evidence session on Belize could be awkward since by early February we may have started, or be about to start, a fresh round of negotiations with Guatemala to try to resolve the matter of their claim to the territory. Mr George Price, Premier of Belize, was re-elected in November for a further five years, and is about to consider with us how to proceed. Matters are now at a formative stage— it may be possible later this month to provide a clearer programme of action.

3. Even so, I would hope that the session can be indefinitely put off. It is at present by no means easy to forecast when or whether such a session might be convenient. At almost any time it would be likely to focus unhelpful attention in Belize and Guatemala. I note that Mr Rose's letter says, in the context of the general paper, that "delicate matters" could be considered in private session. I hope that this possibility might extend to a session on Belize, if we have to agree to one at an awkward time.

7 January 1980

cc: Lord N Gordon Lennox Mr Thompson

A J Payne
Mexico and Caribbean Dept
Mr Figg

cc Lord N Gordon Lennox
Mr Thompson, PCCU

SELECT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. In your minute of 31 December you asked about problems of timing on the subjects on which the Select Committee have expressed interest.

2. I certainly hope that it will be possible to dissuade the Select Committee from tackling the Falkland Islands dispute at this stage. The present position is that we are looking for 00 agreement in January (but not before 16 January) to a renewal of negotiations with the Argentines on the Falklands issue. Such negotiations would be delicate and probably lengthy: and it would be most inopportune to encourage parliamentary interest through having the issue aired in the Select Committee. In statements on the record on our policy towards the Falklands in recent months, we have only said that the Government intends to continue exchanges with the Argentines in a constructive spirit but that no dates have been set. If the Select Committee are persistent on the Falklands you may wish to consider whether Mr Ridley might have an informal word with the Committee chairman.

P R Fearn
South America Dept.

4 January 1980
Mr Clift, HK&GD

Policy Towards the Dependent Territories

Over the Christmas holiday Lord Carrington was able to consider the attached papers on the Government's policy towards the dependent territories, which were submitted by your predecessor. Lord Carrington has approved the memorandum on this subject, to be used as a basis for guidance to Officials Administering Governments. He did not see a need to convene a meeting within the FCO to discuss the memorandum, or circulate it to his OD colleagues for their agreement.

RMJ Lyne

4 January 1980

ccs:-

PS/LPS
PS/Mr Ridley
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/Mr Blaker
PS/PUS
WIAD
SAD
SAPR
SPD
EAD

[Signatures]

Mr Davies

[Initials]
Mr. A. Boniface
Western European Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON SW1

Dear Tony,

1. You may be interested to hear of an example of the Finnish desire for neutrality being taken to seemingly ridiculous lengths.

2. On 14 December, the Head of Purchased Programmes of MAINOS-TV (the commercial company), Mr. Jaakko Tervasmäki, telephoned to inform us that the Argentine Embassy had made representations to them in respect of a half-hour television programme entitled "THE FALKLAND ISLANDS - SUMMER IN THE MIDDLE OF WINTER", principally a nature programme and due to be screened on 19 December 1979. The local TV guide referred to the Islands as a "place in which the seasons are a mirror-image of our own - Christmas is in the middle of summer. A place in which Man and Nature live just as they do in Scotland. The Falkland Islands are a part of a British Island-group - in the Southern Hemisphere, 13,000 kilometres away".

3. The Argentine Embassy had apparently reiterated their claim to the sovereignty of the islands, pointing out that the "correct" name for the islands was not the Falkland Islands, etc. The film, otherwise innocuous, apparently contained a passing reference to the question of sovereignty and had a shot of a wall on which had been painted a pro-British slogan. Mr. Tervasmäki said that he understood the islands were British but sought confirmation of this position. I subsequently informed him accordingly and sent him a copy of the COI Fact Sheet THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ref. FS13/78) for his information.

4. On the day of the scheduled evening showing of the film, MAINOS-TV again telephoned to inform us in confidence that the film was to be broadcast but with the "political" references deleted. It appears that the Argentinian Ambassador had called upon the Foreign Ministry to raise the matter. MAINOS-TV were obviously angry but clearly were unable to ignore pressure from "on high".
5. Argentinian Embassies around the world no doubt have standing instructions to draw attention to their claim to the Falkland Islands whenever the opportunity arises. The Foreign Ministry's rather silly reaction no doubt gave the Argentinians immense satisfaction.

Yours ever,

Vic

(V. C. Wallis)