FILE No ALA 020/1 (Part B 117)

TITLE: **Political Relations Between UK and Argentina** (Exchange of Ambassadors)

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**Sic.**

| FC07/3574 |

Registry Address

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PART 'B'

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SENT AT 14/1442Z HR
RECD AT 14/1442Z APH
BAFO 339/14
CO FCO
GRPS 45
RESTRICTED
FM BUENOS AIRES 14/13142 NOV 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 365 OF 14 NOVEMBER 1979
FOR HEAD OF S AMD, AND NEWS DEPT.
MY TELNO 365: AMBASSADORS

1. LOCAL PRESS OF 14 NOVEMBER REPORTS THAT THE SUBJECT OF
AMBASSADORS WAS DISCUSSED YESTERDAY AT A MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT
VIDELA AND FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR. THE STORIES, CLEARLY BASED ON
OFFICIAL BRIEFING, IDENTIFY AS BRITAIN'S FUTURE REPRESENTATIVE THE
PRESENT AMBASSADOR IN LIBYA.

2. WE ARE REFUSING COMMENT UNTIL 16 NOVEMBER.

CARLESS

NNNN

SENT AT 14/14427 HR
RECD AT 14/14427 APH
OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats
REstricted

Precedence/Deskby
IMMEDIATE

27 Nov 1979

FM FCO 151700Z NOV 79.

TO IMMEDIATE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 139 OF 15 NOVEMBER 1979

ARGENTINA: EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS

1. News Department will announce at 1200Z on 16 November that agreement has been reached for the exchange of Ambassadors between Britain and Argentina. The British Ambassador will be Mr J. J. Williams CMG. The Argentine Ambassador will be Dr Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, a career diplomat.

LINES TO TAKE

2. You should not stimulate interest, but if questioned you may draw upon the following:

///

Q. Who took the initiative in the proposal to restore relations to Ambassadorial level?

A. Argentina did. It was Argentina and not Britain who recalled

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Fco/WHITEHALL

ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE

OUT

FM FCO 151700Z NOV 79.

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ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
their Ambassador in 1975, and subsequently requested the withdrawal of the British Ambassador, so it was for them to make the first move.

Q. How can the Government contemplate appointment of Ambassadors in the light of the human rights situation in Argentina?
A. Ministers have on several occasions made our views on violations of human rights very plain to the Argentine Government. Restoration of Ambassadors is not an indicator of approval of any government's policies and does not signify any change in HMG's stance vis-a-vis abuses of human rights in Argentina. Exchanges with the Argentine Government on this and on other issues will be helped not hindered by the appointment of Ambassadors. (For unattributable use: we use on a number of South American countries, Uruguay and Paraguay, very effectively to bring pressure to bear both in defence of human rights in general and in protection of individuals).

Q. What are the implications for the Falklands?
A. There are no implications. We have no doubts about our sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and Dependencies. But on a practical plane to restore relations to Ambassadorial level will improve the capacity at both ends for dialogue on a whole range of complex matters.

BACKGROUND

3. Argentina recalled her Ambassador in October 1975, and subsequently requested the withdrawal of the British Ambassador, Sir (then Mr) Derick Ashe, following the deterioration in our relations over the Falkland Islands dispute.
Britain, Argentina to exchange ambassadors

BRITAIN and Argentina are to resume diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level, Robert Lindley writes from Buenos Aires. Argentina downgraded relations in 1978 because of the dispute over the Falklands. The British envoy will be Mr. A. J. Williams, now ambassador to Libya. Argentina has named Sr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, a controversial figure who was a supporter of the Axis during the last war and who is known as an extreme nationalist, often bitterly critical of Britain.

Sam D  
Feb 

Tel. to BA  
16/11 TM 

No Dugan has seen.

Quite possibly, Argentina was sympathetic to the Axis cause (as was Spain) only declaring war on Germany a few weeks before the German surrender. With 4 million in BA or Italian columns, her pro-Axis attitude was inevitable.
ARGENTINA TIES
By Our Diplomatic Staff
Britain will re-establish full
diplomatic relations with Argen-
tina tomorrow after a three-
year break caused by the dis-
pute over the Falkland Islands.
The new ambassador will be Mr
Anthony Williams, who has
been Ambassador to Libya.

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

FOR NWS DEPT

1. LATIN AMERICA DAILY BULLETIN WHICH CIRCULATED THROUGHOUT THE
REGION (IN ENGLISH). HAS RECEIVED AGENCY REPORT FROM BUENOS
AIRES WHICH STATES THAT BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA WILL FORMALLY
REOPEN THEIR RELATIONS ON FRIDAY 16 NOVEMBER. RESUMPTION OF FULL DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS I.E. EXCHANGE OF EMBASSY

2. LATIN AMERICA DAILY BULLETIN SEND HOTEL LIST (COPIES)

3. LATIN AMERICA DAILY BULLETIN SEND HOTEL LIST (COPIES)

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

16 NOV 1979

SFO/FCO 03/14
00 FCO
GFS91
UNCLASSIFIED
FM SAO PAULO 142015? NOV
TO IMMEDIATE FCO LONDON
TELNO 95 OF 14 NOVEMBER

FOR NEWS DEPT

1. LATIN AMERICA DAILY NEWS WHICH CIRCULATES THROUGHOUT THE REGION (IN ENGLISH), HAS RECEIVED AGENCY REPORT FROM BUENOS AIRES WHICH STATES THAT BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA WILL FORMALLY ANNOUNCE ON FRIDAY 16 NOVEMBER RESUMPTION OF FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS I.E. EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS.

2. L.A. DAILY POST REQUESTS CONFIRMATION AND WOULD LIKE A QUOTE FROM US OR A QUOTE ATTRIBUTABLE TO A SENIOR FCO OFFICIAL ON WHY THIS HAS NOW HAPPENED AND WHAT OUR/YOUR VIEW OF IT IS. GRATUIT

FOR LINE SOONEST.

CHURCH

THC World Service carried a similar announcement this morning.
STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

1. Chief Clerk (to see)
2. Head of News Department (for action)

APPOINTMENT OF AMBASSADOR AT BUENOS AIRES

1. I should be grateful if you would arrange for the following announcement to be made at the 12.30 pm News Conference on Friday, 16 November:

"The Queen has been pleased to approve the appointment of Mr A J Williams CMG to be Her Majesty's Ambassador to the Argentine Republic. Mr Williams will take up his appointment at the end of January."

I attach a copy of Mr Williams' curriculum vitae.

2. Mr Carless, the Minister and Chargé d'Affaires a.i. at Buenos Aires, is due to complete his assignment in mid-January.

3. South America Department have already provided separate briefing for your use in handling possible supplementary questions.

A G Munro
Personnel Operations Department

12 November 1979

Copies to: Miss Walker POD (with copy of CV)
Miss Waugh POD
Miss Robertson POD
Mr Scullard A&S
Mr A J Hunter PSD
Miss Hankins POD
Mr Ure SAMD
Mr Harding AUSS
PS/Mr Ridley

RESTRICTED
STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

We have done so

Please check with News that the briefing sheet has been updated. They have been told to keep

file
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires of the Argentine Republic and has the honour to inform him that, the agrément of the Argentine Government having been received, Her Majesty The Queen has been pleased to approve the appointment of Mr A J Williams CMG to be Her Majesty's Ambassador to the Argentine Republic. Mr Williams will take up his appointment at the end of January.

An official announcement of the appointment will be made in London at 12.30 hours on Friday 16 November, until when it is requested that the matter be kept confidential.

Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs avails himself of the opportunity to renew to the Chargé d'Affaires of the Argentine Republic the assurance of his high consideration.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
12 November 1979
RESTRICTED
FM BUENOS AIRES 13/141\d NOV 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 365 OF 13 NOVEMBER 1979

FOR HEAD OF SAMD, AND NEWS DEPT.

MY TELNO 357: AMBASSADORS

1. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT QUOTE CLARIN UNQUOTE OF 13 NOVEMBER
CARRIES A REPORT THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND BRITAIN WILL
ANNOUNCE ON FRIDAY THE EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS. THE STORY IS
ATTRIBUTED TO A LOCAL DIPLOMATIC SOURCE, DOUBTLESS THE MFA. ONLY THE
ARGENTINE CANDIDATE IS NAMED.

CARLESS

NNNN

SENT AT 13/15\d5Z NSC
RECD AT 13/15\d5Z VJD

Final approval received and everything in hand for Friday's announcements.
PP TRIPOLI

GRS 45

UNCLASSIFIED
FM FCO 091323Z NOV 79
TO PRIORITY TRIPOLI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 273 OF 9 NOVEMBER

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM MUNRO P.O.D.
FCO TEL 263 OF 2 NOVEMBER:
1. DATE ENVISAGED IN PARA 1. IS NOW FIRM. TIMING WILL BE 1230 HOURS GMT.

CARRINGTON

P.O.O. have confirmed that Queen’s final approval received and everything in hand for Friday’s announcement.
1. I think a call of the sort you suggest on the Vatican would be well worth while. They might also be able to give you some background gloss on the Pope's recent pronouncements about human rights in Argentina and Chile.

2. As regards your briefing timetable here, as soon as your appointment is announced I would suggest you ask Heads of Mission Section to concentrate this into whatever part of the period between 11 December and your final departure is most convenient to you. I would think that three weeks of intensive calls and meetings should be adequate.

3. As regards Washington, I think this is far from essential and you might indeed profit more by a visit there in the course of a subsequent leave or consultation trip to the UK, by which time you would have something to contribute as well as to learn from any talks with the Americans.

4. These are personal views and cannot of course be taken as constituting or denying authority for any part of your programme. You are however welcome to quote my view to PSD or anyone else.

5. By the time you get to London Robin Fearn will have taken over this Department.

6. Meanwhile congratulations on your appointment.

Carrington

Files
Sam D
Mr Munro Pod
Mr Harding
BRIEFING FOR H M AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE TO BUENOS AIRES

1. You may like to see Mr Williams's message to me in Tripoli telegram no. 263 (attached) and my proposed reply.

PBren

J B Ure
South America Dept.

8 November 1979

Thank you. I agree with you that a ship over mi lido do not be a good idea.

PBren 87/X1

To issue.
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BUENOS AIRES \(6/18352\) NOV 79
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 357 OF 6 NOVEMBER 1979
FOR HEAD OF SOUTH AMERICA DEPARTMENT
YOUR TELNO 251 : AMBASSADORS

1. ACTION TAKEN. THE FOREIGN MINISTER’S PRIVATE SECRETARY HAS NOW
CONFIRMED AGREEMENT TO MAKING SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENTS ON 16
NOVEMBER.

2. BLOOMER REEVE SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD WISH TO TAKE
ACTION AT ABOUT MIDAY HERE IN ORDER TO CATCH THE EVENING
PAPERS. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THEY WOULD STRESS THE SIMULTANEOUS
NATURE OF THE TWO APPOINTMENTS.

3. I SAID THAT, WHILE NEWS DEPARTMENT WOULD SPEAK ON CUSTOMARY LINES
THEY WOULD DOUBTFUL IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS GIVE THE NAME OF
THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE.

CARLESS

I SHALL TAKE A DEEP DEATH TO LEARN ABOUT CREDIT DEVELOPMENTS
THE CREDITORS’ LINES, AUTHORITY, ESSENTIAL EVENTS, ETC.

SENT AT 12/29/75 HR

WILLIAMS.
TO PRIORITY FCO
TEL NUMBER 263 OF 6 NOVEMBER 1979
INFO BUENOSAIRES (PERSONAL FOR CHARGE D'AFFAIRES)

FOLLOWING FOR MUNRO, POD

1. MANY THANKS FOR YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 263 ABOUT MY AGREEMENT.
   CAN YOU PLEASE NOW GO TO THE HEAD OF SOUTH AMERICAN DEPT?

2. BEGIN. NOW THAT I CAN COMMUNICATE CONFIDENTIALLY ON MY APPOINTMENT AS AMBASSADOR AT BUENOS AIRES, I SHOULD LIKE TO AGREE WITH YOU AND BE CARLESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE HOW I CAN BEST USE THE TIME BEFORE I ARRIVE THERE TO GET MYSELF IN THE PICTURE.

3. I HOPE TO LEAVE HERE BY CAR FERRY ARRIVING GENOA ON 3 DECEMBER. BEFORE PROCEEDING TO UK I AM TEMPTED TO LOOK IN ON ROME TO ASK VATICAN CONTACTS FOR A BRIEFING ON VATICAN MEDIATION BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND CHILE. CAN YOU SAY FAIRLY URGENTLY IF THIS IS A GOOD IDEA?

4. I SHALL HAVE A GOOD DEAL TO LEARN ABOUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, ANTARCTICA, HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS ETC. I SHALL ALSO NEED TO MAKE ALL POSSIBLE CONTACTS ON EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA (AND ALSO IMPORTS) BETWEEN MY ARRIVAL IN THE UK ABOUT 11 DECEMBER AND MY DEPARTURE FROM BUENOSAIRES. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR PLANNING TO KNOW FAIRLY SOON HOW MUCH OF THIS YOU THINK I CAN OR SHOULD GET IN BEFORE CHRISTMAS.

5. WOULD IT BE A GOOD IDEA FOR ME TO GO TO ARGENTINA VIA UNDERLINED WASHINGTON? I REMEMBER DONALD HOPSON DID SO WHILE I WAS IN WASHINGTON AND FOUND IT VERY WORTHWHILE. I SHOULD LIKE TO DO THE SAME, IF IT CAN BE AGREED IN DUE COURSE.

WILLIAMS
PP TRIPOLI

GRS 153

DEYOU

CONFIDENTIAL

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

FM FCO 030900Z NOVEMBER 79
TO PRIORITY TRIPOLI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 263 OF 2 NOVEMBER 79
PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM MUNRO, POD

YOUR NEW APPOINTMENT:

1. PROGRESS IS FASTER THAN EXPECTED - AGREEMENT HAS NOW BEEN
RECEIVED AND OUR PLAN IS TO WORK TOWARDS SIMULTANEOUS
ANNOUNCEMENTS OF YOUR APPOINTMENT (IN LONDON) AND ORTIZ DE POSAS
(IN EA) ON 16 NOVEMBER. I SHALL CONFIRM THIS NEARER THE TIME.
MEANWHILE WE ARE SUBMITTING FOR THE QUEEN'S FORMAL APPROVAL.

2. WHEN SEEKING AGREEMENT FOR EDIS AFTER THE CURRENT ID HOLIDAY
(IF LETTER OF 24 OCTOBER REFERS) ONLY INFORMATION RELEVANT TO
THAT CHANGEOVER SHOULD BE GIVEN. YOUR DESTINATION REMAINS
CLASSIFIED UNTIL PUBLICATION AND MAY NOT BE REVEALED TO ANY
THIRD PARTY.

3. IT IS IN ORDER FOR YOU TO CONTACT YOUR 'PREDECESSOR' ON A
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL BASIS. THE GEOGRAPHY PRESENTING AN
OBVIOUS PROBLEM, I WOULD SUGGEST YOU DO THIS BY TELEGRAM.

CARRINGTON
PP BUENOS AIRES

GRS 86
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 021430Z NOV 79
TO PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES
TELEGRAM NUMBER 251 OF 2 NOVEMBER
FOR CHARGE FROM URE, SAMD
YOUR TEL NO 347 TO HEAD OF POD

1. THE QUEEN'S FORMAL APPROVAL FOR WILLIAM'S APPOINTMENT HAS
NOW TO BE OBTAINED. THIS IS UNLIKELY BEFORE 9 NOVEMBER.
WE THEREFORE PROPOSE THAT NEWS DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCE THE
APPOINTMENT ON CUSTOMARY LINES (PARA 5 OF OUR TEL NO 230) AT
THE 12.30 NEWS CONFERENCE ON FRIDAY 16 NOVEMBER.

2. PLEASE CONFIRM ARGENTINES ACCEPT THIS TIMING FOR THEIR
OWN ANNOUNCEMENT ALSO.

CARRINGTON
ARGENTINA: EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS

Problem

1. The Argentine Government have said that agreement for our nominee for Ambassador in Buenos Aires has been approved. We need now to concert a simultaneous announcement.

Recommendation

2. I recommend that the announcement be made on Friday 16 November. POD and News Department concur. I submit

(i) a draft telegram to Buenos Aires and
(ii) points for News Department to draw on when making the announcement.

Background and Argument

3. When the Argentine Charge d'Affaires called on Mr Ridley on 18 October it was agreed, on the assumption our respective candidates would be granted agreement, that the announcements of the appointments of our Ambassadors should be made simultaneously.

4. The Queen has agreed to the appointment of Dr Ortiz de Rozas. The Argentine Government have now granted agreement for Mr Williams and have stated that they would be prepared to make a simultaneous announcement on 9 November or on any following suitable date. The Queen's formal approval for the appointment of Mr Williams has, however, still to be obtained. 9 November would be a rather tight schedule. The extra week should suffice.

/5. ...
5. News Department would make the announcement on customary lines at their mid-day news conference. The Argentine Ambassador's name would be given in answer to questions.

6. Briefing for News Department's use in handling supplementary questions is attached. This brings out that the restoration of Ambassadors

(a) is an Argentine initiative and that Argentina originally prompted their withdrawal

(b) has no implications for our Falklands policies

(c) in no way implies any change in HMG's stance vis-à-vis human rights abuses in Argentina

(d) will enable us to exert more, rather than less, influence on Argentina.

POD will provide News Department, in the normal way, with details about Mr Williams.

J B Ure
South America Dept.

31 October 1979
DRAFT PRESS BRIEFING FOR USE BY NEWS DEPT.

ARGENTINA: EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS

Line to Take (on the record)

1. The Queen has been pleased to approve the appointment of Mr A J Williams CMG to be H M Ambassador to the Argentine Republic. Mr Williams will take up his appointment at the end of January.

Who is to be the Argentine Ambassador to London?

2. Dr Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, a career diplomat (c.v. attached).

Who took the initiative in the proposal to restore relations to Ambassadorial level?

3. Argentina did. It was Argentina and not Britain who recalled their Ambassador in October 1975, and subsequently requested the withdrawal of the British Ambassador, so it was for them to make the first move.

How can the Government contemplate appointment of Ambassadors in the light of the human rights situation in Argentina?

4. Ministers have on several occasions made our views on violations of human rights very plain to the Argentine Government. Restoration of Ambassadors is not an indicator of approval of any government's policies and does not signify any change in HMG's stance vis-a-vis abuses of human rights in Argentina. Exchanges with the Argentine Government on this and on other issues will be helped not hindered by the appointment of Ambassadors.

(Unattributable: we use our Ambassadors in other South American countries, particularly Uruguay and Paraguay, very effectively to bring pressure to bear both in defence of human rights in general and in protection of individuals.)

/What are ...
What are the implications for the Falklands?

5. There are no implications. We have no doubts about our sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and Dependencies. But on a practical plane to restore relations to Ambassadorial level will improve the capacity at both ends for dialogue on a whole range of complex matters.

Who was the last British Ambassador to Argentina?

6. The last British Ambassador to Argentina was Sir Derick (then Mr Derick) Ashe.
CURRICULUM VITAE

ORTIZ DE ROZAS, Carlos

Chairman of UN Committee on Disarmament; and Special Adviser to the Foreign Minister.

Born 1926.

A lawyer by training but a career diplomat, entering the Diplomatic Service in 1948. He has served in Bulgaria, Greece, UAR, and in London (1965/67), where he was Minister. Ambassador to Vienna (1967/70). Argentine Ambassador to the United Nations (1970/77).

Married to Maria del Carmen Sarobe. Both he and his wife speak excellent English. He also speaks French and Italian.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of Argentina and has the honour to refer to the Embassy's Note Number FO/292 of 18 October seeking agrément to the appointment of Dr Carlos Ortiz de Rozas as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Argentina to the Court of St James's.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has pleasure in confirming that Her Majesty The Queen has now given agrément for this appointment.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office avails itself of this opportunity to express to the Embassy of the Republic of Argentina the assurance of its highest consideration.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, SW1
31 October 1979
PP BUENOS AIRES
GRS 71
RESTRICTED
FM FCO 301750Z OCT 79
TO PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES
TELEGRAM NUMBER 249 OF 30 OCTOBER.
FROM SAND: ORTIZ DE ROZAS
1. AGREEMENT HAS NOW BEEN GRANTED AND ARGENTINE EMBASSY
INFORMED.
2. BLANCO HAS BEEN REMINDED THAT ANY ANNOUNCEMENT OR
DISCLOSURE ABOUT THE NEW AMBASSADORS SHOULD BE MADE
SIMULTANEOUSLY. HE WAS THEREFORE ASKED TO TREAT OUR AGREEMENT
AS CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL WE HAD RECEIVED AN ANSWER FROM THE
ARGENTINES ON OUR OWN CANDIDATE.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

DISTRIBUTION
FILES
S AM D
PCD
POD
NEWS D
MR HARDING

1
RESTRICTGED
BAFO 815/36
PP FCO
D.E.D.I.P.
CRPS 36
CONFIDENTIAL
D.E.D.I.P.
STAFF - IN CONFIDENCE
FM BUENOS AIRES 36/20667 OCT 79
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 347 OF 30 OCTOBER 1979
FOR HEAD OF P O D
YOUR TELNO 236 AND MY TELNO 332 AGREEMENT

1. APPROVED.

2. HEAD OF PROTOCOL INFORMED ME THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WOULD BE READY TO MAKE A SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENT ON 9 NOVEMBER OR ON ANY FOLLOWING DATE SUITABLE FOR YOU.

CARLESS
NNNN

SENT AT 3/2026 HR
AGREEMENT FOR NEW ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR

1. I received from the Private Office on 26 October the attached submission, approved by The Queen, agreeing to Dr Ortiz de Rozas's appointment to London.

2. After consulting Mr Harding, I telephoned this news to the Argentine Chargé who said that he would immediately pass it on to his government. I reminded Dr Blanco that we had agreed that it would be desirable that any announcement or disclosure about the new Ambassadors should be made simultaneously; I was therefore asking him to treat our agreement as confidential until such time as we had received an answer from the Argentine government about Mr Williams. Dr Blanco said he would also pass this on; he hoped for an early reply on Mr Williams, particularly as we had acted so very promptly.

3. I would now be grateful if you would:

   (i) telegraph the essentials of the above to H M Embassy at Buenos Aires;

   (ii) consult the papers and Protocol Dept. and see whether any formal written response to the Argentine Embassy is required (Dr Blanco seemed to think it was).

29 October 1979

J B Ure
South America Dept.

Mr Harding
Mr Duggan
P & CD
Dear Sir Philip,

The Argentine Government have asked for agreement for the appointment of Dr Carlos Ortiz de Rozas as their new Ambassador at the Court of St James's. Dr Ortiz de Rozas has had a distinguished career as a diplomat. His background and experience suggest that he is well-qualified to represent his country in London. I enclose a biographical note.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recommends that agreement be given for this appointment. In the event of this advice being acceptable, I enclose a formal submission to Her Majesty The Queen.

Yours,

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

The Right Honourable Sir Philip Moore KCVO
CB CMG
Buckingham Palace
LONDON
The Lord Carrington, with his humble duty to Your Majesty, has the honour respectfully to submit for Your Majesty's approval that Dr Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, an Argentine citizen, be received as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Argentina at Your Majesty's Court.

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

25 October 1979
CURRICULUM VITAE

ORTIZ DE ROZAS, Carlos

Chairman of UN Committee on Disarmament; and Special Adviser to the Foreign Minister.

Born 1926.

A lawyer by training but a career diplomat, entering the Diplomatic Service in 1948. Has served in Bulgaria, Greece, UAR, and in London (1965/67), where he was Minister. Ambassador to Vienna (1967/70). Argentine Ambassador to the UN (1970/77).

Something of a nationalist, but urbane and cosmopolitan. Went to some trouble to achieve and maintain close relations with the FCO when in London. But as Argentine Permanent Representative at the UN he proved generally unhelpful to Britain and lobbied continuously in support of the Argentine claim to the Falkland Islands. He ran strongly as a candidate to replace U Thant as UN Secretary General. Said to have kept out of recent Argentine politics, perhaps because of his experiences in 1962 when, on the fall of Frondizi, with whose regime he had then closely associated, he was placed en disponibilité for a year.

Married to Maria del Carmen Sarobe. Both he and his wife speak excellent English. He also speaks French and Italian.
ARGENTINA: AGREEMENT FOR NEW AMBASSADOR

1. The Argentine Government have requested agreement for the appointment of Dr Carlos Ortiz de Rozas as Ambassador in London. We have already sought agreement for Mr Anthony Williams through our Embassy in Buenos Aires.

2. I recommend that agreement be given and attach a draft letter to the Queen's Private Secretary, together with a draft formal submission for the Secretary of State's signature.

3. Dr Ortiz de Rozas is a senior and experienced career diplomat (his appointments include Minister in London from 1965 to 1967; and Argentine Ambassador to the UN from 1970 to 1977). The Argentine Government, in proposing him, have fulfilled our wishes that their Ambassador should be a civilian, rather than a military man with connections with the Junta. Dr Ortiz de Rozas is probably their top professional diplomat. The fact that he pursued Argentine policies at the expense of our's at the UN should not be counted against him; when in London he will doubtless work for improved Anglo/Argentine relations.

4. When the Argentine Charge handed over this request, we suggested that on the assumption that agreement was forthcoming on both sides the announcements of the appointments of both Ambassadors should be made simultaneously. The Charge thought this would also be his Government's wish.

J B Ure
South America Department

22 October 1979
Embajada de la República Argentina

FO/292

The Embassy of the Republic of Argentina presents its compliments to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to request, on behalf of the Argentine Government, the corresponding "Placet" of Her Majesty's Government for the appointment as Ambassador to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Dr. Carlos Ortíz de Rozas, whose Curriculum is hereby annexed.

The Embassy of the Republic of Argentina avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurances of its highest consideration.

London, 18th October, 1979

Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London
CURRICULUM VITAE

CARLOS ORTIZ DE ROZAS

Nació en Buenos Aires, el 26 de abril de 1926.
Casado con María del Carmen Sarobe.

TITULOS:

DESEMPEÑO EN EL SERVICIO EXTERIOR:
Jefe interino de la División Investigaciones del Departamento de Política de la Cancillería argentina (1949).
Jefe de la Secretaría del Departamento de Política (1950).
Miembro de la Comisión Interministerial encargada de estudiar las Convenciones Diplomáticas de Ginebra sobre Heridos y Prisioneros de Guerra (1950).
Correo Diplomático (1950).
Jefe de la División Planificación del Departamento de Política (1951).
Delegado alterno del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto ante el Consejo Nacional de Planificación (1951).


Delegado ante la Comisión para la Información sobre Territorios no Autónomos de las Naciones Unidas (1960).


Miembro de la Comitiva Oficial argentina para la reunión de los Presidentes de Argentina y Chile, Viña del Mar, Chile (1961).


Miembro de la Comitiva Oficial que acompañó al Excelentísimo Señor Presidente de la Nación en sus visitas oficiales a Canadá, India, Tailandia, Japón y Estados Unidos (1961).


Adjunto Civil a la Misión Especial de España a las ceremonias de la Transmisión del Mando Presidencial. Buenos Aires (1964).


Miembro de la Delegación Observadora argentina a la Conferencia de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de los Países no Alineados. El Cairo (1965).


Representante Permanente de la República Argentina ante la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo Industrial, Viena (1967 - 1970).


Observador de la República Argentina ante la Reunión de Consulta de los Países no Alineados, Belgrado (1969).


Representante argentino ante el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas (1971 - 1972).

Presidente del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas (marzo de 1971 y julio de 1972).


Presidente de la Delegación Argentina ante el Comité de Fondos Marinos (1971).

Presidente de la Delegación Argentina ante el Comité para el Uso Pacífico del Espacio Ultraterrestre (1971 - 1977).
Candidato en la elección celebrada por el Consejo de Seguridad para designar Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas. Obtuvo el mayor número de votos pero no pudo ser elegido debido al veto de uno de los Miembros Permanentes. (1971).

Miembro del Grupo Asesor del Consejo de Seguridad para Namibia (1972).

Presidente del Subcomité del Consejo de Seguridad de Namibia (1972).


Jefe de la Delegación Argentina Primer Período de Sesiones de la Conferencia de Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho del Mar. Nueva York (Diciembre de 1973).


Presidente de la Delegación Argentina ante el Comité Preparatorio de la Conferencia Mundial de Alimentos (Nueva York, Febrero 1974).


Presidente de la Primera Comisión (Asuntos Políticos y de Seguridad) de la XXIX Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas (1974).


Presidente de la Delegación Argentina ante la VII Asamblea General Extraordinaria (Septiembre 1975).

Delegado titular al Comité Ad-Hoc sobre Revisión de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas (1975).

Representante Titular ante el Consejo de Administración del Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (1975 - 1976).

Presidente de la Delegación Argentina ante el Consejo Económico y Social de las Naciones Unidas (1976 - 1977).


Miembro de la Junta Consultiva del Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas para cuestiones del desarme.


Presidente del Comité de Desarme (Ginebra, Febrero de 1979).

OTRAS ACTIVIDADES:

Profesor de Historia Argentina en la Escuela Normal N° 5, "Martín Guemes" (1951).

Profesor Adjunto de Geopolítica en la Escuela de Política Internacional del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto (Buenos Aires, 1950).


CONFERENCIAS Y SEMINARIOS:


Conferencias en el "Industrial College of the Armed Forces" de Estados Unidos (1972 - 1975).

Conferencias sobre temas de Política Internacional del Centro de Altos Estudios del Ejército, Escuela de Comando de la Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Escuela Superior de Guerra.

Octava Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre la Próxima Década organizada por The Stanley Foundation - Amalfi, Italia (junio de 1973).

Novena Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre la Próxima Década organizada por The Stanley Foundation - Baden beI- Wien (Junio de 1974).

Décima Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre la Próxima Década organizada por The Stanley Foundation - Baden beI- Wien (Junio de 1975).

Quinto Seminario Informativo de las Naciones Unidas organi- zado por The Stanley Foundation (Marzo de 1976).

Seminario del Mid Atlantic Club of New York (Enero de 1976).

Sexto Seminario Informativo de las Naciones Unidas organiza- do por The Stanley Foundation (Marzo de 1977).

Octava Conferencia sobre Procedimientos de las Naciones Unidas organizado por The Stanley Foundation - Lake Mohonk, (Mayo de 1977).

Seminario en la Universidad de Belgrado sobre "La cuestión del Medio Oriente" (agosto de 1977).

CONDECORACIONES:

Orden al Mérito de la República Italiana (Comendador)

Orden al Mérito de Chile (Gran Oficial)

Orden Cruzeiro do Sul del Brasil (Gran Oficial)

Orden del Fénix de Grecia (Gran Oficial)
Orden del Sagrado Tesoro del Japón (Gran Oficial)
Orden El Sol del Perú (Gran Oficial)
Orden al Mérito de la República Arabe Unida (Gran Oficial)
Orden al Mérito de la República Italiana (Gran Oficial)
Soberana Orden de la Corona, de Tailandia (Gran Cruz)
Orden al Mérito, de Austria (Gran Cruz de Oro con Banda)
Orden Nacional "Miguel Larraynaga", de Nicaragua (Gran Cruz)
Orden al Mérito Diplomático, República de Corea (Gran Cruz)
Orden Nacional "Rubén Darío", de Nicaragua (Gran Cruz)
Orden del Fénix, de Grecia (Gran Cruz)
Orden de Isabel la Católica, de España (Gran Cruz)
CURRICULUM VITAE

CARLOS ORTIZ DE ROZAS

Born in Buenos Aires, Argentina on April 26th 1926.

Married to María del Carmen Sarobe.

Lawyer, Diploma of the Faculty of Law, University of Buenos Aires, 1950.


FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS:

Began his foreign service career in 1948 with the rank of Attaché, receiving subsequently different promotions until reaching his present position as Ambassador, in 1967.

Deputy Chief of the Research Division of the Political Department of the Argentine Foreign Office (1949).

Chief of the Political Department's Secretariat (1950).

Member of the Interministerial Commission in charge of studying the Diplomatic Conventions of Geneva on Wounded and Prisoners of War (1950).

Diplomatic Courier (1950).

Chief of the Planning Division, Political Department (1951).

Alternate Delegate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Planning National Council (1951).


Secretary of Embassy and Chargé d'Affaires a.i., Argentine Embassy in Athens, Greece (1954 - 1956).

Member of the Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1958 - 1959).


Chief Delegate to the Legal Sub-Committee of the United Nations Special Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, New York (1959).

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Vice-Chairman of the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (1960).

Delegate Plenipotentiary to the International Conference on Narcotics and Drugs, New York (1961).

Director-General of the Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Buenos Aires (1961 - 1962).

Member of the Argentine Official Delegation for the Meeting of the Presidents of Argentina and Chile, Viña del Mar, Chile (1961).


Member of the Official Delegation that accompanied the President of Argentina in his state visits to Canada, India, Thailand, Japan and the United States. (1961).

Member of the Argentine Delegation to the VIII Consultative Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organisation of American States, Punta del Este, Uruguay (1962).


Member of the Argentine Observer Delegation to the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non Aligned Countries, Cairo (1965).


Observer of the Argentine Republic to the Consultative Meeting of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade (1969).


Representative to the Special Committee on Peace Keeping Operations (1971 - 1972).

Chairman of the Argentine Delegation to the Sea-Bed Committee, (1971).


Nominated by other countries as a candidate at the elections held in the Security Council to appoint the Secretary General of the United Nations, obtained the largest number of votes but was vetoed by one of the Permanent Members (1971).

Member of the Security Council Advisory Group on Namibia, (1972).

Chairman of the Security Council Sub-Committee for Namibia, (1972).

Chairman of the Argentine Delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Geneva (1973).

Chairman of the Argentine Delegation to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea Bed, Geneva (1973).


Chairman of the Argentine Delegation to the Preparatory Committee of the World Food Conference, New York (February, 1974).


Chairman of the First Committee (Political and Security Affairs) of the XXXIX General Assembly (1974).


Chairman of the Argentine Delegation to the VII Special Session of U.N. General Assembly (1975).


Chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (1977 - 1978).

Senior Adviser to the Foreign Minister of Argentina (Special Political Affairs) Buenos Aires (1977 - 1979).

Chairman of the Argentine Delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Geneva (1977 - 1979).

Representative to the Tenth Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, New York (1978).


Appointed by the U.N. Secretary General as member of his Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, New York (1978 - 1981).
Representative to the Committee on Disarmament, Geneva (1979).

Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament, (Geneva, February, 1979).

OTHER ACTIVITIES:

Professor of Argentine History (1951).

Assistant Professor of Geopolitics at the School of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Buenos Aires (1950).

Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Law of the "Universidad del Salvador", (1958 up to the present time).

Professor of History and Constitutional Law at the Faculty of Law of the "Universidad del Salvador, Buenos Aires (1958).

Professor of International Relations at the School of Political Sciences of the "Universidad del Salvador", Buenos Aires (1962 up to the present time).

Professor of International Relations at the School of Diplomacy of the "Universidad del Salvador", Buenos Aires, (1962 up to the present time).

Member of the Superior Council of the "Universidad del Salvador", (Buenos Aires, 1964).


Conference on different issues concerning Foreign Policy at the Centre for High Studies of the Army: Command School of the Argentine Air Force, New York (1972 - 1975).


Participated in the Mid Atlantic Club of New York Seminar, Arden House, (January 1976).

Participated in the Sixth United Nations Informative Seminar, organised by The Stanley Foundation, (March 1977).


**DECORATIONS:**

- Order of Merit of the Italian Republic (Commander)
- Order of Merit of Chile (Grand Officer)
- Order Curzeiro do Sul of Brazil (Grand Officer)
- Order of Phoenix of Greece (Grand Officer)
- Order of the Sacred Treasure of Japan (Grand Officer)
- Order El Sol of Peru (Grand Officer)
- Order of Merit of the United Arab Republic (Grand Officer)
- Order of Merit of the Italian Republic (Grand Officer)
- Sovereign Order of the Crown of Thailand (Grand Cross)
- Order of Merit of the Republic of Austria (Grand Cross)
- Order "Miguel Larraynaga" of Nicaragua (Grand Cross)
- Order of Diplomatic Merit, Republic of Korea (Grand Cross)
- Order "Rubén Darío" of Nicaragua (Grand Cross)
- Order of Isabel la Católica of Spain (Grand Cross–
- Order of Phoenix of Greece (Grand Cross)
OFFICE OF BUENOS AIRES
DEDIP

GRS 290
CONFIDENTIAL
DEDIP/STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

FM FCO 151800Z OCT 79
TO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES
TELEGRAM NUMBER 230 OF 16 OCTOBER
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR CARLESS FROM MUNRO, POD
YOUR SUCCESSOR: CHIEF CLERK'S TEL 228 OF 12 OCTOBER REFERS

1. THE QUEEN HAS NOW GIVEN HER INFORMAL APPROVAL TO THE
APPOINTMENT OF ANTHONY WILLIAMS TO BE H M AMBASSADOR AT BUENOS
AIRES. THE TIMING WOULD BE IN JANUARY AS AGREED LAST WEEK.

2. YOU SHOULD NOW SEEK AGREEMENT OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT.
HOW SOON MIGHT WE EXPECT A DEFINITIVE REPLY?

3. A SUITABLE FORM OF WORDS IS:

"IN PURSUANCE OF INSTRUCTIONS OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT I
HAVE THE HONOUR TO INFORM YOUR EXCELLENCY THAT IT IS PROPOSED
TO APPOINT MR A J WILLIAMS CMG IN THE CAPACITY OF HER
MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT BUENOS AIRES. DETAILS OF
MR WILLIAMS'S CAREER ARE ENCLOSED AND I HAVE THE HONOUR TO
ENQUIRE WHETHER HIS APPOINTMENT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC."

DETAILS OF WILLIAMS' CAREER MAY BE ADAPTED FROM THE 1979 DS LIST.

4. ON RECEIPT OF AGREEMENT PLEASE TELEGRAPH EN CLAIR WITH
REFERENCE TO THIS TELEGRAM SAYING SIMPLY 'APPROVED'. THE QUEEN'S
FORMAL APPROVAL MUST THEN BE OBTAINED BEFORE THE APPOINTMENT
CAN BE ANNOUNCED OFFICIALLY. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD
ENCOURAGE THE ARGENTINIANS TO ASSIST US IN MAINTAINING THE
NECESSARY CONFIDENTIALITY MEANWHILE.

5. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT WE PROPOSE TO RELEASE IN DUE
COURSE:

"THE QUEEN HAS BEEN PLEASED TO APPROVE THE APPOINTMENT OF
MR A J WILLIAMS CMG TO BE HM AMBASSADOR TO THE ARGENTINE

CONFIDENTIAL DEDIP/STAFF IN CONFIDENCE
REPUBLIC. MR WILLIAMS WILL TAKE UP HIS APPOINTMENT AT THE END OF JANUARY.
WE SHALL GIVE YOU ADVANCE NOTICE BEFORE THE ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE HERE SO THAT A SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENT CAN BE MADE IN BUENOS AIRES IF THAT IS CUSTOMARY.

CARRINGTON
FOR CHIEF CLERK, HARDING (AUS) AND HEAD OF PERSONNEL OPS. DEPARTMENT
THE SEASONAL WORKLOAD

1. IN DECIDING THE MOST APPROPRIATE TIME, IN PRACTICAL TERMS, FOR
THE ARRIVAL OF AN AMBASSADOR AND ALSO THE QUESTION OF THE
COUNSELLOR COMMERCIAL TAKING LEAVE, YOU MAY WISH TO BEAR IN MIND
THE FOLLOWING FACTS:

I. IN ARGENTINA THE SCHOOL SUMMER HOLIDAYS RUN FROM EARLY
   DECEMBER TO MID-MARCH;

II. UNDER THIS GOVERNMENT, THE PRESIDENT HAS GONE ON HOLIDAY
    SOON AFTER CHRISTMAS WHILE OTHER MINISTERS HAVE STAGGERED
    THEIR HOLIDAYS THROUGH JANUARY, FEBRUARY AND MARCH;

III. DURING THESE THREE MONTHS, WITH SO MANY GOVERNMENT AND
     BUSINESS PEOPLE AWAY FROM BUENOS AIRES (AS WELL AS OUR
     LOCAL AND DOMESTIC STAFF), THE RHYTHM OF EVENTS AND
     DECISIONS SLACKENS UNTIL PICKING UP AGAIN IN APRIL;

IV. FOR THIS REASON, WE HAVE ARANGED NO BRITISH/ARGENTINE
     EVENTS BETWEEN JANUARY AND 23 MARCH WHEN WE EXPECT THE
     SOUTH BUCKS AND EAST BERKS TRADE MISSION FOLLOWED, IN MID-
     APRIL, BY THE LEEDS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE MISSION AND, IN MAY
     BY A BEAMA SEMINAR HERE;

V. TO COPE WITH ITS WORKLOAD, THIS MISSION SHOULD BE FULLY
    MANNED FROM MID-MARCH TO CHRISTMAS.

CARLESS
CONFIDENTIAL


Those present:

Nicholas Ridley, MP
K D Temple
G S Cowling

1. After an exchange of courtesies Signor Ducci said that the Italian Government was extremely interested in recent events in Central America and Latin America and prior to the visit to the UK next weekend of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Signor Malfatti, the Italian Government would like to know our views on the current situation in Central America, Chile and Argentina.

2. Mr Ridley said that in Nicaragua we did not maintain a Mission and thus did not receive regular reports. He congratulated the Italians on keeping a Mission in Nicaragua throughout the recent disturbances. He thought the present Nicaraguan Junta contained elements ranging from Marxists to Christian Democrats. The Marxists might not in fact be either pro-Cuban or pro-Russian. On balance the Junta wanted to establish a moderate government but it was evident that other elements wanted a stronger left-wing bias. A truce existed between all factions to enable the problem of rehabilitating the country to be undertaken first. Possibly the Communist elements were willing to agree to this in order to get as much Western aid as possible. While all could go smoothly for the next 6-10 months, internal problems could develop after that. Signor Ducci agreed. Nicaragua first needed to reconstruct its country. It had no time to export its revolution. Mr Ridley thought that could well be the view of the government, but not necessarily of individual soldiers in the Sandinista army. Tremendous experience in guerrilla warfare had been built-up and many individuals wished to continue fighting on behalf of the deprived groups in neighbouring countries. He knew for example that Argentina was concerned that left-wing extremists who had gone to fight in Nicaragua, would return to Argentina with new experience and resume their terrorist campaign with increased zeal. As far as the rest of Central America was concerned, the next countries likely to be affected by events were: El Salvador, Guatemala and (possibly) Honduras in that order. These were extremely offensive regimes. The US had now learned that by giving them support they brought far more problems from a human rights point of view than the stability they brought to the area. Venezuela and Colombia would certainly not object to their overthrow. Signor Ducci agreed that the Americans had learned from their experience in Nicaragua and were encouraging the bourgeoisie in El Salvador to detach themselves from President Romero and undertake liberal reforms. But it was likely that these reforms were now too late.
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3. In answer to a point raised by Mr Ridley, Signor Ducci felt that the EEC was approaching the matter of discussing Latin America completely wrongly by trying to discuss in the Political Cooperation framework the whole of Latin America at once. There was little point raising Central America with the EEC. Mr Ridley said that while he was in Panama for the Canal handover ceremony, he met Mrs Violeta de Chamorro, a member of the Nicaraguan Junta, who told him she would shortly be visiting Rome and would be prepared to visit London if invited. We planned to write to her and confirm this, but it might be an idea to ensure that she visited the EEC. Signor Ducci knew nothing of Sra de Chamorro's visit to Rome and said that it was difficult for the EEC to give aid on political grounds, because the EEC itself did not have a foreign policy. Mr Ridley said the EEC need not confine itself to discussing aid but use the opportunity to show that it supported the new Nicaraguan Government politically. Signor Ducci said his Minister would be extremely interested in this.

4. Turning to Chile, Mr Ridley said that only Belgium, Italy and the United Kingdom did not have Ambassadors in Santiago. The Belgian Ambassador in London suggested that they might consider sending an Ambassador if we did. We should have an Ambassador there, not because we approved of the regime but because we saw no point in making an exception. In fact, (speaking confidentially) it was only a matter of time before an announcement was made, this depending on when the Letellier case was resolved between Chile and the United States. Signor Ducci said that there was strong opposition in Italy against exchanging Ambassadors. Allende was almost a legend among the left-wing. But it would be pointless for the Italians to be the odd man out in Europe if Belgium and the United Kingdom exchanged Ambassadors with Chile in the near future, and he would discuss the matter with his minister.

5. Concerning Argentina, Mr Ridley said that the Falkland Islands dispute was at the stage where the Argentine Government were expecting us to negotiate, and for the present they were being extremely charming to us. However, the basic fact remained that the population of the Falkland Islands was British and wish to remain so. It had been announced by Argentina and the UK in July that Ambassadors would be exchanged, but so far agreement for candidates had not yet been sought by either country. Signor Ducci thanked Mr Ridley for the information he had given and said that he would discuss the issues with his minister when he arrived next week.

6. The meeting finished at 4.55 pm.

cc: WED
    SAMD
    M&CD
PP BUENOS AIRES

GRS 107

CONFIDENTIAL

FV FCO 251030Z SEPTEMBER 79
TO PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES
TELEGRAM NUMBER 202 OF 25 SEPTEMBER
INFO PORT STANLEY.

FROM SAMD.
CALL ON MINISTER OF STATE BY ARGENTINE CHARGE.

1. BLANCO CALLED ON MR RIDLEY ON 24 SEPTEMBER TO FOLLOW UP HIS CALL ON 17 SEPTEMBER (OUR TELNO 200) WITH ORAL MESSAGE FROM COMMODORE CAVANDOLI.

2. HE SAID THE ARGENTINES COULD AGREE TO A MEETING IN EARLY NOVEMBER IN NEW YORK BUT WOULD PREFER NO FIXED AGENDA. MR RIDLEY INDICATED THAT NEW YORK WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE BUT SAID, SUBJECT TO FINAL CLEARANCE, WE WOULD PROPOSE FIRM DATES THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL AFTER SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH BRIGADIER PASTOR.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

DIST
FILES
S AM D
MR HARDING
CALL ON MINISTER OF STATE BY ARGENTINE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES:
MONDAY, 24 SEPTEMBER 1979: 2.30 PM

Present

Mr Nicholas Ridley MP
Mr Temple PS/Mr Ridley
Mr Cowling SAmD

Sr Carlos Blanco,
Argentine Chargé d'Affaires

1. Sr Blanco said he had been asked to deliver an oral message to Mr Ridley (which he assumed must have come from Commodore Cavandoli) about the next negotiating round.

2. The Argentines could agree to a meeting in early November in New York. They felt New York would be appropriate since the meeting could take place following the United Nations General Assembly and would be unlikely to attract special attention. There would be no external pressures.

3. On the agenda, Commodore Cavandoli was in broad agreement with the points Mr Ridley had put to Sr Blanco a week previously. (The talks would be about the future of the Islands but could take in Anglo/Argentine co-operation including Antarctic matters). But the Argentines preferred no specific agenda.

4. Mr Ridley said that we still awaited full Cabinet clearance on a further negotiating round and that he could not yet propose firm dates. But New York was acceptable. We would propose firm dates through the diplomatic channel.

South America Department
September 1979
Distribution:
Files
SAMD
PS/Mr Ridley
Mr Harding
Chancery, BUENOS AIRES
FORT STANLEY
ARGENTINE CHARGE'S CALL ON MINISTER OF STATE

1. BLANCO CALLED ON MR RIDLEY ON 17 SEPTEMBER TO DELIVER A LETTER FROM BLOOMER REEVE. THIS WAS IN REPLY TO MR RIDLEY'S MESSAGE ON THE AIDE MEMOIRE (BRASILIA TEL NO 144) WHICH YOU DELIVERED ON 6 AUGUST.

2. BLOOMER REEVE'S LETTER SEeks TO EXPLAIN AWAY THE UNFORTUNATE TIMING OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE AND EXPRESS REGRET IF IT RESULTED IN MISUNDERSTANDING. MR RIDLEY ASKED BLANCO TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT NO CRITICISM HAD BEEN IMPLIED IN HIS REPLY. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT, IF THE NEW YORK TALKS BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS WENT WELL, HE WOULD BE READY FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE 1977 BASIS, BUT WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, WHILE RESPECTING THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS, ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS AND RELATED QUESTIONS (EG BROAD CO-OPERATION IN ECONOMIC AND ANTARCTIC MATTERS). EARLY NOVEMBER MIGHT SUIT, PERHAPS IN NEW YORK OR WASHINGTON. HE WOULD WELCOME PROPOSALS FROM COMMODORE CAVANDOLI ON VENUE/DATES.

3. WE DO NOT INTEND SENDING ANY FORMAL REPLY TO BLOOMER-REEVE'S MESSAGE, AS BLANCO'S REPORT WILL CONVEY ALL THAT NEEDS TO BE SAID. BUT YOU MIGHT REINFORCE WHAT MR RIDLEY SAID, IF YOU SEE FIT, AS OCCASION OFFERS.

4. BLANCO ALSO RAISED LAW ON DISAPPEARED PERSONS, EMPHASISING GOVERNMENT'S WISH TO HELP RELATIVES. HE SAID THAT PROCEEDINGS WOULD NORMALLY BE INITIATED BY RELATIVES AND THE COURTS WOULD FINALLY DECIDE WHETHER A DECLARATION OF PRESUMED DEATH SHOULD BE ISSUED.

5. COPY OF LETTER AND RECORD OF CALL BY BAG.

CARRINGTON
CALL ON MINISTER OF STATE BY ARGENTINE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES:

MONDAY, 17 SEPTEMBER.

1. The Argentine Charge, Sr Blanco, called on Mr Ridley on Monday, 17 September to hand over a letter from Commodore Bloomer Reeve, Chef de Cabinet to the Argentine Foreign Minister. I attach a copy of the letter and of the record of conversation (with copies of all relevant correspondence).

2. The letter is in reply to Mr Ridley's response to the Aide Memoire the Argentines delivered as Mr Ridley was boarding his aircraft in Buenos Aires. The Argentines obviously fear that their action may have upset us. Mr Ridley did express disappointment at the lack of warning in his reply. The letter seeks to explain away the timing as having been inspired by a desire to respect Mr Ridley's wish to avoid substantive exchanges on the Falklands during his brief visit to Buenos Aires. Mr Ridley assured Sr Blanco and asked him to tell Commodore Cavandoli, the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister, that all is well. There seems no need for any further more formal reply. But we should let Mr Carless know what happened and get him to speak soothingly as necessary. I submit a draft telegram to Buenos Aires.

G A Duggan
South America Department

21 September 1979
CALL ON MINISTER OF STATE BY ARGENTINE CHARGE D'AffAIREs: MONDAY, 17 SEPTEMBER 1979: 4.30 PM

1. Sr Blanco said he had been instructed to deliver a letter (attached) from Commodore Bloomer Reeve, Chef de Cabinet to the Argentine Foreign Minister. This was in reply to Mr Ridley's message of 6 August (attached) which had been delivered in Buenos Aires by Mr Carless commenting, in turn, on the Argentine aide-memoire (also attached) given to Mr Ridley shortly before his departure from Buenos Aires.

2. Having read the letter, Mr Ridley said he would be grateful if Sr Blanco could make it clear in reply that his previous message did not imply any criticism. He shared Comodoro Cavandoli's view that the purpose of his visit last July had been to meet the Government and to exchange views. Both sides had agreed to confirm their decision to exchange Ambassadors. Mr Ridley never thought it would be possible to hold substantive discussions on the Falklands. We could not go very far in advance of Cabinet clearance for the negotiations to continue. It was now agreed that our respective Foreign Secretaries would meet in New York. If that meeting went well, he would be available thereafter for substantive negotiations. The two sides would need to agree on a convenient venue and dates. It was not our purpose to slow things down. After the New York meeting, both sides would need to examine their positions and prepare for the negotiating round. Early November might be an appropriate time to meet. The meeting could not take place in Buenos Aires or London since it was important to hold it away from external pressures. Perhaps New York/Washington would be

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be suitable. But Mr Ridley said he would be happy for Commodore Cavandoli to put forward proposals.

3. Sr Blanco asked whether we had suggestions as to agenda. Mr Ridley said that the talks would be concerned with the future of the Islands and related questions. The main requirement was to settle the dispute. But we could also discuss Anglo/Argentine cooperation more broadly including Antarctic matters. A solution would require concessions from both sides. While we expected to move forward on the basis of the terms of reference agreed in 1977, the present administration's position was relatively uncluttered. The negotiations would be entered into without precondition. But Mr Ridley emphasised that the Government stood by its predecessor's undertaking about respecting the wishes of the Islanders. It was also important that the negotiations should take place in total secrecy.

4. Sr Blanco said he would like to take the opportunity to refer to the issue of "disappeared persons". Many believed that those who had disappeared had been killed by the Government. He reminded Mr Ridley that Argentina had gone through a civil war. Undoubtedly many people had been killed in battle. Others had fled the country; rival gangs had operated. The Government had decided to introduce the "Law on Disappeared Persons" to help stabilize things. The objective had been to help the relatives of the disappeared. They would now be able to claim inheritances; obtain social benefits. Some criticism had been levelled by people who said that the law made it easier for the Government to legalise the disappearances. This was not the case. Only if there were special reasons why relatives could not initiate proceedings under the new law would the State do so. And it would finally be up to the courts to decide whether a declaration of
presumed death should be issued. The courts operated independently. Sr Blanco also referred to the current visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. His Government was doing its best to bring the situation back to normal. These moves had to be seen in the knowledge that the Argentines had suffered a civil war. Mr Ridley thanked Sr Blanco for this explanation. For the sake of the Argentine Government's respectability, he hoped they would continue measures to improve the situation. Argentina's international relations had suffered on account of human rights.

5. Sr Blanco said things had got quite out of control during the Government of Sra de Peron. Subsequently a strong reaction had come from the Right. It had been difficult to control. Even now certain activities had not been erased altogether. But overall the situation was much better. No organised acts of terrorism were now committed. Mr Ridley said we had seen the visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as positive. He hoped the Government would now be able to run the country smoothly. If the human rights situation improved, our relations could become more cordial.

South America Department
20 September 1979

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from Argentine Chargé d'Affaires
Carlos Blanco

Mr. Nicholas Ridley, M.P.,
Minister of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs,
London

modalities and possible dates of the future rounds of negotiations. Indeed, it was in the same spirit of not
London, 17th September, 1979

Your Excellency,

I take pleasure in enclosing herewith a message addressed to you by the Chief of Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Commodore Carlos F. Bloomer Reeve.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Carlos L. Blanco
Minister
Chargé d’Affaires a.i.

Mr. Nicholas Ridley, M.P.,
Minister of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs,
London

modalities and possible dates of the future rounds of negotiations. Indeed, it was in the same spirit of not
Buenos Aires, 12th September, 1979

Dear Mr. Ridley,

Mr. Carless has delivered to me your message dated 6th August containing some comments on the Aide-Memoire I had given you a few minutes before your departure from Buenos Aires.

I sincerely regret that my good intentions were misunderstood, but I suppose this is liable to happen. The subjects put forward in that document are undoubtedly important and, as you duly point out, need a careful consideration. It is not my intention to dwell on these matters now, as we could well examine them together during our next meeting. I would not wish though that any misunderstanding could interfere with our recent but sincere and cordial friendship and I would therefore like to clarify the reasons for giving you the aforementioned Aide-Memoire at the last minute, what - I am told - caused you some disappointment.

Prior to your arrival in Argentina, the British Embassy had informed us that your mission was of a merely informative character and that consequently, it was not your intention to hold substantive discussions about the question of the Islas Malvinas.

It goes without saying, that I was ready and willing to continue the negotiations on that occasion, but, respecting your motivations, I had no objections in accepting that our talks on that matter were restricted - as in fact was the case - to exchanging ideas on the modalities and possible dates of the future rounds of negotiations. Indeed, it was in the same spirit of not

Mr. Nicholas Ridley, M.P.,
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
London

//..
contradicting your wishes, that I delayed the delivery of the Memorandum for as long as I could. I thought that in doing so, you were going to avoid having to make any early comments, thus allowing you to meditate on the subjects mentioned therein, during your return flight, and analyzing them with your staff in London, in order to discuss them in due course. After all, your mission would not have been totally informative if our points of view over certain pending aspects had not been conveyed to you.

I sincerely regret that my good intentions were misunderstood, but I suppose this is liable to happen between two people who are not yet well aware of each others' way of acting.

It was a great pleasure having you here with us and I look forward to having the opportunity of intensively continuing our dialogue, which I trust will be very beneficial to the Anglo-Argentine relations.

I suppose our next meeting will take place on a date to be agreed by us, after the meeting in New York between both Ministers of Foreign Affairs, on the occasion of the United Nations General Assembly. I would like to know your opinion in this regard.

Please, accept my cordial regards and the assurances of my highest consideration and esteem.

(Signed)
Carlos F. Bloomer Reeve
Commodore
Chief of Cabinet of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship
Estimado Señor Ridley:

El señor Carless me entregó su mensaje del 6 de agosto con algunos comentarios al Ayuda Memoria que le hice llegar pocos minutos antes de su partida de Buenos Aires.

Los temas planteados en ese documento son sin duda importantes y, como usted bien señala, requieren una detallada consideración. No tengo el propósito de referirme ahora a esos asuntos, que bien podríamos examinar juntos cuando volvamos a encontrarnos. En cambio, como no querría que ningún malentendido se interponga en nuestra reciente pero franca y cordial amistad, deseo aclararle las razones por las cuales le entregué a último momento dicho Ayuda Memoria, lo que le causó - según me dicen - cierta decepción.

La Embajada Británica nos había informado, previo a su llegada a la Argentina, que su viaje tenía un carácter meramente informativo, y, por consiguiente, no era su propósito el mantener discusiones de substancia sobre la cuestión de las Islas Malvinas. Va de suyo que, por mi parte, estaba listo y dispuesto a proseguir las negociaciones en esa ocasión, pero respetando sus motivaciones no tuve inconveniente en aceptar que nuestras conversaciones sobre ese tema se limitasen - como efectivamente fue el caso - a cambiar ideas acerca de las modalidades y posibles fechas de las futuras ruedas negociadoras. Precisamente con el mismo ánimo de no contrariar sus deseos es que demoro al máximo la entrega del Memorandum. Pensé que en esa forma le evitaba...
el tener que hacer comentarios prematuros, permitiéndole meditar en el vuelo de regreso sobre los asuntos que en él se tratan y analizarlos en Londres con sus colaboradores, para discutirlos a su debido tiempo. Después de todo, su misión no hubiese sido completamente informativa si no le hubiera participado nuestros puntos de vista sobre ciertos aspectos pendientes.

Lamento sinceramente que mis buenas intenciones hayan sido mal interpretadas pero supongo que esto suele suceder cuando dos personas no conocen bien todavía sus respectivas maneras de proceder.

Fue un gran placer recibirlos a ustedes y aguardo la oportunidad de proseguir intensamente nuestro diálogo, que confío será muy provechoso para las relaciones Anglo-Argentinas. Supongo que nuestro próximo encuentro tendrá lugar en alguna fecha a convenir entre nosotros, luego de la reunión que los dos Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores concretarán en Nueva York, en ocasión de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas. Me gustaría conocer su opinión al respecto.

Le ruego acepte los cordiales saludos con que le reitero las seguridades de mi más alta consideración y estima.

(Firmado)
Carlos F. Bloomer Reeve
Comodoro
Jefe de Gabinete del
Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto
CALL ON MINISTER OF STATE BY ARGENTINE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES:
MONDAY, 17 SEPTEMBER: 4.30 PM

1. The Argentine Chargé, Sr Carlos Blanco, asked to call on the Minister of State "to deliver a personal reply from Buenos Aires".

2. I submit briefing material.

3. We do not know the subject. The briefing covers possibilities:
   (i) Timetable for negotiations on Falklands; AlW 040[825]
   (ii) Ambassadors; AlA 020[1]
   (iii) Dr Phipps' aero-magnetic survey. AlW 162[5]

4. Mr Cowling is ready to attend to take a note.

14 September 1979
G A Duggan
South America Department

cc Mr Harding
Points To Make

**Falkland Negotiations**

1. The Secretary of State will probably want to discuss this with Brigadier Pastor, when they meet in New York. Principle is a meeting with Brigadier Pastor.

2. Not right for me to anticipate what he will say but Secretary of State has already said he hopes for constructive negotiations.

3. Sorry not possible for me to meet Commodore Cavodoli beforehand.

4. We are considering candidates. Intention remains to seek agreement before end of year.

**Aeromagnetic Survey**

5. No formal approach received. But if Dr Phipps submits proposal, we would need to consider carefully. Not want this to cause any friction. We have common interest in area. Though it right to let Argentine Government know. We would propose to keep in touch with you. Depending on developments, we might discuss at next negotiating round.
MINISTER OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SR BLANCO: 17 SEPTEMBER

Essential Facts

Falkland Islands Negotiations: Timetable

1. The Argentines know that the Secretary of State has agreed in principle to a meeting with Brigadier Pastor (Sept 24/28). Our Mission in New York is in touch with the Argentines to fix a time. We have yet to hear whether a date has been agreed.

2. When Mr Ridley was in Buenos Aires, the Argentines suggested that he might meet Deputy Foreign Minister Cavandoli in early September. The Argentines have now been told (FCO tel no 182) that this is not possible.

3. Sr Oliveri Lopez (the Under-Secretary in charge of the Malvinas Department in the Argentine MFA) had also suggested (BA tel no 244) an informal and confidential exchange at official level in New York in early October at the end of the Antarctic Treaty Meeting. The idea was that Mr Harding would meet him then to follow up their informal exchanges in Buenos Aires in late August. If the Argentines press the Embassy have been instructed (para 3 of FCO tel no 182) to suggest that Sr Oliveri Lopez put his ideas to Mr Hall, who is leading our Delegation to the Antarctic Meeting.

Ambassadors

4. Following the joint announcement in Buenos Aires on 27 July during Mr Ridley's visit, we are identifying a candidate but are not yet ready to put a name to the Argentines. Mr Carless will probably remain in Buenos Aires until the end of the year. The Argentines have still to put a name to us, although we know of their intention to nominate a career diplomat, Carlos Obiz de Rozas.

Falkland Islands: Aeromagnetic Survey

5. If Dr Phipps gets financial backing from industry (still doubtful), he is likely to seek formal approval within a month from us and the Argentines to survey the /Malvinas
Malvinas Basin (which straddles putative median line). Our Embassy in Buenos Aires have put the Argentines in the picture (BA tel no 265). Dr Phipps' meeting with oil industry was to take place on Friday, 14 September. The Argentine Embassy have got wind of it and may have sent a representative.

6. Argentine first reaction was cool. Remains to be seen what they will do: they do not accept that the Falkland Islands generate a Continental Shelf: and maintain that we have no claims to any hydrocarbon resources in area.
The Minister of State is being called on by the Argentine Charge d’Affaires on Monday 17 Sept at 4.30 p.m., at our request.

The subject is to deliver a personal reply from Buenos Aires (his secretary could not say more).

I should be grateful for:

(i) briefing/speaking notes by close of play on Friday 14th

(ii) a member of your Department to be in attendance to take notes and, if necessary, for consultation.

PS/MR Ridley 233 5284/5275 13/9

LETTER TO THE AUSTRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND HE WILL BE ACCOMPANYING VIDELA ON THE LATTER’S STATE VISIT TO JAPAN WHICH BEGINS ON 8 OCTOBER.

4. I HAVE TAKEN ACTION ON YOUR PARAGRAPHS 2.

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MR HARDING

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YOUR TELNO 182 : YOUR MEETING WITH THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER

1. WHEN YOU MEET BRIGADIER (AIR MARSHAL) PASTOR AT THE UNGA, I BELIEVE YOU WILL FIND THAT, ON THE FALKLANDS, HE WILL BE SATISFIED IF HE CAN OBTAIN FROM YOU A REAFFIRMATION OF YOUR INTENTION TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE THROUGH NEGOTIATION AND A PROVISIONAL DATE FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT HE IS UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE MILITARY JUNTA TO ACHIEVE MORE THAN THIS AT PRESENT.

2. HE MAY WISH TO DISCUSS THE EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS BUT SEEMS UNLIKELY TO RAISE ECONOMIC RELATIONS. HOWEVER, AND SUBJECT TO DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN 24 AND 25 SEPTEMBER, YOU MAY WISH TO DO SO IN ORDER TO EMphaSISE THE WILLINGNESS AND CAPACITY OF BRITISH INDUSTRY TO PLAY A PART IN ARGENTINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND YOUR HOPE THAT INDUSTRY (SEC) CAN PARTICIPATE IN THE ARGENTINE NUCLEAR PROGRAMME IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE CANADIANS.

3. PASTOR IS REGARDED HERE AS WELL MEANING BUT INEFFECTUAL AND IS LIABLE TO BE UPSTAGED OR OVERRULED BY THE JUNTA ON MAJOR ISSUES. HOWEVER, HE IS THE PRESIDENT'S BROTHER-IN-LAW, HAS THIS WEEK RECEIVED HERE THE AUSTRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND HE WILL BE ACCOMPANYING VIDELA ON THE LATTER'S STATE VISIT TO JAPAN WHICH BEGINS ON 6 OCTOBER.

4. I HAVE TAKEN ACTION ON YOUR PARAGRAPH 2.

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RECORD OF THE FIRST MEETING BETWEEN MINISTER OF STATE AND THE
ARGENTINE UNDER-SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT THE MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BUENOS AIRES, 26 JULY 1979, 4.45 pm

Present:

The Hon Nicholas Ridley MP
Mr H W Carless CMG
Mr J S Chick
Mr S M J Butler-Madden
Mr K D Temple
Mr R H Goyne

Comodoro Carlos Cavándoli
Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rosas
Comodoro Carlos Bloomer-Reeve
Sr Angel Oliveri López
Sr Fernando Tegnín
Sr Sola

1. Comodoro Cavándoli opened by introducing his team of officials. He explained that Foreign Minister Pastor would see Mr Ridley in an hour and suggested that in the meantime the reinstatement of Ambassadors and the Falkland Islands be discussed. Because of Mr Ridley's delayed return to Buenos Aires there was little time to spare.

2. He outlined the moves made during 1979 towards the restoration of Ambassadors. When in London he had made a formal proposal for restitution and been given a letter for Brigadier Pastor from Lord Carrington. Comodoro Bloomer-Reeve had subsequently been to London to explain the Argentine attitude on the level of Ambassadors and the desire to effect an exchange as soon as possible. The Argentine Government understood that it would take 3 or 4 months for HMG to find a new nominee. They agreed that the communiqué at the end of Mr Ridley's visit should refer to the resumption of relations at ambassadorial level. When HMG were ready the Argentine Government would put forward their request for agreement for their nominee. He asked for Mr Ridley's views on the next steps.

3. Mr Ridley thanked Comodoro Cavándoli for receiving him, for helping with his travel arrangements to the Falklands, and in particular for rescuing him, by sending a special plane, from the bad weather of Comodoro Rivadavia.

4. He agreed with Comodoro Cavándoli's account of the exchanges to date and was ready to issue a joint communiqué announcing agreement in principle to exchange Ambassadors. It was unfortunate that news of this agreement had appeared in the Argentine newspapers and sad that the fact that Mr Carless was not to be Ambassador had leaked. This leak had caused the British to hesitate. He hoped that exchanges between the two parties could be kept confidential; he had a letter

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for Brigadier Pastor from Lord Carrington and it would be most
unfortunate if its contents were to reach the press. The personal
life of Mr Carless had to be considered; he had been an excellent
Chargé in Buenos Aires and the suggestion that he was not acceptable
as Ambassador was unfortunate for him personally. It would have
been nicer if the British Government had been able to post him,
probably to another capital as Ambassador, without this fuss.

5. Comodoro Cavándoli understood Mr Ridley's concern. He wished to
make clear how much he regretted the public exposure. The Foreign
Ministry knew of some of the sources which had made the affair
public and regretted that they had not followed the correct form.
As had been said before, the Argentine Government had the highest
opinion of Mr Carless and hoped that the reasons for their position
were understood. The Argentine press were quick to take up this
issue and some people used it for the wrong reasons and objectives.
He understood the need for confidentiality and claimed that it was not
the Foreign Ministry or the Argentine Government who had been
responsible for making the issue public.

6. Mr Ridley hoped that both governments would be able to make
clear their opinion of Mr Carless and repair the damage done. Apart
from announcing the agreement to restore Ambassadors through the
joint communiqué he had arranged for a question to be asked in
Parliament as it rose for the summer recess the following day. He
did not know how long it would take to find a suitable candidate for
Ambassador but perhaps one could be found by the end of the year.
In the meantime Mr Carless would be left in Buenos Aires as Chargé
d'Affaires. When the time came Ambassador Ortiz de Rosas would be
welcomed in London and in the meantime the British side would keep
his nomination confidential.

7. Comodoro Cavándoli said that the Argentine request for
agreement would be held back but he wanted to be sure of the agreement
in principle to exchange Ambassadors.

8. There followed some discussion on the form of the communiqué
and it was agreed to leave it over until the following day's session.

9. Ambassador Ortiz de Rosas said he wished to make the point that
the Foreign Ministry had taken all measures to protect the name of
Mr Carless. When the newspaper "La Nación" published the story (on
22 July) the Foreign Ministry had put out a denial for the sakes of
both Mr Carless and himself. Mr Ridley hoped that the source of
the leak could be discovered.

10. Comodoro Cavándoli suggested that the subject of the exchange
of Ambassadors had been covered; the Argentines would expect a name
by the end of the year and the timing of the nominations should be
contemporary though not necessarily simultaneous. Mr Ridley

/explained
explained that in referring to the end of the year he had no particular date in mind. Comodoro Cavándoli believed that bilateral relations would not realise their full potential until Ambassadors were reinstated. He asked that all efforts be made to bring forward the date and said that in the absence of Ambassadors important matters referred to in Lord Carrington's letter could not be carried forward. Mr Ridley agreed but pointed out that it was not the British Government who had withdrawn Ambassadors, and that the delay was due to the Argentine inability to accept Mr Carless.

11. Comodoro Cavándoli believed that all possible efforts should be made to improve bilateral relations. Mr Ridley reciprocated the feeling, pointing out that he had come to Argentina before any other major country. Comodoro Cavándoli recalled that his discussions in London had brought out certain common themes, including the need for parallel progress on economic and political relations. Argentina had a demand for sovereignty (over the Falkland Islands) that needed to be met. Martínez de Hoz had put forward ideas for economic cooperation when in London in May. Comodoro Cavándoli thought that there were five years in which to work. Mr Ridley agreed that it was time for the two countries to discuss much and that they had a number of mutual interests. Many British people lived in Argentina; Britain did substantial trade with Argentina. He was convinced that much more could be done. Britain could also help on technical matters. He would like to include all these aspects in any negotiations.

12. The two countries also had a common interest in the Antarctic seas and continent. Britain and Argentina should have a common position on scientific exploration and exploitation which would cover maritime rights and even the search for oil.

13. On the Falkland Islands HMG believed it was right to talk about the dispute and his visit to the Falklands had convinced him of this. The basic ground rule was that any solution had to be acceptable to the Islanders. His discussions in the Islands had made him believe that some solution was just possible, but both sides needed to make concessions. The dispute was to the disadvantage of all three countries. In New York at the end of September Lord Carrington and Brigadier Pastor might start to plan how negotiations could take place. Feelings in the Falkland Islands ran high and it would be infinitely easier if discussions could be entirely private. He was sure that all aspects should be discussed at the same time and was ready to do so any time after the Foreign Ministers had met. The dispute was, however, one of the most difficult anywhere in the world.

14. Comodoro Cavándoli said he shared Mr Ridley's ideas and believed that negotiations need not wait until Ambassadors were reinstated. A meeting between the Foreign Ministers in September would be a good opportunity and the Argentines believed that a preparatory meeting between himself and Mr Ridley could be useful. He agreed with

/Mr Ridley's
Mr Ridley's insistence on privacy; this would also help to reduce public interest. Mr Ridley had no objection in principle to a preparatory meeting but the timing would be difficult. He needed to report to Lord Carrington and discuss the issue in the light of his visit to the Falklands and by the time he returned to Britain on 8 August it would be holiday time. If a preparatory meeting was not possible then they could meet in October or whenever was convenient to the Argentines. It was important that the British side had time to clear their thoughts before entering on discussions.

15. Senor Oliveri López took up Mr Ridley's reference to the Antarctic. The Anglo/Argentine relationship over the Antarctic had been fluid and fruitful. During the Buenos Aires meeting on the Living Resources Convention the claimant States had agreed a position which resulted from a British initiative. The other aspects, that is oil and fishing, would be an important part of negotiations in September or October. Mr Ridley feared that if Britain and Argentina did not establish a close relationship over Antarctic matters they would both lose out. There were possibilities for an Anglo/Argentine partnership into which Chile might be brought later.

16. Comodoro Cavándoli then left to consult Brigadier Pastor. In his absence Ambassador Ortiz de Rosas emphasised that since 1965 very little had been said publicly by either side about the negotiations. The problem was press speculation. Mr Ridley said that his only public statement in the Falklands had been his interview on the local radio. Anything else that might appear would be speculative.

17. On the return of Comodoro Cavándoli, there was some discussion as to where a meeting preparatory to the Foreign Ministers' meeting might be held and Comodoro Cavándoli said he would prefer New York or Geneva.

18. Comodoro Cavándoli and Mr Ridley agreed that their second session might include discussion of the EEC, trade, Vietnamese refugees, events in Africa, the new Caribbean States, Nicaragua and perhaps Human Rights. Mr Ridley felt it was better not to say too much about the Falkland Islands until the negotiations re-started.

19. The meeting finished at 6.00 pm.
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1. Those present were the same as for the earlier meeting on 26 July except that Councillor Carlos Tecco of the MFA's International Economic Co-operation Department was also present.

2. Mr Ridley opened on the subject of Vietnamese refugees. He was pleased that the Geneva Conference had gone well and that there had been a large increase in the number of families accepted for resettlement. He was delighted that Argentina had decided to take 1,000 families. Even the Falklands were doing their bit and, although the information was still confidential, had decided to take ten families. A very large number of refugees had landed in Hong Kong and many had not been accepted anywhere. The colony was already overcrowded and if Argentina could take a proportion of their 1,000 families from Hong Kong it would be much appreciated. Comodoro Cavándoli said that Argentina had made the best offer for resettlement of all the South American countries. The offer had the backing of the Argentine people; he had received many calls from Argentines wanting to help with resettlement or offering jobs. But in setting up colonies of new immigrants which might be in the border areas of the country, Argentina had to select the people carefully. If a suitable selection process could be organised a further increase in numbers might well be possible. The MFA were in touch with their Consul-General in Hong Kong and, if maximum help could be given with selecting the refugees, it would be quite possible for a large number of the 1,000 families to come from Hong Kong. He believed that selection in Hong Kong would be easier than elsewhere because better facilities existed there.

3. Mr Ridley was grateful. He knew that the Argentine delegation to the Geneva Conference had spoken with the Governor of Hong Kong, that facilities existed in Hong Kong for finding the most suitable families and was sure that the Governor would be ready to make arrangements. Ambassador Ortiz de Rosas asked about the background of the refugees. Mr Ridley believed they covered all trades including craftsmen, shopkeepers and middle-men. They were mostly of Chinese descent but the number of Vietnamese was substantial. Amongst the refugees in Malaysia they amounted to 40%. Before the exodus finished the total numbers could reach 1 or 2 million.

4. Comodoro Cavándoli understood that the Geneva Conference had looked at the problem in humanitarian terms. It was also necessary to solve the political problem otherwise further reprisals by the Vietnamese in the future could lead to a renewed exodus. Mr Ridley

/believed

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believed there had been some condemnation of Vietnam at Geneva. Pressure was best applied through Moscow although, when Mrs Thatcher had raised the problem there with Kosygin, the latter seemed to have dismissed the problem.

5. Ambassador Ortiz de Rosas thought it would be useful to exchange information with the UK about the wider aspects of the problem; within the Non-Aligned movement Argentina could be a moderating influence. Mr Ridley said he would be very pleased if Argentina would do so, and point the finger at Vietnam in the Non-Aligned summit thus focusing the attention of the Non-Aligned movement on this issue rather than issues such as Rhodesia. In their approach the Non-Aligned movement seemed far from non-aligned.

6. Mr Ridley invited Mr Carless to speak on human rights. Mr Carless said that human rights had been discussed by the EEC Heads of Mission with senior members of the Argentine Government including Comodoro Cavandoli. The meetings were useful and frank and at the last meeting the Heads of Mission had noted positive factors and trends, a reduction in the number detained and arrangements in hand for the reception of an OAS mission. Britain fortunately had much fewer individual nationals involved than some other EEC countries. There was only one in prison, Miss Daisy Hobson, who had been convicted and whose case was under judicial review. He was pleased that the review was taking place.

7. Comodoro Cavandoli did not know personally of Miss Hobson’s case but hoped that it could be solved quickly. The Argentine Government were very grateful for the British Government’s attitude and their understanding of the issue as a whole. The Argentines had to learn to live with the problem and to solve it. Mr Ridley hoped for good news about Daisy Hobson. The lobbyists in Britain would maintain their attitude and he felt he must warn the Argentine Government that there would be criticism in the UK at the proposed improvement in Anglo/ Argentine relations.

8. Comodoro Cavandoli said that arrangements were being made for a visit by the Human Rights Commission of the OAS in September. Only the Argentines knew the background to the problem; they must solve it, not because of outside pressures, but for their own sake. The country did not have facilities to handle 5,000 court cases in a few months but great efforts were being made. As a secondary consideration they were well aware of the influence of the problem on their bilateral and multilateral relations. Mr Ridley shared the view that clearing the existing cases were desirable. It would be infinitely easier to improve bilateral relations as the problem was solved. He had noted the progress already made and once Ambassadors were reinstated the greater the progress, the easier would be all bilateral relations including the Falkland Islands and related subjects.
9. Mr Ridley asked for Argentine views on improving economic relations. Ambassador Ortiz de Rosas believed that there were many possibilities and the affinities between the economic policies of the new government in Britain and the Argentine Government would greatly help. 100 years ago when Argentina was in the midst of difficulties the UK took a great step by establishing the railways. Unfortunately in Argentina, as elsewhere in Latin America, the British presence had fallen in recent years. But Argentina believed that the time had come when economic relations could be revitalised. Mr Ridley said that the greatest importance was attached to economic relations with Latin America. He hoped that the new British Government's policies would permit an improvement in these relations. Over the previous few years Britain had been consuming more of her production than she should. There had not been enough left over for export and thus delivery dates were late and exporters showed a lack of interest. It was interesting that Britain had recently done better abroad in construction contracts or by installing equipment bought elsewhere. The Government's intention was to free resources for export by savage public expenditure cuts. In addition they had removed controls on the export of capital, except for portfolio investments, which opened new possibilities for investment. He was aware of the increasing number of British Trade Missions to Argentina and the London Seminar in May had been successful. He would be happy to see such events repeated.

10. Comodoro Cavándoli said that Argentina had introduced a new investment law two years earlier and was making every effort to increase trade. But in trade relations with Britain the Falkland Islands question would always play a part.

11. Mr Ridley raised the nuclear project. He understood that Argentina might be seeking a general agreement in this field. Britain had much to offer. He knew there was a problem with the Canadians but had already asked that action be taken to avoid a repetition of the problem. If the Canadians and GEC obtained the contract, Britain was ready to help Argentina across the field. Comodoro Cavándoli said that negotiations on the nuclear contract were fairly far forward. The Canadians and GEC were in the running and from his knowledge of the subject he believed the only concern to be about safeguards. The decision rested with the President's Office which was now responsible for the whole subject. Ambassador Ortiz de Rosas confirmed that there was a problem with the Canadians which was causing delay. British abilities were well known and a partnership with Britain could be beneficial. On safeguards public statements by Argentina, for example at the UN, had provided complete security. He believed that a mutually acceptable formula could be found. Eventually Argentina might be in a position to join the Club of London.

12. Mr Ridley was sure that the difficulties could be ironed out in negotiations and accepted the assurances that Argentina did not wish to enter into the production of material for nuclear weapons.
13. Senor Oliveri López took up Mr Ridley’s offer in the previous meeting to talk about the EEC and wondered whether he had been referring to the organisation’s relevance to the Falkland Islands negotiations or more generally. Mr Ridley explained that his reference had been in a general sense. Trade matters would be increasingly channelled through the EEC in the future. Did the Argentines have any questions about this? Senor Oliveri Lopez said that the Argentines knew Britain’s position in the GSP negotiations and wished for access for the widest possible range of Argentine goods. On the EEC’s role in the Falkland Islands negotiations he was pleased to see that Britain’s membership of the Community would not affect British competence in the proposed fishing scheme.

14. Discussion followed on the draft communiqué put forward by the Argentines, some amendments were made and the final clearance of the text was left until lunch.

15. Finally Comodoro Cavándoli thanked Mr Ridley for their discussions and expressed the hope that they would meet again soon. Mr Ridley hoped that their meeting would lead to a greater phase of Anglo/ Argentine co-operation. He was sorry to have been late returning to Buenos Aires but grateful for the way in which the timetable had been re-arranged.

16. The meeting finished at 1 p.m.

Circulation

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News Department
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Buenos Aires
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Research Department
Mr Cowling
South America Dept.

ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS

1. You may be amused to see the attached article (from the Review of the River Plate of 31 July which has just reached us) about a few unsolved riddles, i.e. the Falklands problem and the 'ugly little performance' concerning the status of the change. On the former, it seems to me that the Review, like a good many of its readers, consistently underestimates the strength of feeling among the islanders themselves about the question of sovereignty.

9. A. Penney

J A PENNEY
American Section
Research Dept.

3 September 1979

To Davie

You may wish to see.
not subject, but local industrialists are nevertheless better off with the low-cost fuels than without them.

THE ECONOMIC PROGRAMME
Gradualism in Reverse

As remarked in our political note, the economic plan now in force is due for reconsideration and possible revision, before the end of the year; the Minister Dr. Martinez de Hoz, stated this at the 37th. Anniversary Luncheon of the Business and Marketing Management Association (ADECO), during the course of a seventy minute session replying to written questions previously submitted by members. One of the most interesting answers concerned indexation. We have always been aware, from the very first day, that this system can cause trouble if it is not confined to isolated sectors, and that the moment it becomes generalised, it can bring with it the danger of institutional inflation, or become a factor for feeding existing inflation.” There was a need to “reject against this technique and proceed towards gradual disinflation.” There were two major contributors towards inflation, apart from indexation. One was the external sector, and the other the pressure upon the economy of the public works programme. much of which had been inherited from the previous regime, and had to be finished. There was an almost inevitable contradictory attitude involved here. The public wanted, richly, telephones that worked, a decent road system and an adequate supply of electricity, etc. But since none of these services had been kept up to date, any effort to meet this demand called for more expenditure than the economy was able to support, and the result was inevitably inflationary. There had been widespread misinterpretation of Dr. Alemann’s recent remarks, which had been taken as an attitude of resignation towards living with inflation. What was meant was, that certain political decisions having been taken on April 2, 1976, they had to be followed through by other political decisions, all the time, and there had to be coherence between decisions taken by the government, and what the public opinion was asking for. In the end, inflation depended upon the availability of resources and the demands made upon them.

It is difficult to summarise so lengthy a session, the more so since the answers were given but not the questions. It is also easy enough to extract facile conclusions by generalising from specific replies. For example, “there is a general idea that the process of turning State controlled companies over to private enterprise has not gone on fast enough.” But this was now completed, in the cases of companies that had previously been national, had been taken over because they had collapsed, and in the cases of total bankrupt; it was the judicial process that had taken time.

The Minister could barely have killed two birds with one stone by saying that vast State-owned factories that ate money were outside his control, and that these were being increased by such projects as SINDINA, or that Municipal motorways and car parks, apart from destroying houses and making the lives of those “privileged” to live near such obnoxious works a misery, were a highly inflationary addition to demand, but it appears that he might have meant this.

There will be much satisfaction over the possible selective ending of indexation – provided this does not mean that taxes will always be indexed, and official debts to suppliers and taxpayers will not. Anyway, the basic message is that economic policy is under constant consideration, the major effort has already been made, “and I am sure that the final triumph is not too far distant.”

ISLAND DIPLOMACY
And Some Unsolved Riddles

Mr. Nicholas Ridley, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, has just returned from a visit to the Falkland Islands, where he has been acquainting himself with the nature of the problem, in the physical and demographic sense, and the views of the islanders about Argentine claims. He is not the first Minister to do so, and if present attitudes do not change considerably, he will not be the last. As long as the British Government takes the line that the islands cannot possibly be handed over (back) to Argentina, without the approval of the inhabitants, it is very difficult to see what progress can be made at ministerial level. Admittedly, a great deal can still be done lower down in the form of easier communications with the mainland, scholarships at Argentine schools, and a mass of other administrative actions that would make life on the islands less bleak and more in keeping with the nearby presence of a rich neighbour who at present appears to the islanders as a threat rather than a Potential fairy godmother, and one that increases the sense of isolation.

Argentina wants sovereignty, and does not seem particularly interested in such mundane details as how, and what pace, economic co-operation leading to eventual integration should take place, with, on this view, sovereignty being the last piece in the jigsaw puzzle to fall into place. It is quite easy to demonstrate that in the modern world, where all actions interact, there is no such creature as a sovereign state and hence that sovereignty does not exist, except as an empty concept. Transfer of sovereignty might therefore seem to be a gesture that would cost the islanders very little, but might merely lead to neglect because there would be no incentive to do any more for them. If Argentina were a little more flexible on this, she might get what she wants quicker.

The atmosphere of negotiations has not been improved by the strange rumour published in a normally impeccably well-informed newspaper that the Argentine Government had refused its place at the REVIEW OF THE RIVER PLATE, July 31, 1979

Mexico and Caribbean Department

CONFIDENTIAL
for the appointment of Mr. Hugh Carless, the Chargé d'Affaires, as ambassador if and when normal relations with the United Kingdom are resumed. This was later printed as news in other papers, but has now been roundly denied. There has been much speculation about who planted the story and why, with a kind of consensus of opinion forming that the real object of the attack was Dr. Carlos Ortiz de Rosas, the leading candidate for the Argentine embassy in London. If so, whoever it was appears to have succeeded for the moment. This ugly little performance has set the ambassador question back by at least six months, and this is another example of how mistaken tactics can delay the achievement of desired objectives. The claim that Mr. Carless was not senior enough to be ambassador in Argentina is not only absurd but is evidently a mere smoke screen—and no one knows for what purpose. His arrival here constituted the first occasion in British diplomatic history on which a Chargé d'Affaires has been appointed to succeed another Chargé d'Affaires and the evident intention was his subsequent formal promotion to a substantive rank that he holds anyway.

There is no obvious connexion between the Ministerial visit and the planted newspaper story, but in both cases insistence on form rather than substance is delaying desired (and desirable) objectives being reached.
NEW ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR

1. You will remember that some time in June I told you that a prominent Argentine friend of mine, Mr Arthur Edbrooke, who was in London at the time and is a close friend and adviser of the Argentine Minister of Economy, would be seeing Dr Martinez de Hoz soon after his return to Buenos Aires, and asked if we wished to send any message about the question of an exchange of ambassadors. You agreed that Mr Edbrooke could tell Dr Martinez de Hoz that if the Argentines were to propose an exchange of ambassadors they would be pushing at an opening door. I duly conveyed this to Mr Edbrooke. I have just returned from leave to find a letter waiting from him about this matter. I realise that this is now mostly water under the bridge but you may be interested in certain passages of his letter nevertheless.

2. The letter, which is dated 6 July, reads as follows:

"Just a line to tell you that last night the "Round Table" reunion [a small English/Argentine diner club of which I was a member] was held at Joe's [Dr Martinez de Hoz] flat .......

At one stage, before the crowd arrived, I had a chat with him and passed on the message you asked me to convey to him (without actually identifying you as the source, though I did say I had been with you in London) about the favourable climate in London for a restoration of diplomatic relations back to normality. I told him that I had found in the UK a large measure of goodwill towards Argentina in business and banking circles and that I was given to believe, on high authority, that this was also true at the F.O. after the change of Government. I told him that Argentina can do with all the friends she can muster abroad and he agreed. He said that he too had found a favourable climate in London and he told me the appointment of a new Argentine Ambassador (Ortiz de Rosas) has been agreed. You no doubt know this - Ortiz de Rosas is one of Argentina's top ranking diplomats and I for one am glad to see the job hasn't been given to some retired military type.

Joe said that of course the Islands are still a hot issue but he felt the long term solution lies in economic cooperation in the area between the two countries - I was delighted to hear him say this as I have for long held this view."

J W R Shakespeare
Mexico and Caribbean Department
Question of status

THE integration of the populated islands of the South Atlantic with the mainland is in everyone's interest. Britain will not be able to administer the islands if calls the Falklands for ever and independence is not a viable solution for the islanders, regardless of the question of sovereignty. It makes good sense, both economically and socially — and, even strategically, in an increasingly insecure world — from everyone's point of view to find a solution to an issue that has harmed Anglo-Argentine relations for far too long and has kept the Falklands living in isolation. The principal concern, of course, in all negotiations (and this should apply to Argentina as much as Britain) must be the wellbeing of the islanders. They are the most important natural resource, more valuable by far than the other legendary riches beneath the sea, whether fish protein or oil and minerals.

Mr Nicholas Ridley,Mrs Thatcher's assistant foreign secretary for Latin American affairs, is returning today from the Falkland Islands where he has been sounding out the "Kelpers" on the future. In Britain, it is the future of the settlers, not sovereignty and certainly not economic resources, which is politically important. No British government — and least of all a Conservative administration — could afford to appear indifferent to the wishes of the islanders who, in an overwhelming majority, will have told Mr Ridley that they want to remain British. The solution to the long-standing problem — the only remaining bone of contention in the long Anglo-Argentine love-hate relationship— calls for a degree of tact, diplomacy and common sense which is rare enough. With the present threat of aggressively nationalistic attitudes from all parties, it is a remarkable tribute to the Argentine and British diplomats who have been handling the issue since the thaw began almost a decade ago that so much progress has been made towards a solution that will resolve the islanders' fears and realize the islanders' economic potential without destroying their peace and wild beauty.

Mr Ridley's visit here underlines the existing opportunity to re-establish relations at ambassadorial level and pick up again the lost momentum in reaching an understanding over the islands' future. It would be a tragedy if misinformation or a misunderstanding of the status of the current British representative should set the islanders' integration back once again. The British Charge d'Affaires, Mr Hugh Carless, chose Buenos Aires post in preference to an ambassadorial posting in another South American country. He did so because, as head of the Latin American department of the foreign office, he realized the importance of this country — and the challenge of the job to be done here — and fully expected relations to be re-established at ambassadorial level, with himself as head of mission. It is ironic that during a debate in parliament, where the decision to restore ambassadorial relations was discussed, criticism of the move by critics of alleged human rights violations in Argentina was overcome by pointing out Mr Carless's outstanding qualifications for the job. Fortunately, reports that the Argentine foreign ministry — acting, presumably, on mistaken ideas about status or because of a lack of information — has sacrificed the opportunity to appoint an ambassador to the Court of St James's by not granting Mr Carless's place have been denied.
With the compliments of

CHANCERY

BRITISH EMBASSY
BUENOS AIRES

Made 3 calls at the Foreign Ministry: Chief de Cabinet of the Foreign Office, the Political Director, and of the Falklands and Antarctica and Head of Western European Affairs together. Subsequently he had a lunch with Oliveri López.

It is worth recording some of the events discussed during the call. They included the overthrow of Somoza’s regime in Nicaragua. They also saw some changes in some of the Lesser Antilles as possibly part of a common threat in the Caribbean region. Lupiz and Bloomer-Reeve showed themselves to be at a loss to understand the foreign policy of President Carter.

3. There was also discussion of Peruvian foreign policy. Lupiz and Bloomer-Reeve indicated that the Argentine government was following closely the Peruvian approach towards the Non-Aligned Summit. They thought the Peruvians might be trying to use the Non-Aligned movement as a counter to United States influence over them. Mr Harding drew a distinction between the attitude of the new Peruvian Foreign Minister and the Peruvian President, Bermudez Morales. The former had a robust attitude and was likely to take a firm line over some of the ideas likely to be put up at the summit. The President, however, was more easily influenced by the concept of promoting a new Economic Order through the Non-Aligned Movement.

4. Over lunch Oliveri López said he had taken heart at the reference in Mr Ridley’s latest message to Comodoro Cavandoli, (sent after the Minister of State’s visit to Buenos Aires), to the Minister’s belief that the British commitment to the wishes of the Islanders did not close the door to a settlement. In response to a question from Mr Harding about the timing of any changes that might be agreed in negotiations, Oliveri López said that it would be negotiable.

CONFIDENTIAL
NOTE ON MR HARDING’S CALLS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, FRIDAY 24 AUGUST

1. On 24 August Mr Harding made 3 calls at the Foreign Ministry: on Comodoro Bloomer-Reeve, Chef de Cabinet of the Foreign Minister, Ambassador Ortiz de Rosas (in the absence of Comodoro Cavándoli) and on Ambassador Lupiz, the Political Director, Ambassador Oliveri López, Head of the Falklands and Antarctic Department and Minister Ruben Vela, Head of Western European Department. He saw the last 3 together. Subsequently he had lunch with Ambassador Oliveri López.

2. Little of substance was discussed during the call on Ambassador Ortiz de Rosas but it is worth recording some of the points made by Bloomer-Reeve, Lupiz and Oliveri López. Both Bloomer-Reeve and López expressed grave concern at recent events in Nicaragua. The dangers of the new regime there have been brought home to the Argentine Government, they said, by the way in which Montonero leaders, notably Firmenich, had appeared in Managua and made public statements. The Montoneros had also been able to operate a radio station from within Costa Rica beaming propaganda against the Argentine Government to the region. The Argentines feared for the political future of El Salvador and Guatemala following the overthrow of Somoza's regime in Nicaragua. They also saw recent changes and discontent in some of the Lesser Antilles as possibly part of a common threat in the Caribbean region. Lupiz and Bloomer-Reeve showed themselves to be at a loss to understand the foreign policy of President Carter.

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/5/
5. Possibilities for the next round of negotiations were discussed briefly, Oliveri López pointing out that the Argentines were still waiting for an answer to Comodoro Cavándoli’s suggestion that he might meet Mr Ridley before the Foreign Ministers met at the end of September. Mr Harding suggested that it might be useful if he and Oliveri López met informally after the Foreign Ministers' meeting but a few weeks before a round of negotiations between Mr Ridley and Comodoro Cavándoli. As to the venues for meetings, whether between officials or at Minister of State level, the possibility of meeting in London or Buenos Aires was discussed but it was agreed that New York and a European conference centre such as Geneva remained the best bets.

BUENOS AIRES

31 August 1979

Distribution:
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26 July 1979

Mr Michael Grylls (North West Surrey): To ask the Lord Privy Seal, if he will make a statement on normalisation of our diplomatic relations with Argentina.

No 258W

SIR IAN GILMOUR

During his current visit to Buenos Aires, my hon. Friend the Minister of State discussed the question of relations between our two countries with the Argentine Government. Both Governments have now agreed on the need to restore relations to Ambassadorial level and will be seeking agreement for their respective candidates in due course.

Mr Polandson 30/7

To Overseas 27/7

27/7
WRITTEN ANSWER

The Baroness Emmet of Amberley to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will make a statement on normalisation of their diplomatic relations with Argentina.

ANSWER

During his current visit to Buenos Aires, my Hon Friend, the Minister of State discussed the question of relations between our two countries with the Argentine Government. Both Governments have now agreed on the need to restore relations to Ambassadorial level and will be seeking agreement for their respective candidates in due course.
Pay Beds in Hospitals

[LORDS]

 Lords. COL. 4Q1
 Nº 20
 3 July 79
 Cols. 222-224

 Lord HARMAR-NICHOLLS: My Lords, what has happened to them?

 Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE: My Lords, I am afraid that I cannot answer that question, because many of those pay beds were under-used at the time. Most of the pay beds which have been phased out were phased out on account of the fact that they were little used.

 Lord WALLACE of COSLANY: My Lords, the noble Lord said that so much money would be lost if pay beds were abolished. Could he tell the House how much the average pay bed costs the country in provision of staff, nurses, doctors, facilities, and what have you?

 Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE: My Lords, I am afraid I cannot. I can say that, of the £29 million-odd that the NHS received, a good deal would of course go in providing the service. There would be some profit on it, but not a very great one. On the other hand, if all the pay beds were phased out, those beds would have to be otherwise financed.

 Lord ORR-ERWING: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend to press the Government to proceed with legislation? It seems ridiculous to continue with an old, out-of-date policy which is against the present elected Government's Manifesto, particularly denying the money which comes from pay beds when modern equipment such as body scanners have to be closed down and sold off because hospitals do not now have the money to keep them equipped. This is a waste of effort and is totally unnecessary. Will legislation be coming forward fairly soon to reverse the policy of getting rid of pay-beds?

 Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE: My Lords, consultation is now going on and we are awaiting publication of the report of the Royal Commission on the National Health Services which is due to come out this month. Before that is seen and consultations have taken place no further decisions will be taken.

 Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, the Minister said that £29 million would have been the figure to be received by the Government. Would he agree that it would be dependent on whether the pay beds in existence at that particular time had been in full use?

 Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE: That is correct, my Lords.

 RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA

 2.44 p.m.

 Baroness EMMET of AMBERLEY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

 The Question was as follows:

 To ask Her Majesty's Government what progress is being made with the normalisation of our diplomatic representation with the Argentine.

 Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, We are actively considering the level of our relations with Argentina. Our decision will be announced in due course.

 Baroness EMMET of AMBERLEY: My Lords, may I suggest to the noble Lord—

 Several noble Lords: No!

 Baroness EMMET of AMBERLEY: My Lords, may I ask the Minister to consider that while there are certain differences between the Argentinians and ourselves, those difficulties would be much better handled and solved if we had an ambassador there who would give us a certain status which at the moment we do not have?

 Lord TREFGARNE: I think my noble friend is quite right, my Lords, and that is why we are actively reconsiderng our policy in this matter.

 Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, may I ask the Minister to accept from this side of the House—perhaps I might put this in an interrogatory form—the full support of the Opposition for the earliest possible resumption of normal diplomatic relations with a country with which we have had for some centuries ties of close friendship, both commercial and cultural? Perhaps from this House might go to our Argentinian friends, as proof...
of our desire to resume these relations, the face that the ambassador designate in Buenos Aires is an officer of the highest credentials, of great experience of Latin America and of great personal friendship for the Argentine itself.

Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Lord for that helpful observation. I think we are actually continuing the policy of the previous Administration in this matter.

Lord MORRIS: My Lords, may I ask the Minister to be good enough to confirm that approaches were made by the Argentinian Government as long ago as February/March of this year, and would he further confirm that the reason for the delay can in no way be attributed either to the Argentinian Government's or to Her Majesty's Government's using the appointment of an ambassador as a bargaining counter?

Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, of course we already have diplomatic representation at a lower level in Buenos Aires, but the appointment of an ambassador is an important matter and not to be rushed.

Lord AVEBURY: My Lords, is the Minister aware that on 19th June Members of both Houses received a deputation of the mothers of the Plaza de Mayo who were here to plead on behalf of the 15,000 persons who have disappeared in Argentina since the coup of March 1976 and whose relatives have been kept in ignorance as to what has happened to them? Would the Government, notwithstanding any change in the level of diplomatic representation in Buenos Aires, press for this matter to be laid before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights under the Article 1503 procedure as a gross and persistent violation of human rights? Will the Minister assert on behalf of the Government that the restoration of diplomatic representation at ambassadorial level is in no way to be taken as a derogation of the horror that the British people feel at the continued atrocities committed against the people of Argentina by the State?

Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, our approval or disapproval of human rights considerations in various countries of the world does not necessarily affect our decision to appoint or otherwise the ambassador. If we took that as a criterion we should have hardly any ambassadors anywhere.

Viscount MONTGOMERY of ALAMEIN: My Lords, would the noble Lord not agree that the fact that there are more than half a million citizens of British descent living in Argentina, who are all God-fearing citizens, and the fact that there is great opportunity for trade and investment in the revived economic climate, give added reason to have an ambassador at an early date?

Lord TREFGARNE: That is certainly a special consideration, my Lords, but it is perhaps relevant and right for me to point out that the Argentine Government last year issued a decree calling on all religious organisations to register. Organisations which are considered a threat to public order, national security or Argentine morals or traditions may be refused registration and thus denied permission to practise. We are not very happy with that decision.

CHANNEL TUNNEL PROJECT

2.48 p.m.

Lord SWINFEN: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are giving any consideration to the construction of a Channel Tunnel.

The PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT (Lord Bellwin): My Lords, as noble Lords will be aware, a report prepared by the British Railways Board setting out the results of preliminary studies undertaken in conjunction with the French railways for a single-track rail-only Channel tunnel was published in February last. At the same time, the chairman of the board asked for an early indication of the Government's attitude. The Government are giving careful consideration to the board's proposals, but it is too early to say what view the Government will take of this new project.
CONFIDENTIAL

CFT 200
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BUENOS AIRES 41231732 AUG 79
TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY
TELEGRAM NUMBER 21 OF 31 AUGUST
AN TO PRIORITY FCDO
INFO PRIORITY PORT STANLEY

FOLLOWING FOR PS/ MR RIDLEY

FALKLANDS: RESPONSE TO THE ARGENTINE AIDE MEMOIRE

1. I WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE SWIFT RESPONSES (FCO TELEGRAM NO 147 TO ME AND BRASILIA TELEGRAM NO 144 TO FCDO) TO MY TELEGRAMS ABOUT THE AIDE MEMOIRE. I SHALL DELIVER THE MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO CAVANDOLI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT, BEFORE DOING SO, WISH TO SUGGEST AN AMENDMENT.

2. THE ARGENTINES ARE DEEPLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CHANCES OF ANY AGREEMENT BEING ACCEPTABLE TO THE ISLANDERS. MR RIDLEY'S MESSAGE AS IT STANDS, WHICH FIRMLY AND RIGHTLY RESTATES HMG'S COMMITMENT TO RESPECT THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS, MAY LEAD THE ARGENTINES TO PREPARE A STERILE PRESENTATION ON SOVEREIGNTY ON WELL WORN LINES FOR ANY AUTUMN MEETINGS, AT A TIME WHEN YOU WOULD WISH THEM TO BE PURSUING A MORE POSITIVE AND INNOVATIVE LINE.

3. I SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT THE MINISTER OF STATE'S MESSAGE MIGHT RE-STATE HIS BELIEF IN THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EVENTUAL SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE ISLANDERS. THE FOLLOWING COULD BE INSERTED BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND SENTENCES OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH:-

"QUO" BUT I WOULD STRESS THAT, ON THE BASIS OF MY VISIT TO THE ISLANDS, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT OUR COMMITMENT TO ISLANDER WISHES SHUTS THE DOOR TO SATISFACTORY SOLUTIONS TO THE WHOLE PROBLEM UNQUOTE.
ARGENTINA AND SIR DEREK ASHE

1. The Resident Clerk - quite rightly - woke me at 1 a.m. on Saturday, 28 July to tell me that Sir Derek Ashe (formerly HM Ambassador at Buenos Aires) had been telephoning her about the joint communique issued in Buenos Aires following Mr Ridley's talks there. Sir Derek claimed that he was being pressed by newspapers for comments on this before their deadlines and that he needed urgent guidance. The Resident Clerk told me that he had been irritable with her and that she would be grateful if I could telephone him, which I did.

2. Sir D Ashe told me that "the press" had read over to him the terms of the communique from BA and that "he had been asked whether he thought the communique was too bland and incomplete". Sir D Ashe talked hard at me for just on half an hour (until 1.45 a.m.) in the course of which the following points emerged.

3. Firstly, he had not in fact been approached by any newspapers with deadlines; he later modified his statement to saying that "all the news agencies" had been on to him but when pressed about which could only mention the Falkland Islands Committee (who are neither a newspaper nor an agency but a private organisation committed to "defending" the Falkland Islanders at the expense of Argentina).

4. Secondly, Sir D Ashe did not really want any guidance; he wanted to complain (a) because the communique had not reiterated the circumstances of his own withdrawal from BA and had not mentioned the "monstrous affront" of the Argentines towards himself (in this context he quoted to me at length from newspaper cuttings at the time); and (b) because the FCDO had not been consulting and briefing him about developments.

5. Thirdly, it transpired Sir D Ashe had already volunteered his opinion that the communique was "too bland, and incomplete".

6. I said that I had myself only learned the terms of the communique two or three hours earlier when the Resident Clerk had read these to me over the telephone. It was a joint communique which had been negotiated abroad, not drafted in London. There was no question therefore of us having been in a position to brief Sir D Ashe about the wording. In any case it struck me that the communique did not say anything which was startlingly new: the previous government had announced that in principle we would restore Ambassadors, and this statement merely confirmed that. I added that he might be sure that both Mr Ridley and News Department had been fully briefed about the history of our breach with Argentina. I did not myself ...
myself see any requirement to comment on the communiqué but obviously Sir D Ashe - as a retired senior member of the Service - would know how to deal with enquirers who might be seeking to enlist his support for their own purposes. I undertook to pass on what Sir D Ashe had said to me.

7. Sir D Ashe remained less than gruntled and muttered about talking to the PUS. He said that there seemed a determination to overlook what had happened and to rush back into cordiality with Argentina. I understand that his views have been well known for some time and that when Mr Ted Rowlands saw Sir D Ashe on his retirement on 29 January this year, the latter was told about the general lines of our dialogue with the Argentines. There was then no suggestion that he should be kept in detailed touch with our negotiations, and indeed some trouble was taken to avoid his involvement with these when he was in Geneva. I do not think any immediate action is required, but I thought you should be aware of this outburst in case you wished to have a word with Sir D Ashe at some later date yourself.

30 July, 1979

J B Ùre

Copies to:

Chief Clerk

Mrs S Wiseman (Resident Clerk)

Mr Elam (News Dept)
GRPS 195
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FM BUENOS AIRES 24/15447 JULY 1979
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 196 OF 24 JULY 1979
INFO IMMEDIATE PORT STANLEY

MY TELNO 196 : AMBASSADORS

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE MFA PRESS COMMUNIQUE ISSUED LATE ON 23 JULY AND REFERENCING TO THE LA NACION ARTICLE SUMMARISED IN MY TELNO 197.

QUOTE WITH REFERENCE TO AN ARTICLE THAT APPEARED IN A METROPOLITAN MORNING DAILY, BASED ON THE ALLEGED OFFICIAL PRESENTATION OF A REQUEST FOR AGREEMENT FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A FUTURE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO ARGENTINA, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WISHES TO STATE THAT SUCH INFORMATION IS NOT TRUE.

THE QUESTION OF UPGRADING OF THE RESPECTIVE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND THE RESTORATION OF AMBASSADORS REMAINS UNDER STUDY BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS, AND NO REQUEST FOR AGREEMENT HAS YET BEEN MADE. UNQUOTE

2. SEE MY DEDIP IFT.

CARLESS
FILES
SAM D.
POD
PS/PUS
S. L. P. PARSONS.
M. HALL
CHIEF CLERK.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

DESPLY 278888Z
FM BUENOS AIRES 262222Z JULY 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 195 OF 26 JULY 1979

FOR COWLING, SAMO FROM MURRAY

AMBASSADORS

1. OUR TELECON OF 26 JULY REFERS.

2. CAVANDOLI AND MR RIDLEY HAVE NOW AGREED TO ISSUE A COMMUNIQUE TOMORROW, 27 JULY, CONFIRMING THAT AMBASSADORS WILL BE EXchanged.

THE MINISTERS WILL SETTLE THE FINAL TEXT TOMORROW MORNING. THIS WILL BE SENT BY IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM.

CARLESS

FILES

SAM D
SIR A PARSONS
MR HALL

CONFIDENTIAL
Argentina

You will see from Mr. Winston's self-explanatory mind below that Lady Emmet will put down a Question for answer in the House on the same lines as that down for the Commons.

Raison Hussey.

Both this PQ and the one in the Commons have been suspended until S&ND give the word.

24 July, 1979

Copy to:
Mr Hall

The Govt Whip's Office will ask Baroness Emmet to put down a Question for written answer today: I have dictated the text. We can then reply to it tomorrow (as in the Commons).
ARGENTINA: EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS

1. Your minute of 20 July refers.

2. It has been agreed with the Argentines that the news of our decision to reinstate Ambassadors should be announced on 26 July when Mr Ridley will be in Buenos Aires. In accordance with Mr Ridley's wishes the Argentine announcement will be echoed in London via an inspired written PQ on the same day.

3. Baroness Emmet has persistently lobbied on behalf of the normalisation of relations with Argentina - her last intervention on this subject being on 3 July.

4. I now submit a draft letter for Lord Trefgarne's signature which, having regard to the timing of the announcement in Buenos Aires, might perhaps best issue on Friday, 27 July.

24 July, 1979

J B Ure
South America Department

Copy to:
Mr Hall

The Govt Whip's Office will ask Baroness Emmet to put down a Question for written answer today: I have dictated the text. We can then reply to it tomorrow (as in the Commons). 25/7
Mr Tre South America Dept

Baroness Emmet of Amberley questioned Lord Trefgarne last night on the subject of our diplomatic representation in Argentina. She does in fact have either a son or daughter living in Uruguay, so is interested in South America.

I would be grateful if a draft letter could be prepared for Lord Trefgarne's signature, giving Lady Emmet the current line on the likelihood of the exchange of Ambassadors.

20 July 1979

Maureen Howley
FOR RESIDENT CLERK: PLEASE PASS TO CWLING S&D, THIS EVENING IF POSSIBLE.

BY TEL NO 195

MINISTER OF STATE'S VISIT TO ARGENTINA: COMMUNIQUE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE TO BE ISSUED BY MFA AT 1944 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 27 JULY.

BEGIN:

CUSTED DURING HIS VISIT TO ARGENTINA, THE MINISTER OF STATE, MR NICHOLAS RIDLEY, ACCOMPANIED BY THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, MR. HUGH CARLESS, AND OFFICIALS, HELD FRIENDLY AND CONSTRUCTIVE WORKING MEETINGS WITH THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, COMODO CARLOS CAVANDOLI AND OFFICIALS OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON 26 AND 27 JULY.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE DISCUSSED, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE LEVEL OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION, AND TO POSSIBLE DATES AND FORMS OF THE NEXT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE HIGH EXPRESSED BY THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS THAT THEY MIGHT MEET IN NEW YORK DURING THE OPENING SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THERE WAS ALSO AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT OF BILATERAL COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS, AND ON THE ANTARCTIC TREATY NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONSERVATION OF MARINE RESOURCES.

IN A WIDER CONTEXT THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES FROM SOUTH EAST ASIA AND OTHER MATTERS OF MUTUAL AND INTERNATIONAL INTEREST WERE CONSIDERED.

MR RIDLEY WAS RECEIVED BY H E THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BRIGADIER CARLOS PASTOR. ON THIS OCCASION THE EARLIER AGREEMENT OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS WAS CONFIRMED.
HAS CONFIRMED, IT BEING ACCEPTED THAT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS SHOULD BE RAISED TO THIS LEVEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WOULD SEEK AGREEMENT FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE CANDIDATES IN DUE COURSE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PROCEDE.

MR. RISELEY WAS ALSO RECEIVED BY THE MINISTER OF ECONOMY OF JOSÉ ALFREDO MARTÍNEZ DE HOZ. UNQUOTE.

ENDS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PM FCN 251458Z JUL 79
TO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES
TELNO 139 OF 25 JULY

YOUR TELNO 191: AMBASSADORS.

FOLLOWING FROM PUS,

1. PLEASE INFORM THE MINISTER OF STATE THAT MY ADVICE IS THAT HE SHOULD HAND OVER THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S LETTER TO SR. PASTOR ON 25 JULY.

2. DESPITE THE DEVELOPMENTS YOU HAVE REPORTED, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE IS ANY REAL PROSPECT OF THE ARGENTINES CHANGING THEIR MINDS NOW. INDEED, THE LEAK WILL BE ALL TOO LIKELY TO RALLY ANY WAVEERS TO THE DECISION TAKEN BY PASTOR. OUR OBJECTIVE MUST THEREFORE BE TO MINIOMISE THE POSSIBILITY OF OUR LOSING FACE OR BEING SEEN TO QUOTE GIVE IN UNQUOTE TO THE ARGENTINES. THIS RISK IS THE LESS SINCE EVERYONE RECOGNISES THAT THE ACCEPTANCE OR NOT OF A PARTICULAR INDIVIDUAL IS FULLY WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE RECEIVING STATE, OUR RECOMMENDATION TO MINISTERS WILL BE THAT THE QUOTE PERIOD OF CALM AND REFLECTION UNQUOTE WHICH YOU MENTION SHOULD FOLLOW THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS. DURING THIS YOU WOULD REMAIN AS CHARGE D'AFFAIRES BEING SEEN TO OPERATE AS SUCH FOR SEVERAL MONTHS UNTIL THE APPOINTMENT AND ARRIVAL OF A NEW AMBASSADOR. WE WOULD NOT THEN PROPOSE TO PUT ANY NAME TO THE ARGENTINES AT LEAST UNTIL THE PROSALE MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND SR. PASTOR IN NEW YORK IN SEPTEMBER, SO THE NEW AMBASSADOR WOULD NOT ARRIVE UNTIL LATER IN THE YEAR AT THE EARLIEST.
2. I suggest that the Minister of State should express our displeasure at the leak to La Nación and make clear that any leakage of the Secretary of State’s letter would be taken exceedingly badly in London. It would certainly not create the right atmosphere for the restoration of normality to our bilateral relations.

CARRINGTON

FILEs:
HEAD S AM D
HEAD POD
PO
PO/FR KIDLEY
PO/FPP
SIR A. DUFF
SIR A. PARSONS
CHIEF CLERK
MR HALL

- 2 -
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

FCDO 2416552 JULY 1979
TO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES
TELEGRAM NUMBER 135 OF 24 JULY
INFO IMMEDIATE PORT STANLEY

YOUR TELEGRAMS NO 186 AND 187: AMBASSADORS

1. IF MR RIXLEY OR YOU ARE QUESTIONED ABOUT THE FACTS REVEALED IN THIS ARTICLE YOU WILL WISH TO BE GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING LINE WHICH WILL BE TAKEN ON THE RECORD IF NECESSARY BY NEWS DEPARTMENT HERE:

QUESTION - IT IS TRUE THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE REJECTED MR CARLESS?

ANSWER - NO REQUEST FOR AGREEMENT HAS BEEN MADE BY EITHER SIDE, WE HAVE HOWEVER HAD INFORMAL AND CONFIDENTIAL EXCHANGES WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT ABOUT BOTH THE PRINCIPLE OF RESTORING AMBASSADORS AND POSSIBLE NOMINEES. THESE EXCHANGES MUST NATURALLY REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL.

2. THE BRIEFING FOR UNATTRIBUTABLE USE BY NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL BE EXPANDED AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE ONE THING THAT HAS EMERGED CLEARLY FROM THE CONFIDENTIAL EXCHANGES IS THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE A HIGH REGARD FOR MR CARLESS PERSONALLY AND FOR HIS PERFORMANCE AS CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN BA FOR OVER TWO YEARS. THER IS ABSOLUTELY NO QUESTION OF ANY DISCOURTESY BY THE ARGENTINES LET ALONE ANY SNUB; THE EXCHANGES HAVE BEEN AMICABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE THROUGHOUT. UNQUOTE.

3. AS BACKGROUND, YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT OUR PRACTICE IS NOT REPEAT NOT TO COMMENT ON APPOINTMENTS OF HEADS OF MISSION, BUT IF, AS YOU SAY, LA NACION REFLECTS THE VIEW OF SENIOR OFFICERS, IT LOOKS AS IF THEY ACCEPT THE MFA'S VIEW THAT YOUR APPOINTMENT WOULD UNFORTUNATELY NOT BE SEEN AS CORRESPONDING TO THE ARGENTINIAN DESIRE FOR VISIBLY ENHANCED STATUS IN OUR RELATIONS.

MARRINGTON

FILES
SAMD
NEWS D
POD
PS
PS/MR RIXLEY

CONFIDENTIAL
EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS WITH ARGENTINA

A. Mr Carless (BA telno 191) is still arguing that the Argentines are likely to come round to accepting him as Ambassador and that we will lose face if we accept that his name should be withdrawn. He urges the suspension of the Secretary of State’s letter, to be delivered by Mr Ridley tomorrow, to the Argentine Foreign Minister.

B. We have already sent guidance as to how Mr Ridley and Mr Carless should handle questioning on this subject.

C. A further telegram is now required and I submit a draft which is on lines agreed between Sir A Parsons, the Chief Clerk, Mr Hall, POD and my own department.

J B Ure
South America Department

25 July, 1979

Copy to:
Sir A Parsons
Chief Clerk
Mr Hall
POD
EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS WITH ARGENTINA

Problem

1. What modification should be made to our intended statements and background briefing on the exchange of Ambassadors with Argentina in the light of the disclosures (BA telno 187) in the Argentine press.

Recommendation

2. I recommend that:

   (a) the proposed written answer in Parliament on 26 July should stand;

   (b) the press announcement agreed with the Argentines for release on 26 July should also stand;

   (c) the briefing for use on the record and unattributably by News Department should be expanded on the lines indicated in the attached draft telegram to BA.

   (d) Mr Ridley and Mr Carless should be given guidance on how to handle questions in Buenos Aires, in the terms of the attached draft telegram.

Background & Argument

3. The Argentine Foreign Minister wrote to the Secretary of State explaining why they did not want us to pursue the candidature of Mr Carless, and Lord Carrington's answer is to be delivered by Mr Ridley in Buenos Aires on 26 July.

14. ...
4. Undoubtedly, (as Mr Carless predicts in his telno 186) Mr Ridley may be questioned about whether we have proposed Mr Carless; and we must expect similar questioning in London.

5. The above recommendations for how Mr Ridley and News Department should handle this are based on two prime considerations: firstly, we must avoid a situation where it appears that we have been pushed around by the Argentines as this is not the case and such allegations would damage the orderly progress of our relations; secondly, we owe it to Mr Carless to make sure that the embarrassment to him is minimised and there is no implication that he has fallen down on the job or is a personally unacceptable envoy. News Department and POD concur in all these recommendations.

J B Ure
South America Department

24 July, 1979

Copies to:
PS/PUS
Sir A Parsons
Chief Clerk
POD
News Dept

Discussed and agreed
with amendments by the
Chief Clerk.
FALKLANDS: ANGLO/ARGENTINE RELATIONS

1. Buenos Aires telno 158 reported:
   (a) that Air Marshal Temporini, Air Force Chief-of-Staff, in talking to Lord Nelson of GEC had stated bluntly that major contracts would not come our way failing progress over the Falklands and
   (b) suggested that in his discussions in Buenos Aires, Mr Ridley should maintain the line that progress through economic co-operation would improve the climate for negotiations.

2. The Embassy's account of Lord Nelson's conversation with Air Marshal Temporini (obtained via the local GEC representative) does not altogether square with what Lord Nelson told Mr Ridley (paragraph 1 of the record).

3. We had earlier discussed and considered whether, in the light of the Embassy's report, we should ask Mr Carless to have a quiet word with Dr Martinez de Hoz making the point that the Argentines would get off on the wrong foot if they thought that the way to make progress on Falklands matters was to subject us to this sort of duress. On reflection, this may not be necessary. Martinez de Hoz has told us quite openly that he favours "making progress through economic co-operation". He is, in short, on our side on this and does, I think, fully understand that we are not likely to respond to any Argentine pressure of the sort Air Marshal Temporini may have in mind.

CONFIDENTIAL
4. I therefore conclude that there is, in fact, no need for Mr Carless to buttonhole Martinez de Hoz in advance of Mr Ridley's talks in Buenos Aires on 26 July. I submit a draft telegram to Buenos Aires.

J B Ure
South America Department

18 July, 1979
1. LORD NELSON OF GEC MAY HAVE GIVEN YOU AN ACCOUNT OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH AIR MARSHAL TEMPORINI, THE AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF, ON 24 JUNE. ACCORDING TO FOSTER, THE LOCAL GEC REPRESENTATIVE WHO WAS PRESENT, TEMPORINI STATED FLATLY THAT BRITAIN WOULD NEVER WIN ANY MAJOR CONTRACTS IN ARGENTINA UNLESS PROGRESS WERE MADE OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE NUCLEAR CONTRACT.

2. WE HAVE HEARD SUCH AN ARGENTINE ATTITUDE BEFORE, IT WAS, FOR EXAMPLE, EXPRESS OVER THE FRIGATE NEGOTIATIONS 2 YEARS AGO. BUT IT HAS NOT BEEN PUT SO STARKLY.

3. TEMPORINI, WHO SAID THAT HE WAS SPEAKING WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA'S AUTHORITY, ALSO TOLD FOSTER THAT HE HIMSELF WOULD BE SUPERVISING ARGENTINE POLICY TOWARDS BRITAIN OVER THE FALKLANDS IN FUTURE.

4. CAVANDOLI, IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH MR RIDLEY, MAY ECHO TEMPORINI'S LINE. IF SO, I BELIEVE THAT THE MINISTER OF STATE'S BEST FORM OF COUNTER-ATTACK WOULD BE TO MAINTAIN THAT IT IS SURELY THROUGH THE PRACTICE OF ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION ON A LARGE SCALE, WHETHER ON THE MAINLAND OR IN THE SOUTH WEST ATLANTIC, THAT PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE DISPUTE, AND THEIR VALUE TO ALL PARTIES CONCERNED, WILL BECOME APPARENT.

5. THIS VIEW, AS YOU KNOW, IS SHARED BY THE ARGENTINE MINISTER OF ECONOMY, DR MARTINEZ DE HOZ. BUT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND MILITARY STAND ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT SOME ADVANCE, IF ONLY SYMBOLIC, ON THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION MUST GO IN PARALLEL TO ARRANGEMENTS FOR ECONOMIC OR INDUSTRIAL CO-OPERATION.
6. YESTERDAY CAVANDOLI COULD NOT CONFIRM TO ME THAT FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR WILL BE AVAILABLE TO SEE MR RIDLEY ON 19 JULY. ACCORDING TO FOSTER OF GEC AIR MARSHAL TEMPORINI HAS SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE MINISTER OF STATE. IN TERMS OF ARGENTINE POLICY TOWARDS BRITAIN, TEMPORINI IS AS IMPORTANT, IF NOT MORE SO, THAN PASTOR. SHOULD THE LATTER BE UNAVAILABLE, I RECOMMEND THAT MR RIDLEY SHOULD AGREE TO CALL ON TEMPORINI IF INVITED TO DO SO.

CARLESS

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PS/LPS

Ps/MR Rидley
Ps/PUS
Sir A Parsons
Sir A Duff
Mr. Hall
Mr. Thomas
Mr. Hayes
Cabinet Office
APPOINTMENT OF AMBASSADORS

1. PRESS SPECULATION IS GATHERING FORCE. ON 13 JULY QUOTE CLAIM UNQUOTE STATED THE ARGENTINE NOMINEE WOULD PROBABLY BE ORTIZ DE ROSAS AND THE BRITISH MIGHT BE MYSELF.

2. TODAY, THREE DAILIES STATED THAT THE FOREIGN OFFICE HAD REQUESTED AGREEMENT FOR ME, TWO OF THEM, REFLECTING FOREIGN MINISTRY BRIEFING, COMMENTED THAT THE NORMAL PERIOD FOR ACCEPTANCE HAD NOW LAPPED WITHOUT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT GIVING A REPLY.

CARLESS

FILES

SAM D
POD
PS/PS
SIR A PARSONS
CHIEF CLERK
MR HALL
CONFIDENTIAL

1. I HESITATE, ON ACCOUNT OF MY OWN INVOLVEMENT, TO GO ON ABOUT THIS. BUT I MUST WARN YOU SQUARELY THAT BRITISH STANDING AND INTERESTS IN ARGENTINA, AND PERHAPS IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, ARE AT STAKE. MANY PEOPLE HERE ARE FOLLOWING EVENTS CLOSELY AND THIS MAY AROUSE CONCERN IN LONDON.

2. BECAUSE THE ARGENTINES HAVE LEAKED TO THE PRESS DETAILS OF WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN A CONFIDENTIAL TRANSACTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS, THE QUESTION OF AMBASSADORS IS BEING WIDELY DEBATED IN TERMS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN FAVOURABLE TO THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTRY. THIS HAS-ALTERED THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DECISION YOU MADE (YOUR AS YET UNDELIVERED LETTER OF 12 JULY TO THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER) TO CONCEDE A POINT TO HIM IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT A GENERAL IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA. BECAUSE THE ISSUE HAS BECOME SO PUBLIC, IT IS NOW WE, AND NOT THE ARGENTINES, WHO ARE IN DANGER OF LOSING FACE. THIS MAY HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR YOUR POLICY ON THE FALKLANDS AND RAISES THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE MINISTER OF STATE SHOULD HAND OVER YOUR LETTER TO SENIOR PASTOR ON 26 JULY.

3. YOUR MAIN CONSIDERATION WILL BE TO AVOID A ROW WHICH MIGHT HEAT UP THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE WHICH YOU NATURALLY WISH TO KEEP COOL. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS THE RISK OF OUR BEING SEEN TO BE GIVING IN TO THE ARGENTINES. IT IS THEY WHO ARE THE DEMANDEURS, WHO ARE MORE ANXIOUS TO APPOINT AN AMBASSADOR, WHO HAVE ASKED YOU TO RECIPROCATE SIMULTANEOUSLY AND WHO, NOTWITHSTANDING YESTERDAY'S DENIAL, ARE PUBLICLY BELIEVED TO HAVE REJECTED YOUR CANDIDATE.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

4. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT THE MINISTER OF STATE SHOULD CONSIDER TAKING THE FOLLOWING LINE WITH PASTOR:

A. EMPHASISING YOUR WISH TO DEVELOP A WARM AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH ARGENTINA;

B. INVITING PASTOR TO COMMENT ON THE SITUATION CREATED BY THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF YOUR POSITION WHICH IS NEITHER IN THE ARGENTINE NOR IN THE BRITISH INTEREST;

C. STATING THAT THIS HAS MADE DIFFICULTIES FOR YOU AND THAT YOU BELIEVE A PERIOD OF CALM AND REFLECTION SHOULD NOW FOLLOW;

D. LIMITING ANY REFERENCE TO AMBASSADORS IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE TO BE ISSUED LATE ON 26 JULY TO A STATEMENT THAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS WISH TO NORMALISE RELATIONS BY APPOINTING AMBASSADORS IN DUE COURSE.

5. IF MR RIDLEY NOW HANDS OVER YOUR LETTER, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ARE LIKELY TO LEAK ITS CONTENTS IN SELF-JUSTIFICATION. YOU MAY THEREFORE WISH TO GIVE HIM DISCRETION TO withhold IT.

6. AS SEEN FROM HERE, SUCH A LINE WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF SHOWING CONCERN, EXPRESSING DUE FRIENDSHIP AND ALLOWING YOU TO PLAY THINGS LONG. IT WOULD NOT PREJUDICE MR RIDLEY’S DISCUSSION WITH THE MINISTER OF ECONOMY LATER IN THE DAY.

CARLESS

P I L V E S
HD/ADM SIR A. PARSONS
HD/CSD CHIEF CLERK
PS/PUS MR HALL
ARGENTINA: EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS

1. Your minute of 20 July refers.

2. It has been agreed with the Argentines that the news of our decision to reinstate Ambassadors should be announced on 26 July when Mr Ridley will be in Buenos Aires. In accordance with Mr Ridley’s wishes the Argentine announcement will be echoed in London via an inspired written PQ on the same day.

3. Baroness Emmet has persistently lobbied on behalf of the normalisation of relations with Argentina – her last intervention on this subject being on 3 July.

4. I now submit a draft letter for Lord Trefgarne’s signature which, having regard to the timing of the announcement in Buenos Aires, might perhaps best issue on Friday, 27 July.

J B Ure
South America Department

24 July, 1979

Copy to:
Mr Hall
CONFIDENTIAL

CRPS 216
CONFIDENTIAL
FM BUENOS AIRES 23/15547 JULY 1979
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 187 OF 23 JULY 1979
INFO IMMEDIATE PORT STANLEY

MIPT: AMBASSADORS

1. THE NACION ARTICLE STATES THAT ARGENTINA HAS INFORMED BRITAIN THAT IT IS NOT PREPARED TO GRANT AGREEMENT FOR MYSELF AS AMBASSADOR, COMMENTS THAT SUCH A REFUSAL IS AN EXTREMELY RARE OCCURRENCE IN DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE AND SAYS THAT THIS DECISION WAS COMMUNICATED TO YOU BY BLOOMER REEVE ON A RECENT VISIT TO LONDON.

2. AFTER SUMMARISING THE BACKGROUND TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF AMBASSADORS, IT COMMENTS THAT QUOTE THE DIPLOMATIC TACT UNQUOTE WITH WHICH THE EMBASSY HAS BEEN LED SINCE MID-1977 IS WELL APPRECIATED BY SENIOR MILITARY FIGURES. IT THEREFORE CONCLUDES THAT THE ONLY REASON FOR THE MFA'S DECISION MUST BE THE STATED ONE THAT THE BRITISH NOMINATION DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION THAT ITS REPRESENTATIVE IN LONDON SHOULD BE QUOTE AN AMBASSADOR AND NOT A MINISTER UNQUOTE. IT ALSO STATES THAT THE ARGENTINE NOMINEE IS LIKELY TO BE ORTIZ DE ROSAS.

3. THE REST OF THE ARTICLE REFERS TO ORTIZ DE ROSAS' UNSUCCESSFUL CANDIDACY FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OUTLINES MY CAREER AND QUOTES LORD CORONWY ROBERTS IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON 3 JULY.

4. THE NACION'S WEEKLY POLITICAL COLUMN, WRITTEN BY CLAUDIO ESCRIBANO, GENERALLY REFLECTS THE VIEWS OF SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS.
CPRS 65
CONFIDENTIAL
FN BUENOS AIRES 23/15517 JULY 1979
TO IMMEDIATE FCOS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 185 OF 23 JULY 1979
INFO IMMEDIATE PORT STANLEY

YOUR TELNO 129 (NOT TO PORT STANLEY): AMBASSADORS

1. THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAS NOW BEEN MADE PUBLIC. IT CONTAINS A SUMMARY OF AN ARTICLE IN LA NACION'S SUNDAY POLITICAL COLUMN.

2. THE MINISTER OF STATE WILL I FEAR COME UNDER PRESSURE TO COMMENT BOTH FROM THE BUENOS AIRES-BASED JOURNALISTS WHO TRAVELED WITH HIM TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ON HIS RETURN HERE.

CARLESS

SIR A PARSONS
CHIEF CLEIK
MR HALL

CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
1. The minister of state's arrival here was widely reported in today's press with generally friendly comment and speculation.

2. In addition to following the agreed programme, Mr Ridley had a private discussion with the Papal Nuncio who called on him at the residence last night.

Carless

Files
Sand
P&O
W&O
News
O&O
Pod
Pst Mr Ridley
Sir A Parsons
Sir E Youde
Mr Hall
ARGENTINA: EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS

1. It has been agreed with the Argentines that the news of our decision to reinstate Ambassadors should be announced on 26 July when Mr Ridley will be in Buenos Aires.

2. Mr Ridley has said that the announcement should also be made in London; and considers that this might best be done by answering an inspired written PQ on 26 July. News Department have been separately briefed to handle any questions which may arise.

3. I submit a draft PQ and answer, which should reach the Parliamentary Unit (after clearance with Ministers as necessary) by noon on 25 July at the latest.

J B Ure
South America Department

20 July, 1979

Inspired PQs in Commons/Lords answered today. Texts attached.

27/7
PP BUENOS AIRES
GRS 61
RESTRICTED

FM FCO 2011452 JULY 78
TO PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES
TELEGRAM NUMBER 130 OF 20 JULY.
FROM SAMD
1. COP BAG NUMBER A32, CONTAINING LETTER FROM SECRETARY
OF STATE TO BRIGADIER PASTOR, IS BEING DESPATCHED TO YOU
ON BR 663 ETA BUENOS AIRES 1150 SUNDAY 29 JULY. PLEASE
MEET PLANE AND COLLECT AND TELEGRAPH CONFIRMATION OF
RECEIPT.

CARRINGTON

N N N N

FILE
SAMD
COD
Thank you for the letter which you sent to me by hand of Commodore Bloomer-Reeve; I have given this very careful thought.

I was glad to learn that you will be extending a cordial welcome to my colleague, Mr Nicholas Ridley. He is looking forward to exchanging ideas with you and with Commodore Cavandoli on matters of common interest. Thank you also for your friendly remarks about a possible meeting between ourselves in New York later in the year.

I cannot conceal from you that I was disappointed to hear that you do not see your way to accepting Mr Hugh Carless as our Ambassador in Buenos Aires. I appreciate the tribute you paid to his work, and am not surprised by this, since he is a diplomat who is held in very high regard in our own Diplomatic Service. However I accept your request and am giving consideration to the selection of another diplomat to fill the important post of Buenos Aires. As Nicholas Ridley indicated to Commodore Bloomer-Reeve, inevitably it will take time to identify and appoint the right person. I shall be putting forward a name to you in due course.

Meanwhile I should be happy for us to announce during Mr Ridley's visit to you that we have both decided that Ambassadors should be appointed as soon as possible.

I cordially reciprocate the good wishes you kindly expressed.

(CARRINGTON)

His Excellency Brigadier Carlos Washington Pastor
GRS 030

RESTRICTED

F 24 JUL 79

FO 191910Z JULY 79

TO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES
TELEGRAM NUMBER 129 OF 19 JULY

YOUR TELNO 183; AMBASSADORS.

1. NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL NOT BE COMMENTING ON THESE RUMOURS AND NO STATEMENT IS PLANNED UNTIL MR RIDLEY'S VISIT ON 26 JULY.

CARRINGTON
FILES
SAMID
POD
MR HALL

RESTRICTED
1. The attached letter, which is to be handed to Brigadier Pastor by Mr Ridley, had not been signed by the Secretary of State before the Minister's departure. As the next bag does not reach Buenos Aires until Thursday, 26 July it will be cutting things rather fine and we have therefore sent this to you by hand of British Caledonian pilot. I would be grateful if you would give the letter to Ken Temple when he returns from the Falklands.

Yours truly,

J B Ure
Mr Hall

FALKLANDS: ANGLO/ARGENTINE RELATIONS

A 1. Buenos Aires telno 158 reported:
   
   (a) that Air Marshal Temporini, Air Force Chief-of-Staff, in talking to Lord Nelson of GEC had stated bluntly that major contracts would not come our way failing progress over the Falklands and

   (b) suggested that in his discussions in Buenos Aires, Mr Ridley should maintain the line that progress through economic co-operation would improve the climate for negotiations.

   2. The Embassy's account of Lord Nelson's conversation with Air Marshal Temporini (obtained via the local GEC representative) does not altogether square with what Lord Nelson told Mr Ridley (paragraph 1 of the record).

   B

   3. We had earlier discussed and considered whether, in the light of the Embassy's report, we should ask Mr Carless to have a quiet word with Dr Martinez de Hoz making the point that the Argentines would get off on the wrong foot if they thought that the way to make progress on Falklands matters was to subject us to this sort of duress. On reflection, this may not be necessary. Martinez de Hoz has told us quite openly that he favours "making progress through economic co-operation". He is, in short, on our side on this and does, I think, fully understand that we are not likely to respond to any Argentine pressure of the sort Air Marshal Temporini may have in mind.

   /4. ...
4. I therefore conclude that there is, in fact, no need for Mr Carless to buttonhole Martinez de Hoz in advance of Mr Ridley's talks in Buenos Aires on 26 July. I submit a draft telegram to Buenos Aires.

J B Ure
South America Department

18 July, 1979
OUT TELEGRAM

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GRS
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 171140Z JULY 1979
TO PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES
TELEGRAM NUMBER
INFO ROUTINE PORT STANLEY
FROM SAMD
YOUR TELNO 158: ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS

1. As you will now have seen from your copy of the record of Lord Nelson's call on Mr Ridley on 28 June, his account of discussion with Air Marshall Temporini left us with a rather different impression of the attitude the Argentines might take over future contracts with the UK in the absence of progress over Falklands. Nelson thought that Temporini had been dangling a carrot rather than brandishing a stick.

2. Mr Ridley (your paragraph 4) will be emphasising the importance we attach to developing economic co-operation with Argentina. As you say, we already know that we have something

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of an ally in the shape of Martinez de Hoz who made it clear during his visit to London last May, that he was in favour of making progress through economic co-operation.

CARRINGTON

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GRS
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 1817152 JULY 1979
TO PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES
TELEGRAM NUMBER 127 OF 18 JULY 79.
INFO ROUTING PORT STANLEY
FROM SAMD

AL A (661)

YOUR TELNO (152)
ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS
1. AS YOU WILL NOW HAVE SEEN FROM YOUR COPY OF THE RECORD
OF LORD NELSON’S CALL ON MR R IDLEY ON 28 JUNE, HIS ACCOUNT
OF DISCUSSION WITH AIR MARSHALL TEMPORINI LEFT US WITH A
RATHER DIFFERENT IMPRESSION OF THE ATTITUDE THE ARGENTINES MIGHT
TAKE OVER FUTURE CONTRACTS WITH THE UK IN THE ABSENCE OF
PROGRESS OVER FALKLANDS. NELSON THOUGHT THAT TEMPORINI HAD
BEEN DANGLING A CARROT RATHER THAN BRANDISHING A STICK.
2. MR R IDLEY (YOUR PARAGRAPH 4) WILL BE EMPHASISING THE
IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO DEVELOPING ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION WITH
ARGENTINA. AS YOU SAY, WE ALREADY KNOW THAT WE HAVE SOMETHING
OF AN ALLY IN THE SHAPE OF MARTINEZ DE HOZ WHO MADE IT CLEAR
DURING HIS VISIT TO LONDON LAST MAY, THAT HE WAS IN FAVOUR
OF MAKING PROGRESS THROUGH ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION.

CARRINGTON

FILES
SMR
PS MR R IDLEY
MR HALL
ARGENTINA: EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS

The Minister of State has seen your minute of 16 July and is content with the lines of the notes attached.

2. However, Mr Ridley feels that an announcement should be made in London, as well as Buenos Aires. He feels this would best be done by answering an inspired written PQ here on 26 July, recording the same news that he gives in Buenos Aires on that day.

K D Temple
18 July 1979

1. Please consult the Parliamentary Unit and arrange for an inspired PQ as suggested by Mr Ridley.

2. Please also ensure that News Department have copies of the briefing agreed by Mr Ridley and are adequately prepared for handling questions on these lines on or after 26 July.

J B Ure
South America Department

19 July, 1979

CONFIDENTIAL
ARGENTINA: EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS

1. When Commodore Bloomer-Reeve called on Mr Ridley on 9 July, it was agreed that we should announce our decision of principle to exchange Ambassadors during the Minister of State's visit to Buenos Aires; but neither side should at this stage disclose the identity of their nominations.

2. Mr Hall gave the Argentine Charge a suggested formula for the announcement on 13 July (FCO telno 123 to BA). The Argentine Charge has now told us that his Government accepts terms, timing and suggested method of announcement.

3. Although it is therefore our intention that this news should issue from BA rather than London, and there seems little advantage in making a special announcement here, News Department must be prepared to answer questions. I therefore submit notes and background for the use of News Department, who tell us that these are acceptable from their point of view.

J B Ure
South America Department

16 July, 1979
Copy to:
Sir A Parsons
News Department
ARGENTINA: EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS: BRIEFING FOR NEWS DEPARTMENT

For on the record use

1. Who took the initiative in recalling Ambassadors?
The Argentines were responsible for reducing the level of our relations.

2. Who took the initiative in the move to restore Ambassadors?
The Argentine Government recently indicated their wish to see relations restored at Ambassadorial level.

Nominations

3. We have not yet nominated our candidate. The Argentines have not yet sought agreement for their's.

Falkland Islands: What are the implications?

4. There are no implications for our policy. But on a practical plane, to restore relations to Ambassadorial level would improve the capacity at both ends for dialogue on a whole range of complex matters.

For unattributable use

Human rights abuses

5. The Government is aware of the human rights situation in Argentina and has consistently made its views clear. But having Ambassadors does not betoken any mark of favour of a regime's policies. If it did, there would be a great many countries with no British Ambassador. We have Ambassadors abroad to serve our interests - including our human rights interests.
6. The human rights situation in Argentina has improved in recent months, possibly prompted in some measure by the visit which the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights will make to Argentina this September. Specific evidence of improvement includes the release of more political prisoners; more activity in the courts which makes it difficult for the authorities to continue to ignore requests for investigation into habeas corpus cases; more local press coverage of human rights issues; and a marked decline in the number of "disappearances".

Events leading to the withdrawal of HM Ambassador from Buenos Aires

7. Mr Derick Ashe, British Ambassador to Argentina, was recalled on 19 January 1976 at the suggestion of the Argentine Government. The Argentine Ambassador, Dr Manuel de Anchorena, had returned to Argentina for consultations in October 1975. Anglo/Argentine relations had already deteriorated sharply, principally due to the announcement of Lord Shackleton's Economic Survey of the Falkland Islands. The Argentine Government regarded the Survey as an unacceptable change in the status quo in the context of the sovereignty dispute over the Falkland Islands; and refused permission for Lord Shackleton's Economic Survey to transit Argentina en route to the Falkland Islands.
CONFIDENTIAL

FP: FCO 1318007 JULY 79
TO: PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES
TELEGRAM NUMBER 123 OF 14 JULY 1979
INFO ROUTINE PORT STANLEY

EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS: PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT

1. WE HAVE AGREED WITH THE ARGENTINES THAT THE NEWS THAT
   THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO EXCHANGE
   AMBASSADORS SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED DURING MR RIDLEY'S VISIT TO
   BUENOS AIRES, BUT THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE SAID BY EITHER SIDE AT
   THIS STAGE ABOUT THEIR RESPECTIVE NOMINATIONS.

2. WE SHOULD AIM FOR A JOINT TEXT. WE HAVE GIVEN THE
   ARGENTINE CHARGE THE FOLLOWING TEXT AS A PROPOSAL AT OFFICIAL
   LEVEL:

   'DURING THE COURSE OF MR RIDLEY'S VISIT TO BUENOS
   AIRES, THE MINISTER OF STATE HAS DISCUSSED THE QUESTION
   OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WITH THE
   ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER BRIGADIER CARLOS WASHINGTON
   CASTOR AND THE TWO MINISTERS HAVE CONFIRMED THEIR
   GOVERNMENTS' EARLIER AGREEMENT TO EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS.
   BOTH COUNTRIES ARE AGREED ON THE NEED TO RESTORE RELATIONS TO
   AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND WILL BE
   SEEKING AGREEMENT FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE CANDIDATES IN DUE
   COURSE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PROCEDURE'.

3. WE HAVE TOLD THEM THAT MR RIDLEY WOULD LIKE THE
   ANNOUNCEMENT TO BE MADE ON THURSDAY, 26 JULY.

CARRINGTON

/Files

NNNN
FILES
SAM D
NEWS DEPARTMENT
POD
PCD
PS
PS/VR RIDLEY
PS/PUS
SIR A PARSONS
MR HALL
REPLY TO ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER

1. Brigadier Pastor sent a letter to the Secretary of State by hand of his Chef de Cabinet about Mr Ridley's visit and the exchange of Ambassadors. The Secretary of State has decided that we must accept the Argentine veto on Mr Carless, who has been informed in a personal telegram from the PUS.

2. It remains to reply to Brigadier Pastor, and Mr Ridley's visit (he will be in Buenos Aires on 26 July after returning from the Falklands) is probably the most appropriate occasion to send an answer: indeed, a letter from Lord Carrington might facilitate Mr Ridley's access to the Foreign Minister.

3. I submit a self-explanatory draft of a letter which would require to be signed and in Mr Ridley's hands before his departure on 18 July.

J B Ure
South America Department

13 July, 1979

Sir A. Parma
P.S. to PUS.

P.S. Mr Ridley

OK - 2 more headings
Thank you for the letter which you sent to me by hand of Commodore Bloomer-Reeve; I have given this very careful thought.

I was glad to learn that you will be extending a cordial welcome to my colleague, Mr. Nicholas Ridley. He is looking forward to exchanging ideas with you on the best way of continuing our negotiations about the Falklands. Thank you also for your friendly remarks about a possible meeting between ourselves in New York later in the year.

I cannot conceal from you that I was disappointed to learn that you do not see your way to accepting Mr. Hugh Carless as our Ambassador in Buenos Aires. I appreciate the tribute you paid to his work, and am not surprised by this, since he is an officer who is held in very high standing in our own Diplomatic Service. However, I accept your remarks and am giving urgent consideration to the selection of another officer to fill the important post of Buenos Aires. As was indicated to Commodore Bloomer-Reeve, inevitably it will take us a little time to identify and release the right person. I shall be putting forward a name to you in due course.

/Meanwhile...
Meanwhile I should be happy that we announce simultaneously during Mr Ridley's visit to you that we have both decided to appoint Ambassadors as soon as possible. I am afraid it will not be practicable for us to release the name of our candidate by this date however.

I value the best wishes which you were kind enough to express in your letter; we both have heavy tasks ahead of us but, with determination and goodwill, I am sure we can resolve them.
MEETING BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE AND ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER

1. It is clear from the record of the meeting between Commodore Bloomer-Reeve and Mr Ridley yesterday that Lord Carrington may meet the Argentine Foreign Minister in Geneva at the end of this month when they will both be attending the conference on South East Asian refugees.

2. Please ascertain the briefing arrangements for this meeting and submit to me in good time a short note for the Secretary of State's use at any meeting with Sr Pastor. This would need to cover

(a) Mr Ridley's visit;

(b) Future negotiations on the Falklands, and

(c) the state of play on Ambassadors.

J B Ure
South America Department

10 July, 1979
CONFIDENTIAL/STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Mr Temple

The Secretary State,

agreed that we should

not be involved in

this matter. The

view had been taken

by Mr Ridley.

Stowell

117

Mr Joe.

117

Alexander

C. Temple

Commodore Carlos Bloomer-Reeve
(Envoy)
Sr Carlos Blanco
(Argentine Chargé d'Affaires)

Mr Ridley explained that the Foreign Minister
had brought with him a letter from

to Lord Carrington; the Foreign

Minister had come to deliver it personally. When

(mentioned) Mr Ridley expressed thanks.

Bloomer-Reeve explained that the Foreign Minister

had turned with the question. The fact was that

the Foreign Secretary had not accepted the elevation

of the Ambassador. He stressed that no personal

attitudes were intended, but it would be much easier

if Argentine public opinion was content with

the present arrangement.

It was agreed that it would take some time to find an

Agreement. Hall added that this delay would mean

that our Ambassador would not be able to

Buenos Aires later this month; to find

an agreement would probably take some 3-4 months. But it was

agreed that the principle of exchanging Ambassadors

was in Buenos Aires. Mr Ridley

wanted to improve relations, and his


CONFIDENTIAL/STAFF IN CONFIDENCE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL/STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

RECORD OF MEETING BETWEEN MINISTER OF STATE AND COMMODORE CARLOS BLOOMER-REEVE, FOREIGN MINISTER OF ARGENTINA, ON MONDAY 9 JULY 1979 AT 11.45 AM IN THE FCO

Present:

Mr N Ridley
Mr G Hall
Mr K D Temple

Commodore Carlos Bloomer- Reeve
(Envoy)

Sr Carlos Blanco
(Argentine Chargé d'Affaires)

1. Commodore Bloomer-Reeve had brought with him a letter from the Argentine Foreign Minister to Lord Carrington; the Foreign Minister had asked him to come to deliver it personally. When he had read the letter (attached) Mr Ridley expressed thanks.

2. Commodore Bloomer-Reeve explained that the Foreign Minister was personally very concerned with the question. The fact was that Argentine public opinion would not accept the elevation of Mr Carless to the rank of Ambassador. He stressed that no personal criticism of Mr Carless was intended, but it would be much easier for a new Ambassador if Argentine public opinion was content with him.

3. Mr Ridley explained that it would take some time to find an alternative candidate. Mr Hall added that this delay would mean that to announce the name of our Ambassador would be impossible before Mr Ridley visited Buenos Aires later this month; to find a new candidate would probably take some 3-4 months. But it was generally agreed that the principle of exchanging Ambassadors could be announced when Mr Ridley was in Buenos Aires. Mr Ridley emphasised that we very much wanted to improve relations, and his visit was part of this.

4. Mr Hall, looking at the remainder of the letter which the Commodore had brought, said that we were certainly gratified at the welcome the Argentine side had given to Lord Carrington's letter, and at the warmth of expression in it. Mr Ridley said that Lord Carrington would probably be in Geneva briefly for the forthcoming Conference on South East Asian Refugees; Commodore Bloomer-Reeve thought that Sr Pastor would be there also, and perhaps the two could meet briefly.
Distribution:
PS
PS/FUS
Sir A Parsons
Mr Hall
Mr Ure
Mr Alexander, POD
Mr Duggan

ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS

1. With reference to BA telno 158 (attached) I suggest that we should brief Mr Carless about how he might react to these statements before Mr Ridley’s visit. However I think we should first await the visit here of the Chef du Cabinet to the Argentine Foreign Minister. We can then look at these points together.

2. Briefly, on substance, we should make it clear to the Argentines that we are not prepared to continue the Falklands negotiations under this sort of duress. But the best way of getting this across may well be for Mr Carless to have a quiet word with one of the Economic Ministers in the first place.

3. The above reflects a discussion of this which I have had with Mr Hall.

J B Ure
South America Department

5 July, 1979

Mr Duggan to note

1. Draft submission and draft telegram to Buenos Aires below.

2. In the light of our record of the Nelson/Temporini exchanges (which the Embassy will have received over the weekend) you may agree that it is no longer necessary specifically to prime Martinez de Hoz as envisaged in your paragraph 2 above.

J R Cowling
South America Department

17 July 1979
BUENOS AIRES, 4 de julio de 1979

Estimado Ministro:

Con gran placer recibí su carta del 14 de junio último, que tuvo la amabilidad de enviarme por intermedio del señor Subsecretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Comodoro Carlos R. CA VANDOLI. Mucho le agradezco que haya tomado la iniciativa de establecer una comunicación directa y personal entre nosotros. Estoy persuadido que el diálogo así entablado nos permitirá encarar con franqueza las cuestiones que interesan a los dos países e impulsar resueltamente las relaciones bilaterales, a las que yo también asig no gran importancia.

Dentro de esos asuntos, desde luego, tendrá especial relevancia el problema de las Islas Malvinas. Coincido con su apreciación que para resolverlo deberemos proceder con espíritu constructivo y comprensión recíproca. Por nuestra parte, proseguiremos empeñando todos los esfuerzos que sean necesarios para solucionar satisfactoriamente esa disputa y remover el único obstáculo serio que entorpece la tradicional vinculación de amistad entre la Argentina y el Reino Unido.

En ocasión de la visita a Buenos Aires del Ministro RIDLEY, a quien acogeremos complacidos, podríamos cambiar ideas sobre la mejor manera de continuar las negociaciones. Posteriormente me será muy grato encontrarme con Usted en Nueva York, durante la

A Su Excelencia
el señor Secretario de Estado Para Asuntos Exteriores
Lord CARRINGTON
LONDRES
Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, para seguir examinando ese tema prioritario como asimismo muchos otros que abren grandes perspectivas a una fructífera cooperación entre ambos países en todos los campos.

La inmediata reposición de Embajadores en las respectivas capitales, en lo que también hemos concordado, sin duda facilitará y promoverá pasos concretos en esa dirección. Sobre este aspecto el Comodoro CAVANDOLI tuvo oportunidad de explicar en detalle nuestros puntos de vista al señor RIDLEY. Para nosotros -y estoy convencido que también para ustedes- esa decisión implica jefarquizar nuestras relaciones e imprimirle una proyección positiva hacia el futuro. Con ese ánimo hemos escogido para que nos represente ante vuestro Gobierno a uno de los más antiguos y experimentados Embajadores de nuestro Servicio Exterior, de destacada actuación en el marco internacional y con vastos conocimientos en las materias que deberá tratar.

Luego de la entrevista del Comodoro CAVANDOLI con el Ministro RIDLEY, el señor HALL comunicó a nuestro Encargado de Negocios en Londres que el Foreign Office prácticamente había llegado a la conclusión de proponer al señor Hugh CARLESS, actual Encargado de Negocios del Reino Unido, como futuro Embajador en Buenos Aires. Quisiera reiterar ahora, con la mayor cordialidad y sinceridad, las razones expuestas por el Comodoro CAVANDOLI por las cuales no sería viable tal nominación. El señor CARLESS es un excelente diplomático que, en momentos difíciles, ha cumplido su misión con dignidad y eficiencia habiendo ganado el respeto y la amistad de todos aquellos entre quienes debió desempeñarse. No existe, pues, ninguna objeción personal a su respecto.

and Commonwealth Affairs.
Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto

Sin embargo, así como puedo hacer esta afirmación sin reservas, también debo agregar sin temor a equivocarme que para la opinión pública argentina, que sigue este tema con mucha atención, el nombramiento del señor CARLESS equivaldría a una promoción "sur place" -no muy usual en las prácticas diplomáticas- que no recíproca el gesto de mi Gobierno ni concide con los propósitos antes mencionados de otorgar nuevo sentido y nivel a nuestras relaciones. Lamentablemente en estas circunstancias las apariencias adquieren mucha importancia y es preciso tenerlas en cuenta para no perjudicar desde un comienzo los buenos deseos que nos inspiran a los dos.

Por estos motivos, que espero sabrá comprender, me veo obligado a pedirle con toda amistad que reconsidere esta delicada situación y tenga la bondad de pensar en un candidato adecuado como Embajador de Su Majestad en mi país. Podríamos entonces acelerar las formalidades del caso para estar en condiciones de anunciar la designación de los respectivos Embajadores durante la visita del señor RIDLEY, tal cual me ha sugerido.

En este mi primer contacto con usted quisiera hacerle llegar mis mejores augurios en la gestión que recién ha iniciado y asegurarle mi voluntad de trabajar juntos en beneficio de nuestros dos países. Le ruego acepte los cálidos saludos con que quedo de Usted.

Su amigo afectísimo

[signature]
Dear Minister,

I received with great pleasure your letter of June 14th last, which you kindly sent with the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Commodore Carlos R. Cavandoli. I very much appreciate the initiative you have taken in establishing direct and personal communication between us. I am sure that the dialogue thus established will permit us to frankly face the questions which interest our two countries and to move forward our bilateral relations, to which I too assign great importance.

Within these matters, of course, the Malvinas Islands question will be specially outstanding. I fully agree with your appreciation that to find a solution to it we shall have to act with a constructive spirit and mutual understanding. For our part, we shall continue making every effort necessary in order to satisfactorily solve this dispute and to remove the only serious obstacle hindering the traditionally friendly bonds between Argentina and the United Kingdom.

On the occasion of the visit to Buenos Aires of Minister Ridley, whom we shall be pleased to welcome, we could exchange ideas on the best way of continuing negotiations. Later on, I shall be delighted to meet you in New York at the time of the United Nations General Assembly, to continue working on this matter, which takes priority for us, as well as on many others which open up great vistas to a fruitful cooperation in every field between our countries.

The immediate reinstatement of Ambassadors in both capitals, to which we have also agreed, will no doubt facilitate and promote definite steps in that direction. On this matter, Commodore Cavandoli had the opportunity to explain in detail to Mr. Ridley our points of view. This decision implies for us - and I am convinced that for you also - raising the level of our diplomatic relations and projecting them positively into the future. With this thought in mind we have selected one of our senior and most experienced Ambassadors in our Foreign Service, prominent in international fora and with a vast knowledge of the matters with which he will have to deal.

After the meeting that Commodore Cavandoli had with Minister Ridley, Mr. Hall informed our Chargé d'Affaires in London that the Foreign Office has practically arrived at the conclusion of proposing Mr. Hugh Carless, the present Chargé d'Affaires of the United Kingdom, as future Ambassador in Buenos Aires. I would like to reiterate now, with the

His Excellency Lord Carrington,
Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs.
utmost cordiality and sincerity, the reasons, as expressed by Commodore Cavandoli, why such a nomination could not be viable. Mr. Carless is an excellent diplomat who, in difficult moments, has accomplished his mission with dignity and efficiency earning for himself the respect and friendship of every person with whom he had to deal. There is, therefore, no personal objection in his regard.

Nonetheless, inasmuch as I can state this without reservation, I can also add without fear of making a mistake, that for Argentine public opinion, which follows this matter closely, the nomination of Mr. Carless would amount to a promotion "sur place" -not very usual in diplomatic practice- one which does not reciprocate my Government's attitude nor agrees with our intention of giving new meaning and level to our relations. Unfortunately, in these circumstances appearances take on much importance and it becomes necessary to bear them in mind if we are not to prejudice from the start the good purposes that inspire us both.

For these reasons, which I hope you will understand, I feel bound to ask you in all friendship to reconsider this delicate situation and kindly think of another suitable candidate as Her Majesty's Ambassador in my country. We could then speed up the formalities so that we can announce the appointment of both our Ambassadors during Mr. Ridley's visit, as you have suggested.

In this my first contact with you I should like to send you my best wishes for success in the duties you have just assumed and to assure you of my determination to work together for the benefit of both our countries.

I remain,

Sincerely

(Carlos W. Pastor)
EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS WITH ARGENTINA

1. Mr Hall's minute of 2 July to me, attached.

2. I spoke to the Argentine Charge d'Affaires yesterday and told him that since the Secretary of State would not be in the Office before 5 July, it was impossible to know whether he would be able to see the Chef de Cabinet, but that Mr Ridley would be pleased to see him, and if the Secretary of State were free at the time the Chef de Cabinet called, Mr Ridley might take him to see Lord Carrington for a few minutes. Senior Blanco referred to his Ministry for instructions; he telephoned me again this afternoon to say that the express wish of the Argentine foreign ministry was for the Chef de Cabinet to deliver the message to the Secretary of State. I undertook to pass this on to you.

3. The Chef de Cabinet will be leaving London on the evening of Monday 9 July.

4 July 1979

cc: Mr Hall
    PS/PUS
    Mr Ure

K D Temple
PS/Mr Ridley
EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS WITH ARGENTINA

1. The Argentine Chargé d'Affaires called me this morning to say that the Chef de Cabinet of the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs was coming to the UK to deliver his Minister's reply to our indication that we would propose on our side to elevate Mr Carless from being Chargé d'Affaires in Buenos Aires to being Ambassador. He had instructions to ask for a short interview with the Secretary of State for the Chef de Cabinet on Friday next 6 July. I said that I did not know whether the Secretary of State would be available but I would let him know.

2. My first inclination is to recommend that the Chef de Cabinet should be received by Mr Ridley but if the Secretary of State is available I believe that the extra courtesy involved in his receiving a personal emissary from the Argentine Foreign Minister would be useful. I fear that the fact that the emissary is coming means that the Argentines propose to ask us not to put in a request for agrément for Mr Carless.

2 July 1979

cc
Private Secretary
PS/PUS
Chief Clerk
Sir A Parsons
Mr Ure